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Abstract 
 
Healthcare professionals, legal professionals, patients, scholars and members 
of Research Ethics Committees all hear the term „informed consent‟ and seem 
to assume a common meaning.  It is a phrase often said and widely accepted, 
but what does it really mean?  This thesis challenges the doctrine of „informed 
consent‟ and argues that it lacks coherence and fails in its foundational goal: 
to  protect  the  autonomous  patient.  It  argues  that  „informed  consent‟  is  a 
misnomer; that the process under consideration is not about the consent to 
treatment, rather it is about individual choice. 
 
This  thesis  critically  examines  the  evolution  of  the  doctrine  of  „informed 
consent‟ across three jurisdictions (the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Australia) and focuses on the central debates.  These include the appropriate 
measure for standard of care and the nature of the test for causation.  It asserts 
that these ongoing issues mask the true dilemma facing the Courts which is 
the problematic nature of linking a dignitary harm (the denial of complete 
information) with a logically irrelevant physical harm (the manifestation of a 
physical risk inherent in the treatment). 
 
The  thesis  departs  from  existing  literature  on  „informed  consent‟  by 
challenging the relevance of the term „consent‟ and proposing the adoption of 
choice.  The proposed model of choice emerges from the critical analysis of 
the law and the existing body of scholarly literature.  These both demonstrate 
an ongoing struggle with the ability of the existing doctrine to achieve the 
core aim of protection of autonomy.  Central to this proposal is the adoption 
of a narrow, purposive definition of autonomy which is based upon the ideal 
of narrative autonomy.  Under this model the individual is identified as a 
storyteller, in control of their own narrative path.  Crucial to this ideal is the 
provision of information regarding possible future selves, and it is here that 
the  key  concepts  of  autonomy  and  choice  under  the  proposed  model  of 
„informed choice‟ meet.   
 
The  thesis  concludes  by  drawing  these  two  themes  together  and 
demonstrating that clarity can only be found by retreating from „informed 
consent‟ and adopting a legal ideal of „informed choice‟. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
‘A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition: 
and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula indiscriminately used to express 
different and sometimes contradictory ideas.’1 
 
What is informed consent? 
 
[1.10]  Healthcare  professionals,  legal  professionals,  patients,  scholars  and 
members of Research Ethics Committees all hear the term „informed consent‟ 
and seem to assume a common meaning.  It is a phrase often said and widely 
accepted, but what does it really mean?  Is it a concept that is clearly defined 
and protected at law or is it an example of the way that „uncritical use of 
words bedevils the law?‟2  This thesis will challenge the doctrine of „informed 
consent‟ and argue that it lacks coherence and fails in its foundational goal to 
protect the autonomous patient.  It will present an alternative view and argue 
that „informed consent‟ is a misnomer; that the process under consideration is 
not about the consent to treatment, rather it is about individual choice. 
 
The  adoption  of  the  term  choice  in  my  thesis  is  critical  to  the  central 
argument.  It is not a casual decision and reflects the language of the High 
Court in the seminal case of Rogers v Whitaker.3  In Rogers, the Court referred 
to the fact that a choice to undergo treatment is „meaningless‟ if it is made on 
the basis of incomplete information.4  Importantly, once a patient has agreed 
in broad terms to undergo treatment, they have satisfied the basic consent 
requirement: they have negatived any battery action.  However, if they make 
a choice to undergo the treatment in the absence of complete information, that 
choice can be described as meaningless.  It could be said that it lacks content. 
                                                 
1 Tiller v Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co 318 US 54 (1943), 68 Frankfurter J. 
2 Ibid. In this instance Frankfurter J was referring to the phrase „assumption of risk.‟ 
3 (1992) 175 CLR 479.  
4 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).   10 
 
To  make  a  meaningful  choice,  individuals  need  to  be  aware  of  all  of  the 
significant  options.  It  is  this  process  of  information  exchange  that  is  the 
starting point of the current doctrine of „informed consent‟ but the discussion 
becomes  diverted  once  the  issue  of  consent  to  treatment  is  introduced.  
Returning  now  to  the  doctrine  as  it  currently  stands  we  see  that  at  its 
simplest,  „informed  consent‟  is  shorthand  for  a  process  of  consenting  to 
medical  treatment.5  According  to  the  doctrine6  of  „informed  consent,‟  any 
decision to undergo medical treatment must be based upon the provision of 
sufficient information.  As a term, „informed consent‟ is commonly used in the 
academic literature, judicial decisions and by healthcare professionals to refer 
to  pre-treatment  conversations.  Informed  consent  is  interpreted  as  a 
procedure to be followed, something that a treating doctor does to the patient.  
It is an activity that happens prior to the administration of medical treatment: 
something  that  the  patient  gives  to  the  treating  doctor  in  exchange  for 
treatment. 
 
The scholarly landscape of informed consent  
 
[1.20] Informed consent has been the source of active scholarly debate for at 
least thirty years.  The inconsistency and variability of the application of the 
doctrine was raised by Devereux in „It‟s Just a Jump to the Left – and then a 
Step to the Right,‟7 and Skene hinted at similar concerns with references to 
„swings,  roundabouts  and  pendulums.‟8  Others  have  referred  to  the 
                                                 
5 It is also used to connote consent to participation in research activities but in the context of this thesis, the 
discussion is limited to consent to medical treatment. 
6 Informed consent is variously described as a doctrine, term, phrase, test and concept throughout this thesis. These 
descriptions are used interchangeably, for the most part this is for elegant variation but when I am describing the 
„doctrine‟ of informed consent I am referring specifically to the legal test as developed by the Courts. 
7 J. Devereux, „It‟ s Just a Jump to the Left – and then a Step to the Right: Developments post Rogers v Whitaker in 
the Law Relating to Failure by a Medical Practitioner to Advise of Risks‟ (1998) 17 University of Tasmania Law 
Review 63. 
8  L.Skene,  „Doctors‟ Duty  to  Inform:  Debates  pre-and  post  Rogers  v  Whitaker:  Swings,  Roundabouts  and 
Pendulums,‟ (2002) 11(3) Australian Health Law Bulletin 33.   11 
„debunking  of  myths  and  misconceptions‟9  and  described  the  ideal  of 
„informed consent‟ as being „mythical‟ or  „fairytale-like.‟10  The intersection of 
law and morality was raised by Boos and Boos11 and Montrose asked whether 
negligence and informed consent are creatures of ethics or sociology.12 The 
overwhelming scholarly mood is thus one of caution and scepticism, and as 
summed up by Smith, the debate serves to highlight the „vagaries of informed 
consent.‟13 
 
The 1990s saw a flurry of scholarly activity when the Australian High Court 
made what was deemed a significant departure from the accepted approach 
to  the  question  of  professional  standard  of  care  in  the  provision  of  pre-
treatment  advice  (as  enunciated  in  Bolam  v  Friern  Hospital  Management 
Committee (Bolam)).14  The influential decision of Rogers v Whitaker15 saw the 
High Court turning away from the previously accepted Bolam standard and 
apparently refocus the debate on the central character of the patient.  It was 
forecast that this decision would lead to greater uncertainty and an increase in 
claims.16  Rogers  v  Whitaker  apparently  caused  some  alarm  amongst  the 
medical profession17 and resulted in the spilling of „remarkable amounts of 
ink and angst‟ about potential ramifications.18 
 
                                                 
9  J.M.  Beck  and  Elizabeth  Azari,  „FDA  Off-Label  Use,  and  Informed  Consent:  Debunking  Myths  and 
Misconceptions‟ (1998) 53 Food and Drug Law Journal 71. 
10 J. Katz „Informed Consent – A Fairy Tale?‟ (1977) 39 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 137 and then the 
later lament, J. Katz „Informed Consent – Must it Remain a Fairytale?‟ (1994) 10 Journal of Contemporary 
Health Law and Policy 69.  See also M. Jones „Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories,‟ (1999) 7 Medical 
Law Review103. 
11 K. Boos and E. Boos, „At the Intersecton of Law and Morality: A Descriptive Sociology of the Effectiveness of 
Informed Consent Law,‟ (2004)5 Journal of Law in Society 457. 
12 J.L. Montrose, „Is Negligence an Ethical or Sociological Concept?‟ (1958) 21 Modern Law Review 259. 
13 G. Smith, „The Vagaries of Informed Consent‟ (2004) 1 Indiana Health Law Review 111. 
14 [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
15 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
16 D. Newnes and G. Pynt, „Failure of Surgeon to Advise Patient of Risk of Sympathetic Ophthalmia‟ (1993) 
International Insurance Law Review 81. 
17 F.A. Trindade, „Disclosure of Risks in Proposed Medical Treatment‟ (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 352, 
354. 
18 I. Freckelton, „Rogers v Whitaker Reconsidered‟ (2001) 9 Journal of Law and Medicine 5, 10. The decision has 
continued to attract debate and was deemed significant enough to warrant a conference to mark its 10 year 
anniversary:  „conference  convened  to  recognise  the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  decision,  AIHLE  Conference: 
Informed Consent in Australia - Tenth Anniversary of Rogers v Whitaker held at ANU 26 October 2002.
‟   12 
Locating my thesis in the scholarly landscape 
 
[1.30] The focus of the scholarly literature tends to be on the actual duty itself 
and, of course, the test for standard of care.  There is also the related debate as 
to whether or not the term „informed consent‟ is appropriate, or even a part of 
the  law.    In  these  discussions,  autonomy  is  raised  and  accorded  due 
deference, the nature of the causation enquiry is acknowledged, but there is 
little concern with the true nature of the loss.  There is a level of deference 
paid  to  the  consent  process,  but  there  is  little  in  depth  analysis  of  what 
happens after that. 
 
The reality is that the incongruity of measuring a loss of personal autonomy 
by an unrelated physical harm is yet to be consistently raised in the academic 
and judicial discussions, and it is this incongruity which sits at the heart of my 
thesis. It has been asserted that „informed consent has come to obscure rather 
than to clarify the goal it was designed to serve.‟19 This thesis will return to 
the  original  goal  of  the  doctrine  of  informed  consent  and  challenge  the 
inclusion of the trespassory concept of consent.  Instead of consent, I will, as 
introduced above, focus on the process of choice and establish a new model of 
loss (and therefore damage).  This proposed model will, unlike consent, serve 
to protect and recognise the dignitary harm suffered by a patient when they 
agree  to  undergo  treatment  without  being  provided  with  all  material 
information.   
 
The  scholarly  debates  regarding  „informed  consent;  have  been  many  and 
varied.  To effectively locate my discussion in the scholarly landscape it is 
appropriate to begin with a snapshot of the discussions of others.  It would be 
impossible here to provide a complete overview so I have chosen two eminent 
                                                 
19 Joseph Goldstein, „For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent 
and the Plea Bargain‟ (1974-5) 84 Yale Law Journal 683, 690.   13 
scholars  (Jay Katz  20  and Sheila McLean21) whose work has spanned three 
decades. I have chosen these two scholars because they are highly regarded 
and their work spans a significant period of time.  Whilst neither is Australian 
they are both relevant to the law in this jurisdiction.  The doctrine of informed 
consent as it has developed here is nestled somewhere between that of the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  Indeed the doctrine here has relied 
heavily  on  comparative  discussions  of  these  two  jurisdictions  and 
purportedly marks departures from the accepted law in both.   
 
Both  Katz  and  McLean  have  re-visited  the  „informed  consent‟  debate  in 
different guises, developing sophisticated arguments and concerns about the 
existence of the doctrine and raising questions regarding the nature of the 
interest that is protected by informed consent.  If we briefly consider their 
core arguments we will gain some insight into the broader debates.   
 
As early as 1977 Katz questioned the reality of a doctrine of informed consent 
in  his  article,  „Informed  Consent  –  A  Fairy  Tale?‟22  Here  he  described 
informed consent as „symbolised by conflicting interests‟ and suggested that it 
is this conflict which has shaped the doctrine.23  In Katz‟s view, the leading 
United States decision of Canterbury24 represented an „apparently bold move‟ 
but lamentably, introduced a test that was „far from clear‟.25  Of interest here 
is his assertion that the judicial focus was on disclosure to the exclusion of 
                                                 
20 „Informed Consent – A Fairy Tale?‟ (1977) 39 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 137 and J. Katz „Informed 
Consent – Must it Remain a Fairytale?‟ (1994) 10 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 69  he also 
published a book in 1984 The Silent World of Doctor and Patient The Free Press, (New York, 1984) which was 
deemed sufficiently current and relevant to warrant a re-publication with a new foreword by Alexander Morgan 
Capron in 2002 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press).  
21 Sheila A.M McLean, A patient’s right to know: Information disclosure, the doctor and the law (Dartmouth 
Publishing  company,  Aldershot,  1989)  and  more  recently  Autonomy,  Consent  and  the  Law    (Routledge-
Cavendish, London, 2010). 
22 (1977) 39 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 137.  
23 Ibid, 155. 
24  Canterbury  v  Spence  464  F.  2d  772  (1972).  Of  relevance  to  this  discussion  as  it  is  popularly  viewed  as 
representing  the  United  States  position  of  a  patient  centred  doctrine  of  informed  consent.  The  decision  is 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. 
25 Ibid.   14 
consent26 and that it failed to afford any protection of choice.27  In 1984, Katz 
revisited these themes in his influential text,  The Silent World of Doctor and 
Patient28  in  which  he  reasserted  his  „earlier  assessment  of  law‟s  informed 
consent vision as overly optimistic and fairy-tale like.‟29  In maintaining his 
critical stance, he suggested that the „all too single minded emphasis‟ of the 
Court on „risk disclosures made the objective of giving patients greater voice 
in medical decision-making well-nigh unattainable.‟30 Significantly, he argued 
that the doctrine failed to deliver a „meaningful blueprint for implementing 
patient self-determination‟ with an overwhelming focus on „what goes on in 
the  separate  actors  heads  not  what  goes  on  between  them.‟31  Similar 
arguments were reiterated in his 1994 article,  „Informed Consent – Must it 
Remain a Fairytale?‟32 where he described informed consent as a „charade‟ 
which  undermines  doctor/patient  communication.33In  the  foreword  of  the 
2002 reprint of Katz‟s Silent World, Alexander Morgan Capron emphasised the 
ongoing relevance of the discussion and described the doctrine as „at best a 
waste  of  time,  at  worst,  an  irritant  to  harmonious  relations  between 
physicians and patients and a stimulus for unjustified litigation.‟34 He further 
emphasised the currency of Katz‟s work, noting that at that time it had been 
„cited  and  discussed  in  more  than  three  hundred  law  review  articles  and 
numerous judicial decisions.‟35 
 
From Katz therefore we see a discussion spanning three decades highlighting 
the  ongoing  problems  inherent  in  the  doctrine  of  informed  consent.  He 
                                                 
26 Ibid, 147, whilst this comment was made in 1977, it was echoed 30 years later: „… the emphasis of this doctrine 
is less on consent than on the duty to inform.‟ D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Consent and the Law (Hart 
Publishing, Portland Oregon, 2007), 349. 
27 Ibid, 159. 
28  Katz,  J,  The  Silent  World  of  Doctor  and  Patient  (New  York,  The  Free  Press,  1984),  reprinted  in  2002: 
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). All page references refer to the later edition. 
29 Ibid, 83. 
30 Ibid, 82. 
31 Ibid, 84. This remains a live issue with Miola raising similar concerns over 30 years later when he suggests that 
the „focus on risk disclosure rather than the interaction [in both English and Australian law] means that it misses 
the target in terms of the maximisation of autonomy.‟ J Miola, „On the Materiality of Risk: Paper tigers and 
panaceas’  (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 76, 108. 
32 (1994) 10 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 69. 
33 Ibid, 81. 
34 Katz, above n.28, x. 
35 Ibid, xv.   15 
describes  a  lack  of  doctrinal  and  judicial  clarity  resulting  in  an  approach 
which  serves  to  detract  from  rather  than  enrich  the  doctor/patient 
relationship.    McLean  came  to  the  debate  after  Katz  but  raised  similar 
concerns.    In  her  1989  discussion,  A  Patient’s  Right  to  Know,36McLean 
addresses  the  nature  of  the  decision-making  process  and  describes  it  as  a 
„deeply human question‟ as opposed to a „technical process‟ and refers to the 
notion  of  „patient  choice.‟37  In  exploring  the  expectation  of  disclosure, 
McLean  asks  whether  a  doctor  „ought  to  be  held  to  a  duty  to  ensure 
understanding‟38 and concludes that understanding and rationality can only 
be determined from the perspective of the patient, explaining that „what is 
medically rational may be personally irrational.‟39 
 
Two themes emerge from McLean‟s work. The first is the correlation of the 
nature of the duty with the right from which it derives,40 and the second is the 
significance of autonomy and autonomous choice in the development of the 
doctrine.41  However,  in  essence,  her  concern  is  the  extent  to  which  the 
doctrine of „informed consent‟ as developed, is able to provide the desired 
protection.  McLean challenges the appropriateness of the negligence action 
due  to  the  „focus  on  medical  duties‟  and  mere  „tangential  dependence  on 
patients‟ rights.‟42  In McLean‟s view „negligence is not concerned with injury 
to  dignity‟43  and  as  a  result  the  Courts  have  „continued  to  balk  at  the 
provision of redress and the imputation of negligence where no measureable 
harm has actually arisen.‟44  In short, she questions the dedication of the law 
to  the  protection  of  the  individual  and  their  autonomy,  and  asserts  that 
                                                 
36 Sheila, A.M. McLean, A patient’s right to know: Information disclosure, the doctor and the law (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, Aldershot, 1989). 
37 Ibid, 75. 
38 Ibid, 75. 
39 Ibid, 80. 
40 Ibid. 
41  See  for  example  her  comment  that  the  „purpose  is  to  permit  the  patient  the  continued  exercise  of  self-
determination or autonomy‟, (80),„the patient needs … [to] be able to make an autonomous choice,‟ (81), and 
„reference to patient autonomy as the fundamental value in non-disclosure cases has been echoed in a number of 
… decisions‟ (90). 
42 Ibid, 87. 
43 Ibid, 91. 
44 Ibid, 92.   16 
despite some „impressive rhetoric‟45 the individual patient‟s interests are not 
served by the existing law.  
 
McLean revisits these concerns in her recent book, Autonomy, Consent and the 
Law46 in which she refers to the „spotlight of autonomy‟ and describes it as the 
„transcending  principle  of  modern  bioethics.‟47  Of  significance  here  is  her 
recognition of the absence of any „precise meaning of autonomy‟48 and her 
challenge to the capacity of the consent doctrine to protect the interests of the 
autonomous individual.49 Once again she asserts that the „fundamental rules 
of  negligence  action  seem  ill-suited  to  the  focus  on  individual  choice  that 
respect  for  autonomy  would  presumably  demand‟50  and  suggests  that 
„consent law bears only a very limited relationship to any particular concept 
of autonomy.‟51 
 
Whilst  I  have  chosen  to  highlight  the  work  of  these  two  authors,  it  is 
important  to  acknowledge  the  sheer  breadth  of  work  on  the  question  of 
„informed consent.‟ There have been numerous books written on the topic,52 
and  there  is  an  ongoing  struggle  to  identify  the  common  threads  of  the 
doctrine  and  clarify  its  goals  and  aims.    There  is,  however,  one  point  of 
agreement that serves as an appropriate starting point to our discussion here: 
the common position of the majority of scholarly (and judicial) discussions is 
that  the  doctrine  of  informed  consent  aims  to  protect  the  decision-making 
authority  of  the  individual,  usually  described  as  either  autonomy  or  self-
                                                 
45 Ibid, 98. 
46 Sheila, A.M, McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2010). 
47 Ibid, 6. 
48 Ibid, 37. 
49 Ibid, see for example her discussion at 93 where she suggests that „the development of a generalised standard … 
is inherently inimical to the individual patient and, ex hypothesi, to respect for actual autonomy.‟ 
50 Ibid, 93. 
51 Ibid, 215. 
52 See for example, Neil C. Manson and Onora O‟Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2007), R.R. Faden and T.L. Beauchamp (with Nancy King), A History and Theory 
of Informed Consent (Oxford university Press, New York, 1986), J.W. Berg, P.S. Appelbaum, C.W. Lidz and 
L.S. Parker, Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice (2
nd ed, Oxford university Press, New York, 
2001) and A.R. Rosoff, Informed Consent (Rockville, Aspen, 1981), D.Beyleveld and R.Brownsword, Consent 
and the Law (Hart Publishing, Portland Oregon, 2007) to name but a few.   17 
determination.53  An  equally  common  position  is  the  doubt  that  this  goal 
either is or can be achieved.  There is yet to be a satisfactory conclusion to this 
debate and it is this inconclusiveness that provides the impetus for my thesis. 
 
Despite the thorough coverage of „informed consent‟ it remains a live issue 
and the question as to whether or not the interests of the patient are truly 
protected remains open.54  The broader question of what is the nature of the 
interest that the law is seeking to protect (or ought to protect) is also open.   
It  is  worth  pausing  here  to  recognise  that  the  concerns  raised  in  this 
discussion have been considered elsewhere.  Indeed, in the sunset phase of 
writing this thesis, McLean‟s Autonomy, Consent and the Law55 was published 
and begins with similar criticisms of the nature of the doctrine of informed 
consent and the manner in which the law protects (or rather, does not protect) 
the  autonomous  individual.    The  point  of  departure  from  this,  and  other, 
work is that my discussion will focus on the quality of the information and 
the nature of the loss sustained.  The focus of McLean‟s work is on the nature 
of the doctor/patient relationship and a consideration of autonomy in specific 
situations.56 This thesis will of course consider the work of McLean and other 
scholars  and  build  on  their  arguments  as  it  moves  away  from  informed 
consent towards informed choice. 
 
This  thesis  will  do  more  than  merely  add  to  the  debate.  It  will  mark  a 
significant  departure  from  the  discussions  regarding  the  right  to  self-
determination, the nature of the test for standard of care and the question as 
to whether there ought to be a doctrine of informed consent.  My thesis will 
                                                 
53 Although both of these terms were specifically rejected by the High Court of Australia in Rogers v Whitaker 
(1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).  See  Back to basics: Is 
informed consent a part of our law? (at [1.130]) and more specifically Chapter 4 for an elaboration of the High 
Court‟s position regarding autonomy. 
54 See for example the recent paper by Jose Miola, „On the Materiality of Risk: Paper tigers and panaceas’  (2009) 
17 Medical Law Review 76 or Neil C. Manson and Onora O‟Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), and of course Sheila A.M. McLean, Autonomy, Consent and 
the Law (Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2010). 
55 (Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2010) 
56 McLean has a Chapter on the role of autonomy in the following situations: the end of life, pregnancy, genetic 
information and organ transplantation.   18 
demonstrate  that  the  protection  of  the  individual  right  to  pre-treatment 
advice is essential but that it cannot be achieved by focussing on tests for 
professional  standard  of  care,  the  appropriateness  of  the  negligence 
framework or questions of the role of self-determination.  An even clearer 
departure from the existing literature and judicial discussion is my rejection 
of consent as relevant to the provision of pre-treatment advice.  I will argue 
that the debate should be refocussed with a clear identification of the true 
nature of the harm sustained.  In denying the patient access to appropriate 
information,  the  doctor  is  denying  them  the  right  to  consider  all  realistic 
options  and  therefore  make  a  choice  based  upon  appropriate  levels  of 
information.  The action should therefore be framed as informed choice not 
informed consent. 
 
The question of damages 
 
[1.40] The thesis will not, however, attempt to analyse the appropriate remedy 
or measure of damages for this loss.  I assert at the outset that the law has 
consistently  (and  comfortably)  redressed  intangible  losses  such  as  loss  of 
expectation of life, loss of amenities of life and pain and suffering.  Whilst 
mental harm (previously nervous shock) had a chequered history because of 
the intangibility of the loss it is now an established and accepted part of our 
law.  Significantly, in Tame and Annetts57 that the High Court asserted that 
psychiatric harm „is not damage of a different kind from physical injury.‟58  
Thus  the  intangible  nature  of  a  dignitary  harm  does  not  represent  an 
insurmountable obstacle to the model espoused in this thesis.  The nature of 
remedies is, however, outside of the scope of a thesis focusing on the essence 
of the loss sustained. That is a discussion best left for another time and is 
therefore put to one side for now. 
                                                 
57 Tame v State of New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317. Mental harm is, 
of course, now given legislative recognition under the Civil Liability Acts: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) 
Part 3.2, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Part 3, Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s53, Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) 
Part 8, Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss72-73, Civil Liability Act 2003 (WA) Part 1B. 




[1.50]  My  argument  begins  from  the  position  that  informed  consent  has 
emerged from a series of judicial decisions that have, paradoxically, denied its 
validity  as  a  term.    Borrowing  from  Frankfurter  J  in  Tiller59  we  have  an 
example of a „legal test‟ which perhaps began its existence as „an expression‟, 
has  been  repeatedly  raised  in  case  law  and  is  now  viewed  as  a  legal 
doctrine.60 But is it coherent and does it have meaning? That is the central 
problem for my thesis which will be addressed through careful analysis of the 
law across three jurisdictions61 followed by a close consideration of the two 
central  themes  that  I  will  highlight  throughout  the  analysis:  defining 
autonomy and the essential role of choice and choice theory.  This discussion 
will move towards a resolution centred on the identification of a new model 
of  loss  and  a  doctrine  labelled  „informed  choice‟  as  opposed  to  „informed 
consent.‟ 
 
This  conceptual  analysis  will  necessarily  cross  disciplines  from  the  law  to 
philosophy  and  bioethics. This cross-over will only occur when  needed to 
lend clarity to the discussion and is essential  to critical analysis of judicial 
usage  of  such  concepts  as  „autonomy.‟    But  first  and  foremost,  this  is  an 
analysis  of  a  legal  doctrine  and  therefore  does  not  pretend  to  be  an 
authoritative analysis of either autonomy or choice.   
   
                                                 
59 Tiller v Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co 318 US 54 (1943) (Frankfurter J). Refer to the quote, above n.1 
60 Ibid, 68. 
61 Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.  I have chosen to omit the equally relevant 
jurisdiction of Canada as it would not add anything substantive to the debate.  New Zealand is also put to one 
side as it operates under a different system, relying on the New Zealand Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers‟ Rights, 1996.  The differences (and similarities) to be found in the three chosen jurisdictions serve 
to highlight my concerns, demonstrate the practical reality that whilst different language is used there is little 
substantive difference and most importantly, have developed in reference to each other.   20 
A joining of two concepts 
 
[1.60]  The  term  „informed  consent‟  sees,  in  the  words  of  Beyleveld  and 
Brownsword,  the  attempted  marriage  of  „not  just  two  elements  but  two 
doctrines:  one  a  doctrine  of  informational  obligation  which,  contingently 
bears on consensual decision-making; the other a defence of consent to an 
intentional tort.‟62  We therefore need to ask not only are they compatible but 
does this „marriage‟ work?  
 
Part I of this thesis focuses on the first stage of the enquiry and explores the 
way that the law addresses the adequacy of any pre-treatment advice which is 
a process of identifying the appropriate standard of care.  The focus of the 
discussion here is on the patient‟s needs and the doctor‟s response to those 
needs.  Part II of the thesis considers the other partner in this „marriage‟, the 
issue of consent to treatment.  This necessarily involves a consideration of the 
causative stage of the negligence enquiry.   
 
The judicial enquiry begins with the provision of information, and involves 
an analysis of the information that enables a patient to make a decision about 
the  options  available  to  them.    This  information,  in  accordance  with  the 
requirements of Rogers v Whitaker,63 is not limited to what the doctor believes 
the patient ought to know. The information must include all factors that the 
doctor  either  knows,  or  ought  to  know,  is  material  to  the  patient.  The 
explanation of materiality contained in Rogers v Whitaker is something that „a 
reasonable  person  in  the  patient‟s  position  …  would  be  likely  to  attach 
significance to.‟64  This then is the first part of „informed consent‟ and forms 
the substance of the enquiry into the appropriate standard of care focusing on 
the concept of materiality. The question is: „What ought the doctor to have 
                                                 
62 D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Consent and the Law (Hart Publishing, Portland Oregon, 2007), 174. 
63 (1992) 175 CLR 479 is the key „informed consent‟ decision in Australia and will be considered in some detail 
throughout this thesis. 
64 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).   21 
told  the  patient?‟  And  the  answer  is:  „Everything  that  is  material  to  that 
patient in their decision-making process.‟ 
 
At this stage the reference to an autonomous patient is clear and logical.  The 
test focuses on what this patient, before this doctor, in this situation would 
deem important.  It makes sense then that in Rosenberg, Justice Kirby referred 
us back to the seminal American decision of Schloendorff and the principle that 
„each individual has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body.‟65  The  significance  of  the  Schloendorff  statement  of  autonomy  is  a 
repeated  theme  throughout  the  scholarly  discussions  of  informed  consent, 
with firm statements along the lines of „the concept of informed consent has 
its roots in a recognition of the patient‟s right to self-determination,‟66 and, 
importantly informed consent „fixed its roots in Schloendorff.‟67 Thus informed 
consent is popularly, judicially and academically described as resting on the 
principles  propounded  in  Schloendorff  which  focus  on  bodily  integrity  and 
consent  to  contact.    Significantly,  this  foundational  decision  is  not  at  all 
concerned with the provision  of advice  prior to treatment or the  expected 
standard  of  care  of  the  doctor  when  giving  that  advice.    It  was  in  fact 
addressing  the  consent  to  surgery  for  a  tumour  and  was  therefore  a 




[1.70]  Part  I  will  track  and  explain  the  development  of  the  law  and  the 
concerns  of  the  judiciary.    The  aim  of  this  Part  is  to  clearly  identify  the 
foundational principles of the doctrine as expressed in the duty stage of the 
enquiry.    This  Part  of  the  discussion  will  explore  the  tension  between 
                                                 
65 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 105 NE 92 at 93 (1914).  See also Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr 
University Board of Trustees 317 P 2d 170 at 181 (1957); cf Monks, „The Concept of Informed Consent in the 
United States, Canada, England and Australia:  A Comparative Analysis‟, (1993) 17 University of Queensland 
Law Journal 222, 223 . As cited by Kirby J in Rosenberg [142]. 
66 Gerald Robertson, „Informed Consent to Medical Treatment‟ in Sheila A.M. McLean (ed), Medical Law and 
Ethics (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002) 85. 
67 Leonard L. Riskin, „Informed Consent: Looking for the Action‟ (1975) University of Illinois Law Forum 580, 
582.   22 
professional standards and individual needs which are particularly relevant 
to the question of pre-treatment advice.  We will observe the intricate debate 
regarding  the  appropriate  test  for  standard  of  care  and  ultimately,  the 
somewhat  triumphant  rejection  by  the  High  Court  of  Australia  of  the 
accepted  approach  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  subsequent  adoption  of  a 




[1.80]  Part  II  will  focus  on  the  second  partner  in  this  uneasy  marriage: 
consent.  The focus here is on the vexed question of causation.  Negligence 
turns on the identification of a link between the breach of duty (discussed in 
Part I) and the manifestation of harm.  We will have seen in Part I that the 
focus of the Courts, at the duty stage of the enquiry, is on the right of the 
patient  to  an  appropriate  amount  of  information.    Part  II  will  explore  the 
struggle to link this right to information to a physical harm arising out of 
medical treatment.  It will be argued that the importation of the language of 
trespass  at  this  stage  of  the  enquiry  undermines  the  protection  of  patient 
interests at the heart of the duty enquiry.  This presents the Courts with the 
impossible  task  of  linking  the  failure  to  fully  inform  the  patient  with  an 
unrelated physical harm. 
 
As  well  as  drawing  together  the  themes  of  the  three  jurisdictions  under 
consideration, this Part will also conclude with a brief consideration of the 
role  of  policy  in  judicial  decision-making.  The  repeated  judicial  calls  on 
policy during the causative enquiry, will have been highlighted throughout 
the critical analysis here.  This raises the question as to whether or not these 
references to policy involve a consistently defined (or perhaps even definable) 
concept.  This discussion will challenge the consistency of the application of 
„policy‟  in  the  „informed  consent‟  decisions  and  concludes  that  it  usually 




[1.90] Part III of the thesis will focus on the two core themes that logically 
emerge from the discussions in Parts I and II: autonomy and rejection of the 
notion  of  consent.    The  autonomous  individual  and  the  right  to  self-
determination  is  central  to  the  doctrine  of  „informed  consent‟  and  Part  III 
begins with an exploration of this complex ideal.  Members of the judiciary 
repeatedly  and uncritically  refer to  notions of autonomy  but stop short of 
defining  it.    In  Part  III  we  will  see  that  this  is  problematic  as  there  is  no 
consistent definition or understanding of autonomy. It is from this discussion 
that a proposed adoption of a single purposive definition of autonomy will 
emerge as a model for judicial consideration of the pre-treatment discussion.  
This model is based on the ideal of narrative autonomy,68 and is consistent 
with the interest  of obtaining complete  advice  and being  in  control of the 
story of one‟s own life.   
 
Part  III  will  then  identify  the  process  that  truly  sits  at  the  heart  of  the 
„informed consent‟ debate: choice.  Here we will see that the ongoing struggle 
for judicial clarity is driven by the incongruity of the dignitary harm of denial 
of information being linked with a subsequent physical loss.  It will be clear 
from all of the preceding discussions that the provision of information is not 
about consent; rather it is about the deeply individual and personal process of 
choice.  Part III will therefore see a firm retreat from the doctrine of „informed 
consent‟  towards  a  new  doctrine  of  „informed  choice.‟  It  is  here  that  the 
central arguments of the thesis will be drawn together and clear conclusions 
made.  
   
                                                 
68 At its simplest, the ideal that each individual is the „narrator‟ of their own story and able to create their own 
story from the information provided to them.   24 
Sally 
 
[1.100]  It  is  always  important  to  remember  that  the  scholarly  and  judicial 
consideration of informed consent is deeply human in nature.  They focus on 
individuals who are vulnerable and reliant on the expertise of another.  The 
discussion ought then to focus on the vulnerability of the individual and the 
consequent  need  to  address  the  harms  arising  out  of  the  doctor/patient 
interaction.  We begin with an individual who is, by definition, unwell and at 
risk.  They go to see a doctor and seek advice as to appropriate treatment.  At 
this  point,  the  law  says  that  the  information  given  to the  patient  must  be 
everything that is material to that patient.  To demonstrate what then happens 
to patients (and later plaintiffs), I will introduce Sally, a hypothetical patient 
who will be called upon throughout this thesis as a practical demonstration of 
the theory and law under discussion.   
 
Sally‟s situation will be described in detail in Part I69 and she will provide 
insight into the practical application of the different tests analysed in Parts I 
and II. She will also support the presentation of Choice in Part III. 
 
The current law 
 
[1.110]  My  deconstruction  of  the  doctrine  of  informed  consent  and 
reconstruction of a doctrine of informed choice requires a detailed analysis of 
the existing law and an exploration of the themes and issues that emerge from 
this analysis.  In addressing the current law there are two preliminary issues 
that warrant a brief exploration. First I will explain the trespass/negligence 
divide.  The core of my rejection of consent is that it is an enquiry best suited 
to trespass and thus  outside of the scope  of a negligence  enquiry.   If this 
argument is to be understood a clarification of the divide between the two 
causes of action is necessary.  The second issue relates to my challenge of the 
                                                 
69 See Chapter 5, „The more things change, the more they stay the same‟ (at [5.10]) and „Sally‟ (at [5.20]).   25 
current law.  I  have suggested  (and will continue  to argue) that the High 
Court  has  rejected  „informed  consent‟  and  I  must  therefore  address  the 
question of whether or not „informed consent‟ is even a part of our current 
law.  
 
The trespass/negligence divide 
 
[1.120] At law there is a clear distinction between trespass and negligence.  
This  is  a  significant  distinction  because  the  foundations  of  the  doctrine  of 
informed  consent  were  laid  in  actions  in  trespass  but  the  main  body  or 
structure of the doctrine is founded in actions in negligence. Before critiquing 
that structure we need to identify why there was a move away from trespass 
and ask whether or not it was an appropriate one.  
 
Consent to treatment is essential and its primary role is that it „renders lawful 
what would otherwise constitute a battery‟.70 Despite the label of informed 
consent, judicial considerations of the provision of pre-treatment advice have 
revealed a reluctance to link poor advice to the intentional tort of trespass to 
the person, presumably because of the „overlap with the criminal offence of 
assault.‟71  „Informed  Consent‟  is  therefore  a  creature  of  negligence  law,  a 
position clearly stated by the High Court in Rogers v Whitaker: 
 
Anglo-Australian law has rightly taken the view than an allegation 
that  the  risks  inherent  in  a  medical  procedure  have  not  been 
disclosed to the plaintiff can only found an action in negligence and 
not  in  trespass;  the  consent  necessary  to  negative  the  offence  of 
battery is satisfied by the patient being advised in broad terms of the 
nature of the procedure to be performed.72 
 
                                                 
70 M. Jones, Medical Negligence (3
rd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2003), 453. 
71 Ibid, 448. 
72 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 491 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). At this 
point the Court also referred to the UK decision of Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432 and the Canadian 
decision of Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880, 888-892.   26 
It follows that if a patient is aware of the nature of the treatment and the 
extent of the bodily invasion, but is unaware of some of the risks inherent in 
the treatment, they will be deemed to have consented to the treatment despite 
the  gaps  in  the  advice  provided.    This  distinction  has  been  described  by 
Beyleveld  and  Brownsword  as  „thicker  and  thinner  conditions  for  valid 




FIGURE 1: TRESPASS/NEGLIGENCE DIVIDE.74 
 
In  her  article,  Somerville  goes  on  to  question  the  appropriateness  of  the 
exclusion of risks from the nature of the act, raising the issue that perhaps 
„some risks are so serious that they necessarily relate to the basic nature and 
                                                 
73 D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Consent and the Law (Hart Publishing, Portland Oregon, 2007), 183. 
74 M. Somerville, „Structuring the Issues in Informed Consent‟ [1981] 26 McGill Law Journal 740, 743. This 
diagram is a slightly modified version of that presented by Somerville (in shape only) and the explanation is in 
her words. 
  
                          NOTE:   
   This figure is included on page 26  
 of the print copy of the thesis held in  
   the University of Adelaide Library.  27 
character of an operation.‟75 Similarly, Beyleveld and Brownsword describe 
this approach as setting a „relatively weak informational standard for a valid 
consent,‟76  suggesting  that  it  is  conceivable  that  information  regarding  the 
risks of the treatment could be included in discussions regarding the nature of 
the  treatment.    This  is  an  interesting  alternative  view,  which  will  not  be 
pursued here.  My discussion will proceed on the grounds that, consistent 
with the views of the High Court as expressed in Rogers v Whitaker, once the 
patient has been informed of the nature of the treatment, then any action in 
trespass will fail.  The nature of the treatment is narrowly defined to include 
the nature of the touching77 and does not extend to considerations of risks. 
 
The line between trespass and negligence is a clear one.  Importantly, it is not 
a line that will be challenged in this discussion, indeed I will be arguing that it 
ought to be maintained and more clearly adhered to.  Consent to treatment 
(and trespass) are distinct from the provision of advice (and negligence) and 
therefore notions of consent should not be imported into negligence.  This 
position is fundamental to my thesis and will be explored in some depth.  As 
the  law  exists  at  the  moment  consent  and  pre-treatment  advice  remain 
conceptually linked and it is therefore necessary at the outset to determine 
why this is so.  The answer can be found in a review of the evolution of the 
legal consideration of consent from straightforward agreement to (or refusal 
of) medical treatment to the more complex concept of the provision of pre-
treatment  advice  (which  involved  the  addition  of  the  epithet  „informed‟).  
Beyleveld and Brownsword point to „judicial reservations‟ about the role of 
consent  in  considerations  of  the  provision  of  pre-treatment  advice  and 
suggest that „whilst the language of consent has been carried forward from 
the settled understanding of the defence to battery,‟ the doctrine of informed 
consent  „might  not  actually  be  grounded  in  the  idea  of  a  patient  giving 
                                                 
75 Ibid, 747. 
76 Beyleveld and Brownsword, above n.73, 173. 
77 That is information regarding the mechanics of the treatment and the body part to be treated.   28 
consent.‟78  The  High  Court  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker  specifically  rejected  the 
terminology79  yet  we  consistently  see  reference  to  consent  in the  scholarly 
literature80 and the protection of personal integrity continues to provide the 
justification for the of the doctrine of informed consent. 
 
This relationship between trespass and negligence in the doctrine of informed 
consent  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  as  we  progress  through  my 
argument,  but  it  is  important  to  acknowledge  at  this  point  that  trespass 
protects the personal right to determine what is or is not done to one‟s own 
body.  It is the very essence of autonomy, the right to decide what is or is not 
done  to  one‟s  own  body.  Negligence  on  the  other  hand  is  traditionally 
focussed on tangible loss or damage (to property, person or, more recently, 
economic interests).  Indeed, it has been said many times that  „damage is the 
gist of negligence‟.81  Thus we have two areas of law, one (trespass) focussing 
on personal integrity through the protection of the right to consent to what is 
or is not done to one‟s own body and the other concerned with recompensing 
for  loss  or  harm  (negligence).    With  the  importation  of  the  language  of 
consent into negligence law we find the roots of the concerns that have driven 
the  scholarly  debate,  not  least  of  which  is  the  apparent  inability  of  the 
doctrine of informed consent, firmly grounded in negligence, to protect the 
autonomy of the decision-maker, an interest protected by the law of trespass.   
 
Back to basics: Is informed consent a part of our law? 
 
[1.130]  The  conventional  wisdom  is  that  informed  consent  was  introduced 
into  Australian  law  via  the  decision  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker,82  Olbourne83 
                                                 
78 Beyleveld and Brownsword, above n.73, 171. 
79 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. This rejection is detailed in the next section of the discussion, „Is 
Informed Consent a Part of our Law?‟ See also Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 
663 (and as discussed in Beyleveld and Brownsword, ibid). 
80 Refer discussion above, in particular n.11-n.13. 
81 See for example J. Stapleton, „The Gist of Negligence‟ (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review 389. 
82 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
83 Norman Olbourne, „The Influence of Rogers v Whitaker on the practice of Cosmetic Plastic Surgery,‟ (1998) 5 
Journal of Law and Medicine 334.   29 
suggests that the doctrine of informed consent was developed from Rogers v 
Whitaker  and  involves  consent  by  an  autonomous  patient  who  makes  an 
informed decision based on understanding.84 Others have claimed that, over 
the  years,  Australian  Courts  have  slowly  shaped  the  requirements  for 
informed consent and describe Rogers v Whitaker as the „landmark case which 
added to the mountain of words about informed consent, what it means and 
how it can be achieved.‟85  Indeed, even in the High Court the decision has 
been  recognised  as  coming  to  represent  the  „commonly  termed  notion  of 
informed consent.‟86 
 
These comments appear uncontroversial on the surface and, in many respects, 
quite reasonable.  Surely if the academic literature, the medical profession and 
the High Court itself refers to a doctrine of informed consent without much 
further  explanation,  then  it  must  be  a  clear  and  well  developed  part  of 
Australian law.  It is my position that this is not the case.  Whilst there has 
been  a  loose  adoption  of  the  phrase  „informed  consent‟  to  describe  an 
apparently  coherent legal doctrine  resting on the foundational principle  of 
autonomy, it is far from coherent.  It is in fact flawed in both interpretation 
and application.   
 
To demonstrate this claim, it is best to return to the foundational decision of 
Rogers v Whitaker and take the time to consider what the High Court actually 
decided.  It is important to recognise that the Court took care to avoid the 
adoption of the language of consent and specifically noted that nothing is to 
be gained by reiterating the expressions used in American authorities such as 
„the patient‟s right to self determination‟ or even the oft-used and „somewhat 
amorphous phrase informed consent‟.87  Indeed, in the words of the Court, 
„the right of self-determination is an expression which is, perhaps, suitable to 
                                                 
84 Ibid, 341 and 342. 
85 Ian Kerridge and Kenneth Mitchell, „Missing the Point: Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 and the Ethical 
Ideal of Informed and Shared Decision-making‟ (1994) 1 Journal of Law and Medicine 239, 239. 
86 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 477 (Kirby J). 
87 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).   30 
cases where the issue is whether a person has agreed to the general surgical 
procedure or treatment, but is of little assistance in the balancing process that 
is involved in the determination of whether there has been a breach of the 
duty of disclosure.‟88  Furthermore, the term informed consent was described 
as „apt to mislead‟89 as it suggests a test of the validity of the patient‟s consent.  
Importantly,  consent  was  described  as  relevant  to  those  cases  involving 
trespass and not negligence; the question before the Court (which was dealing 
with the provision of advice prior to treatment) was not one of consent.90  This 
then is the starting point of the so-called doctrine of informed consent which 
emerged from the High Court decision of Rogers v Whitaker. It is a doctrine 
resting upon a denial of the very term used to describe it.  
 
Towards a doctrine of informed choice 
 
[1.140] It has been said that a „basic commitment of the legal system is to 
respect human dignity,‟91 and in denying access to information the doctor is 
denying the autonomous right to choose which path to take.  The adoption of 
the term choice in this thesis is critical to the central argument and is informed 
by the language of the High Court.  This thesis presents a challenge to the 
current doctrine of „informed consent.‟  Through an exploration of the current 
law, combined with analysis of scholarly debate, it will be demonstrated that 
the  appropriate  solution  is  a  doctrinal  shift  away  from  „informed  consent‟ 
towards „informed choice.‟  
 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Joseph Goldstein, „For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent 
and the Plea Bargain‟ (1974-5) 84 Yale Law Journal 683, 691. 31 




This thesis offers a critical analysis of informed consent and will challenge the 
existing judicial approach to a consideration of pre-treatment advice.  To do 
this it is necessary to begin with a careful, in depth, consideration of the law 
as  it  currently  functions.    The  discussion  in  both  Part  I  and  Part  II  will 
critically  assess  the  concept  of  informed  consent  and  address  the  central 
question of whether or not the underlying ideals match the practical realities.  
 
The doctrine of informed consent is central to this thesis and even the most 
cursory  glance  over  the  scholarly  and  judicial  considerations  of  informed 
consent will reveal that the term itself is problematic.  However, if a concept is 
to  be  critiqued  it  is  essential  that  it  is  provided  with  a  consistent  and 
identifiable label.  This means that, despite strongly disagreeing with the use 
of  the  term  „informed  consent,‟  (my  thesis  rests  on  the  strength  of  this 
disapproval and rejects the use of the phrase and therefore the essence of, the 
doctrine in its current form) I will reluctantly conform and use the shorthand 
phrase.  Therefore, any reference here to „informed consent‟ is in relation to 
the legal test of the appropriateness (or not) of the provision of pre-treatment 
advice. 
 
The analysis of the law in Part I will address some central questions: 
 
1.  Is „informed consent‟ truly about consent?  
2.  Who takes the central role (is it the prudent patient or the prudent 
professional)? and (most significantly),  
3.  Are we dealing with patient autonomy or professional standard of 
care? (Or is it about the doctor or the patient?) 32 
 
In  combination  the  answers  to  these  three  questions  will  permit  the 
identification  of  the  appropriate  standard  of  care  to  be  applied  when 
assessing  the  advice  given  by  a  doctor,  to  a  patient,  before  the  treatment 
commences. 
 
At first glance, each of these questions appears to be both straightforward and 
clear, suggesting an equally straightforward and clear answer.  This is not the 
case;  acceptable  (and  consistent)  answers  are  difficult  to  find.  The  three 
principal jurisdictions under consideration are, on one level, consistent only 
in  their  inconsistency.    We  see  the  Courts  in  each  jurisdiction  carefully 
constructing a test for standard of care that, in their view, differs from the 
other  two  jurisdictions.  In  the  United  States  there  is  the  key  decision  of 
Canterbury  v  Spence  (Canterbury),1  which  is  viewed  as  authority  for  the 
doctrine of informed consent, whilst in the United Kingdom Bolam v Friern 
Hospital  Management  Committee  (Bolam)2  combined  with  Sidaway  v  Board  of 
Governors  of  the  Bethlehem  Royal  Hospital  &  the  Maudsley  Hospital  &  Ors 
(Sidaway)3 to reject the notion of informed consent.  The third position is that 
of Australia. Here Rogers v Whitaker4 saw a rejection of the Bolam position as 
well  as  that  of  Canterbury  and  purported  to  introduce  a  third  test  of 
materiality of information and an apparent denial of the concept of informed 
consent. 
 
Each  of  the  different  approaches  to  the  expected  standard  of  care  in  the 
provision of pre-treatment advice has one distinguishing feature, which is the 
nature of the language used.  There is a mixture of terms including „informed 
consent‟, „material information‟, „significant information‟, „meaningful choice‟ 
and  of  course,  „professional  standards.‟    But  when  one  looks  behind  the 
language, seeking the essence of the decisions, it becomes apparent that the 
                                                 
1 464 Fed Report, 2d 772 (1972). 
2 [1957] 1 WLR 582.   
3 [1984] QB  493. 
4 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 33 
differences lie in terminology rather than substance.  Close scrutiny of these 
judgments also reveals that this substance, however it is expressed, fails to 
deliver on its purported core value of respect for patient autonomy.  
 
Whatever the language used, it is clear that the legal doctrine of informed 
consent  has  now  been  accepted  across  all  three  jurisdictions  as  belonging 
under the banner of negligence.  The negligence enquiry is, of course, a staged 
one and Part I deals only with the second stage: standard of care.5  The third 
stage of the enquiry is of course causation and this will be considered in Part 
II.6  The discussion in Part I will provide the background for the critique of the 
role of causation and will focus entirely on the question of standard of care.  
We  will  discover  that  despite  careful  linguistic  distinctions,  the  practical 
outcome is the same.  This assertion will be supported by inviting my fictional 
character,  Sally,7  on  a  world  tour  to  have  her  case  analysed  in  each 
jurisdiction.  The proposal is that the outcome will be the same wherever she 
may be. 
 
This  analysis  is  the  first  step  in  unravelling  the  complexities  of  informed 
consent. In doing this we will begin to draw out the common threads and 
move towards a coherent model of informed choice. 
                                                 
5  Duty  is  not  addressed  as  the  doctor/patient  relationship  is  an  established  duty  category  and  therefore 
unproblematic. 
6 Defences and damages are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
7  We  were  introduced  to  Sally  in  the  Introduction  to  the  thesis  (see  [1.100])  and  she  will  have  her  case 
reconsidered many times throughout this discussion, serving to illustrate the practical import of the different uses 
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[2.10]  The  United  States  is  mistakenly  described  as  adhering  to  a  patient-
centric doctrine of informed consent with the central authority identified as 
Canterbury v Spence.8 This seminal decision is best described as the „pin-up 
case‟ for informed consent.  Courts in both Australia and the United Kingdom 
refer to the decision as a clear statement of the American position of broad 
recognition of patient-based information sharing.9  To describe Canterbury as 
representative  of  the  position  across  all  of  the  United  States  is,  however, 
misleading.10  The  approach  to  „informed  consent‟  in  America  is  not 
monolithic and, as will be explained in this Chapter, more than half the States 
have statutory regimes which reject the Canterbury test.11  It is noteworthy that 
despite the subsequent aligning of  Canterbury  with „informed consent‟,  the 
Canterbury Court itself rejected the notion of „informed consent‟ as useful.12 
 
Despite the discrepancy between the perceived and actual intent of the Court 
in Canterbury v Spence, the case continues to be significant, largely because of 
the  important  role  it  has  played  in  the  development  (and  rejection)  of  an 
„informed consent‟ doctrine in both the United Kingdom and Australia. The 
significance  of  the  Canterbury  decision  therefore  lies  in  its  position  of 
perceived authority.  Courts and commentators in Australia and the United 
Kingdom debate the relevance of the term „informed consent‟ based on the 
different  standards  applied  in  each  jurisdiction.13  In  the  United  States, 
                                                 
8 464 F. 2d 772 (1972). The High Court in Australia specifically aligned the Canterbury judgment with informed 
consent in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
9 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1985] AC 871, 
887-888 and Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490. 
10 This is a common interpretation of this decision, see the discussion below and footnote 44. 
11 See discussion below and refer to footnote 45.  
12 Robinson J at 780 cautioned that the uncritical use of the label informed consent can be misleading. This aspect 
of the judgment is explored further below. 
13 In the United Kingdom the standard test is described as professional with Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee [1957] 1 WLR and Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley 35 
however, there is a broad acceptance of the existence of a doctrine of informed 
consent which turns on the nature of a physicians‟ duty to warn the patient of 
risks  inherent  in  the  proposed  course  of  treatment.    The  view  across  the 
jurisdictions in the United States is not consistent with the point of difference 
being the test for the general measure of this duty.14 The discussion in this 
Chapter will demonstrate that despite the perceptions of the United States as 
having embraced a clear doctrine of informed consent, it is as unclear there as 
everywhere else.   
 
The foundations of informed consent 
 
[2.20] The evolution of informed consent which is identified with Canterbury 
can  be  traced  to  the „germinal  case‟  of  Schloendorff15  in  which  the  primary 
requirement for patient consent was clearly enunciated by Cardozo J: 
 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon 
who  performs  an  operation  without  his  patient‟s  consent, 
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.16 
 
The decision in this instance focussed on the tort of trespass to the person 
(battery) and made no reference at all to the quality of pre-treatment advice.  
Over time, however, its application has broadened and it is now viewed as 
being „emblematic of the law‟s purported aspiration to protect autonomy,‟17 
and as we will see, it is almost universally referred to in the informed consent 
decisions.  A point worth noting here is that „informed consent‟, which has 
                                                                                                                                            
Hospital & Ors [1985] AC 871 and in Australia the standard is commonly referred to as patient-centred as 
developed in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
14 L.B. Frantz, „Modern Status of views as to General Measure of Physician‟s duty to inform patient of risks of 
proposed treatment.‟ 88 ALR 3d. 1008, (updated Nov. 2005 Annotation), §2a. 
15 Retkwa v Orentreich 154 Misc. 2d 164 (1992, SC of NY County, NY), referring to Schloendorff v The Society of 
the New York Hospital 211 N.Y 125 (1914). 
16 Schloendorff v The Society of the New York Hospital  211 N.Y 125 (1914), 129-130 . 
17 Sheila A.M. McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2010), 77. 36 
been  judicially  distinguished  from  the  tort  of  trespass,18  is  founded  on  a 
trespass decision and thus presents a clear potential for conflicting principles.   
The first significant post Schloendorff development was the coining of the term 
„informed consent‟ by the Salgo19 Court, closely followed by the shift to the 
tort of negligence, as opposed to battery, in Natanson v Kline.20  Of significance 
in  these  developments  was  the  continued  emphasis  on  the  foundational 
premise  of  autonomy.21  Once  this  foundation  was  laid,  it  was  a  relatively 
small  step  to  the  maturation  of  the  doctrine  of  patient-centred  informed 
consent  developed  by  the  Canterbury  Court.22  And  it  was  during  this 
evolutionary phase that the focus of the Courts shifted to the quality of pre-
treatment  information  provided  by  the  doctor.    We  begin  to  see  the  pre-
occupation with the appropriate test for standard of care.23  It is my position 
that this ongoing struggle to identify the appropriate test for standard of care 
masks the true nature of the problem with the current doctrine of „informed 
consent‟. As we will see in further discussions, despite the care taken by the 
Courts to identify the most appropriate test, it is of little practical import.  The 
outcome of both tests is the same and breach of duty is readily identified, and 
it is questionable that the autonomy of the patient is ultimately protected. 
 
As  indicated  at  the  outset,  this  part  of  the  thesis  will  involve  a  close 
consideration  of  a  number  of  key  decisions,  a  process  that  most  logically 
begins  with  Canterbury.    The  facts  of  the  case  are  straightforward:  the 
appellant suffered from back pain and agreed to an operation but was not 
informed of the risk of paralysis inherent in the procedure.  The day following 
the  operation,  he  fell  out  of  bed  and  suffered  some  paralysis.  He  then 
                                                 
18 Refer to Figure 1 (in the Introduction) and the accompanying discussion regarding the trespass/negligence divide 
in this context (at [1.120]). 
19 Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr University  Board of Trustees  317 P.2d 170 (1957). 
20 Natanson v Kline 186 Kan 393 (1960). For an excellent discussion of the history of the evolution of the doctrine 
refer R.R. Faden, T.L. Beauchamp, (with Nancy King), A History and Theory of Informed Consent, (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1986), Chapter 4. 
21 Ibid, 132. 
22 Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972), was an appeal to the Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit, 
the judgment was delivered by Robinson J and the decision of the District Court was reversed, it was remanded 
to the District Court for a new trial.  
23 This preoccupation is consistent across all three jurisdictions and the struggle to find the appropriate test will be 
explored as we analyse the seminal cases in more detail below. 37 
underwent a second procedure and whilst this resulted in an improvement in 
his condition, he continued to rely on crutches and suffer ongoing paralysis 
and resulting incontinence. 
 
Of significance to the decision was the fact that neither the patient nor his 
mother (who signed the consent form after the original surgery) questioned 
the physician regarding the risks inherent in, or any possible alternatives to, 
the procedure.  There appeared to be unquestioning acceptance that this was 
the most appropriate treatment. 
 
In  delivering his judgment,  Robinson J specifically  noted the need to look 
beyond proficiency in diagnosis and treatment when determining the scope of 
a physician‟s duty of care with the duty being founded on more than simply 
the provision of treatment.  Some insight into the preferred approach of the 
Court was provided by Robinson J‟s suggestion that the physician‟s training 
enables  a  „self-satisfying‟  evaluation  of  the  question  of  whether  or  not  a 
particular procedure should be undertaken.24  Such an evaluation was viewed 
by  the  Court  as  more  properly  belonging  to  the  patient.  It  was  the  clear 
prerogative of the patient and not the physician to determine the direction in 
which their interests seemed to lie.25  Thus we see the emergence of a patient-
centred  enquiry  which  now  forms  the  basis  of  judicial  and  scholarly 
considerations of informed consent.  
 
Once  the  patient  was  identified  by  the  Court  as  the  one  in  control  of  the 
decision-making  process,  it  became  necessary  to  establish  how  the  patient 
was to ascertain what was in their best interests. The Court returned to first 
principles by appealing to the basic assumptions of Schloendorff, emphasising 
that true consent requires the „informed exercise of a choice and that entails 
an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available.‟26 Of note 
                                                 
24 Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972), 781 (Robinson J). 
25 Ibid, 784. 
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here  is  the  early  emergence  of  the  language  of  choice  which  hints  at  a 
recognition of the process behind the giving of consent.  Unfortunately it is an 
idea that fails to reach maturation in this and later judicial discussions and 
whilst  we  see  many  and  varied  references  to  choice,  it  is  never  given  the 
prominence  that  I  argue  is  necessary  to  give  substance  to  the  legal 
consideration of pre-treatment advice.  In Canterbury we do however see a 
Court focussing on the patient and it is this focus that is generally referred to 
when the authority of Canterbury is either adopted or rejected.  
 
Whilst it is true that the individual interests of the patient appear to drive the 
Canterbury decision, it must be recognised that the discussion does not end 
there; it is but the starting point.  Before the Court considered the content of 
the physician‟s duty of care, it carefully retreated from the patient focus and 
called for the adoption of a broader view. For a complete understanding of 
the basic principles espoused by the Canterbury Court, it is essential that this 
preliminary  stage  in  the  discussion  be  carefully  considered  and  yet  it  is 
routinely overlooked and understated.   
 
The  significant  role of  Canterbury  as a key decision in the development of 
informed  consent  is  now  cemented  and  it  has  been  described  as  having 
„played  an  iconic  and  influential  role  in  commentary  on  the  issue  of 
consent.‟27  The decision has risen to a position of prominence despite the 
clear caution against uncritical adoption of the language of „informed consent‟ 
and the description of the term as potentially misleading.28  It is important to 
recognise that in the view of the Canterbury Court, it was inappropriate to 
focus on the patient‟s understanding of the advice or their decision to consent.  
The essence of the enquiry lay in a consideration of the nature and content of 
the  physician‟s  divulgence.29  The  interrelationship  between  adequate 
disclosure  and  informed  consent  was  acknowledged  by  the  Court;  it  was 
                                                 
27 McLean, above n.17, 77. 
28 Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972) 780, (Robinson J). 
29 Ibid.  39 
described  as  „two  sides  of  the  same  coin,‟30  but  to  attempt  to  ground  the 
discussion in the language of informed consent, as opposed to duty, was said 
to be misdirecting the enquiry.  The Court emphasised that the language of 
informed consent implies that the patient‟s comprehension is decisive when, 
in reality, the question to ask is whether or not the physician has made a 
„reasonable  effort  to  convey  sufficient  information.‟31  Thus  we  have  a 
judgment  which begins by  looking directly at the patient and  the right of 
autonomy but swiftly switches focus to the doctor and his/her knowledge 
and  skill.    This  altered  focus  reduces  the  significance  of  the  patient  and 
emphasises the role of the doctor as a professional.  In light of this significant 
focal  shift,  the  question  I  will  explore  more  fully  throughout  this  and 
subsequent Chapters, is whether or not it is appropriate to rely completely on 
an examination of the content of the duty of a doctor as a professional in 
order to determine what information is material to the decision-making of the 
individual patient.  
 
The  emphasis  on  the  doctor  as  a  professional  comes  from  the  Court‟s 
recognition of the significance of the expertise of the physician which places 
them in the position of power in the relationship.  The patient on the other 
hand,  comes  to  the  therapeutic  relationship  with  little  to  no  knowledge 
leaving  the  physician  to  bear  the  responsibility  of  providing  appropriate 
„enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision.‟32  Inherent in this 
choice of language is the implication that the physician, not the patient, is the 
one who is best equipped to identify what constitutes an intelligent decision 
and it is their role to provide sufficient information to guide the patient in the 
appropriate  direction.    Alongside  this  acknowledgment  of  power  sits  the 
Courts‟ clear recognition of the duty to disclose.  The legal significance of the 
duty arises from the need to protect the patient from the risk of physicians 
reaching „self-satisfying‟ conclusions as to appropriate advice and treatment 
                                                 
30 Ibid, 780 refer fn.15. 
31 Ibid, fn.15. 
32 Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972) fn15, (Robinson J).  40 
which could undermine the relationship of trust.33  These conflicting positions 
left the Court struggling to reconcile the needs and expectations of the patient 
with the established role of the physician. 
 
Canterbury began with the legitimate expectation of a patient that adequate 
information will be provided.  The test as to whether or not this expectation 
had been met then focused not on the patient‟s understanding, but on the 
content  of  the  physician‟s  disclosure.    The  core  of  the  test  applied  in 
Canterbury lies in a determination of adequate disclosure.  It is at this point in 
the  enquiry  that  the  Court,  despite  earlier  resiling  from  the  language  of 
consent,  began  to  adopt  the  terminology  that  has  led  to  the  common 
interpretation of this as a case about informed consent.   
 
With the content of the duty identified as the foundational question, the Court 
sought to establish a clear test of the standard of disclosure with the central 
question being, who is to determine what constitutes adequate information? 
Despite  asserting  that  the  physician  is  in  the  best  position  to  determine 
appropriate information so as to facilitate „enlightenment‟ and an „intelligent 
decision‟, the Canterbury Court rejected the position previously adopted by 
some States, of turning to the medical fraternity for advice on what risks are 
deemed  to  be  material  and  routinely  presented  to  patients  contemplating 
particular procedures.34  The position adopted by the Court was that to rely 
on professional practices is to remove the decision making power from the 
Court  and  place  it  in  the  hands  of  the  medical  profession  and  so  it  was 
determined  that  the  patient‟s  cause  of  action  is  not  dependent  upon  the 
existence and non performance of a relevant professional tradition.35 It is this 
proposition that has led directly to the interpretation of the decision as being 
a patient, as opposed to physician-centred one.  
                                                 
33 Ibid, 782. 
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Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1985] AC 871. 
35 Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972) 784, (Robinson J). We will see in Chapter 4 that this position was 
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With professional practices relegated to the back seat, the next stage of the 
enquiry  was  to  determine  the  actual  scope  of  disclosure.  The  Court 
recognised that this is a question of standard of care with the standard of a 
professional being above that of the ordinary citizen.  Significantly, the Court 
clearly and specifically rejected the full disclosure standard, describing any 
expectation that the physician discuss every risk of proposed treatment, no 
matter how small or remote, as prohibitive and unrealistic.36 
 
At this point, the Court was clearly endeavouring to arrive at a test that was 
both realistically attainable and appropriately respectful of the right of the 
patient to possess sufficient information to make an „intelligent choice.‟ The 
question then became one of how to determine where, along the continuum of 
available  information,  reasonable  and  appropriate  information  lay  and, 
perhaps more importantly, by whom and how was it to be determined?  
 
Despite the clearly stated view that the standard was to be determined by the 
law, the evidentiary relevance of professional practice was readily accepted.  
The Court was not prepared, however, to limit its enquiry to an examination 
of what the profession thought was (or was not), appropriate.  The scope of 
the  information  required  was  to  be  shaped  by  the  patient‟s  right  of  self-
decision  and  need  for  information  material  to  the  decision.    The  test  of 
materiality  required  a  consideration  of  what  the  patient  would  consider 
„significant‟ to their  decision.37  The  language  adopted at this point in the 
enquiry touches upon self-determination and issues of autonomy, which are 
traditionally  identified  as  central  to  the  discussion  of  „informed  consent.‟  
However, in the absence of a clear doctrine of „informed consent,‟ the Court 
here  was  struggling  to  protect  the  patient  while  creating  an  attainable 
standard  for  the  physician.    The  potential  for  a  clash  of  interests  is  well 
                                                 
36 Ibid, 786. 
37 Ibid, 785-6.  The terminology here is important, as similar language was later employed by the High Court in 
Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 42 
illustrated by the curious position adopted by the Court when it stated that 
the  materiality  of  a  piece  of  information  (that  is,  the  materiality  of  the 
information to the patient in their decision making process) is always judged, 
at first instance, by the physician: 
 
Of necessity, the content of the disclosure rests in the first instance with the 
physician. Ordinarily it is only he who is in position to identify particular 
dangers;  always  he  must  make  a  judgment,  in  terms  of  materiality,  as  to 
whether and to what extent revelation to the patient is called for.38   
 
When considered closely, it becomes apparent that the Canterbury judgment 
has  some  internal  contradictions  which  have  often  been  overlooked  in 
subsequent interpretation and application.  It has come to stand as authority 
for the doctrine of „informed consent,‟ despite the Court‟s rejection of the term 
as useful.  It develops a test which purports to be measured by a patient-
centred standard of materiality but one which is to be determined, at least in 
the first instance, by what the physician believes to be material. The result is a 
judgment lacking both clarity and certainty.  It has also come to stand for a 
doctrine that was, on some levels, rejected by the Court. Perhaps the problem 
lies in the fact that when one is considering the notion of consent, there is no 
„bright line separating the significant from the insignificant.‟39  Despite this 
weakness in the judgment, it has come to mean so much more than a mere 
setting  of  a  standard  of  disclosure.  It  has  now  assumed  an  apparently 
authoritative position and is interpreted as being the key „informed consent‟ 
case.  The question is why and how has such a broad and perhaps erroneous 
interpretation been given to a relatively narrow decision? 
   
                                                 
38 Ibid, 786. 
39 Ibid, 787. 43 




[2.30]  The  aim  of  the  Canterbury  Court  was  to  clearly  enunciate  a  test  for 
determining whether sufficient information was given to a patient prior to a 
particular  course  of  treatment.    Such  a  test  did  not  turn  on  patient 
comprehension  or informed consent, yet the  accepted interpretation  of the 
decision embodies both of these principles.40 Canterbury is now the exemplar 
for the autonomous patient test as reflected in a patient-centred doctrine of 
informed consent.  This perception of the case has gradually evolved through 
subsequent  interpretations  and  apparent  applications  of  the  decision.  In 
endeavouring to trace the emergence of a doctrine of informed consent, it is 
informative to explore subsequent judicial treatments and to ascertain why 
(or indeed how) it has come to mean so much more and to be given such a 
broad interpretation.  
 
The core of the problem really lies in the evident difficulty of giving content to 
the duty of disclosure. It is readily recognised by the Courts that the scope of 
the disclosure required of physicians defies simple definition.41  In an attempt 
to create certainty, the Courts have sought to develop a clear test based on 
recognisable principles and readily accepted terminology. This has meant that 
the  cautionary  note  in  Canterbury  has  been  ignored  and  the  language  of 
informed consent has been embraced by the American judiciary in an at times 
                                                 
40 See for example Carr v Strode (1995) 904 p.2d 489 in which Moon CJ in the Supreme Court of Hawai‟i 
described Canterbury as „spearheading patient oriented standard of disclosure for actions founded in the doctrine 
of informed consent‟ (494) and Ketchup v Howard (2000) 247 Ga.App, 54 where the Court of Appeals of 
Georgia viewed Canterbury as embodying the common law doctrine of informed consent and in the literature, 
R.R.  Faden,  T.L.  Beauchamp,  (with  Nancy  King),  A  History  and  Theory  of  Informed  Consent  (Oxford 
University Press, New York,1986), 136 and 139 clearly aligns Canterbury with informed consent and  M.A. 
Berger, A. D. Twerski  „Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert‟ (2005) 104 Mich. L. Rev. 257, 
271 describes Canterbury as pushing informed consent into the limelight. Outside of the United States Courts in 
both  the  United  Kingdom  and  Australia  link  informed  consent  with  Canterbury,  refer  Sidaway  v  Board  of 
Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1985] AC 871, 898 Lord Bridge, 
(Lord Keith concurring) describe informed consent as being based on Canterbury and in the process of rejecting 
informed  consent  the  High  Court  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker  (1992)  175  CLR  479, 490    ((Mason CJ,  Brennan, 
Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ), specifically refer to Canterbury.  
41 Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal.3d 229 (1972), 244. 44 
misguided attempt to acknowledge the rights of the autonomous patient.  Of 
interest  is  the  fact  that  despite  the  clear  split  in  doctrinal  approach,42  the 
rationale and language employed to support the different tests remains the 
same.  In all jurisdictions within the United States, there is an unquestioning 
acceptance  of  the  idea  of  informed  consent  and  the  significance  of  the 
autonomous patient.  What has emerged as a result is a test which, in the 
hands  of  different  Courts  (and  different  legislatures),  purports  to  have 
different content but is in effect a hybrid test embracing elements of both the 
professional and the patient centred standards.43 
 
Despite the repeated reference to Canterbury as a „landmark‟44 decision, it does 
not represent an authoritative resolution of the informed consent debate.  The 
underlying  issues  raised  by  questions  regarding  pre-treatment  advice  are 
universally recognised, as is the basic premise that the patient has a right to 
sufficient information to make an „intelligent‟ or „informed‟ decision.  What is 
contested, or at variance, between the different jurisdictions within the United 
States (and as we shall see in following Chapters, other jurisdictions), is the 
actual content of the disclosure and the test for determining what constitutes 
                                                 
42 In the United States there is both a „patient centred‟ and a „professional standard‟ test, both of which will be 
discussed in detail below. 
43 This section of the discussion was informed by a broad review of decisions across jurisdictions in the United 
States. These included: Blazoski v Cook (2002) 346 NJ Super 256 (superior Court of New Jersey), Caputa v 
Antiles (1996) 296 N.J. Super.123 (Superior Court of New Jersey),  Carr vStrode (1995) 904 P.2d 489 (SC 
Hawai‟i), Cobbs v Grant  (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, Daum v Spinecare Medical Group Inc (1997) 52 Cal. App.4
th 
1285 (Court of Appeal, first District, Division 3, California), Duttry v Patterson (2001) 565 Pa. 130. (SC of 
Pennsylvania), Duttry v Patterson (2001) 565 Pa. 130. (SC of Pennsylvania), Foote v Rajadhyax (2000) 268 
A.D.2d 745 (SC, Appellate Division, NY), Giese v Stice (1997) 252 Beb. 913 (SC of Nebraska), Gorab v Zook 
(1997) 943 P.2d 423 (SC of Colorado), Guidry v Neu (1997) 708 So.2d 740 (Court of Appeal, Louisiana), 
Harrison  v  United  States  of  America  (2002)  284  F.3d.293  (United  States  Court  of  Appeals,  First  Circuit), 
Howard v University of Medicine & Dentistry of NJ (2002) 172 NJ 537, Hyles v Cockrill (1983) 169 Ga. App. 
132, Jamison v Kilgore (2004) 905 So. 2d 610 (Court of Appeals Mississippi), Karp v Cooley (1974) 493 F.2d 
408, Ketchup v Howard (2000) 247 Ga.App, 54 (Court of Appeals of Georgia), Largey v Rothman (1988) 110 
N.J. 204 (SC of New Jersey), Martin v Richards 192 Wis.2d 156 (1995), Matthies v Mastromonaco (1999) 160 
N.J. 26 (SC of New Jersey), Natanson v Kline 186 Kan. 393 (1960), Pope v Davis (2003) 261 Ga. App. 308 
(Court of Appeals, Georgia), Quintanilla v Dunkelman 133 Cal. App. 4
th 95 (2005) (Court of Appeal, Second 
District, Div.5 California), Retkwa v Orentreich (1992) 154 Misc. 2d 164 (Sc of NY County, NY), Salgo v 
Leland Stanford Jr University  Board of Trustees  (1957) 317 P.2d 170, Schreiber v Physicians Ins. Co. 588 
N.W.2d 26 (Wis 1999). 
44 For reference to Canterbury as a „landmark‟ decision see inter alia, J.W. Berg, P.S. Appelbaum, C.W. Lidz, L.S. 
Parker, Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice (2
nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2001), 65, Barbara L. Atwell, „The Modern Age of Informed Consent,‟(2006) 40 University of Richmond Law 
Review 591, 596, J.L. Hale, G.R. Podell „Medical Malpractice in New York‟ (1976) 27 Syracuse L. Rev 657, 
732, Arnold J. Rosoff, Informed Consent (Rockville, Aspen, 1981), 38, R.R. Faden, T.L.Beauchamp,. (with 
Nancy King), A History and Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford University Press, New York,1986), 133 and  
Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, [105] (Kirby J). 45 
an appropriate  level of information.  It  is important  to remember that  the 
Canterbury test is, in fact, adopted by less than 50% of the States.45 
 
Before the test for standard of care is analysed, it is helpful to turn one‟s mind 
to the underlying problem that the Courts, when considering standard, are 
attempting to solve.  A good starting point is to consider why the level of 
information due to a patient is even open to debate.  We can take this one step 
further and ask why the informational needs of the patient are not routinely 
met?  Close  analysis  of  the  decisions  suggest  that  the  problems  can  be 
attributed to certain underlying „certainties‟ that have been accepted by the 
judiciary and remain unchallenged by either patients or physicians.46 These 
certainties were clearly stated by the Court in Cobbs v Grant:47 
 
1.  the knowledge of the patient and physician are not in parity, 
2.  a  person  of  adult  years  and  sound  mind  has  the  right  to 
exercise control over their own body to determine whether or 
not to submit to lawful medical treatment, 
3.  for  patient  consent  to  treatment  to  be  effective  it  must  be 
informed, and 
4.  the patient, being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject 
dependence  upon  and  trust  in  his  physician  for  the 
information upon which he relies in making a decision.48 
 
The aim of the Courts is therefore to bridge the power-and-knowledge gap 
between the physician and patient and ensure that the patient is „informed.‟ 
But can this be achieved and, if so, what is the appropriate yardstick?  Do we 
                                                 
45 L.B.Frantz, above n.14, and W. Berg, P.S. Appelbaum, C.W. Lidz, L.S. Parker, Informed Consent: Legal Theory 
and Clinical Practice (2
nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), 48 notes the reversal in the trend set 
by Canterbury and the split in the approach in the Courts in the United States whilst R.R.Faden, T.L.Beauchamp, 
(with Nancy King), A History and Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford University Press, New York, 1986), 139 
tracks the decline of the Canterbury approach. 
46 These „certainties‟ form the basis of decisions not only in the United States but can also be seen to underpin the 
decisions in Australia and the United Kingdom, as will become evident in jurisdiction specific discussion to 
follow. 
47 Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal. 3d 229 (1972). 
48  Ibid, 242  (Mosk  J),  I  have  set  these  out  as a list  for  clarity,  in  the  judgment  His Honour describes these 
„postulates employed by judges‟ and the words are essentially his. 46 
look to the patient to determine what information they would have deemed 
appropriate or is it best left to the knowledge and skill of the doctor? If it is 
the doctor who is to decide what information the patient needs, how can this 
be reconciled with the purported role of informed consent which is to protect 
the individual needs of the autonomous patient?  We can see therefore that 
even at this most basic stage of the enquiry the Courts struggle to establish 
the appropriate focus.  If we are to unravel the complexities and establish a 
coherent doctrine of  „choice‟ we must carefully consider the existing tests for 
„informed  consent‟  and  ascertain  their  efficacy.    Canterbury  is  indeed  a 
„landmark‟ decision yet both Courts and legislatures in the United States have 
retreated from the position adopted by the Canterbury Court.  As a result of 
this retreat we have, in the United States (and indeed around the world), a 
clear  distinction  between  the  patient-centred  or  materiality  test  and  the 
professional practice test.  As we shall see below, however, the differences 
tend to be purely linguistic and the practical outcomes are remarkably similar, 
a  point  that  Sally  will  help  make  abundantly  clear  in  the  concluding 
discussions of Part I of this thesis.  
 
Patient centred, materiality test 
 
[2.40] The patient-centred test begins from the perspective of the patient and 
seeks  to  determine  what  information  would  have  been  material  to  the 
decision-making process of either that particular patient (a subjective test not 
widely adopted) or, more commonly, the reasonable patient in that position. 
The central theme introduced in Canterbury and adopted by many Courts, is 
materiality, a concept driven not by professional practice, but solely by what 
the  patient  wants  and  needs  to  know  (or  ought  to  want  and  need).    The 
adoption  of  materiality  as  a  decisive  factor  is  a  common  theme  running 
through the decisions purporting to apply Canterbury. 
 47 
The  Supreme Court of New Jersey, for example, embraced the decision  in 
Canterbury,  describing  it  as  introducing  a  new  standard  resting  on 
materiality.49  This  is  a  telling  decision  as  the  Court  emphasised  the 
underlying rationale of the rejection of the professional standard, citing, inter 
alia:  the  absence  of  a  discernable  custom  reflecting  medical  consensus,  the 
imperative of non-medical factors such as emotional condition, inconsistency 
with  the  right  to  self-determination  and  the  difficulty  of  patient  access  to 
supporting  expert  testimony  (the  risk  of  the  professional  „conspiracy  of 
silence‟).50  Each of these factors were described as supporting the rejection of 
the  professional  standard  and  the  return  of  the  decisional  power  to  the 
patient. 
 
The view of Canterbury as a significant protector of patient self-determination 
is  one  repeated  throughout  judicial  consideration  of  the  issue.  It  has  been 
described as adopting the materiality standard to protect the patient‟s right to 
self-determination,51  and  spearheading  what  has  become  known  as  the 
patient-oriented standard.52  Significantly, Canterbury has come to represent 
protection of self-determination by directing Courts to look to the motivating 
force  of  the  doctrine  of  informed  consent  –  protection  of  the  autonomous 
patient.53  For those decisions basing their reasoning on an interpretation of 
Canterbury, the cautionary note54 is ignored and informed consent is viewed 
as the core principle.  The reason for the rejection of the „informed consent‟ 
terminology  by  Robinson  J  (in  Canterbury  v  Spence)  was  that  in  his  view, 
                                                 
49 Refer Largey v Rothman 110 N.J. 204 (1988). 
50 Ibid, 213. 
51 Retkwa v Orentreich 154 Misc. 2d 164 (1992). 
52 Carr v Strode 904 P.2d 489 (1995)(Supreme Court Hawai‟i). 
53 Ibid, 499.  Also note Harrison v United States of America 284 F.3d. 293, in which the Court describes the „very 
purpose of disclosure‟ as being protection of autonomy, (298), in  Carr v Strode (1995) 904 P.2d 489 self-
determination was desecribed as the „motivating force and purpose of the doctrine of informed consent‟ (499), 
Daum v  Spinecare  Medical  Group  Inc  (1997)  52  Cal.  App.4
th  1285  saw the  Court  exploring  the  „cardinal 
principle which guides the Courts‟ (self-determination) (1304), whilst in Largey v Rothman (1988) 110 N.J. 204 
the Court chose to abandon the professional standard describing it as, „inter alia, inconsistent with the patient‟s 
right of self-determination‟ (213),  Howard v University of Medicine  & Dentistry of NJ  (2002) 172 NJ 537 
explained that the „patient-centred view of informed consent stresses the patients‟ right to self-determination‟ 
(547) and in Natanson v Kline 186 Kan. 393 (1960) the Court stated that „Anglo-American law starts with the 
premise of thorough-going self-determination‟ (407).  
54 Refer Canterbury v Spence 464 F. 2d 772, (1972) at 780, fn15, where the Court rejects the term informed 
consent as unhelpful. 48 
„informed consent‟ misdirects the enquiry and „implies that what is decisive is 
the  degree  of  the  patient‟s  comprehension.‟55  It  was  the  view  of  the 
Canterbury Court (a view supported in subsequent decisions) that it is not a 
question  of  patient  comprehension.  Additionally,  the  quality  of  the 
information given is not a key concern. Rather the focus is on content.  This is 
not entirely consistent with a patient-centred enquiry. 
 
With the emphasis on such ideals as self-determination and autonomy in the 
evolution  of  the  materiality  test,  there  is  a  stated  aim  of  returning  the 
decision-making  power  to  the  patient.  This  is  deemed  to  be  the  central 
concern not only in the United States, but as we shall see in the following 
Chapters,  in  all  of  the  jurisdictions  under  consideration.  Interestingly, 
however, despite the impetus for the enquiry being the return of authority to 
the patient, it becomes irrelevant when the Courts turn their attention to the 
identification of the measurement of the loss sustained.  The loss of decision-
making  power  which  flows  from  incomplete  pre-treatment  information  is 
ignored.    What  we  see  is  an  enquiry  which  starts  with  the  foundational 
premise of a patient‟s right to information: in jurisdictions which apply the 
patient-centred  materiality  test  this  right  is  given  content  through  an 
exploration  of  what  the  patient  would  deem  material.    But  the  loss  then 
becomes  a  physical  one.  There  is  a  gap  in  reasoning  here  that  the  Courts 
struggle to bridge as there is not always a clear causative link between the 
denial of information and the manifestation of a physical harm.56   
 
The  gap  between  the  apparent  aim  of  informed  consent  and  the  practical 
application of the doctrine becomes even more problematic when the right of 
the patient to information is measured not by the expectations or needs of the 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 This gap is investigated in detail in Part II which explores the role of causation, it will then be specifically 
addressed when we consider an alternative to the current model of loss in Part III and the concluding discussion. 49 
patient but by the professional expertise of the doctor.  This is the situation in 
the United Kingdom57 and parts of the United States.  
 
The professional practice test 
 
[2.50] In some instances in the United States, the Courts have purported to 
reject the patient centred approach embodied in the Canterbury decision.  Yet 
the enquiry continues to spring from the „root premise‟ of Schloendorff that 
„every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body.‟58  Importantly, the nature of consent 
turns on the provision of information enabling a knowledgeable evaluation of 
the  options  available  and  the  risks  attendant  upon  each.59  The  point  of 
departure from the materiality test is the source of evidence and the question 
of who is to determine what constitutes sufficient information. In Texas, for 
example,  it  is  described  as  a  medical  standard  to  be  proved  by  medical 
experts, focussing on the reasonable practitioner, with the correct question 
being not what the reasonable juror or the reasonable man would relate, but 
what the „reasonable practitioner‟ would relate.60 
 
The  professional  practice  standard  is  most  commonly  embodied  in  statute 
mandating its adoption by the Court.  This does not always sit comfortably 
with the judiciary.  The decision in Eccleston v Chait,61 provides an excellent 
example  with  the  professional  standard  (as  opposed  to  the  more  patient 
centred material risk standard), being described as paternalistic,62 resulting in 
the patient being left in the „precarious position‟ of having to explore the risks 
and adverse consequences themselves.63 
 
                                                 
57 To be discussed in Chapter 3. 
58 Karp v Cooley 493 F.2d 408 (1974), 415 (Bell J, citing Schloendorff v The Society of the New York Hospital 211 
N.Y 125 at 129-130, (1914)). 
59 Ibid, 419. 
60 Ibid, 420. 
61 Eccleston v Chait 241 Neb. 961 (SC Nebraska) (1992). 
62 Ibid, 968. 
63 Ibid, 969. 50 
As a result of this discomfort, the Courts have tended to struggle with the 
application of a standard that is viewed as potentially in conflict with the 
foundations  thought  to  be  laid  by  decisions  such  as  Schloendorff  and 
Canterbury.  The Courts strive to preserve the autonomy of the patient in a 
climate viewed as being controlled by the medical profession.64  The Court in 
Retkwa,65  for  example,  took  care  to  explore  the  materiality  standard  as 
explained in Canterbury v Spence and interpreted it as protecting the patient‟s 
right  to  self-determination66  and  therefore  consistent  with  the  aims  of 
Schloendorff.    However  the  Court  was  bound  by  the  implementation  of 
legislation  requiring  that  informed  consent  be  measured  not  by  what  a 
reasonable patient would want or need to know, but by what a competent 
physician  believes  the  patient  in  his  or  her  circumstances  ought  to  know.  
Thus the appropriate standard was to be determined with reference to expert 
evidence but the enquiry must continue to be driven by the underlying right 
of the patient to determine whether or not to undergo a particular course of 
treatment.67  Similarly, the more recent decision of Foote v Rajadhyx68 grounds 
the test in what a reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed along 
with what the reasonably prudent patient would have decided to do.69   
 
It  is  perhaps  this  struggle  to  have  due  regard  to  the  prudent/reasonable 
patient within the constraints of the professional practice standard that has 
led  to  the  emergence  of  a  hybrid  test  which  uses  the  language  of  the 
professional practice standard but, at times directly, addresses the concepts of 
materiality and the prudent patient.  The waters have become muddied by 
this preoccupation with the appropriate measure of standard and the enquiry 
complicated by the perceived need to combine two, potentially conflicting, 
                                                 
64 The Court in Retkwa v Orentreich 154 Misc. 2d 164 (1992) describes the implementation of legislation as being 
driven by threats of strike action following Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid, 166. 
67 Ibid, 168. 
68 Foote v Rajadhyax (2000) 268 A.D. 2d 745. 
69 Ibid, at 745. 51 
approaches.  Interestingly, whatever approach is adopted, breach of duty is 
the most common conclusion. 
 
The scholarly view of Canterbury 
 
[2.60] With the apparent acceptance by the Courts of the autonomous, self-
determining  patient,  it  would  perhaps  be  reasonable  to  assume  that  the 
doctrine of informed consent can be clearly identified and analysed. This is 
not the case. There are repeated references throughout the scholarly literature 
to the inherent uncertainty of the doctrine along with a recognition that the 
Courts  are  endeavouring  to  balance  competing  needs  that  may  not  be 
reconcilable. For example, Faden and Beauchamp describe the doctrine and 
underlying theory as „strikingly unsettled‟70 and suggest that this „unclarity … 
has  hindered  the  understanding  of  informed  consent  since  its  earliest 
development,‟71 whilst Berg et al explore the confusion that continues to exist 
about the requirement of the informed consent doctrine72 and suggest that the 
„legal requirements of the doctrine remain unclear.‟73  Katz is a little more 
scathing  in  his  description  of  the  doctrine,  highlighting  the  „problem  of 
uncertainty  of  the  doctrine‟  and  suggesting  that  „informed  consent  is  a 
charade‟74 and in a similar vein Heinemann talks of the „residual doubts‟ left 
by Canterbury and goes so far as to suggest that „it undermined the ideal of 
self-determination.‟75 Still others say that it is „either functionally symbolic or 
dysfunctionally sentimental‟76 and „laudable in theory, but not a panacea.‟77  
In  short,  neither  Canterbury  nor  the  doctrine  of  informed  consent  are 
                                                 
70 R.R. Faden and T.L. Beauchamp (with Nancy King),  A  History and Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1986), 115. 
71 Ibid, 116. 
72 J.W. Berg, P.S. Appelbaum, C.W. Lidz, L.S. Parker, Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice (2
nd 
ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), 45. 
73 Ibid, 65. 
74 J. Katz, „Informed Consent, Must it Remain a Fairytale‟ (1994) 10 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and 
Policy 69, 81. 
75 R.A.  Heinemann, „Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v Kokemoor and Physician- Specific 
Disclosure,‟ (1997) Wisconsin Law Review 1079, 1085. 
76 K. M. Boos, E. J. Boos, „At the Intersection of Law and Morality: A Descriptive Sociology of the Effectiveness 
of Informed Consent Law,‟ (2004)5 Journal of Law in Society 457, 464. 
77 B. L. Atwell, „The Modern Age of Informed Consent,‟ (2006) 40 University of Richmond Law Review, 591, 598. 52 
embraced as clear or certain.  There is, however, one common thread and this 
is  the  ready  acceptance  of  the  concept  of  a  doctrine  of  informed  consent 
striving to protect patient autonomy,78 a concept which, close analysis reveals, 
was challenged by the Canterbury Court. 
 
As  outlined  above,  the  common  starting  point  for  considerations  of 
Canterbury is a discussion of autonomy with the recognised goal of „informed 
consent‟  being  „to  obtain  a  morally  valid  consent‟  based  on  appropriate 
provision  of  information.79  The  traditional  position  of  informed  consent, 
hinging  upon  the  notion  of  autonomy,  is  widely  recognised80  as  are  the 
difficulties often encountered by the Courts when they have sought to adhere 
to  this  apparently  foundational  premise.    The  various  judicial  appeals  to 
autonomy  have  been  described  as  „blundering‟  and  „confused,‟81  clearly 
reflecting the practical difficulty of uniform application of a concept which is 
not  uniformly  defined.82  The  problem  of  focussing  on  the  mechanics  of 
information  giving  without  testing  patient  understanding  has  also  been 
highlighted.83  This gap between information and understanding (which was 
specifically identified as valid by the Canterbury Court84) poses an obstacle to 
truly informed decision making, and therefore to autonomy. The enquiry is 
                                                 
78 A significant problem with the concept of autonomy is the imprecise meaning of the term, this is explored in 
detail in Part III, Chapter 10. For reference to the significance of self-determination and autonomy refer (for 
example), Faden et al, above n.70, 135 where self-determination is described as providing the Canterbury Court 
with its primary justification,‟ Frantz, above n.14, §2b where the „very basis‟ of the informed consent theory is to 
protect the patient‟s right to choose what is done to their body.  Boos and Boos, above n.76, 468 claim that 
„informed consent hinges on autonomy‟  Suzanne K. Ketler, „The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A Cultural 
Analysis of the Informed Consent Doctrine after Schreiber v Physicians Insurance of Wisconsin,‟ (2001) 95 
Northwestern  University  Law  Review  1029  explains  that  the  common  law  doctrine  of  informed  consent  is 
premised upon the principle of bodily self-determination‟ and Atwell, above n.77, 596 asserts that „autonomy is 
the fundamental principle … a fundamental part of our legal fabric.‟ 
79 G.P. Smith „The Vagaries of Informed Consent‟ (2004) 1 Indiana Health Law Review 111, 112.  See also the 
references and comments outlined ibid. 
80A.D. Burnett III, „Suturing the Loophole: Informed Consent as a Requirement for Procedures not Enumerated in 
Pennsylvania‟s Medical Informed Consent Statute,‟ (2004) 108 Penn State Law Review 1249,1263, Boos and 
Boos, above n.76, 469 Atwell, above n.77, 594. 
81 Faden, et al, above n.70 , 141. 
82 Boos and Boos, above n. 76, 469 for example highlights the point that as the concept of autonomy is variously 
defined, it creates an uncertain basis upon which to rest a foundational doctrine.  As mentioned above, this issue 
is discussed in more detail in Part III, Chapter 10. 
83 Cathy J. Jones, „Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decision-making: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecy‟ (1990) 47 Washington and Lee Law Review 379, 392. 
84 Refer Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972), 779. 53 
guided  by  considerations  of  professional  standards,  not  patient  needs  and 
rights. 
  
It has been suggested that the rationale of Canterbury is based upon a flawed 
assumption.85 The decision is therefore not routinely endorsed. As we have 
seen,  one  of  the  most  significant  criticisms  of  the  decision  is  its  lack  of 
certainty and efficacy. Within the scholarly literature there is a recognition 
that  the  richness  of  law‟s  „rhetorical  devotion  to  the  ideal  of  patient  self 
determination‟  is  not  equalled  by  a  willingness  to  provide  effective  legal 
redress to patients who have a grievance. This is a theme that I will develop 
further throughout this thesis and in Chapters 3 and 4 we will see that this is 
also  a  concern  in  both  the  United  Kingdom  and  Australia.    In  short,  the 
existing  doctrine  presents  some  difficulties  to  the  scholars  who  have 
considered it and the practical application of informed consent as exemplified 
by  Canterbury  has  been  described  as    „far  from  perfect,‟86  „a  fa￧ade‟87  and 
„inadequate.‟88 
 
One objection to Canterbury decision is the apparent lack of certainty attached 
to the concept of materiality and the questionable basis of the reasoning of the 
Court.  It has been suggested that the rationale of Canterbury is based upon a 
flawed  assumption  and  involved  the  Court  simply  „grafting‟  the  patient‟s 
interests and the physician‟s duties together. 89 The identified flaw being the 
assumption  that  the  patient‟s  personal  choice  and  the  physician‟s 
commitment to their professional duty „tend generally to the same end.‟90  In 
reality, these two duties may coincidentally align but this will not always be 
the case.  To preserve a patient‟s right of self-determination by specifying the 
physician‟s  standard  of  care  (as  was  done  by  the  Canterbury  Court),  is  to 
                                                 
85 A.J. Wiesbard, „Informed Consent: The Law‟s uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory,‟ (1986) 65 Nebraska 
Law Review 749, 751. 
86 Atwell, above n.77, 598. 
87 Schuck, P.H, „Rethinking Informed Consent,‟ (1994) 103 Yale Law Journal 899, 904. 
88 Atwell, above n.77, 598. 
89 Faden, Beauchamp (Nancy King), above n.20, 135. 
90 Ibid. 54 
obscure the different nature of physician and patient rights and duties.  In the 
blurring  of  the  lines  between  rights  and  duties  we  see  the  beginning  of  a 
problem  which  is  apparent  in  all  stages  of  the  informed  consent  analysis.  
There is a foundational premise of the patient‟s right to adequate disclosure 
and a stated intention to protect this right.  Yet there is a significant divide 
between the protected right and the measure of appropriate standard of care.  
The Courts emphasise autonomy and begin with a clear focus on the patient, 
yet in the practical application of the legal test, they immediately shift focus 
from the patient to the doctor.  Very quickly we see autonomy give way to 
considerations  of  accepted  (and  expected)  medical  standards.    Thus,  one 
person‟s  right  is  measured  by  another‟s  duties.91  Whilst  this  could  be 
described as a clear example of Hohfeld‟s „jural correlatives‟92 with the „right‟ 
of the patient being defined and explored by the doctor‟s correlative duty, it 
diminishes the significance of the patient‟s perspective and the existence of a 
relationship, choosing to focus instead entirely on the expected standards of 
the  doctor.    Thus  the  correlative  nature  of  the  relationship  is  overlooked 
beyond the initial recognition of the two parties with the enquiry focussing 
entirely on one side of the relationship. 
 
The Canterbury Court is most generally associated with the adoption of the 
patient-centred  test  and  rejection  of  the  professional  standard  as  unduly 
deferential to the medical profession,93 but this is not the only interpretation 
of the decision.  The  endorsement of therapeutic privilege94 along with an 
objective standard driven by what the physician believes a reasonable patient 
would consider material (as opposed to the actual patient before him or her), 
has supported an interpretation that it is a decision „typifying the reluctance 
                                                 
91 This is a theme also raised by Sheila A.M. McLean, see A patient’s right to know: Information disclosure, the 
doctor and the law (Dartmouth Publishing Company, Aldershot, 1989), 87 and Autonomy, Consent and the Law 
(Routledge-Cavendish, New York, 2010), 72. 
92 W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Yale university Press, Newhaven, 1964), 36 ff. 
93 This description is one that the Canterbury Court itself would favour, refer Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, 
(1972), 784.  
94  That  is,  the  endorsement  of  the  withholding  of  information on  the  grounds that  „it poses such  a  threat of 
detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view‟ Canterbury v 
Spence  464 F.2d 772, (1972), 789. 55 
of judges to impinge on the authority and expertise of medical practitioners.‟95  
A further criticism levelled at the Canterbury decision is that its „legacy is as 
much the consent form‟ as it is clarity and awareness of the patient‟s rights.96 
 
The  endeavours  of  the  Canterbury  Court  are  not,  however,  universally 
criticised.    The  case  has  been  described  as  the  landmark  case  providing  a 
touchstone for informed consent97 „presenting a modern, comprehensive and 
focal paradigm of the legal concept of informed consent in application.‟98 It 
has been recognised as establishing a „far-reaching patient-centred standard 
of disclosure,‟99 „based upon a foundation of bodily integrity.‟100  Indeed, it is 
this  foundational  principle  which  is  most  frequently  emphasised  as 
emanating from the heart of the Canterbury decision.  Despite this support, it 
is clear that there are problems with the realisation of the ideal of Canterbury 
and it is to these problems we must now turn. 
 
The practical application of Canterbury and the emergence of a 
hybrid test 
 
[2.70] Scholarly consideration of Canterbury has been quick to highlight the 
shortcomings of an ideal based upon patient autonomy, but Courts have been 
reluctant to abandon this ideal.  The realities of practice, however, have meant 
that informed consent in the United States is purportedly represented by two 
distinct  standards:  the  professional  standard  and  the  patient-centred 
standard.  Careful  consideration  of  the  different  judgments,  however, 
demonstrates that the two interests have merged to create a hybrid standard 
endeavouring  to  protect  both  the  physician  and  the  patient.    This  hybrid 
standard  pays  deference  to  the  autonomous  patient  at  the  same  time  as 
                                                 
95 Richard A. Heinemann, „Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v Kokemoor and Physician- Specific 
Disclosure,‟ (1997) Wisconsin Law Review 1079, 1086. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See for example: Atwell, above n79, 596, A.R. Rosoff, Informed Consent (Rockville, Aspen, 1981), 38 and G.P. 
Smith, above n.79, 117. See also the references to Canterbury as a „landmark‟ decision as outlined above n.44. 
98 G. P. Smith, above n.79, 117. 
99 Boos and Boos, above n.76, 473. 
100 Burnett, above n.80, 1262. 56 
turning  to the  profession  for  advice.    Once  again  we  see  Courts  trying to 
reconcile  interests  which  even  in  an  ideal  doctor/patient  relationship  are 
unlikely to be reconcilable. 
 
A clear example of the hybrid standard is found in Cobbs v Grant101 which 
begins from the position that the physician must reveal to the patient such 
additional  information  as  a  „skilled  practitioner  of  good  standing  would 
provide  under  similar  circumstances.‟102  The  Court  then  summarises  its 
position  by  describing  the  right  of  self-decision  as  the  measure  of  the 
physicians‟ duty to reveal and then affirms the concept of intelligent choice 
and the Canterbury idea of materiality.103  The Court concludes by handing 
discretion back to the physician with the strong statement that a disclosure 
beyond that required by the medical community is not necessary when it can 
be demonstrated that such a disclosure would have meant that the patient 
was  unable  to  „dispassionately  weigh  the  risks  of  refusing  to  undergo the 
treatment.‟104  Thus  the  Court  is  advocating  the  „protection‟  of  the  patient 
through the withholding of information which would only serve to colour 
their  reasoning  and  perhaps,  lead  to  a  decision  that  is  in  contrary  to  the 
accepted medical opinion.  We see therefore the use of the language of self-
determination alongside a clear deference to professional opinion, with the 
reasoning leaving open the question of how or when a patient can ever be 
described  as  „dispassionate.‟  Surely,  the  personal  nature  of  the  decision-
making process, in the context of medical treatment means that it is, by its 
very nature, a deeply personal and „passionate‟ process?  Thus we see that 
despite the steps taken by the Court to lend clarity to the debate, they have 
simply raised another set of questions. 
 
                                                 
101 8 Cal.3d 229, (1972). 
102 Ibid, 244-5 (Mosk J). 
103 Ibid, 245.  The concept of an intelligent decision is not defined in any of the case law that employs the term, 
once again leaving a definitional gap. 
104 Ibid, 246. 57 
The hybrid standard reflects an attempt by the Courts to balance individual 
needs and rights against the social utility of a medical profession that can 
confidently  operate  without  constant  fear  of  litigation.  In  Colorado  the 
balance was struck by recognising the need to inform patients of „medically 
significant risks.‟105 However whether or not a risk was deemed to meet this 
requirement  had  to  be  demonstrated  by  expert  testimony.106  The  test  of 
significance or materiality was removed from the patient and returned to the 
profession.  A final example (for present purposes) of the hybrid test is found 
in  Ketchup  v  Howard107  when  the  Court  acknowledged  the  requirement  of 
material risk and claimed that all states had a doctrine of informed consent 
embodying this concept.108  The Court then neatly straddled the divide of the 
two, apparently competing, standards by referring to the American Medical 
Association  (AMA)  Code  of  Medical  Ethics  which  provides  at  s  8.08  that: 
„[t]he patient‟s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the 
patient possessed enough information to enable an intelligent choice.‟109 
 
The  view  of  the  Court  in  this  instance  was  that  because  the  AMA  is  an 
organisation  composed  of  medical  experts,  its  code  of  ethics  should  be 
understood to reflect the professional standard of care,110 therefore the patient 
and professional standards are to be viewed as one.  It is worth noting the use 
of the term „choice‟ here.  Clearly it is recognised as an important component 
of  the  informed  consent  process  and  the  language  of  choice  is  deemed 
appropriate by the AMA, yet choice is generally overlooked in favour of the 
term consent.  We will of course explore this further in Part III in our journey 
towards  a  legal  recognition  of  informed  choice  as  opposed  to  informed 
consent. 
 
                                                 
105 Gorab v Zook 943 P.2d 423 (1997), 427. 
106 Ibid. 
107 247 Ga.App 54 (2000). 
108 Ibid, 54 (Johnson CJ). 
109AMA  Website,  http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics.shtml, at January 2011. 
110 Ketchup v Howard 247 Ga. App 54 (2000), 60 (Johnson CJ). The Court was referring to an earlier version of 
the AMA Code but the point continues to be relevant in this context and retains the same provision.  58 
These examples of judicial linking of two ideals (professional standard and 
protection  of  autonomy  through  a  more  patient-centred  test)  are  overly 
optimistic and fail to appreciate the complex clash of expectations. In reality, a 
test has evolved that endeavours to protect the physician from liability.  It has 
even been suggested that the disclosure practices changed not to protect the 
autonomous  patient,  but  to  assist  doctors  to  escape  liability.111  This 
interpretation is further strengthened by the strong assertion by Ketler in 2001 
that the legal doctrine of informed consent is concerned with how much and 
what kinds of information physicians must provide to their patients in order 
to avoid legal liability, while also suggesting that the common law doctrine of 
informed  consent  is  premised  upon  the  principle  of  bodily  self-
determination.112    This  description  is  inherently  contradictory  and 
demonstrates  inconsistency  in  application  of  the  doctrine.  How  can  a 
doctrine  which  is  given  effect  by  protecting  physicians  from  liability  be 
described as protecting a patient‟s bodily self-determination? This is a core 
problem with the practical application of the Canterbury principle which does 
not match its stated aims.  And this is a problem which we will observe in 
each jurisdiction under consideration. 
 
A further problem with the application of informed consent in the United 
States  is  the  fact  that  despite  the  different  tests,  there  is  little  practical 
difference in the application of the different standards. Berg et al113 refer to a 
comparative study of states employing the professional standard versus those 
focussing on the „materiality‟ or more patient-centred approach.  The study 
found  no  significant  difference  between  physician  disclosures.114  Therefore 
after  much  debate,  many  assertions  and  conclusions  it  would  appear  that 
                                                 
111 J.Katz, „Informed Consent – Must it Remain a Fairytale?‟ (1994) 10 Journal of Contemporary Health Law & 
Policy 69, 80-81. 
112 Suzanne K. Ketler, „The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A Cultural Analysis of the Informed Consent Doctrine 
After Schreiber v Physicians Insurance of Wisconsin,‟ (2001) 95 Northwestern University Law Review, 1029, 
1032 and 1035). 
113 Berg et al, above n.72 referring to A. Rosoff, A.R. Rosoff, Informed Consent (Rockville, Aspen, 1981). 
114 Ibid, 52. 59 
there  is  no  difference  between  the  practical  outcomes  of  the  purportedly 
divergent tests. 
 
More than 30 years on, what then does Canterbury represent?  The practical 
realisation of the decision appears to be a standard difficult to both define and 
apply in the clinical setting. Not only are the standards unclear, but in reality 
they are often viewed as the means of instructing juries about professional 
standards  rather  than  protecting  patients  or  informing  physicians.115  Once 
again we see the recurring issue of measuring the rights of one party through 
the analysis of the duties of another. Whilst duties and rights are, by their 
nature, correlative, here the correlation is present in name only.  The Courts 
refer to the right of the patient to information and the duty of the doctor to 
provide it.  The nature of the duty then transforms into a professional duty to 
act in accordance with professional standards.  The result of this approach is a 
displacement of the autonomous patient from the discussion as their rights 
are  not  a  practical  consideration.  This  conclusion  is  one  which  will  echo 
throughout  our  discussion  and  we  will  see  that  it  is  a  concern  that  is 
repeatedly  raised  in  judicial  and  scholarly  considerations  of  pre-treatment 
advice.   
 
   
                                                 
115 Ibid, 64. 60 
Re-visiting the core issues 
 
[2.80]  In  the  introductory  discussion  I  posed  three  questions  that  will  be 
addressed in each of the Chapters of this Part of the thesis.  The preceding 
discussion implicitly answered each of those questions but before moving on 
to the discussion of the position in the United Kingdom (and then of course of 
Australia), each of the questions will be specifically addressed, thus providing 
a clear end to this stage of our discussion.  
 
Is ‘informed consent’ truly about consent? 
 
[2.90] Robinson  J in  Canterbury  asserted that „true  consent comes from the 
informed  exercise  of  a  choice  and  the  ability  to  evaluate  knowledgeably  the 
options available.‟116  Alongside this, however, he cautioned that the test is 
not truly about consent and emphasised that consent and the provision of 
information are „two sides of the same coin‟ but to label inquiries such as 
those outlined here as being about consent is a „misdirection.‟117 Analysis of 
the informed consent doctrine is therefore not truly about consent but about 
patient rights to information and the doctor‟s professional duty to provide 
that information.  Consent is best left to discussions of trespass. 
 
Who takes the central role (the prudent patient or the prudent professional)? 
 
[2.100] As we have seen, the position in the United States is often interpreted 
as being patient centred as represented by Canterbury.  Such an interpretation 
entails a misunderstanding (and over simplification) of the actual position as 
stated by  the  Courts.  The  approach in the United States is not consistent 
across  the  jurisdictions  and  even  the  apparently  patient-centred  enquiries 
involve clear consideration of professional standards.  In addition to the mix 
                                                 
116 Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972), 779, (emphasis added). 
117 Ibid, 780 refer fn 15 of the judgment.  61 
of considerations, there has been an attempt to reconcile the interests of both 
the doctor and the patient which has resulted in the development of a hybrid 
test  representing  both  the  doctor  and  the  patient.    It  is  also  important  to 
remember  that  whilst  Canterbury  is  viewed  as  rejecting  the  professional 
standard,  the  Court  acknowledged  the  significance  of  the  expertise  of  the 
physician and suggested that the test is not about the patients‟ comprehension 
or consent but it is about the physician‟s provision of information and their 
duty to „enlighten‟ the patient.118   
 
A further important aspect of the Canterbury decision is the evidentiary role 
played by professional practice along with the fact that the so-called patient-
centred  test  of  materiality  begins  with  a  consideration  of the views  of  the 
physician.119  Beyond Canterbury, both patient and professional-centred tests 
are  applied  and  the  reality  is  that  similar  language  is  employed  in  both 
discussions and often elements of the other creep in, thus we have a hybrid 
test.120 
 
Are we dealing with patient autonomy or professional standard of care? (Or 
is it about the doctor or the patient?) 
 
[2.110]  This  question  addresses  the  main  issue  at  the  duty  stage  of  the 
enquiry.  The purported driving force of the doctrine is patient autonomy121 
and yet the actual patient does not always factor in the judicial discussions.  
As outlined above, even Canterbury, which purports to focus on the patient, 
marks a retreat from the patient.  The focus is on the actions of the doctor.  
There  is  a  perceived  conflict  between  the  needs  and  expectations  of  the 
patient and the role of the doctor as a professional.  We see in Canterbury an 
ostensible recognition of the significance of the actual patient, but the „patient-
centred‟  materiality  test  begins  from  the  perspective  of  the  doctor.    By 
                                                 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid, 786. 
120 For references to support this assertion, refer above n.43. 
121 See discussion and references above n.53 62 
contrast, in Retkwa v Orentreich122 we see the opposite happen, when a Court 
bound by statute to apply a professional standard begins from the position of 
the rights of the patient, while Foote v Rahadhyax endeavours to straddle both 
considerations  by  holding  that  the  question  must  be  addressed  by 
determining  what  a  reasonable  medical  practitioner  would  have  disclosed 
along with what the reasonably prudent patient would have decided to do.123 
 
The  answer  to  the  three  questions  posed  is  therefore  neither  clear  nor 
straightforward.  It is upon this uncertain foundation that the entire doctrine 
of informed consent sits.  We will now turn to the United Kingdom which 
purports  to  employ  a  pure  professional  test  and  discover  that  similar 
considerations guide  the decisions of the English Courts.   As we  progress 
through  this  analysis  it  will  become  increasingly  evident  that  we  have  a 
complex doctrine that purports to protect a foundational right of the patient 
but fails to do so with any consistency.  Perhaps this is because the wrong 
question is being asked.  The enquiry is framed around the issue of consent 
when the  matter  is really  about the communication  between a  doctor and 
their  patient  and  the  resulting  process  of  making  a  choice.  This  is  the 
argument  at  the  heart  of  my  thesis  and  it  is  an  argument  that  is  further 
developed in Chapter 3 where we consider the United Kingdom.  
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[3.10] This Chapter provides a perfect contrast to the  last as we move our 
attention to a test for standard of care purportedly based upon professional 
practice as opposed to patient expectations.  In the United Kingdom we find a 
test with an apparently different focus from that of the United States.  Despite 
the fact that some Law Lords have expressed sympathy for the position in the 
United States,2 there has been a clear and consistent rejection of the notion of 
informed consent.  The test of sufficiency of information prior to receipt of 
treatment  is  closely  identified  with  professional  standards,  determined  by 
„responsible‟  members  of  the  profession.    In  establishing  the  appropriate 
standard of care the patient is removed from contemplation (they do not re-
enter the arena until the causation stage), with the doctor and his/her peers 
taking centre stage.   
 
This description of the position in the UK is the traditional one and relies 
upon  a  received  interpretation  of  the  two  leading  decisions  of  Bolam  and 
Sidaway.3  The traditional interpretation is, however, open to challenge, with 
more  recent  decisions  and  discussions  questioning  the  original  aims  of 
McNair J in Bolam and the subsequent broad application of his words.  With 
the apparent demise of informed consent in the United Kingdom, it has been 
argued  that  the  Courts  have  abrogated  their  authority  to  the  medical 
profession, allowing those who were being judged to do the judging.4  Such 
                                                 
1 As noted above, for the purposes of this thesis I will refer broadly to „The United Kingdom‟ but this is limited to 
England and Wales and excludes specific analysis of Scotland, where the law is different. 
2 In particular, see  Lord Scarman in  Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital  & the 
Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1984] QB 493. 
3  Bolam  v  Friern  Hospital  Management  Committee  (Bolam)  [1957]  1  WLR  582  and  Sidaway  v  Board  of 
Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1984] QB 493. 
4 See for example Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 489 „one consequence of the application of the Bolam 
principle … medical opinion determines whether the risk should or should not be disclosed (Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ) and Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880, 894 „this is to hand over to the 
profession the entire question of scope of duty of care.‟ 64 
an  approach  does  not  accord  with  general  negligence  principles5  and  it 
perhaps represents a move away from the intent of the original judgment of 
Bolam.  More recent decisions reflect an awareness of this underlying problem 
and there is a growing recognition of the role of the patient in the treatment 
conversation.  This represents a shift to the middle ground in which the rights 
and duties of both the doctor and the patient are considered. We will explore 
the evolution of the standard test below but it is worth noting that the shift 
back to the patient is reflected in the most recent General Medical Council 
Guidelines on Consent.  The Guidelines specifically focus on the partnership 
between  the  doctor  and  patient  and  clearly  guide  the  doctor  away  from 
paternalistic  practice  towards  a  joint  decision-making  process.6  This 
suggestion that there has been a shift in focus has recently been advanced by 
Miola.7  He reasons that the „Bolam test‟ has become similar in effect to the 
traditionally more patient-oriented tests, especially in Australia8 and goes so 
far as to question whether perhaps Bolam actually enhances autonomy.9  We 
will explore this possibility in the following discussion which begins with a 
careful  analysis  of  the  actual  decision  of  Bolam.    We  will  then  consider 
subsequent interpretations and applications of the decision.10 
 
The foundations of informed consent 
 
[3.20]  As  discussed  above,  the  test  for  informed  consent  in  the  United 
Kingdom is said to rest on interpretations of Bolam.  The approach that has 
                                                 
5 J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997), 170 suggests that „this comes close 
to being a rule that doctors themselves set the standard of care required of them and that all that negligence does 
is  to  reinforce  existing  professional  standards  …  Such  a  rule  would  run  against  the  normal  principles  of 
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6 General Medical Council,  Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together (Guidance for doctors), 
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7 Miola. J, „On the Materiality of Risk: Paper Tigers and Panaceas,‟ (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 76. 
8 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 represents the „panacea‟ of his title. 
9 Miola, above n.7, 105. 
10 This will entail a consideration of Bolam followed by Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal 
Hospital &  the Maudsley Hospital  & Ors [1985] AC 871 (Court of Appeal) Sidaway v Board of Governors of 
the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1984] QB 493 (House of Lords).  These three 
decisions provide insight into the evolution of the current position in the United Kingdom.  Subsequent judicial 
and scholarly interpretations will also be explored. 65 
emerged has been described as the „infamous Bolam test‟11 and subsequent 
key decisions appeal directly to the Bolam standard.12  In Australia, Rogers v 
Whitaker13 directly refers to (and rejects) Bolam.14  Any discussion of „informed 
consent‟ in the United Kingdom must therefore begin with the foundational 
decision  of  Bolam.    The  plaintiff  in  this  instance  was  a  voluntary  patient 
suffering  from  depression.  He  was  treated  by  electro-convulsive  therapy 
(ECT) and suffered injury as a result of the manner in which the treatment 
was administered (he was neither given relaxant drugs nor restrained).  The 
claim, for the purposes of this discussion, was that the doctor was negligent in 
failing to provide adequate warning of the inherent risks of the treatment15 
and there was some disagreement as to whether or not warning should have 
been  given.  It  was  ultimately  concluded  that  in  these  circumstances,  no 
warning was required. 
 
The need to balance competing interests was clearly recognised by McNair J 
in his directions to the jury that began by highlighting the rarity of the injury 
and the enormous benefits conferred by this form of treatment.16  This pattern 
of placing emphasis on the social utility of treatment is one that has been 
repeated in subsequent cases; policy is clearly a relevant factor underlying all 
discussions in the context of medical decision making, but it is not until 2005 
that  policy  openly  plays  a  central  role.17  In  Bolam  it  was  a  relevant 
consideration but not yet a driving force. 
 
In his measured judgment, McNair J took care to separate the emotive issues 
from  the  underlying  legal  question  that  he  clearly  limited  to  one  of 
                                                 
11 Ibid, 78. 
12 See for example Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432 which appeals directly to the Bolam standard, Sidaway v 
Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1984] QB 493 which 
begins from Bolam and moves forward and Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 in which the Bolam standard is 
applied (these are only a handful of examples but are authoritative statements of the significance of the test). 
13 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
14 See discussion above, n.4. 
15  There  was  also  some  debate  regarding  the  actual  treatment  with  respect  to  the  use  of  relaxant  drugs  and 
restraints but these turned on questions of negligent treatment and are therefore not relevant in this context. 
16 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (Bolam) [1957] 1 WLR 582, 585-6 (McNair J). 
17 By the House of Lords in Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, to be discussed below in the context of causation, 
and further explored in Part II, Chapter 6 (see [6.70]-[6.90]). 66 
professional skill.  He provided the jury with a definition of negligence as the 
failure  to  act  in  accordance  with  reasonable  behaviour  and  asked  it  to 
determine what  a  „reasonable man‟  would do  in the circumstances.18  The 
issue then became one of determining what is reasonable – the man on the 
Clapham omnibus was rejected as lacking the requisite medical skills.  Also of 
note was the reminder to the jury that a „skilled man‟ is not one who possess 
the highest expert skill, but simply „an ordinary competent man exercising his 
art.‟19 
 
We now come to the fundamental question: How to determine the expected 
standard of skill?  McNair J emphasised that a medical practitioner will not be 
negligent if he has acted „in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by 
a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art.‟20  The second 
limb of the test was that the existence of a body of opinion with a „contrary 
view‟ would not mean that his actions were negligent.  The caution to the jury 
was that it was not essential for it to determine which of the two practices 
presented  was  the  better  practice,  so  long  as  they  accepted  that  what  the 
defendants did  was  in accordance  with a  practice  accepted by  responsible 
persons.21 
 
The final points of the judgment recognise the difficulty of making treatment 
decisions when the doctor is dealing with a patient who is „mentally sick.‟  In 
acknowledging  that  a  doctor  in  this  situation  may  be  confronted  with  a 
difficult  choice,  McNair  J  expressed  his  view  that  a  doctor  „cannot  be 
criticised‟ for failing to emphasise risks which „he believes to be minimal‟ in 
the treatment if he believes that the treatment is in the best interests of the 
patient who, by implication (because of the nature of his illness) could not 
                                                 
18 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (Bolam) [1957] 1 WLR 582, 586 (McNair J). 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid, 587 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that Miola has suggested that the term „responsible‟ was 
forgotten by the Courts between 1957 and 1997, with the result being that Judges were not permitted to choose 
between expert witnesses resulting in an „absurdly low level of justification for their actions … expected of 
doctors.‟ Miola, above n.7, 79. 
21 Ibid, 588. 67 
comprehend or emotionally cope with such information.22  This reads as a 
clear sanction of medical paternalism and, to a certain extent, undermines the 
otherwise balanced judgment directing the application of an objective test. 
 
A straightforward reading of this decision indicates that:  
 
1.  policy is a relevant consideration, 
2.  the issue is one of professional standard, 
3.  professional standard is to be determined against a responsible body of 
peers, and 
4.  a level of medical paternalism is sanctioned when it may be viewed as 
detrimental to the patient‟s health to tell them of „minimal risks.‟23 
 
The  Bolam  decision  was  subsequently  endorsed  in  Chatterton24  and  further 
elaborated on in Sidaway.25  It was in this latter case that the technicalities of 
informed  consent  and  the  Bolam  case  were  closely  analysed  and  Bolam  is 
rarely, if ever, discussed without reference to Sidaway.  It is therefore prudent 
to consider Sidaway before proceeding with any critique of the position in the 
United Kingdom.  
 
Developing the Bolam test: Sidaway26 
 
[3.30] Discussion here will involve an analysis of each of the judges‟ reasoning 
in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.  This is an important 
analysis as it reveals the complexities of adjudicating pre-treatment advice 
(and the absence of a coherent or clear legal test).  It has been said of Sidaway 
                                                 
22 Ibid, 590. 
23 This final point can be viewed as an early acceptance of therapeutic privilege. 
24 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432. 
25 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital &  the Maudsley Hospital  & Ors  [1985] 
AC 871. 
26 Both the Court of Appeal (Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital &  the Maudsley 
Hospital & Ors [1984] QB 493) and House of Lords (Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal 
Hospital &  the Maudsley Hospital  & Ors [1985] AC 871) decisions will be discussed here as both sets of 
judgments contain some illuminating discussions which clearly demonstrate the perception and evolution of the 
Bolam test. 68 
that it contains a „confusing mix of speeches,‟27 that it „is impossible to find a 
majority view [as there] is little common ground to distil a consensus,‟28 and 
that „the judgments throw up several different and irreconcilable approaches 
[making  it]  impossible  to  assign  a  ratio  decidendi  to  the  case.‟29  We  will 
therefore explore the judgments in some detail with the aim of identifying 
any  central  principles  and,  of  course,  illustrating  the  key  point  that  the 
language of consent diverts judicial attention from the true issues.  If the focus 
were on the process of choice then it would be easier to identify, and state, a 
coherent principle as the Courts would be able to point to both the right that 
is being protected and the process that is potentially harmed by the provision 




[3.40] Mrs Sidaway suffered from recurrent pain in her neck, right shoulder 
and arms and had been treated by a senior neurosurgeon for a number of 
years.  It was finally decided that the best course of action was surgery and 
the  procedure  was  carried  out  with  all  due  care.    The  surgery  carried  an 
inherent and „material risk‟ (put at somewhere between one and two percent) 
of damage to the spinal column and nerve roots.  When the risk materialised 
and she experienced significant disability, Mrs Sidaway claimed that she was 
not informed of the risk. She sought damages for negligence relying on the 
failure of the surgeon to inform her of the risk.  
 
Judgment: Court of Appeal 
 
[3.50] The discussion in the Court of Appeal provides some insight into the 
considerations  underlying  the  professional standard  test.    Lord Donaldson 
reviewed the existing law across the United States and Canada, beginning 
                                                 
27 D.Meyers, „Chester v Afshar: Sayonara, Sub Silentio, Sidaway?‟ in Sheila A.M. McLean , ed First Do No Harm  
(Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006), 259. 
28 Montgomery, above n.5, 244. 
29 Miola, above n.7, 83. 69 
with the acknowledgment of the common position that to provide treatment 
in  the  absence  of  consent  constitutes  an  assault.    Despite  this  initial 
recognition of a potential trespass action, he took care to emphasise that it is 
not a matter of English law that a failure to give sufficient information will 
vitiate consent.30  Trespass and quality of consent were therefore not relevant 
in  this  context;  the  issue  was  clearly  one  of  negligence  and  professional 
standards.  Thus despite labelling the issue as one of consent, His Lordship 
carefully stepped back from traditional consent issues.  He took care to place 
the discussion within the negligence framework and focus not on the needs of 
the patient but on the duties of the doctor. 
 
Lord Donaldson went on to emphasise the significance of the position of trust 
held by  the doctor and  asserted that  the law will not „permit the medical 
profession to play God.‟31  These statements were tempered by his view that 
the „prudent patient is a rare bird‟32 and that the doctor knows (or ought to 
know) the patient‟s true wishes, which may or may not coincide with what 
the  patient  is  actually  saying.33  This  observation  elevated  the  medical 
practitioner to a position in which he or she is able to lead the patient towards 
a „rational‟ decision.  In his judgment, Lord Donaldson added a significant 
caveat to the Bolam test: the actions of a professional must be in accordance 
with  a  practice  rightly  accepted  as  proper  by  a  body  of  skilled  and 
experienced  men.34  He  therefore  left  us  with  an  interesting  and  partially 
contradictory test that appears to rely upon a „right‟ and all-knowing doctor 
who is able to guide the patient to rational decisions.  This then leaves open 
the  question  as  to  who  is  to  determine  what  is  rational?    This  is  an 
exceptionally difficult question to answer, especially if one accepts that the 
patient is unlikely to be prudent and possibly incapable of expressing (or even 
knowing)  their  true  wishes.    The  necessary  implication  is  that  the 
                                                 
30 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital  & the Maudsley Hospital  & Ors [1984] QB 
493, 511 (Lord Donaldson). 
31 Ibid, 513. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid, 513-514. 
34 Ibid, 514. 70 
determination  of  what  is  rational  rests  with  the  doctor  who  provides 
sufficient  information  to  guide  the  patient  towards  the  most  appropriate 
decision (as defined by the doctor). 
 
Lord  Dunn  also  took  time  to  clearly  reject  the  „transatlantic  doctrine‟  of 
informed consent and to emphasise that if there is consent to the nature of the 
act, then there is no trespass to the person.35  His judgment began with a 
promising  recognition  of  patient  interests  and  needs  when  he  noted  that 
doctors treat patients and not diseases.36 But he managed to resile from this 
position by emphasising that the decision to provide warnings (or not) is a 
question  of  clinical  judgment  and  therefore  of  professional  standard.  
Significantly, he further asserted that the majority of patients prefer to rely 
unreservedly  on  the  doctor  and  that  to  view  it  any  other  way  would  be 
detrimental to medical care leading to an increase in claims and the practice of 
defensive medical care.37 
 
Lord  Browne-Wilkinson  also  placed  emphasis  on  the  social  utility  of  the 
doctor/patient relationship and asserted that the duty of care imposed on the 
medical  profession  needs  to  be  realistic  and  not  detract  from  the  proper 
function of caring for the sick.  To introduce a more stringent (or perhaps 
patient-centred) test would, in his view, expose doctors to the threat of legal 
proceedings with actions being judged by hindsight and not by the standard 
of „those skilled in the art but by judges or juries.‟38 
 
The Court of Appeal decision recognised the significance of the patient in the 
decision-making  process, but gave  greater weight  to policy considerations.  
Relevant considerations included the social utility of the provision of medical 
care without fear of litigation.  The doctrine of informed consent, in the view 
                                                 
35 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital  & the Maudsley Hospital  & Ors [1984] QB 
493, 516 (Dunn LJ). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, 517. 
38 Ibid, 523 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ). 71 
of  the  Court  of  Appeal,  clearly  represented  a  threat  to  the  provision  of 
medical care in general and the doctor/patient relationship in particular.  The 
Bolam test was endorsed as the appropriate test, with the medical practitioner 
being  elevated  to  a  powerful  position  of  knowledge  and,  one  could  infer, 
insight and wisdom above that of their patients.  But without a consistent 
approach, the decision left open some important questions which is perhaps 
why it went on to appeal in the House of Lords. 
 
Judgment: House of Lords 
 
[3.60] Lord Scarman‟s dissenting judgment in the House of Lords is the closest 
that  any  Law  Lord  has  come  to  the  Australian39  and  American  positions.  
Indeed, it is his judgment that is often viewed as the most persuasive.40 His 
Lordship acknowledged that he was attracted by the American acceptance of 
informed consent and argued that there was a need to look beyond the Bolam 
test.  His summation of this test was that the law imposed a duty of care with 
the standard of care being a matter of medical judgment.  This is a situation 
which he viewed as „disturbing‟ as it left the determination of a legal duty to 
the judgment of doctors.41 
 
Lord Scarman did not deny the relevance of medical evidence. He recognised 
that medical opinion might provide the law with an acceptable standard in 
determining whether a doctor, in diagnosis or treatment, has complied with 
his duty.  At the same time, however, he questioned whether it is right that 
medical judgment should determine the existence of a duty to warn of risk 
and  its  scope.42  Indeed,  he  described  it  as  a  „strange  conclusion‟  that  the 
Courts accept that the law recognises a right in the patient to decide whether 
                                                 
39 To be discussed in Chapter 4, also see Miola, above n.7, 81. 
40 Despite his clear rejection of Bolam and the fact that he was the only dissenting Judge, his comments are often 
referred to and some go so far as to suggest it has been adopted by later judgments.  See for example Meyers 
claim that Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] ECC 167 „essentially adopted Lord Scarman‟s 
minority speech in Sidaway‟, Meyers, above n.27, 259.   
41 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1985] AC 871, 
881-2 (Lord Scarman). 
42 Ibid, 882. 72 
to undergo treatment, yet permits doctors to determine whether and in what 
circumstances a duty arises in the context of warning prior to making that 
decision.43  The most significant conclusion is his strong statement that the 
Court should not allow the profession to judge its own cause and therefore 
give  rise  to  a  situation  in  which  the  medical  view  of  what  is  best  for  the 
patient overrides that patient‟s right to decide for themselves whether they 
will submit to the treatment.44  In Lord Scarman‟s view, the patient should be 
at the centre of the test for standard of care, not the doctor. 
 
An interesting inclusion in this judgment is recognition of factors beyond the 
purely medical.45  Lord Scarman took care to note that there are many factors 
influencing a patient‟s decision-making process.  In his view, it is important 
that doctors recognise that whilst their concern is with health and the relief of 
pain, the patient may well „have in mind circumstances, objectives and values 
which  he  may  reasonably  not  make  known  to the  doctor.‟46  In  short,  the 
doctor‟s duty arises from the patient‟s rights.47 
 
Lord  Scarman‟s  endeavours  to  return  the  patient  to  centre  stage  were, 
however, in vain with the rest of the Law Lords embracing the Bolam test and 
viewing the question from the opposite end of the relationship.  It was their 
position that the question centres around the doctor‟s duty as viewed by other 
doctors with the patient‟s rights receiving at best, collateral benefit. 
 
The judgment of Lord Diplock provides a contrast to that of Lord Scarman 
and is viewed as the most conservative of the judgments.48  He also began 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 This recognition is important in the context of defining autonomy. As will be seen in Part III, Chapter 10 at the 
heart of the autonomy debate sits a clear divide between individualistic and relational models of autonomy with 
the latter, similarly to Lord Scarman, emphasising the significance of the impact of external  factors on the 
individual.  
46 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1985] AC 871, 
885-6. 
47 Ibid, 886. 
48 Miola, above n.7, 81 and 82, and Kenyon Mason & Douglas Brodie, „Bolam, Bolam  - Wherefore Art Thou 
Bolam?‟ (2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review 298, 300.  73 
from the position of the patient, noting that the doctor‟s duty of care is owed 
to  the  particular  patient  before  them,  „idiosyncrasies  and  all.‟49  Despite 
starting with the patient, he quickly moved to a clearly doctor-centric test.  
The  individual  patient‟s  idiosyncrasies  serve  to  guide  the  doctor  in  the 
exercise  of  his  professional  skill  and  judgment  about  whether  it  is  in  the 
patient‟s  best  interest  to  take  the  risk  and  undergo  the  recommended 
treatment.50  In other words, according to Lord Diplock, it is left to the doctor 
to determine what is in the patient‟s best interests and then proceed on the 
basis of this determination.  The role of the doctor is to heal the patient and if 
this  means  proceeding  with  a  risky  procedure,  then  the  doctor  is  best 
qualified  to  determine  that  such  treatment  is  appropriate.    The  patient‟s 
views,  unless  expressly  stated  through  direct  questioning,  were  of  little 
interest to Lord Diplock.  Thus we have a clear identification of a personal 
right which is to be measured and protected by scrutinising the content of 
another‟s professional duty.  This concern was also raised in Chapter 2 when 
we were considering the relevant test in the United States.  As was explained 
there,  this  approach  is  inconsistent  with  Hohfeld‟s  „jural  correlatives‟  and 
means the significance of the patients‟ perspective is diminished. 51 
 
Lord Diplock also appealed to broad, public policy questions, focussing on 
the  public  interest  in  the  advancement  of  medicine  over  the  individual, 
perhaps  idiosyncratic,  needs  of  the  patient.    His  Lordship  viewed  it  as 
appropriate  to  focus  on  accepted  medical  practice  as  opposed  to  the 
individual patient.  To his mind the body of opinion in support of the level of 
information given by the neurosurgeon was determinative.52  Of significance 
was  his  view  that  to  broaden  the  duty  and  focus  more  on  the  individual 
patient would result in the practise of defensive medicine with doctors only 
                                                 
49  Sidaway  v  Board of  Governors  of  the  Bethlehem Royal  Hospital  &  Maudsley  Hospital  &  Ors  [1985]  AC 
871,891, (Lord Diplock). 
50 Ibid. 
51 See discussion above, Chapter 2: The scholarly view of Canterbury (at [2.60]), and text accompanying fn 92. 
52 Ibid, 892. 74 
providing „tried and true‟ methods as opposed to being prepared to „stretch 
the outer parameters.‟53 
 
Lords Scarman and Diplock are the two extremes of the judgments and, as 
suggested by Miola, the remaining Judges represent the middle way.54 Whilst 
it has been suggested that Lord Templeman‟s speech is „the most significant‟ 
of all55 it has also been described as „unclear.‟56 Thus it is fair to say that the 
judgments  are  open  to  interpretation.    I  suggest  that  Lords  Bridge  and 
Templeman aim to balance the competing interests and, similarly to Miola, I 
argue that their speeches represent an attempt to walk the middle ground 
between doctor and patient.  Lord Bridge (with Lord Keith concurring) began 
with an emphasis on the right of a competent patient to determine whether or 
not to proceed with treatment.57  This significant right, as explained by Lord 
Bridge, is subject to practical realities.  This reference to „realities‟ signalled 
yet another retreat into policy considerations.  Lord Bridge focussed on the 
practical difficulties of determining the appropriate standard based upon the 
needs of the patient. In his view, a decision regarding the degree of disclosure 
so as to enable a patient to make a „rational choice‟ must primarily be a matter 
of clinical judgment.58 The all-knowing medical practitioner recognised in the 
Court of Appeal was once again returned to a central position.  His Lordship 
did,  however,  stop  short  of  creating  a  completely  bullet-proof  doctor  and 
recognised that there may be „rare situations‟ in which a judge may intervene 
if he or she concludes that disclosure was so „obviously necessary‟ that no 
„prudent  medical  man‟  would  fail  to  warn.59  Unfortunately  he  failed  to 
provide any guidance as to how such a determination should be made. 
 
                                                 
53 Ibid, 893. 
54 Miola, above n.7, 83. 
55 Mason and Brodie, above n.48, 300. 
56 M.A. Jones, Medical Negligence, (3
rd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2003), [6-113]. 
57 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1985] AC 871, 
897 (Lord Bridge). 
58 Ibid, 900. 
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The final judgment is that of Lord Templeman who came to the conclusion 
that the procedure was so obviously risky that Mrs Sidaway should have been 
alert to the possibility of something going wrong near the site of the nerve 
root.  In his view, any additional warning could only have „reinforced that 
possibility.‟60  He then proceeded to cast doubt upon Mrs Sidaway‟s ability to 
comprehend  and  in  an  apparent  contradiction  to  this  statement,  he 
emphasised that she could have asked questions. Alternatively, he suggested 
that it is possible that the surgeon could have reasonably taken the view that 
she would have been confused, frightened or misled by more information.61  
He concluded with the view that the doctor must exercise his professional 
judgment and determine what is the appropriate level of information.  
 
Consistent with the Court of Appeal, the House of Lord‟s judgments  were 
clearly  driven  by  policy  considerations.    The  significance  of  medical 
advancement and recognition of the professional status of the doctor combine 
to  create  a  test  dictated  by  professional  standards.    The  Bolam  test  thus 
evolved  into  a  clearly  doctor-centric  one  with  the  views  of  the  individual 
patient relegated to the sidelines.  Despite recognition of the significance of 
the patient‟s right to determine what is to be done to their body, the views of 
the individual patient do not appear to be a consideration in applying the 
professional standard approach.  At this point in the development of the law 
in the UK it would appear that „informed consent‟ has little to do with the 
views of the patient and is entirely determined by the exercise of the medical 
practitioner‟s skill and judgment.  Furthermore, whether the duty has been 
met is to be determined by evidence from other medical practitioners, with 
the  Court  being  relegated  to  the  role  of  facilitator  as  opposed  to  decision 
maker.  
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It is important to pause here and explain my approach to the role of policy in 
judicial decision-making.  It is not my aim to challenge the validity of policy 
considerations or question their adoption by the Courts.  My main concern is 
the ease with which reference is made to policy when it is unclear what or 
whose  policy  is  being  applied.  As  we  are  still  considering  the  actual 
judgments and identifying references to such issues as the role of policy, the 
questions as to what or whose policy is being applied will be put to one side 
for the moment.  It is sufficient here to recognise the role of policy in judicial 
decision-making and it will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9.62 
 
Interpretations of Bolam and Sidaway 
 
[3.70] The basic proposition of the Bolam test as elaborated in Sidaway is a 
fairly straightforward one.  The doctor clearly owes the patient a duty of care 
which includes a responsibility to disclose some risks prior to treatment.  The 
standard of care is to be determined by reference to accepted practice but the 
Courts  will  not  allow  the  medical  profession  to  „play  God.‟    Despite  this 
apparent clarity, the position of the Courts has developed into one of ready 
acceptance  of professional opinion  and a clear reluctance  to question such 
evidence.63  Indeed,  it has  been  suggested  that  the  Bolam  test  has  been  so 
broadly applied that it has been allowed to become a test not just of medical 
practice but also of medical ethics with informed consent being „hustled into a 
Bolam  straightjacket.‟64  It  could  be  argued  that  Bolam  has  dominated  so 
effectively that the test focuses entirely on the doctor to the exclusion of the 
patient.  This  would,  however,  represent  an  overly  simplistic  view  and 
overlook  some  significant  judicial  and  scholarly  discussions  of  the  Bolam 
principle.  It is to these discussions that we will now turn.  
                                                 
62 Refer below, Chapter 9 „Causation and policy‟ (at [9.10]). 
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clearly stated that it is not up to the Court to choose between differing professional opinions.  His Lordship noted 
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other but it is no basis for a conclusion of negligence.‟  This is a position which Miola, above n.7, 79 suggests 
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The Courts: Putting a gloss on the professional standard test 
 
[3.80] Bolam has consistently been acknowledged as the appropriate test in the 
context of the provision of pre-treatment advice.65  A standard approach of 
the  Courts  has  been  to  reject  first  the  notion  of  trespass  and  then  that  of 
informed  consent.    The  central  theme  of  professional  standard  is  always 
clearly established but once the test is discussed some subtle but significant 
departures from the original formulation become apparent.  The result is that 
through the progression of time, and wide application, the test has had a gloss 
placed on it which perhaps moves it away from its initial intention. 
 
Chatterton v Gerson66 explained the Bolam test as being a duty of the doctor to 
explain  the  treatment  and  its  implications  in  the  way  a  „careful  and 
responsible‟  doctor  would  do,67  whilst  the  judgment  in  Hills  v  Potter 
introduced the additional notion of the respectable and responsible doctor.68 
The question then becomes: How does one determine what is „responsible‟, 
„careful‟ and „respectable‟ – and who is to determine it?  A hint of a solution 
was  expressed  by  Lord  Browne-Wilkinson  in  Bolitho  v  City  Hackney  Health 
Authority (Bolitho) when he suggested that the use of these adjectives means 
that the Court must be satisfied that the professional practice has a logical 
basis.69  Unfortunately he failed to indicate how the Court is to be satisfied of 
this outside of the professional evidence before it.  On another reading, the 
use  of these  adjectives  to classify the type of doctor who  gives acceptable 
advice, reflects the Courts‟ discomfort with simple acceptance of professional 
                                                 
65 See for example: Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority Respondents [1998] AC 232, 239ff, Maynard v 
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68 [1984] 1 WLR 641,653 (Hirst J). 
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evidence,  along  with  their  inability  to  create  a  test  which  challenges 
professional evidence with any rigour. The judiciary was at an impasse: on 
the  one  hand  there  was  recognition  that  it  is  inappropriate  to  allow  the 
medical  profession  to  judge  itself;  on  the  other  hand,  there  was  the 
recognition that the Courts are ill equipped to evaluate the exercise of clinical 
skills.   
 
The solution to this problem was provided in Bolam and Sidaway when the 
conclusion turned on basic policy considerations.  Although as noted above, 
this is problematic because  the nature  of the relevant  „policy‟  is not made 
clear.    Perhaps  in  response  to  this  uncertainty  subsequent  judicial 
interpretations of these decisions have resiled from this aspect of the decisions 
and  have  declined  to  openly  acknowledge  the  significance  of  policy 
considerations.    The  interpretation  of  the  Bolam  test  has  generally  been 
couched  in  strict  legal  terms:  what  would  the  prudent  professional  have 
done?  It is only when one closely considers some of the earlier decisions and 
looks beyond the legal eloquence that the role of policy becomes apparent.  
Unfortunately it is not always policy grounded in patient interests; more often 
it is policy aimed at protecting the medical profession.70 
 
Between Bolam and Sidaway was the decision of Chatterton v Gerson71 which 
saw a straightforward application of the Bolam test.  Bristow J recognised the 
imperative to warn the patient,72 but his imperative was clearly tempered by 
other  considerations.    As  noted  above,  he  appealed  to  the  standard  of  a 
careful and responsible doctor,73 but placed his determination in the context 
of a stated „fundamental‟ assumption that the doctor knows his job and will 
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do it properly.74  Such a strong assumption is difficult to displace and reflects 
a true reluctance to challenge the professional opinion of the treating doctor.  
Bristow J took care to recognise the relevance of the personality of the patient 
and their welfare but considered this in the light of the doctor‟s view of these 
issues.75  The practical result is that if the doctor believes that withholding 
information and proceeding with treatment is in the patient‟s best interest, 
then  their  actions  are  unlikely  to  be  questioned  by  the  Court.  The 
consideration of what is appropriate is therefore from the perspective of the 
medical profession and not the patient. 
 
A  few  years  after  this  came  the  decision  of  Hills  v  Potter76  in  which  the 
outcome of the medical treatment was unreservedly described as a complete 
and total tragedy.77  The plaintiff underwent a procedure aimed at alleviating 
(but not curing) a deformation of the neck and as a result suffered paralysis 
from the neck down.  On the evidence, prior to the time of the operation there 
were no recorded cases of paralysis and the treatment itself was never viewed 
as a complete cure. The best outcome involved a 70-80% improvement.78 
 
The  evidence  as  presented  by  the  defendant  was  that  he  would  always 
explain  the  operation  with  some  variation  in  advice,  dependent  upon  the 
particular  patient‟s  ability  to  understand.    He  emphasised  that  he  would 
never  exaggerate  the  risks  and  agreed  that  he  would  have  made  some 
reassuring statements in order to calm the patient  as in his view, she was 
„overestimating the dangers.‟79  This evidence (and the subsequent acceptance 
of it) emphasises the significance of the view of the professional as opposed to 
that of the patient.  If a patient is concerned about a specific risk (she asked 
questions about paralysis) and these risks are down-played by the doctor, and 
in reliance on this she proceeds with the treatment and suffers the very risks 
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she  was  concerned  about,  how  can  one  honestly  conclude  that  she  was 
overestimating the very danger that materialised? 
 
Hirst  J  accepted  the  professional  evidence  that  the  warning  (or  lack  of 
warning) was in accordance with professional standards and therefore found 
that  the  requisite  standard  was  met.    Of  interest  is  the  fact  that  he 
acknowledged the concern that the Bolam test involves an „abdication‟ of the 
Court‟s powers but clearly rejected such a proposition. His position was that 
the Court must be satisfied that a respectable and responsible body of opinion 
accepts  the  standard,80  yet  he  failed  to  provide  any  guidance  on  how  the 
Court is to be so satisfied.  Once again we see that the inherent respect for the 
evidence of medical professionals appears to drive the decisions and there is 
an  absence  of  any  clear  indication  of  how  professional  evidence  is  to  be 
challenged.  This decision is consistent with the judicial approach of not really 
challenging medical professional standards.  
 
The Courts continued to apply the Bolam test without any significant variation 
until the 1998 decision of Bolitho81 which Lord Woolf, writing extra-judicially, 
describes  as  explaining  the  Bolam  test  in  a  manner  less  deferential  to  the 
medical profession,82 Brazier and Miola suggest that it returned the Bolam test 
to its proper limits83 whilst Jackson describes Bolitho as representing a more 
robust version of the Bolam test and posits that the „excessively deferential 
interpretation  must now be in doubt.‟84  This scholarly  commentary must, 
however, be put into the appropriate context: the Bolitho decision specifically 
dealt with diagnosis and treatment with a central question of causation.  It 
was not at all concerned with the provision of pre-treatment advice.  Thus to 
attempt  to  give  it  a  broad  application  and  proclaim  it  as  removing  the 
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„straight-jacket‟85 of Bolam is an over-simplification and risks giving Bolitho a 
breadth of application that is not appropriate.  
 
The fact scenario involved the death of a child.  There was some dispute over 
the facts but they were settled at trial. The child was in hospital and suffered 
two episodes of serious (and ultimately fatal) respiratory distress.  On both 
occasions there were calls by the nurses for doctors to attend.  The doctors 
failed to respond to these calls and this was accepted as negligent. The issue 
was whether or not this made any difference to the ultimate outcome which 
was  respiratory  distress  leading  to  cardiac  arrest  and  „catastrophic‟  brain 
damage. The respondents‟ position was that even if the doctors had attended 
when paged they would not have intubated the child, which was the only 
course  of  treatment  that  would  have  averted  the  tragedy.    The  hospital 
successfully  argued  that  the  negligence  of  the  doctors  did  not  cause  the 
damage suffered.  Thus in the face of clear negligence, the plaintiff stumbled 
at the causation stage of the enquiry. 86 
 
In his judgment Lord Browne-Wilkinson endeavoured to clarify the issues by 
drawing  a  line  between  the  questions  of  what  would  have  occurred  as 
opposed to what should have occurred.  In the process of drawing this line he 
raised the question of who should give evidence for both the „would‟ and 
„should‟ questions.87  His conclusion was that the doctor informs the Court of 
what they would have done and it is the evidence of the medical fraternity 
that  goes  to the  „should‟  question  which  then  assists  the  Court  to  make  a 
decision.88  He then reasserted the authority of the Court and referred to the 
adoption of adjectives such as „responsible‟, „reasonable‟ and „respectable‟ in 
the context of acceptable medical behaviour.89  Of significance in this decision 
is his additional requirement of a „logical basis‟ and the need for the Court to 
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be satisfied that the medical opinion has such a basis.90  It is this addition to 
the Bolam test which has been viewed as significant, resulting in the Courts 
reclaiming a key role in the decision making process. 
 
Thus  despite  scholarly  assertions  regarding  the  impact  of  Bolitho  on  the 
Bolam/Sidaway test, the impact of the decision on the standard of disclosure 
can,  however,  only  be  described  as  minimal.    Not  only  did  His  Lordship 
describe the assessment of medical risks and benefits as matters of clinical 
judgment with which the Court is unlikely to interfere, but he also explicitly 
stated that he was not considering questions of disclosure of risks.91  Two 
clear points can thus be made. Firstly, this decision does not bring any real 
clarity  to  the  debate  and  secondly,  careful  consideration  of  the  judgment 
reveals an ongoing deference to medical opinion with Lord Brown-Wilkinson 
referring to evidence from the treating doctor and the medical fraternity, not 
the individual patient.  Bolitho is therefore of limited relevance to the current 
discussion and we need to turn to other decisions which specifically address 
the question of pre-treatment advice. 
 
Shortly after Bolitho came the decision of Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS 
Trust92 which, it has been claimed, indicated that the judicial pendulum was 
swinging  back  in  favour  of  patients.93  This  optimistic  claim  (made  by  the 
presiding judge, and some scholars) overlooks the outcome of the decision 
and the reality of the test applied which, despite appearing at first glance to 
be approaching the Australian position of material risk, is in fact centred on 
                                                 
90 Ibid. It is interesting to note that in Australia, under the „Civil Liability Acts’ the „Bolam test‟ has been given 
legislative form for diagnosis and treatment (pre-treatment advice is specifically excluded). This addition of a 
„logical basis‟ to the Bolam test is also given legislative recognition with the Courts given the freedom to reject 
peer professional opinion (regarding diagnosis and treatment) if the Court is of the view that it is „irrational‟. 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s5O, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s22, Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s41, Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s22, Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s59 (this section refers to „unreasonable‟ as opposed to 
„irrational‟). 
91 Ibid, 243. 
92 [1999] ECC 167. 
93 Refer Lord Woolf, above n.82, see also Meyers, above n.27, 258ff.  Jackson, above n.84, 276 and 277 also raises 
this issue. 83 
professional  opinion  and  judgment  of  what  is  „significant‟  with  individual 
patient perceptions being irrelevant.  
 
The  plaintiff  was  pregnant  and  14  days  overdue  when  she  attended  the 
hospital on the 27th November.  She begged the doctor either to induce the 
child  or  perform  a  caesarean  section.    He  advised  against  both  of  these 
procedures.    There  was  some  evidence  that  during  this  consultation  the 
doctor told Ms Pearce not to „behave like a child‟ and informed her that to 
induce was risky and that the caesarean was not his preferred option.  She 
later delivered a stillborn infant on the 4th of December.  The issue turned on 
whether she should have been informed of an increased risk to the child with 
further delay and whether she would have changed anything if she had been 
so informed.94 
 
In his judgment, Lord Woolf acknowledged that if a plaintiff asks a doctor 
about a certain risk, then he is clearly bound to provide an „honest answer.‟95  
The discussion then focussed on what is appropriate in the absence of such a 
request.  Lord Woolf canvassed the „closely reasoned speech‟ of Lord Scarman 
in Sidaway but rejected it as not reflecting the law of „this jurisdiction.‟96 He 
then adopted a position similar to that of Bolitho, arguing that whilst in the 
vast majority of cases if „distinguished experts in the field‟ are of an opinion it 
will demonstrate reasonableness, it is still open to the Court to determine that 
the opinion is neither reasonable nor responsible if it can be demonstrated 
that it is not capable of withstanding logical analysis.97 
 
This position holds some promise of a shift to a more patient-centred test, but 
Lord Woolf then clarified his view by noting that it will be „very seldom right 
for a judge to reach a conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent 
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medical expert are unreasonable,‟98 a statement which contains echoes of the 
Maynard comments that it is „not up to the Court to choose between differing 
professional opinions.‟99 Consistent with earlier judgments, the reason for this 
assertion  was  the clinical nature  of the decision  to discuss (or not) certain 
risks. We see then that individual patient needs are not relevant to disclosure 
(unless  they  have  the  wherewithal  to  ask  specific  and  detailed  questions).  
The  issue  is  solved  through  consideration  of  clinically-defined  factors,  not 
individual needs.  
 
The notable addition to the Bolam test was the concept of a „significant‟ risk.  
Lord Woolf stated that if there is a significant risk which would affect the 
judgment of a reasonable patient, then the doctor must inform the patient of 
that risk.100  It would appear that the Court here was endeavouring to provide 
a measure for the determination of reasonable and responsible treatment  – 
and that perhaps this measure focuses on patient needs.  But this is not the 
case.  The definition of what constitutes significant did not rely upon patient 
characteristics or needs or desires.  It was instead given a statistical value – in 
His Lordship‟s view, a risk will be significant if it has around a 10% chance of 
manifesting.101 
 
Where does this leave the patient?  Lord Woolf noted that a doctor must take 
into account all relevant considerations and these include the ability of the 
patient to understand along with their physical and emotional well being.102  
In this situation, the increased risk of stillbirth was estimated at somewhere 
between 0.1% and 0.2% and was therefore not deemed to be „significant.‟  One 
cannot help but wonder what Ms Pearce would have said if asked whether 
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the loss of her child was a „significant‟ risk?  In Lord Woolf‟s view, if she had 
been informed of this „particularly small risk‟ she probably would not have 
been able to understand the warning and would therefore have „reluctantly‟ 
followed the advice of the doctor and waited.103  This reflects a paternalistic 
view of the patient who, unable to understand the implications of medical 
advice, would quietly follow the guidance of the doctor.  If the focus is truly 
on  the  patient  and  their  individual  right  to  information,  perhaps  a  better 
question would  have been, why  would the doctor have been incapable of 
describing  straightforward  life-and-death  issues  in  a  manner  suited  to  the 
needs of his patient? 
 
Despite suggestions to the contrary it can therefore be seen that the general 
judicial  interpretation  of  the  Bolam  test  has  entailed  respect  for  the 
professional and clinical judgment of the medical profession, combined with a 
protective view of the patient.  What constitutes a risk that must be disclosed 
to a patient is determined by factors entirely external to the patient and in the 
context of deference to medical professional opinion.  The patient is not an 
active participant in the process and, it would appear, is not deemed capable 
of determining what is significant to them.  
 
The scholarly view of Bolam and Sidaway 
 
[3.90]  The  Bolam  test  clearly  plays  a  central  role  in  the  determination  of 
medical  negligence;  it  has  been  described  as  the  „touchstone‟104  and  the 
„benchmark test‟105 of a doctor‟s duty of care.  Some view it as having the 
advantage of clarity, with a standard understood by both the medical and 
legal  professions.106  Others  have  described  it  as  ambiguous107  and  as 
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presenting a situation in which ethical requirements and legal tests diverge.108 
Any  scholarly  discussion  of  Bolam  invariably  includes  consideration  of 
Sidaway, and the commentary is not always complementary.  Meyers refers to 
the „confusing mix of speeches in Sidaway‟109 and goes on to argue that after 
Sidaway„ jurisprudence and doctors were left adrift … [and there were] no 
meaningful  criteria‟110  Jackson  also  remarks on  the  lack  of  clarity111  whilst 
Montgomery and Miola argue that it is impossible to identify a „majority view 
[or]  common  ground  to  distil  a  consensus‟112  and  that  it  is  „impossible  to 
assign a ratio decidendi to the case [because] the judgments throw up several 
different  and  irreconcilable  approaches.‟113  It  is  therefore  a  test  which  has 
attracted much ongoing discussion and analysis with one consistent theme: a 
scholarly striving to comprehend the true nature of the test and a challenge to 
its appropriateness and relevance.  Is it a test which turns on patient needs or 
professional practices?  
 
Whilst the Courts have consistently emphasised that the test is not about the 
medical profession, with the judiciary remaining as the final arbiters of the 
law, this certainty is not echoed in the literature.  A common interpretation of 
the  Bolam  test  is  that  it  is  up  to  the  medical  profession  to  determine 
appropriate  behaviour.  It  has been described as the test,  „any responsible 
doctor knows best,‟114 and Brazier and Miola have suggested that all the test 
requires is that a medical professional find some other expert to declare that 
they would have acted in the same manner, reducing the Court to a form of 
„trial by battle‟ in which each side pits their „champion expert‟ against the 
other.115  More recently, Miola, continuing his exploration of the Bolam test, 
has referred to the „absurdly low level of justification for their actions that was 
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expected of doctors.‟116 Absent from the test are two key players: the Court 
and most significantly, the patient.  Patient autonomy does not even rate a 
mention. 
 
The true weakness of the test as perceived by commentators is that it operates 
to protect the doctor as opposed to the patient.117 The emphasis of the Courts 
has been on a general protective policy that focuses on the medical profession, 
the  doctor-patient  relationship  and  the  standard  of  medical  treatment.118  
Despite  this apparent condemnation  of the test,  the commentary is not all 
negative.  Whilst Miola raised the concerns (outlined above) about the basic 
Bolam test, he has opined that subsequent decisions have enabled the test to 
evolve into something more patient-friendly, even going so far as to suggest 
that  Bolam  perhaps  enhances  patient  autonomy.119  As  highlighted  in  the 
preceding discussion, two decisions are seen by some scholars as representing 
a shift to a more patient-centred approach: Bolitho120and Pearce.121 It has been 
suggested  that  both  of  these  decisions  have  redressed  the  doctor/patient 
imbalance and introduced clarity to the test.122 However, as argued above, I 
challenge this view as it ignores the fundamental flaws in the test and fails to 
recognise that in both of these decisions, the medical professional continues to 
occupy  a  position  of  strength  and  control  with  the  patient,  once  again, 
relegated to the sidelines as an observer.  Indeed in Pearce both the doctor and 
the Court reduce the patient to a level similar to that of a child, unable to 
understand  or  process  basic  information  regarding  an  important  aspect  of 
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their condition.  All this despite the fact that she had come in to see the doctor 
because she was concerned about her health and that of her unborn child. 
 
To some commentators the decision of Bolitho introduced the clarifying term 
of „logical‟. The Court must be satisfied that the treatment had a logical basis. 
Lord Woolf, writing extra-judicially, suggested that the decision, as a result of 
this apparent qualification of the Bolam test, is less deferential to the medical 
profession123 and Jones has argued that it calls for closer scrutiny of expert 
witnesses,124 whilst Meyers described it as a „chink in the armour of Bolam‟125 
and as representing a „gloss on Bolam.‟126 This assessment is, however, overly 
optimistic  and  does  not  address  the  essence  of  the  decision.  As  explained 
above, the decision both denies any relevance in the context of the giving of 
advice and fails to depart from the guiding hand of policy.  And, as we have 
seen, it is a poorly enunciated policy which therefore fails to provide a clear or 
consistent guide for future decisions.127 
 
The interpretation of Pearce as introducing a balance of power between the 
doctor and patient, is also open to challenge.  The introduction of the term 
„significant‟ has been described as a „bold step away from Sidaway and Bolam 
and towards the standard found in Australia.‟128  Whilst the terminology on 
its own sounds promising, an analysis of the reasoning  (as set out above) 
clearly demonstrates that what is significant continues to be determined by 
factors external to the patient.  The patient is deemed completely unable to 
determine the significance of information for themselves.  To the Court and 
the doctor significance is little more than a percentage likelihood; concepts 
such as severity of the risk of harm and potential impact on the patient (and 
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their unborn child) are not relevant considerations.  I argue this despite the 
assertion of Kennedy and Grubb129 that the Court directed that significance is 
more  than  a  mere  percentage  and  that  a  „significant  risk  need  not  be  one 
which would have altered the patient‟s decision.‟130  In their view this meant 
that the patient‟s views were considered.  But the Court, in fact, demonstrated 
a willingness to overlook the patient‟s view when it empowered the doctor to 
conclude that the patient simply would not have understood the information 
presented.  This once again goes to the issue of incorrect focus:  why was it 
not  deemed  to  be  a  breach  of  duty  of  care  that  the  doctor  did  not  try  to 
explain the potential risks to her unborn child131 in a manner that she could 
understand?  Surely it is the doctor‟s responsibility to take care to demystify 
and clarify treatment options and the mysteries of medical procedures? 
 
We can see, therefore, that the general view of the pure Bolam test is one of 
general  pessimism  with  commentators  viewing  it  as  a  test  protecting  the 
medical profession, providing a minimal benchmark: wheel in an expert and 
the test is met.  Some suggest that more recent decisions have brought more 
rigour to the process, whilst others say it redresses the imbalances, turning 
more attention to the patient.  The question to consider now is: What is the 
practical reality? 
 
The practical application of Bolam and Sidaway: A professional 
practice test 
 
[3.100] The reality is that the practical application of the Bolam test (even as 
clarified in more recent decisions) continues to be one based on a standard 
driven by the very profession under scrutiny.  Such an approach is clearly in 
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conflict with basic principles of the tort of negligence.  An early commentary 
on the Bolam decision recognised and analysed this problem by considering 
the  question  of  negligence  as  an  ethical  or  sociological  concept.132  In  his 
discussion of the case, Montrose noted that conduct is not acceptable merely 
because others engage in it.  A speeding motorist does not escape a claim in 
negligence  merely  because  others  speed  on  that  road.    This  prompts  the 
question,  why  then  does  a  medical  professional  escape  negligence  merely 
because other medical professionals would act in the same way?133 
 
The  patient  approaches  the  medical  professional  with  certain  expectations 
and these will generally include an expectation that their wants and needs 
will  be  taken  into  consideration.    The  law  in  the  UK  continues  to  fail  to 
recognise  this.    At  its  simplest  level,  if  a  common  (and  accepted)  medical 
practice is not to inform a patient, then the law does not expect that patient to 
be  warned.  At  this  point  in  the  development  of  the  law,  there  is  no 
opportunity for the Court to turn to the patient and ask them, what would 
you consider a „significant‟ risk? Ms Pearce would certainly have thought that 
risk of stillbirth was significant and Mrs Sidaway felt that nerve root damage 
was significant to her.  Whilst these were opinions formed after the event, Mrs 
Pearce clearly was concerned about the welfare of her unborn child (which is 
why she approached the doctor in the first place) and Mrs Sidaway had, in 
fact,  asked  about  the  chance  of  paralysis.    The  Courts,  however,  held  a 
different view, even going so far as to accept the argument that a pregnant 
woman is unable to understand the nature of risks to her unborn child. 
 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  whilst  the  Courts  are  protecting  the  medical 
profession,  the  profession  itself  is  tightening  its  standards.    The  General 
Medical Council (GMC) provides guidelines for professional behaviour and 
in  its  Guideline  on  seeking  patients‟  consent  has  moved  away  from  the 
                                                 
132 J.L. Montrose „Is Negligence an Ethical or Sociological Concept?‟ (1958) 21 Modern Law Review 259. 
133 Ibid. 91 
position  adopted  by  the  Courts.134  There  is  no  reference  to  the  phrase 
„informed consent‟ in the Guidelines135 and the emphasis is on the nature of 
the doctor/patient relationship which is viewed as a partnership.  Of note is 
the  requirement  that  no-one  else  besides  the  competent  patient  can  make 
decisions  about  their  treatment,136  and  the  description  of  the  process  as 
individual and focussed on the making of „informed decisions‟137 as opposed 
to „informed consent.‟  A final point of note in the Guidelines is the assertion 
that  doctors  must  avoid  making  „assumptions  about  a  patient‟s 
understanding of risk or the importance they attach to different outcomes.‟138  
Thus  an  application  of  the  Guidelines  to  the  approach  adopted  by  Mrs 
Pearce‟s  doctor  would  perhaps  find  that  he  failed  to  meet  the  requisite 
standard  of  care  as  he  made  clear  assumptions  regarding  her  ability  to 
understand and absorb advice he might give her.  An intriguing juxtaposition 
is now revealed: the professional standards which will be used to measure the 
duty of care expected of the doctor may well be set at a higher level than the 
legal standard which is said to be based on the professional standards.  At the 
time of writing professional standards are yet to make an appearance in either 
the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords so it will be interesting to see how 
they will be reconciled with the legal standard as enunciated in the decisions 
discussed here. 
 
Returning  to  the  legal  standard  as  expressed  in  Bolam  and  subsequent 
decisions, the practical effect is that the „Bolam test‟ focuses on matters outside 
the immediate concern of the patient.  The doctrine of informed consent is 
clearly rejected and policy considerations continue to drive the Courts.  But is 
                                                 
134 General Medical Council, Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together (Guidance for doctors), 
http://www.gmc-k.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/consent_guidance_index.asp at 20 January 2011. 
135 Although it was a phrase which was entrenched in earlier Guidelines (replaced in 2008). 
136 Ibid, para 13. 
137 Ibid, para 28.  This approach accords with the recommendation of the process being referred to as informed 
choice as opposed to informed consent, in both the GMC Guidelines and my argument (to be explored further in 
Part III) the focus is on the process of obtaining and processing information as opposed to the mechanics of 
agreeing to a particular course of treatment. 
138 Ibid, para 31. 92 
the  outcome  significantly  different  from  what  would  happen  in  either  the 
United States or Australia? 
 
Re-visiting the core issues 
 
[3.110] Returning  once  again to our three  main  questions we  will see  that 
despite  claims  that  the  position  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  grounded  in  a 
straightforward professional practice test,139 this is not always the case.  The 
application of the Bolam test has been subject to ongoing judicial and scholarly 
debate with the result being a variable standard and a situation that is no 
clearer  than  that  found  in  the  United  States  (which  the  UK  Courts 
emphatically reject) or Australia (which has, in turn, emphatically rejected the 
position in the United Kingdom).   
 
Is ‘informed consent’ truly about consent? 
 
[3.120] Jones has suggested that „it is a misnomer to talk of informed consent 
since a patient‟s right to the information which will enable him [or her] to 
make  a  meaningful  choice  about  the  treatment  options  depends  upon  the 
doctor‟s  duty  to  exercise  reasonable  care  in  performing  his  [or  her] 
professional functions as a doctor.‟140 Similarly, Lord Donaldson in the Court 
of Appeal stepped back from consent when he pointed out that „it is not a 
matter of English law that a failure to give sufficient information will vitiate 
consent.‟141 The focus in all of the discussions (both judicial and scholarly, as 
outlined above) is on the quality of advice given by the doctor as measured by 
professional  standards.    As  well  as  referring  to  „informed  consent‟  as  a 
„misnomer‟, Jones, went on to explain that the „Courts in the UK have, to a 
large  extent,  separated  …  doctors  duty  and  patient‟s  rights,  principally  to 
                                                 
139 See for example the comments in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 489 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, 
Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
140 Jones, above n.56, [6-105]. 
141 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital  & the Maudsley Hospital  & Ors [1984] QB 
493, 511 (Lord Donaldson).  93 
curtail actions for battery against medical practitioners,‟142 thus indicating a 
retreat from consent issues. 
 
If the legal test is not about consent then we must determine what it truly is 
(or ought to be) about.  In Chester143 Lord Walker took some steps towards 
clarifying the law when he noted that whilst the test is not specifically about 
consent, the provision of advice is the „foundation of consent,‟144 a position 
which  is  perhaps  reflected  in  the  GMC  Guidelines  on  „consent‟  which  are 
labelled „consent‟ but address the concept of informed decisions which are the 
precursor to the consent to (or of course, refusal of) medical treatment.145 It is 
best therefore to avoid the language of consent and talk instead of the quality 
of the advice  given  to and the ability  of the patient  to make  an informed 
choice or informed decision.   
 
Who takes the central role (the prudent patient or the prudent professional)? 
 
[3.130] As we have seen, the United Kingdom is traditionally identified as the 
jurisdiction  most  focussed  on  the  professional  standards  of  the  doctor  (as 
established by his or her peers).  It is this perception which drove the rejection 
of  the  Bolam  test  by  the  Rogers  v  Whitaker146  Court  and  Lord  Scarman‟s 
dissenting judgment in Sidaway.147  There have been claims of a shift in focus 
back to the patient as demonstrated by Pearce148 and this is supported by some 
more recent judicial statements, such as that of Lord Steyn in Chester when he 
adopted language reminiscent of Cardozo‟s in Schloendorff149 and referred to 
the „starting point … that every individual of adult years and sound mind has 
                                                 
142 Jones, above n.56, [6-105]. 
143 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134. 
144 Ibid, 165 (Lord Walker). 
145  General  Medical  Council,  Consent:  patients  and  doctors  making  decisions  together  (Guidance  for 
doctors),http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/consent_guidance_index.asp at 20 January 2011. 
146 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 489. 
147 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital  & the Maudsley Hospital  & Ors [1985] AC 
871, as outlined above. 
148 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust  [1999] ECC 167, refer discussion and references above n.92. 
149 Schloendorff v The Society of the New York Hospital  105 NE 92 at 93 (1914). 94 
a right to decide what may or may not be done with his or her body.‟150  He 
then  proceeded  to  refer  specifically  to  the  notion  of  autonomy  and  the 
imperative  that  „due  respect  is  given  to  autonomy  and  dignity  of  each 
patient.‟151  As argued above however, I reject these claims and argue that the 
doctor continues to sit firmly at the heart of the debate  and  it truly  is an 
enquiry which focuses on the prudent professional. 
 
Are we dealing with patient autonomy or professional standard of care? (Or 
is it about the doctor or the patient?) 
 
[3.140] It follows directly from the answer to the previous question that the 
enquiry  as  it  stands  is  emphatically  one  of  professional  standard  of  care.  
Chester  demonstrates  some  attempt  by  the  judiciary  to  shift  focus  to  the 
autonomous patient but, as we will see in Part II when we consider causation, 
this  attempt  is  confounded  because  under  the  existing  framework, 
fundamental causative principles need significant massaging in order to meet 
the stated aims of the Court.  
 
It is important to remember that in the United Kingdom, despite Lord Steyn‟s 
acknowledgment  of  the  „correlative  rights  and  duties  of  the  patient  and 
surgeon,‟152 there is a clear distinction between the two.153 This separation of 
the  right  of  the  patient  to  information  from  considerations  of  the  doctor‟s 
professional  standard  remains  constant  throughout  all  of  the  judgments.  
Thus it is clear that the enquiry centres on a professional standard of care. 
 
As with the situation in the United States, we see in the United Kingdom that 
each  of  the  questions  posed  is  open  to  some  debate.    There  is  more 
consistency  in  the  United  Kingdom  than  in  the  United  States  (perhaps 
                                                 
150 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, 143 (Lord Steyn). 
151 Ibid, 144. 
152 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, 143 (Lord Steyn). 
153  This  point  is  clearly  made  by  Jones,  above  n.56,  and  discussion  above  Is „informed  consent‟ truly  about 
consent? (at [3.120]). 95 
reflective  of  the  consistency  of  jurisdiction  as  opposed  to  the  multiple 
jurisdictions in the United States) but there continues to be judicial discomfort 
and  ongoing  debate  regarding  the  true  focus  of  enquiries  involving  the 
provision of pre-treatment advice („informed consent‟).  I suggest, once again, 
that  this  is  due  to  the  attempts  to  combine  disparate  concepts  in  the  one 
enquiry.  There is an attempt to: utilise the language of consent (best suited to 
a trespass enquiry), address the question of professional standards (which are 
measured by other members of the same profession) and the infringement of 
a personal right to information.  This cannot, and does not, result in coherent 
law.  The focus ought to be on the individual concerned and the affected 








[4.10]  We  will  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  last  of  our  triumvirate  of 
jurisdictions, Australia.  It is fitting that this is the final jurisdiction to be 
considered  in  this  section  of  our  discussion  because  the  High  Court  has 
respectfully,  but  firmly,  distinguished  its  position  from  that  of  both  the 
United States and the United Kingdom, highlighting the „shortcoming(s) of 
Bolam‟1  and  describing  the  use  of  terms  such  as  „self-determination‟  and 
„informed  consent‟  (as  represented  by  Canterbury)  as  „amorphous‟  and 
„unhelpful.‟2  The position in Australia, as exemplified by the decision of 
Rogers  v Whitaker,3  has been hailed as a „defining moment‟  in Australian 
medical jurisprudence4 providing a „concise statement of the law‟5 which 
reflects  a  consistency  between  medical  law  and  sound  legal  and  ethical 
principles.6 Equally, it has been described as imposing an „onerous burden‟ 
on doctors7 and has been subject to „significant criticism.‟8  This part of our 
discussion  will  analyse  the  decision  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker,  unravel  the 
commentary and investigate the true nature of the test.   
 
In completing the profile of the different approaches to standard of care it 
will become clear that despite the ongoing debate regarding the appropriate 
test,  Miola  was  correct  when  he  suggested  that  ‘Rogers  and  Sidaway’  are 
                                                 
1 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 481(Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
2 Ibid, 490. 
3 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
4 J. Devereux, „It‟ s Just a Jump to the Left – and then a Step to the Right: Developments post Rogers v Whitaker 
in the Law Relating to the Failure by a Medical practitioner to Advise of Risks,‟ (1998) 17 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 63, 64. 
5 T. Addison, „Negligent Failure to Inform: Developments in the law since Rogers v Whitaker „ (2003) 11 Tort 
Law Journal 165, 167. 
6 J. Keown, „Burying Bolam: Informed Consent Down Under,‟ [1994] Cambridge Law Journal 16. 
7  R.  Mulheron,  „Twelve  Tests  to  Identify  Whether  a  Medical  Risk  is  “Material”‟ (2000)  National  Law 
Review 1, [97]. 
8 I. Kerridge, M. Lowe & C. Stewart, Ethics and Law for the Health Professions (2009, Federation Press, 
Sydney), 306. The authors refer the reader to D. Mendelson, „Liability  for Negligent Failure to Disclose 
Medical Risk‟ (2001) Journal of Law and Medicine 335. 97 
„more  similar  than  different‟9  (and  I  would  add  that  Canterbury  is  also 
similar in outcome).  All three travel a different path of judicial reasoning 
but all arrive at the same point.  This conclusion will be supported by a 
return to our discussions about Sally.  I will apply the three different tests to 
her situation and we will see that the same conclusion is reached.  This then 
raises  the  additional  question  of  why  is  this  test  so  troubling  and  why, 
despite the considerable judicial concern and effort, does it continue to be 
problematic?  This in turn raises the additional question of why does this 
debate continue?  I suggest that it is symptomatic of the troubling nature of 
the „informed consent‟ doctrine which is, quite simply, asking the wrong 
question.    The  judicial  scrutiny  should  be  of  the  process  of  choice,  not 
consent.10 
 
The foundations of ‘informed consent’11: Rogers v Whitaker – The 
decision 
 
[4.20] In Australia, as in the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
issue of consent in the context of medical treatment has long been viewed as 
appropriately governed by the law of negligence, with decisions turning on 
the standard of care required of medical practitioners.  Until the decision of 
Rogers v Whitaker, that standard in Australia was governed by the „Bolam 
principle,‟12 but it was not without its critics.  The basis of judicial criticism 
was  that  it  enabled  the  medical  profession  to  be  the  arbiter  of  what 
constituted  negligent  behaviour,  an  approach  that  was  inherently  risky.  
This  concern  was  given  full  voice  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker  but  was 
foreshadowed in the earlier decision of F v R13 with the Court recognising 
that professions may well adopt unreasonable practices which develop to 
                                                 
9 J. Miola, „On the Materiality of Risk: Paper Tigers and Panaceas‟ (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 76, 99. 
10 This is, of course, the central theme of my thesis and it is one to which we will return as we progress. 
11 The term „informed consent‟ is placed in inverted commas here to highlight the fact that the foundations of 
the doctrine in Australia lay in a clear denial of its relevance as a term. 
12 Refer Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, as outlined above in Chapter 3. 
13 (1989) SASR 189. 98 
serve  the  needs  of  the  profession  rather  than  the  client  (or  in  these 
circumstances  the  patient).  King  CJ  called  for  judicial  scrutiny  of 
professional practices to ensure that they accord with the requirements of 
the  law.14  The  High  Court  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker,  endorsed  F  v  R  and 
specifically affirmed the relevance of the factors set out by King CJ.15 These 
„factors‟ were collectively described as „relevant circumstances‟ and said to 
„include the nature of the matter to be disclosed, the nature of the treatment, 
the desire of the patient for information, the temperament and health of the 
patient  and  the  general  surrounding  circumstances.‟16  It  was  upon  this 
foundation that the High Court then built the materiality test and rejected 
the Bolam approach of allowing the medical profession to set the standard of 
care  as  „illogical‟.17  We  see  then  an  addressing  of  some  of  the  concerns 
highlighted  in  Chapter  3,  and  a  clear  intention  to  bring  a  clarity  to  the 
debate.  We will also see however that subsequent interpretations of this 
decision,  many  of  them  scholarly,  have  meant  that  its  full  vigour  and 
rejection of the „mistakes‟ of other jurisdictions is not given practical effect. 
 
The  facts  of  Rogers  v  Whitaker  are  well  known.    Mrs  Whitaker  had  been 
almost  totally  blind  in  the  right  eye  for  many  years  (the  result  of  a 
penetrating  injury  when  young)  and  under  medical  advice  she  chose  to 
undergo a corrective procedure. During discussions with the surgeon she 
clearly  exhibited  concern  about  her  left  eye  but  did  not  ask  specific 
questions about sympathetic ophthalmia, a condition which was deemed to 
have  a  risk  of  one  in  14,000.    Unfortunately  the  risk  eventuated,  she 
developed sympathetic ophthalmia and was almost completely blind as a 
result.  She sought compensation on the grounds of negligence.  Dr Rogers 
contested her claim arguing that the accepted practice was not to inform 
patients of this risk.  The Court rejected his position which was consistent 
with the Bolam test, instead introducing a test of „materiality‟ based on what 
                                                 
14 F v R (1983) SASR 189, 193-194. (King CJ). 
15 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 491 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
16 F v R (1983) SASR 189, 192 (King CJ). 
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the patient would want to know as opposed to what the medical profession 
deemed to be relevant.18  Echoing the language of the Canterbury Court, the 
High Court found that a duty of care will be breached unless the doctor 
informs the patient of all material risks.  The Court stated that: 
 
a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable 
person in the patient‟s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to 
attach significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably 
be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risks would be likely 
to attach significance to it.19 
 
In shifting the focus from the perspective of the medical profession to that of 
the patient, the decision has been said to emphasise the importance of self-
determination  and  autonomy  in  the realm of  medical  consent,  the  result 
being  an  introduction  of  the  notion  of  informed  consent.20  This 
interpretation is despite clear statements by the Court that the decision is 
not about consent.  According to the High Court, the question of consent is 
relevant  only  in  the  context  of  battery  and  battery  is  negatived  by  the 
patient being advised in broad terms of the nature of the procedure to be 
performed.21 
 
The  majority  judgment22  was  quite  clear  in  its  rejection  of  notions  of 
informed consent and autonomy.  The focus was on provision of negligent 
advice which turned on the question of scope and content of duty in this 
context.23  It was emphasised that the existence of a duty of care was never 
in question, and neither was the standard of care which was accepted as that 
                                                 
18 Ibid, 490. 
19 Ibid. 
20 I will explore the scholarly interpretations of Rogers v Whitaker further below but it is worth noting Miola‟s 
suggestion that after Rogers „patient autonomy seemed alive and well, and doctors should be quaking in their 
boots,‟ Miola, above n.9, 93. 
21 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
22 Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ presented the joint judgment which has been viewed as 
offering the authoritative position on consent in medical treatment cases. 
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enunciated in Bolam.24  Informed consent, autonomy and self-determination 
were  described  as  „amorphous‟  and  „apt  to  mislead.‟25  Such  terms  were 
deemed  to  be  relevant  with  respect  to  questions  involving  trespass  and 
validity of consent, issues which, in the view of the Court, had no place in 
this decision. 
 
An interesting distinction was drawn in the judgment between consent for 
the purposes of trespass that can, in the view of the Court, be „meaningless‟, 
because it is made in the absence of relevant information and advice, and 
meaningful choice (or agreement) to proceed with treatment.26  On this basis 
there  are,  according  to  Rogers  v  Whitaker,  two  levels  of  decision  making.  
First there is the process of „meaningless consent‟ which, it would seem, is 
sufficient to defeat trespass.  Then there is a second stage of meaningful 
„choice‟ which, despite depending upon quality of advice and information, 
is viewed as a different legal creature from informed consent. 
 
The  question  then  is  what,  according  to  the  Court,  makes  choice 
meaningful?  It is clear that it is about the exchange of information with a 
focus on the needs and wishes of the patient, as opposed to the professional 
judgment of the doctor.  The main criticism of the Bolam principle was that it 
was interpreted as removing the decision-making power from the judiciary 
and placing it in the hands of the very profession which was under review.  
This position marks the apparent point of departure from Bolam with the 
focus  shifting  from  the  prudent  doctor  to  the  prudent  patient  and  a 
consideration of what the patient, as opposed to the doctor, would deem 
material. 
 
                                                 
24 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.  The standard being that of reasonable 
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Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 482, (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). This position 
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It is no coincidence therefore that the theme of choice is at the heart of this 
thesis.27  It is important at this point in our discussion to emphasise the High 
Court‟s endorsement of the significance of choice and rejection of notions of 
consent.  The Court spent some time considering (and rejecting) the Bolam 
test.    As  a  starting  point,  the  majority  of  the  High  Court  declared  the 
provision  of  professional  advice  and  the  provision  of  treatment  to  be  a 
single comprehensive duty.28 Yet the Court went on to find that factors used 
to determine the content of duty in the different components of advice and 
treatment  would  vary  according  to  circumstances.    The  result  was  that, 
despite endeavouring to identify a „single comprehensive duty‟ the different 
aspects  of  the  therapeutic  relationship  were  clearly  separated,  with  the 
Bolam  standard  maintaining  authority  in  the  context  of  diagnosis  and 
treatment.29  The  provision  of  pre-treatment  advice  was  specifically 
separated  from  diagnosis  and  treatment  and  the  test  of  materiality  was 
devised in order to provide content to the duty of care and to give meaning 
to patient choice. 
 
In short, the decision of Rogers v Whitaker was, according to the Court, about 
the  content  of  the  duty  of  care  owed  by  doctors  to  their  patients  when 
giving advice regarding proposed treatment.  Advice that covered material 
risks  (with  materiality  being  determined  from  the  patient‟s  perspective) 
would infuse the choice with meaning or, to put it more succinctly, enable 
informed choice.  This was not, according to the majority, a decision about 
standard of care in the context of diagnosis and treatment, the notion of self-
determination or informed consent.  It was about choice. 
   
                                                 
27 A theme which is more specifically developed in Part III. 
28 Ibid, 489. 
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[4.30]  The  judicial  acceptance  of  Rogers  v  Whitaker  has  proved 
unproblematic, and unlike the ongoing debates in both the United States 
and  the  United  Kingdom,  the  test  has  been  readily  addressed  and 
endorsed.30 
 
The authority of Rogers v Whitaker and significance of the materiality test 
were  reinforced  by  the  High  Court  in  Chappel  v  Hart31  and  Rosenberg  v 
Percival,32 with both decisions focussing on the nature of the risk and the 
needs of the respective plaintiffs.33 This approach has been consistent across 
Australian  state  jurisdictions  with  two  additions:  considerations  of  the 
autonomous individual and the use of the phrase „informed consent‟.  The 
inclusion of both of these concepts (which the High Court clearly rejected), 
signal a subtle, but important, shift away from the basic principles of Rogers 
v  Whitaker  and  perhaps  towards  either  (or  both)  the  approaches  in  the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  The brief discussion that follows is 
a mere snapshot of the judicial application of Rogers v Whitaker but provides 
insight into the three key points I would like to make: the test is applied in a 
straightforward manner, autonomy  is perceived as the foundation  of the 
Rogers v Whitaker test and the language of informed consent is alive and 
well. 
 
   
                                                 
30  A  basic  „CaseBase‟ search  returns  in  excess  of  250  decisions  either  applying  or  considering  Rogers  v 
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31 (1998) 195 CLR 232. 
32 (2001) 205 CLR 434.  
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Applying the test 
 
[4.40] The principles espoused in Rogers v Whitaker remain unchallenged in 
the  lower  Courts.    The  Queensland  Supreme  Court  referred  to  the 
„unproblematic application of the materiality test‟34 and in New South Wales 
Basten JA referred to the  „well established principle‟ of Rogers v Whitaker.35  
Similarly, in the Western Australian Court of Appeal, Martin CJ explained 
that  he  had  „no  difficulty  in  principle  with  the  notion  of  a  medical 
practitioner having a duty to warn …‟ and referred to the „well-established 
duty‟ citing Rogers v Whitaker as authority.36  The significance of the earlier 
decision of F v R37 has also been acknowledged with the factors outlined by 
King CJ38 and endorsed by the High Court,39 providing the structure for 
decisions in lower Courts.40 It is worth noting that the impact of Rogers v 
Whitaker on medical practice has also been emphasised, with McCallum J in 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales using Rogers to reject evidence that 
advice was not given when he stated that he found it „inherently unlikely 
that in 1996, four years after Rogers, an experienced orthopaedic surgeon 
would not give a warning.‟41 
 
It is also noteworthy that the materiality test has been interpreted as having 
two limbs.  Jones DCJ referred to the „proactive‟ and „reactive‟ stages of the 
enquiry,42 with the consideration of the reasonable person in the patients‟ 
position forming the „proactive‟ stage and the question of what the doctor 
knew,  or  ought  to  know,  that  the  particular  patient  would  attach 
significance to, forming the reactive.43  Similarly, in the New South Wales 
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39 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 491 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
40 See for example, Coppolina v Kierath [2003] WADC 141, [4] (Groves DCJ), Monument v Baker [2007] 
WADC 164. 
41 Harris v Bellemore [2010] NSWSC 176, [126] (McCallum J). 
42 Adams v Hertess [2010] QDC 369, [21]. 
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Court  of  Appeal,  Santow  JA  referred  us  to  the  „subjective  and  objective 
aspects of material risk.‟44 There are numerous other examples of the basic 
application  of  the  materiality  test  and  acceptance  of  the  approach  of  the 
High Court but this small collection of more recent decisions demonstrates 
that the nature of the test for duty of care, as enunciated in the High Court 
in Rogers v Whitaker remains unchallenged and is consistently applied.  But 
is the actual „spirit‟ of the principle applied with equal consistency? That is, 
have  Australian  Courts  turned  their  face  from  issues  of  autonomy  and 
informed consent in the context of pre-treatment advice?  We will see, from 
the  discussion  below,  that  not  only  is  this  not  the  case  but  the  point  of 
departure from both the United States and the United Kingdom will also 
prove to be illusory.45 
 
Reference to autonomy 
 
[4.50]  As  we  have  seen,  the  High  Court  clearly  and  unambiguously, 
removed itself from considerations of autonomy  or „self-determination,‟46 
preferring instead to focus on the process of information exchange and the 
duty of the doctor.  Subsequent decisions have not been as careful in their 
avoidance and have viewed considerations of autonomy as the basis of the 
principles espoused in Rogers v Whitaker.  Most notable of these is Kirby J, in 
the High Court when he asserted that „fundamentally the rule [in Rogers v 
Whitaker] is a recognition of individual autonomy.‟47 
 
                                                 
44 Johnson v Biggs [2000] NSWCA 338, [93] (Santow AJA).  This is consistent with the recommendations 
contained  within  the  „Review  of  the  law  of  Negligence  Final  Report‟,  Sep  2002  („The  Ipp  Report‟) 
http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law_Neg_Final.pdf,  at  18  February  2011. 
Recommendation 7 specifically refers to the proactive and reactive elements of the doctor‟s duty and the 
proactive duty to inform is specifically covered [3.51]-[3.64] and the reactive [3.65]-[3.70].  As this has no 
specific relevance to this discussion beyond highlighting of the different components of the test there is no 
need to consider it in any further detail here. 
45 This final point of the argument is discussed in detail in The more things change, the more they stay the same 
(at [5.10]).  
46 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
47 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 480 (Kirby J). 105 
It is unsurprising then that at State level, Rogers v Whitaker has been aligned 
with the protection of autonomy.  In Hookey v Paterno, we are referred to the 
„concept of autonomy‟ as the driving force behind the requirement for the 
Courts to „adjudicate the standard of care‟ (and Rogers v Whitaker is cited as 
authority  for  this  proposition).48  In  Dr  Ibrahim  v  Arkell,  Fitzgerald  JA 
explains the rationale behind the „very high‟ duty as the „policy requirement 
entitling a competent person to make his or her own decision about his or 
her life.‟49  A more specific reference to the principle of autonomy can be 
found  in  other  decisions:  in  Harris  v  Bellemore  there  is  reference  to  „the 
primacy of autonomy‟50 and in Tann v Benkovic Mason P specifically states 
that „the duty of care of Rogers is premised on the notion of autonomy.‟51 
 
It  is  clear  therefore  that,  whilst  not  every  decision  specifically  refers  to 
autonomy, it continues to be a relevant consideration which the Courts view 
as inherent in the right to information.  Significantly, reference to autonomy 
in  the  context  of  pre-treatment  advice  is  present  in  the  High  Court  (in 
Rosenberg v Percival) and this provides authority for it to be considered in the 
lower Courts.  It is therefore a concept which, despite being rejected by the 
Rogers Court, is now viewed as not only present in the principles of Rogers v 
Whitaker  but  as  being  the  basic  premise  of  the  duty  as  espoused  in  that 
decision.    The  „amorphous  and  unhelpful‟52  has  become  a  „policy 
requirement‟53  and  a  „primary  concern‟54  that  is  fundamental  to  any 
consideration of pre-treatment advice.   
 
   
                                                 
48 Hookey v Paterno [2009] 22 VR 362, [224] (Neave JA). 
49 Dr Ibrahim v Arkell [1999] NSWCA 95, [33] (Fitzgerald JA). 
50 Harris v Bellemore [2010] NSWSC 176, [81] (McCallum J). 
51 Tan v Benkovic [2000] 51 NSWLR 295, [29] (Mason P). 
52 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
53 Dr Ibrahim v Arkell [1999] NSWCA 95, [33] (Fitzgerald JA). 
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The role of ‘informed consent’  
 
[4.60] As reflected in the title of this thesis, I believe that despite the High 
Court‟s  rejection  of  the  phrase  „informed  consent‟,  it  continues  to  have 
currency  as  a  term.  We  will  see  this  more  clearly  in  Part  II  and  the 
exploration of causation which clearly turns on the question of consent. For 
the moment however, it is worth noting the acceptance of the term.  It is rare 
in the lower Courts to see judicial use of the phrase „informed consent‟ and 
yet it is not rejected when plaintiffs frame their complaint in the language of 
informed  consent.  In  Ormbsy  v  Stewart  &  Ors,  55  the  statement  of  claim 
referred to the duty of care of the doctor to give information in the context 
that the plaintiff had failed to give informed consent.  Similarly, in Kerr v 
Minister for Health56 the claims raised by the plaintiff included an assertion 
that in the absence of appropriate advice, she did not give informed consent 
and in Coppolina v Kierath, 57 Groves DCJ in explaining the evidence and the 
cross-examination of the plaintiff noted that it „was in large part, directed 
towards pre-operative informed consent.‟58 
 
Thus whilst the term informed consent is generally avoided by the judiciary 
it is used in common parlance and in the framing of claims and, as shown in 
the small collection of cases above, this language is not challenged by the 
judiciary.  This interpretation is supported by Kirby J‟s considered judgment 
in Rosenberg v Percival.59 His Honour clearly acknowledged that whilst there 
is  no  place  for  informed  consent  in  Australian  jurisprudence,  the  issues 
addressed by the materiality rule are those most commonly associated with 
informed consent in both legal and medical literature.60 It is this continued 
reliance on, and reference to, concepts of consent that make the principles of 
                                                 
55 Ormsby v Stewart & Ors [2009] QSC 200. 
56 Kerr v Minister for Health [2009] WASCA 27. 
57 Coppolina v Kierath [2003] WADC 141. 
58 Ibid, [42] (Groves DCJ). Also see Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 18 [35] where Harrison 
J, in setting out the plaintiffs submission referred specifically to the „notion of informed consent.‟ 
59 (2001) 205 CLR 434. 
60 Ibid, 476. 107 
Rogers v Whitaker difficult to apply in practice.  The decision itself sought to 
focus on the process of communication and choice but, as we will see in the 
next part of our discussion,61 it is the principle of consenting to (or refusal 
of) treatment that truly drives, and I suggest misdirects, the enquiry.   
 
The scholarly view of Rogers v Whitaker 
 
[4.70] Turning now to the scholarly interpretations of Rogers v Whitaker, we 
will  see  that  a  similar  pattern  emerges  with  both  informed  consent  and 
autonomy playing a pivotal role in discussions.  Despite the best efforts of 
the High Court, Rogers v Whitaker continues to be associated with informed 
consent.62  It  has  been  described  as  „a  simply-articulated  version  of  the 
American rule of informed consent‟63 and a „consideration of the process of 
informed decision-making.‟64 Similarly, there is a scholarly endorsement of 
autonomy  as  the  foundational  principle  of  „informed  consent‟  and  an 
overriding view that Rogers v Whitaker and Rosenberg v Percival combine to 
„embed the primacy of autonomy for patient decision-making‟ in the law.65 
 
Reference to autonomy 
 
[4.80] The overarching theme of the scholarly literature entails a recognition 
of  the  authority  of  Rogers  v  Whitaker    (as  endorsed  in  both  Rosenberg  v 
Percival and Chappel v Hart), coupled with an acceptance of autonomy (or 
self-determination) as the foundational principle. Gottlieb and Linden for 
                                                 
61 See Part II: In search of the missing link - Causation. 
62 See for example D. Chalmers and R. Schwarz, „Rogers v Whitaker and Informed Consent in Australia: A Fair 
Dinkum Duty of Disclosure‟ [1993] 1 Medical Law Review 139, 139 where we are informed that in Rogers v 
Whitaker the „High Court has presented Australia with the strongest and most patient-oriented doctrine of 
informed consent among the common law jurisdictions.‟ We also see Rogers v Whitaker emphatically aligned 
with informed consent in the title of articles, such as Hon David K. Malcolm, AC „ The High Court and 
Informed Consent: The Bolam principle Abandoned‟ (1994) 2 Tort law Review 81 and J. Keown, „Burying 
Bolam: Informed Consent Down Under‟ [1994] Cambridge Law Journal 16.  Indeed, the Australian Institute 
of Health Law and Ethics (as it was then called, the organisation now forms a part of Australasian Association 
of  Bioethics  and  Health  Law,  AABHL)  hosted  a  10
th  Anniversary  salute  to  Rogers  v  Whitaker  entitled  
„Informed Consent in Australia – Tenth Anniversary of Rogers v Whitaker’ (26 October 2002). 
63 D. Chalmers and R. Schwarz, „Rogers v Whitaker and Informed Consent in Australia: A Fair Dinkum Duty of 
Disclosure‟ [1993] 1 Medical Law Review 139, 145.  
64  Devereux, above n.4 69. 
65 I. Freckelton, „Rogers v Whitaker Reconsidered‟ (2001) 9 Journal of Law and Medicine 5, 6. 108 
example  discussed  Rosenberg  and  emphasised  the  significance  of 
autonomy,66 and in a similar vein to my thesis, Mendelson referred to the 
„dignitary harm to the patient‟s autonomy in being deprived of making a 
meaningful  choice.‟67  Waddams  also  described  the  failure  to  inform  (as 
addressed  by  Rogers  v  Whitaker)  as  leading  to  „an  infringement  of  the 
patient‟s  autonomy‟68  and  Addison  referred  to  „self-determination  as  the 
paramount consideration in Rogers v Whitaker.‟69 
 
More  recently,  Miola  commented  that  „after  Rogers  v  Whitaker  patient 
autonomy seemed alive and well, and doctors should be quaking in their 
boots.‟70  Ross  took  the  argument  one  step  further  when  he  not  only 
recognised the significance of autonomy in the Rogers v Whitaker decision, 
but  argued  that  the  „Rogers  decision  has  promoted  a  form of  mandatory 
autonomy.‟71  Further insight into the scholarly view was given by Malcolm 
who explained that the information supplied by the doctor is the basis for 
the  decision  and  represents  the  patients‟  „only  moment  of  self-
determination,‟72  and  other  scholars  have  referred  to  autonomy  as  the 
„purpose‟73 and the „justification‟74 for the duty to inform.  This review of the 
scholarly  literature  could  continue  but  rather  than  become  mired  in  a 
recount of the arguments of others, I have chosen to simply highlight the 
ongoing acceptance of autonomy as the foundational principle of the duty 
to inform.  My point here is that despite the High Court‟s assertion that 
                                                 
66 J. Gottlieb & S.Linden, „Rosenberg v Percival – Rogers v Whitaker revisited‟ (2001) 9(8) Australian Health 
Law Bulletin 69, 72. 
67 D. Mendelson, „The Breach of Medical Duty to Warn and Causation: Chappel v Hart and the necessity to 
reconsider some aspect of Rogers v Whitaker‟ (1998) 5 Journal of Law and Medicine 312.  Mendelson further 
points to the nature of the loss suffered and describes the nature of the physical harm, which is the focus of the 
causation enquiry, as „consequential‟ as opposed to „primary‟ (I take this one step further and describe it as 
logically irrelevant). We will explore these themes further in Part II of the thesis when we follow the ongoing 
search for the missing causal link.   
68 S.M. Waddams, „Causation, physicians and disclosure of risks‟ [1997] Tort Law Review 5, 7. 
69 T. Addison, „Negligent Failure to Inform: Developments in the law since Rogers v Whitaker‟ (2003) 11 Torts 
Law Journal 165, 167. 
70 Miola, above n.9, 93. 
71 A. Ross, „A Public perspective of Rogers v Whitaker‟ paper presented at the AIHLE Conference: Informed 
Consent in Australia – Tenth Anniversary of Rogers v Whitaker held at ANU 26 October 2002, 1. 
72 Hon D. Malcolm, AC, „The High Court and Informed Consent: The Bolam principle Abandoned’ (1994) 2 
Tort Law Review 81, 92. 
73 M. Stauch, „Taking the Consequences for Failure to Warn of Medical Risks‟ (2000) 63 The Modern Law 
Review 261, 268. 
74 P. Cane, „A Warning about Causation‟ (1999) 115 Law Quarterly Review 21, 24. 109 
Rogers v Whitaker represented a rejection of the transatlantic language and 
notions of self-determination, the scholarly literature (and as we have seen 
the Australian judiciary), have chosen to adopt it. 
 
The role of ‘informed consent’ 
 
[4.90]  Any  review  of  the  scholarly  discussions  of  Rogers  v  Whitaker  and 
associated cases reveals a ready acceptance of the term „informed consent‟ to 
cover the core principles of the decisions.  Some of these have already been 
highlighted75 and further illustrations can be found. These are worth briefly 
considering as they provide insight into the more common interpretations 
of  the  principles  espoused  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker.  Consider  Freckelton  for 
example, whilst he did not specifically adopt the term himself, he referred to 
it through his consideration of the criticisms of Rogers v Whitaker as set out 
in  Rosenberg  v  Percival  which  he  described  as  being  „about  informed 
consent.‟76 The term informed consent is embedded in the work of Olbourne 
who asserts that „the floodgates of informed consent litigation do appear to 
be  opening.‟77  Then  of  course,  as  highlighted  in  our  earlier  discussions, 
Chalmers and Schwarz describe Rogers v Whitaker as presenting Australia 
„with the strongest and most patient-oriented doctrine of informed consent 
among the common law jurisdictions,‟ and also suggest that perhaps the 
„High  Court  was  over-zealous  to  distinguish  itself  [from  the  United 
States]‟.78 
 
Whilst the majority of scholars tend to accept the term „informed consent 
„and express a willingness either to put the High Court‟s rejection of it to 
one side or to simply ignore it, this is not a uniform approach.  Mendelson, 
for example, expresses concern and argues that „by rejecting the informed 
                                                 
75 See above, n.62, n.63 and 64. 
76 Freckelton, above n.65 
77 N. Olbourne, „The Influence of Rogers v Whitaker on the Practice of Cosmetic Plastic Surgery‟ 5 Journal of 
Law and Medicine 334, 346. 
78 Chalmers & Schwarz, above n.63, 139.   110 
consent doctrine on the one hand, by failing to provide an alternative legal 
principle for the imposition of this novel duty on the other, the High Court 
has created an epistemological  conundrum.‟79  Milstein,  however,  is more 
dismissive and acknowledges that there is no doctrine of informed consent 
in Australia but chooses to adopt it as „convenient shorthand.‟80 
 
It is clear there is some debate regarding the existence (and role) of informed 
consent in Australian law but a common theme emerges from the literature.  
Despite the rejection of the term informed consent by the High Court in 
Rogers v Whitaker, as a phrase it continues to have currency and the very 
decision which rejected informed consent has come to represent it.  Perhaps 
this is simply a case of „convenient shorthand‟.  But it is a shorthand that has 
undermined  the  rights  that  the  Court  was  trying  to  protect.    The  focus 
becomes centred on the notion of consent, which in turn is interpreted as 
being the making of a decision whether or not to proceed with treatment, 
and  as  argued  by  McLean,  „just  making  a  decision  is  not  necessarily  an 
exercise  of  autonomy:‟81  to  truly  „exercise  autonomy‟  a  patient  must  be 
actively involved in the decision-making process and one way to ensure this 
is by the provision of relevant (or „material‟) information.  It is this process 
that the High Court was focussing on in the Rogers decision and therefore 
the rejection of the notion of informed consent was clear and reasoned.  To 
adopt it in the face of this rejection is to allow the discussion to become 
distorted and the focus to be on the „consent‟ as opposed to the „informed‟ 
component of the discussion.   
 
   
                                                 
79  D.  Mendelson,  „Liability  for  Negligent  Failure  to  Disclose  Medical  Risk‟ (2001)  Journal  of  Law  and 
Medicine 358, 362. She does not, however, offer a solution to this „conundrum.‟ 
80 B. Milstein, „Causation in Medical Negligence – Recent Developments‟ (1997) 6 Australian Health Law 
Bulletin 21, 21 and 22.This is perhaps no more than open acknowledgment of the approach adopted by other 
scholars. 
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The practical application of Rogers v Whitaker 
 
Informed consent by another name 
 
[4.100] It is fair to say therefore that despite the measured statements of the 
High Court aimed at limiting the scope of Rogers v Whitaker, it has been 
given  a  broad  interpretation  and  application.    We  have  seen  that  the 
majority judgment in Rogers v Whitaker entails a clear rejection of informed 
consent and declines to extend the materiality test beyond the provision of 
advice.   Yet subsequent  scholarly  discussions and judicial interpretations 
have given the test a broad application and consistently refer to the doctrine 
of  informed  consent  in  Australia.  There  is,  therefore,  a  crucial  difference 
between  the  basic  principles  as  stated  in  the  decision  and  how  those 
principles have been applied.  The question we now need to answer is what 
are the practical realities of this decision and do we have a truly patient-
centred test?  
 
When considering Rogers v Whitaker and the materiality test, it is easy to 
focus  on  the  purported  patient-centred  approach  and  overlook  one  key 
aspect of the decision: the emphasis placed on the relevance of professional 
opinion.  It is this key aspect that leads scholars such as Miola82 (and indeed, 
myself) to argue that Rogers v Whitaker and Bolam/Sidaway are „more similar 
than different.‟83 
 
The  authority  of  Rogers  v  Whitaker  has,  as  noted  above,  been  clearly 
endorsed  by  the  High  Court  in  both  Chappel  v  Hart84  and  Rosenberg  v 
Percival85  with  both  decisions  focussing  on  the  nature  of  material 
information and the needs of respective patients.  To understand the true 
                                                 
82 Miola, above n.9. 
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84 (1998) 195 CLR 232. 
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import  of  these  decisions  it  is  important  to  note  the  clear  statement  in 
Rosenberg that Rogers v Whitaker did not reject the relevance of professional 
opinion; rather it „denied its conclusiveness.‟86  The clear recognition of the 
relevance of professional practice means that the Australian test, like that in 
the United States,  has evolved into one that can be described as hybrid. 
There  is,  however,  one  significant  distinction  in  that  Rogers  v  Whitaker, 
Rosenberg v Percival and Chappel v Hart all employ the language of a patient-
centred test but then pay heed to the evidence of practitioners. By contrast, 
the United States test begins with the language of professional practice and 
then moves to patient-centred consideration.87 But they both arrive at the 
same place. 
 
The decision of Rogers v Whitaker was indeed a turning point in  medical 
jurisprudence  in  Australia  which,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  preceding 
discussion,  provoked  widespread  interest,  concern  and,  in  some 
circumstances,  condemnation.88  There  was  concern  that  it  focussed  too 
much on the patient and placed onerous and unrealistic requirements on 
physicians,89 that there was likely to be an ongoing effect resulting in an 
increase  in  litigation,90  and  the  „remarkable  amount  of  ink  and  angst‟ 
expended by sectors of the medical community drew comment.91  In reality, 
however, there has been little change to the test for standard of care. It is a 
straightforward test which addresses the concept of material risks and has 
proven to be relatively simple in its application.  It must be remembered 
that in Rogers v Whitaker, causation was not at issue. It was readily accepted 
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87 Refer Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal.3d 229, (1972) discussed in Chapter 2, under the heading The practical application 
of Canterbury and the emergence of a hybrid test (at [2.70]). 
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Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at 478ff. 
89 R. Smallwood „The NHMRC Guidelines for medical practitioners on giving information to patients: 10 years 
on‟ Paper presented at the AIHLE Conference: Informed Consent in Australia - Tenth Anniversary of Rogers 
v Whitaker held at ANU 26 October 2002, 5.  
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I.LR. 81-83 and F.A. Trindade,„Disclosure of Risks in Proposed Medical Treatment‟ (1993) 109 LQR 352.  
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that Mrs Whitaker would not have proceeded with the treatment had she 
been aware of the risk of sympathetic ophthalmia. The test of materiality is 
an  easy  one  to  meet.  It  is  the  subjective  test  of  causation  which  has 
developed into a more formidable hurdle.  
 
Perhaps  a  key  to  the  difficulty  with  causation  can  be  found  in  the  true 
nature of the harm suffered when a patient is not adequately informed.  The 
High Court took care to distance itself from issues of consent, preferring 
instead to infuse patient choice with meaning.92 Physical considerations and 
harms are specifically aligned with trespass and consent.  As we will see, the 
causation enquiry moves away from choice and embraces notions of consent 
to  treatment.    I  will  argue  in  Part  II  that  it  is  this  crucial  shift  that 
undermines judicial protection of the patient‟s right to material information. 
 
Re-visiting the core issues 
 
[4.110]  Turning  now  to  our  three  main  questions  we  will  see  that  in 
Australia, the answers are all straightforward. The High Court in Rogers v 
Whitaker set out clear guidelines for judicial consideration of pre-treatment 
advice and these have been adopted, without challenge, in subsequent High 
Court decisions and of course, in lower State Courts.  The issue in Australia 
is that despite the rejection of informed consent and autonomy by the Rogers 
Court, both concepts continue to play a central role in judicial and scholarly 
accounts of the law and this perhaps shifts the focus of the decision away 
from the original intent of the Court.  
 
Is ‘informed consent’ truly about consent? 
 
[4.120] Of the three jurisdictions under consideration, the Australian High 
Court  represents  the  clearest  and  most  emphatic  rejection  of  notions  of 
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informed consent.  The  Court directed  us away from informed consent93 
towards choice.  In its unambiguous rejection of consent, the Court clearly 
stated that trespass and validity of consent „had no place in this decision‟94 
which was focussing on the question of the scope and content of the duty to 
provide pre-treatment advice.95  We see once again that decisions focussing 
on the issue of what a patient ought to be told are not about consent and 
that the answer to this particular question is found in trespass decisions, 
which are outside of the scope of this discussion. 
 
Who  takes  the  central  role  (the  prudent  patient  or  the  prudent 
professional)? 
 
[4.130]  The  High  Court  shifted  the  focus  of  its  enquiry  away  from 
professional  practice  and  directed  it  at  the  patient  at  the  centre  of  the 
enquiry.  The correct question to be asked, according to the High Court in 
Rogers v Whitaker, is what would the particular patient deem „significant‟ 
and the label given to this is, of course, materiality.96  The answer to the 
question  of  who  takes  the  central  role  is  therefore  straightforward.  The 
Rogers Court placed the prudent patient at the centre of its enquiry and it 
was this shift and rejection of the Bolam/Sidaway professional practice test 
that has been interpreted as the most noteworthy aspect of the decision.  
 
Are we dealing with patient autonomy or professional standard of care? 
(Or is it about the doctor or the patient?) 
 
[4.140] As we have seen, the Australian High Court specifically resiled from 
notions  of  autonomy  and  self-determination,  yet  the  decision  has,  in  the 
eyes of scholars and the judiciary, come to stand for the protection of patient 
autonomy.  The test, as formulated in Rogers v Whitaker, is clearly one of 
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professional standard with the Court focussing on the requisite standard of 
care.  Here though, unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
enquiry  begins  with  the  individual  patient  and  asks  what  is  material  to 
them.  But it is not all about the patient and considerations of professional 
practice continue to be relevant.  As noted by the Rosenberg Court, the High 
Court did not reject the relevance of professional opinion, rather it „denied 
its conclusiveness.‟97 
 
Thus there is a mixed focus in the judicial consideration of pre-treatment 
advice.  The simplest answer to this question can, however, be found in the 
words of the Rogers Court when discussing the nature of legal issue they 
were addressing.  The Court clearly stated that, in this instance, they were 
concerned  with  the  provision  of  negligent  advice,  which  turned  on  the 
„scope  and  content  of  duty.‟98  According  to  the  High  Court,  in  the 
authoritative decision of Rogers v Whitaker, we are dealing with an issue of 
professional  standard  of  care.  This  standard  can,  and  does,  include 
considerations  of  the  individual  patient,  tempered  by  considerations  of 
professional opinion.  Thus the enquiry begins with the patient and then 
shifts to the doctor. 
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Chapter 5: Bringing it all Together 
 
The more things change, the more they stay the same 
 
[5.10] In the preceding Chapters we have been evaluating the relevance of the 
term  „informed  consent‟  and  have  seen  that  it  is  by  no  means  a  concept 
embraced by the Australian judiciary.  However, as pointed out by Kirby J in 
Rosenberg  v  Percival  the  rejection  of  the  term  amounts  to  little  more  than 
linguistic niceties.  The underlying issues remain the same.  „Materiality‟ and 
choice in Australia are much the same as materiality and informed consent in 
the United States.1  Despite the ongoing debate regarding the appropriate test, 
particularly evident in the United Kingdom where the professional practice 
test, as enunciated in Bolam, sits uncomfortably with some members of the 
judiciary,2 this is not the truly problematic aspect of the law.  I suggest that 
the  ongoing  discomfort  with  the  test  for  standard  of  care  and  struggle  to 
identify  a  more  appropriate  one,  is  symptomatic  of  the  struggle  to  fit  the 
protection of one right within a framework initially created in the context of 
another, quite separate right.  The right to information is quite separate and 
distinct  from  the  right  to  bodily  integrity  and  the  doctrine  of  „informed 
consent‟ fails to recognise this. 
 
In  all  three  jurisdictions  under  consideration,  it  is  accepted  that  the 
foundational premise of the „doctrine of informed consent‟ (or whatever other 
label is utilised) is the unchallenged right of the patient to receive sufficient 
information.    Of  course  this  then  opens  the  question  of  what  constitutes 
sufficient information and this is where the issue of the nature of the duty 
usually arises.  The best way to answer this question would be to focus on the 
right under consideration and the individual being protected.  The enquiry 
                                                 
1 See His Honour‟s comments in Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 476 and discussed in Chapter 4 under 
the heading Interpretations of Rogers v Whitaker (at [4.30]ff). 
2 This debate is detailed in Chapter 3 and is evidenced in Australia with the clear rejection of the Bolam test as 
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most logically would begin and end with the patient.  However, as we have 
seen in the preceding discussions, this is not the way that the law currently 
deals with problems of pre-treatment advice.  The judicial focus remains on 
the  nature  of  the  duty  of  care  expected  of  the  doctor  in  the  provision  of 
information.   
 
The problem with this approach is not readily apparent if one begins from a 
recognition of the correlative nature of the relationship between rights and 
duties.    The  right  to  information  cannot  exist  (or  be  measured)  without 
reference to the duty to provide it.  Hohfeld reduced the law to „eight jural 
conceptions,‟3 and employed the words of an American Judge to explain the 
specific relationship between a right and a duty: „A duty or a legal obligation 
is that which one ought or not to do. „Duty‟ and „right‟ are correlative terms 
when a right is invaded, a duty is violated.‟4 
 
The nature of rights and duties is not challenged here.  What is challenged is 
the judicial practice in the pre-treatment advice cases of protecting the right to 
information  solely  through  a  consideration  of  the  duty  to  provide  it.    In 
practice, the application of the tests as they currently stand means that the 
focus of the discussion remains on the test for standard of care.  The nature of 
the right to information does not play an overt role in the judicial process 
beyond an initial nodding acquaintance with the rationale of autonomy (or 
self-determination).    In  short,  the  test,  as  it  stands,  „concentrates  on 
descriptions of duties rather than rights.‟5 
 
The issue with which this thesis is concerned is one of inappropriate emphasis 
and the adoption of the unrelated language of consent.  As a result of this 
choice  of  language,  the  right  to  information  (which  I  will  describe  as  a 
dignitary right that is concerned with one‟s personal dignity and unrelated to 
                                                 
3 W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Yale university Press, Newhaven, 1964), 38. 
4 Ibid, citing Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co v Kurtz (1984) 10 Ind App, 60. 
5  S.A.M.  McLean,  A  patient’s  right  to  know:  Information  disclosure,  the  doctor  and  the  law  (Dartmouth 
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the external or physical aspects of being) is linked to the trespassory notion of 
consent and, ultimately, measured by the logically irrelevant physical harm.  
A similar problem arises in the context of causation when we see that the loss 
of decision-making power is measured by an unrelated physical harm.  We 
will discuss this in more detail in Part II.  For now, it is sufficient to note the 
disparity between the underlying motivations of the doctrine  of „informed 
consent‟6 and its application in practice.  
 
If we are serious about protecting the right of a patient to a meaningful pre-
treatment  discussion  that  includes  all  material  information,  then  the  pre-
occupation with the nature of the test for standard of care needs to be put to 
one side.  This suggestion clearly runs counter to the flow of judicial opinion 
which has placed emphasis on the significance of the rejection or acceptance 
of one model or the other.  However, a close consideration of the different 
tests as they have evolved across the jurisdictions reveals that however fine 
these distinctions are, they have little practical import.  I will support this 
assertion through a brief comparative discussion of the three „different‟ tests, 
followed by an application of each test to Sally‟s position.  We will see that 
whichever  way  we  look  at  it,  Sally‟s  doctor  was  in  breach  of  his  duty  to 
provide appropriate pre-treatment advice.   
 
Turning first to the United States and Australia, it is illustrative to begin by 
considering  Canterbury.7  The  Canterbury  Court,  like  that  in  Rogers,8 
specifically  noted  the  need  to  look  beyond  proficiency  in  diagnosis  and 
treatment when determining the scope of a physician‟s duty of care with the 
duty  being  founded  on  more  than  simply  the  provision  of  treatment.9  As 
outlined in Chapter 2, the emphasis in the judgment was upon the personal 
                                                 
6 Once again, I would like to reiterate that I will, somewhat reluctantly, use the term informed consent in early 
discussions as it readily identifies the legal framework under discussion and therefore simplifies the argument. 
The latter parts of the thesis will however, see a complete rejection of the term and the substitution of the more 
appropriate „informed choice.‟ 
7 Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972). 
8 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479.  
9 Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972), 781 (Robinson J). 119 
prerogative  of  the  patient  (as  opposed  to  the  physician)  to  determine  for 
himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie.10  The key issue was 
how the patient is to determine how these „best interests‟ can be served, a 
similar debate to that in Rogers. 
 
What then is the appropriate standard?  The Court specifically rejected the 
full  disclosure  standard  describing  it  as  prohibitive  and  based  upon  an 
unrealistic expectation that physicians discuss with their patients every risk of 
proposed treatment no matter how small or remote.11 The emphasis was on 
the reality that the right to make a decision can only be effectively exercised if 
the  patient  possesses  enough  information  to  enable  an  intelligent  choice.12  
Sufficient  information  is  determined  by  establishing  what  information  is 
„material  to  the  decision‟  with  the  law  determining  what  the  appropriate 
standard will be.13 
 
When the practical application of both Rogers v Whitaker and Canterbury are 
placed side by side, the similarities are inescapable.  In both decisions, it is the 
responsibility  of  the  Court,  not  the  medical  profession,  to  determine  the 
appropriate level of information to disclose to the patient.  In doing this, the 
Court is to consider the nature of the relationship between the doctor and the 
patient, the level of knowledge of the patient, their individual concerns and 
what will be material to that patient.  In  Canterbury the patient is to have 
sufficient  information  to  make  an  intelligent  choice;  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker 
sufficient  information  to  make  a  meaningful  choice  is  required.    Yet 
Canterbury  purports  to  endorse  informed  consent  and  Rogers  v Whitaker  to 
reject it.  Autonomy and self-determination apparently play a significant role 
in Canterbury, yet in Rogers v Whitaker they are deemed to be unhelpful terms.  
Despite this apparent difference in reasoning and application the underlying 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, 786. 
12 Also note that Rogers v Whitaker also emphasised the notion of material risk so as to enable the patient to make 
a meaningful choice (Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490). 
13 Ibid, 786-7. 120 
law appears to be the same.  In the United States there is informed consent.  In 
Australia  there  is,  according  to  the  High  Court,  informed  choice,  which 
according  to  later  interpretations,  is  essentially  informed  consent.14  We 
therefore  have  some  linguistic  differences  to  which  must  judicial  and 
scholarly  discussion  has  been  devoted,  but  I  suggest  that  the  practical 
application is the same. 
 
Turning then to the United Kingdom we see a test which certainly appears to 
stand alone.  The enquiry begins with the patient but quickly moves to the 
profession  and  the  Courts  have  endorsed  a  standard  determined  by  the 
profession.    The  key  point  of  distinction  from  Rogers  v  Whitaker  and 
Canterbury is the description of the provision of advice as a matter of clinical 
judgment.15  This position has been clearly rejected by the Courts in both the 
United States and Australia on the basis that the authority to determine what 
is appropriate in any given set of circumstances before the Court rests with 
the Court, not with the very profession under consideration.  In the United 
Kingdom, the Courts retain one discretionary right as introduced in Bolitho16 
and that is the ability to reject the professional opinion if the Court is of the 
view that it lacks a logical basis.17  Whilst this may appear to retain authority 
in  the  Court  through  the  provision  of  a  veto-like  power,  it  is  difficult  to 
imagine  a situation  in which an accepted body  of healthcare  professionals 
could ascribe to a practice that the Court is willing to describe as lacking a 
logical basis.   
 
In  the  absence  of  specific  or  individual  evidence  regarding  professional 
standards  we  can  find  guidance  in  the  General  Medical  Council  (GMC) 
Consent  Guidelines.18  These  Guidelines  avoid  all  reference  to  informed 
                                                 
14 Refer for example, the discussion of Kirby J in Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 476.  
15 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital  & the Maudsley Hospital  & Ors [1984] QB 
493, refer discussion above p.72ff. 
16 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority Respondents [1998] AC 232. 
17 Ibid, 241. 
18 General Medical Council, Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together (Guidance for doctors), 
<http:www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/125.asp> at 20 January  2011. 121 
consent and emphasise the nature of the doctor/patient relationship as a joint 
one: with all decisions made together.  With respect to the level of information 
expected, it is stipulated that the doctor must give patients the information 
they „want or need‟ about, inter alia: diagnosis and prognosis, uncertainties 
and options (including the option not to treat) and potential benefits,  risks 
and burdens along with the likelihood of success.19  Importantly for present 
purposes  the  Guidelines  stipulate  that  no-one  but  the  patient  can  make  a 
decision  regarding treatment20  and emphasise  the individual  nature  of the 
pre-treatment  discussions  which  have  the  key  aim  of  providing  „clear, 
accurate information … presented in such a way patients can understand, can 
help  them  make  an  informed  decision.‟21  If  these  are  the  professional 
standards to be applied in the context of pre-treatment advice, they are not 
dissimilar to the considerations endorsed in both Australia and the United 
States.  We see once again a standard of care which has been the subject of 
much intense debate but has not diverged too much from other, purportedly 
more patient-centric tests.  This position will be clearly demonstrated through 




[5.20] The best way to explain my point here is through the use of a practical 
example.  This is where the story of Sally becomes relevant.  Sally is 20 years 
of age and has been diagnosed with a degenerative eye disease which, if left 
untreated, will deteriorate and with certainty, she will be completely blind 
within  5  years.    The  doctor  tells  Sally  of  a  particular  treatment  that  is 
available.  This treatment, at best, will slow down the degeneration of her 
sight and she could be able to see for up to 10 years.  The surgery itself will 
not  effect  a  complete  cure,  but  it  does  carry  a  risk  of  immediate  onset  of 
blindness.  This is extremely unlikely, let us say there is a 1 in 14,000 chance of 
                                                 
19 Ibid, para 9. 
20 Ibid, para 13. 
21 Ibid, para 28. 122 
the risk manifesting (much the same as with Mrs Whitaker).  However the 
doctor has had a relationship with Sally for as long as she can remember.  
Indeed,  he  is  the  family  doctor  and  has  been  treating  her  in  one  way  or 
another since conception.  He feels protective towards her and is confident 
that the procedure will go well.  He chooses not to tell her of this small (and to 
him) inconsequential risk.  Sally, under the mistaken belief that her doctor can 
effect a complete cure, agrees to undergo the treatment, the risk manifests and 
she suffers complete and immediate loss of sight.  Understandably Sally is 
distressed by this outcome and seeks recompense. 
 
If we bring Sally before those American Courts which adhere to the principles 
of  Canterbury  v  Spence  (Canterbury)22  the  key  question  asked  by  the  Court 
would be what is material to the patient? Or, in other words, what would be 
„significant‟ to their decision?23  Here Sally is young and perhaps has high 
expectations of her doctor. She considers that he will be able to effect a cure 
(as he has done so with all of her other childhood ailments).  The reality of her 
situation is that this will never occur and one would imagine that she would 
wish to retain her sight as long as possible.  It is quite simple to conclude that 
she would view the fact that she will inevitably lose her sight and that there is 
a chance that she could suffer immediate blindness as „significant.‟   
 
In the interests of completeness, before leaving the United States we must also 
bring Sally before a Court which adopts a different approach.  According to 
Cobbs v Grant we need to ask what information a „skilled practitioner of good 
standing would provide under similar circumstances,‟24 with the additional 
note that there is no need to provide information beyond that expected by the 
medical fraternity if such information would have meant that the patient is 
unable to „dispassionately weigh the risks.‟25  Here one would assume that it 
is reasonable to expect the medical fraternity to support disclosure of the true 
                                                 
22 464 F.2d 772, (1972). 
23 Ibid, 785-786. 
24 Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal.3d 229, (1972), 244-5. 
25 Ibid, 246. 123 
nature of the patient‟s condition along with a realistic assessment of long-term 
prognosis.  Beyond a desire to protect Sally from the harsh realities of her 
condition,  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  clinical  assessment  of  her  inability  to 
process information or make rational decisions.  Under  Cobbs  v Grant  it is 
likely that once again, Sally‟s doctor will be found to have breached his duty 
of care.  A final test from the United States comes to the same conclusion. Grab 
v Zoo  referred to the need to provide „medically  significant‟ information.26  
Clearly it is medically significant that, firstly, Sally will never be „cured‟ and, 
secondly, she could suffer from immediate loss of sight.  Once again, breach 
of duty is easy to establish. 
 
Taking Sally to the United Kingdom would not change the outcome.  The 
Courts  there  have  expended  a  great  deal  of  energy  in  the  rejection  of  the 
Canterbury approach, remaining firm on the position that there is no role for a 
patient-centred  test.    As  we  saw  in  Chapter  3,  the  test  is  driven  by 
professional  standards  and  clinical  judgments  of  what  is  appropriate 
information.  In the absence of evidence of what would be the usual practice 
in these circumstances it is illustrative to turn to the GMC Guidelines27 which, 
as outlined in Chapter 3,  clearly  set out certain expected standards. These 
include the provision of information pertaining to diagnosis and prognosis, 
uncertainties, risks and the likelihood of success.28  Here the diagnosis is of a 
degenerative  eye  disease  with  a  prognosis  of  certain  blindness  (at  some 
uncertain time in the future; at best it will be 10 years away).  With respect to 
the uncertainties, the delay of blindness is unknown and there is a risk of 
immediate  onset  of  blindness.  The  final  issue  is  that  of  the  likelihood  of 
success  and  the  response  here  depends  upon  individual  interpretation  of 
success:  In the Doctor‟s eyes success is a delay of up to 10 years; in Sally‟s 
eyes success is a complete cure.  Her version of success has a 0% chance of 
occurring.  None of these facts were conveyed to Sally and she was able to 
                                                 
26 Gorab v Zook  943 P.2d 423 (1997), 427. 
27 General Medical Council, Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together (Guidance for doctors), 
<http:www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/125.asp>at 20 January 2011.  
28 Ibid, para 9. 124 
maintain  her  fantasy  of  „success.‟    An  application  of  the  GMC  Guidelines 
would therefore have the likely conclusion of breach of duty. 
 
Finally,  in  Australia  the  Court  would  ask  one  simple,  straightforward 
question: Was the information withheld by the Doctor „material‟ to Sally‟s 
decision-making  process?  That  is,  would  she  attach  significance  to  it?29  
Clearly the true nature of her condition and the long-term prognosis would in 
fact be of significance to Sally and ought to have been conveyed to her.  Once 
again, a breach of duty would be established. 
 
We  have  seen  in  the  preceding  Chapters  that  much  scholarly  and  judicial 
energy  has  been  expended  in  the  pursuit  of  the  most  appropriate  test  of 
standard of care.  Indeed, this very discussion simply adds to the debate and 
serves to illustrate the plethora of arguments on each side of the divide.  In 
the judgments, there are careful and fine distinctions drawn between different 
linguistic terms but as we have seen through the application of the different 
tests to Sally‟s situation, the difference lies in terminology and not substance.  
However  his  duty  is  measured,  Sally‟s  Doctor  failed  to  meet  the  requisite 
standard of care. 
 
There is another important issue that has been highlighted in this discussion. 
From the very beginning of the „informed consent‟ discussion there is a clear 
flaw:  the intent of the doctrine does not match the mechanism employed by 
the law to determine, in this instance, the requisite duty.30  The enquiry begins 
with  an  individual  right  to  receive  information  that  is  relevant  and 
appropriate to the particular patient in a particular set of circumstances.  This 
right is then measured by a determination of the content of a duty of another 
(the doctor) and the relationship that they have with their profession.  The 
right of the patient is diminished and the duty of the doctor to behave in 
                                                 
29 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
30 As discussed above, I am not denying the relevance of the content of a correlative duty but I suggest that the 
discussion cannot focus solely on that duty, it must also address the nature of the right, and move to protect that 
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accordance  with  professional  standards  emerges  as  the  predominant 
consideration.  Similarly, when we turn to the question of causation in Part II, 
we  will see  that  the Courts become mired in the complexities which arise 
when  they  are  called  upon  to  measure  a  personal  loss  of  choice  by  the 
manifestation  of  an  entirely  different  form  of  harm  (manifestation  of  a 
physical  risk).  The  end  result  is  a  mix  of  tests  across  (and  within)  the 
jurisdictions, each aiming to protect the individual right to information but 
focussing  on  questions  of  professional  standards  as  opposed  to  what  the 
particular patient wants, or needs, to know.  And the end result of all of this 
analysis and judicial assertion that certain tests are superior to others? The 
different tests all amount to the same thing.  They simply represent different 
routes to the same conclusion.   126 





‘The law should eliminate the cause of action for lack of informed consent. Informed 
consent cause of action does nothing to promote or protect patient autonomy … 
many features of the cause of action lead to its lack of utility. The law is forced to go 
at the entire enquiry backwards. The question the law wants to answer is whether the 
patient had adequate information to autonomously exercise his will. In other words, 
what was on the patient’s mind? However the law does not ask what was in the 
patient’s mind. Instead it asks what the doctor did. Did the doctor tell the patient 
enough. 
 
It is easy to predict that law that must be done backwards is not going to work out 
very well.’1 
 
Questions  regarding  patient  consent  to  treatment  clearly  begin  with  a 
consideration of what the doctor did (or did not) do, with patients themselves 
being left on the periphery of the discussion.  The language adopted by the 
judiciary  across  all  three  jurisdictions,  is  that  of  consent  (or  fleetingly  in 
Australia, choice).  As we have seen in Part I, the focus of enquiry is on the 
scope of the duty of care owed by the doctor.  As argued by Roger Dworkin, 
the enquiry is  conducted  backwards.    In all  three  jurisdictions,  the crucial 
issue is one of professional standards2 and as demonstrated by the preceding 
discussion,  the  measure  of  those  standards  has  been  the  subject  of  much 
rigorous debate. 
 
                                                 
1 Roger B. Dworkin, „Getting What We Should from Doctors: Rethinking Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-
Patient Relationship‟ (2003) Health Matrix 235, 283. 
2 With the debate centring on how that standard is to be measured. 127 
In  every  case  dealing  with  pre-treatment  advice,  there  is  no  question 
regarding the actual touching of the patient; there is no trespass to the person 
as the doctor is acting within the licence of the patient.  As we are dealing 
with standards of behaviour, the appropriate cause of action is negligence.  
The doctor is not intentionally interfering with the patient‟s bodily integrity 
but is potentially failing to meet their standard of care in the provision of 
advice and treatment.  Once breach of duty is established, and as we saw in 
Part I this is not an onerous task, the next stage of the enquiry is causation.  It 
is here that the patient plaintiff most often stumbles in their action. 
 
At  the  base  of  the  causation  enquiry  is  the  fact  that  the  law  „takes  no 
cognisance of carelessness in the abstract‟3 meaning that liability will not be 
imposed  unless  the  duty  and  breach  can  be  linked  to  the  loss  or  damage 
suffered.  The identification of a duty to inform (and a corresponding failure 
to do so) is only the beginning of the process.  A thread of causation must lead 
from that failure directly to the patient‟s loss: Did the failure to inform make a 
material difference to the outcome? My concern with this specific stage of the 
enquiry is that the Courts seek to link the failure to provide sufficient advice 
with  a  logically  irrelevant  harm.4  As  a  result,  the  causative  link  is  rarely 
found.    In  asking  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the  patient  would  have 
consented to the treatment, the Courts divert the enquiry away from the right 
to information towards the idea of consent and concepts ordinarily aligned 
with trespass.  In focussing on the issue of whether or not the patient would 
have proceeded with the treatment if they had been informed of this risk, the 
Courts are, quite simply, asking the wrong question. 
 
                                                 
3 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 619 (Lord McMillan). 
4  I  am  referring  here  to  the  gap  between  the  dignitary  harm  suffered  when  the  patient  received  insufficient 
information and the subsequent manifestation of a physical harm arising out of medical treatment.  This was 
raised in Part I (in particular Chapter 5) and will be explored in depth here in Part II. 128 
Causation  is  a  „notoriously  difficult  area  of  law‟5  and,  as  pointed  out  by 
Honoré, there are „no uniquely right answers to difficult legal problems‟ such 
as this.6  The Courts in the pre-treatment advice cases have struggled with the 
traditional  approach  to  causation  and  have  become  adroit  at  leaping  the 
evidentiary gaps,7 often through the adoption of value-laden language and 
appeals to notions of what is just and right as they seek to impose liability 
upon those who ought to be responsible.  With Courts retreating behind such 
language  and  appealing  to  poorly-articulated  „policy  considerations,‟  the 
underlying  rationale  of  negligence  (to  compensate  for  a  wrong)  has  been 
pushed to one side revealing the need for a clear direction in medical consent 
cases. 
 
A close analysis of causation will demonstrate the problematic nature of an 
enquiry  that  relies  on  finding  a  link  between  what  I  am  referring  to  as  a 
„dignitary harm‟8 and a subsequent physical loss.  This linking of harms of a 
different type is as useful as measuring the length of a piece of string by its 
weight: conceptually difficult and practically impossible.  There is a failure in 
logic and this results in a missing causative link.  Courts simply cannot find 
the link between the failure to meet a duty to protect a dignitary interest and 
the sustaining of an unrelated physical harm. 
 
The  significance  of  causation  is  emphasised  across  the  three  jurisdictions 
under discussion, but the nature of the test adopted in each jurisdiction differs 
slightly.  At one end of the spectrum is the subjective approach favoured in 
the United Kingdom; at the other end is the (apparently) completely objective 
approach  adopted  by  the  United  States;  and  somewhere  in  the  middle  is 
Australia,  with  an  overarching  subjective  approach  tempered  by  objective 
                                                 
5 M. Stauch, „Taking the Consequences for Failure to Warn of Medical Risks,‟ (2000) 63 The Modern Law Review 
261, 268. 
6 A. Honoré, „Medical Non-Disclosure, Causation and risk: Chappel v Hart‟ (1999) 7 Torts Law Journal 1, 3 
7  The term leaping evidentiary gaps is borrowed from Jane Stapleton‟s excellent examination of the problematic 
nature of the medical consent cases,  „Lords A‟Leaping Evidentiary Gaps‟ (2002) 10 Torts Law Journal 276. 
8 That is a harm to one‟s personal dignity through a limitation of choice. See definition provided above, Chapter 5, 
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considerations.9  And yet a close examination of the three jurisdictions reveals 
that  in  developing  divergent  causation  tests  they  have,  in  an  apparently 
contradictory manner, drawn closer together.   
 
The jurisdiction commonly identified as the most patient friendly at the duty 
stage is the United States.  Yet it is here that we see the individual patient 
most  firmly  removed  from  consideration  at  the  causation  stage.    The  test 
developed in the United States is an objective one that turns on questions of 
the „reasonable‟ patient.  In Australia, where the doctor-centric Bolam test was 
rejected in favour of the patient-centred materiality test, the trend ostensibly 
continues with the development of a subjective causation test.  We will see, 
however,  that  careful  examination  of  key decisions  reveals  that  individual 
Australian plaintiffs have generally been treated in the same manner as their 
American counterparts, with plaintiff evidence of what they would have done 
being treated with open scepticism and, at times, rejected outright.10  In the 
United Kingdom, where Bolam defers to the expertise of the health providers 
in establishing  duty, the House  of Lords has rejected traditional causation 
tests in this context preferring instead to consider questions of „justice.‟ 11 
 
In each of the three jurisdictions, therefore, there appears to be a change of 
direction  once  enquiry  moves  from  duty  and  breach  to  causation.    Where 
duty  was  based  upon  professional  standards,  causation  becomes  patient-
focussed.  Conversely, in the jurisdiction where the patient firmly occupied a 
central  position  at  the  duty  stage  (the  United  States),  they  recede  into the 
background  of  causation.    The  result  is  that  across  all  three  jurisdictions, 
patients  and  physicians  are  accorded  similar  significance  and  a  balance  is 
struck  between  patient  and  professional  considerations.  And  in  all 
                                                 
9 In Australia the question begins from what would the plaintiff have done if told of the risk and the evidence is 
tested against what the „reasonable‟ patient in that position would have done. It must be recognised that this 
approach has won some support in the United Kingdom, refer Smith v Barking, Havering & Brentwood Health 
Authority [1994] 5 Med L.R. 285. 
10  Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434. To be discussed in more detail below. 
11 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134. This is complicated further by the merging of the stages of enquiry through 
the introduction of language such as „giving content to the duty‟ and we will be considering this in more detail 
below.  130 
jurisdictions,  the  Courts  struggle  to  find  a  link  between  the  lack  of 
information and the manifestation of a physical harm. 
 
Part II of this thesis will focus on the vexed question of causation.  The three 
questions to be answered in this part of our discussion are: 
 
1.  What is the test for causation (is it subjective or objective)? 
2.  What  factors  influenced  the  development  of  the  test  in  each 
jurisdiction? and 
3.  What (if anything) is the problem with the chosen approach? 
 
In addressing these questions I will, as in Part I, carefully analyse the different 
approaches to this stage of the enquiry.  Discussion will begin with the most 
patient-centred  approach  which,  in  this  instance,  is  represented  by  the 
subjective test of the United Kingdom, then move through Australia (a hybrid 
approach)  and  conclude  with  the  United  States  (an  emphatically  objective 
test).  I will identify the apparent point of distinction between the jurisdictions 
as the nature of the test but, once again, I will argue that this is an empty 
debate as the outcome of all of the tests is the same.12  Here, as with the duty 
and breach enquiry, Courts in the three different jurisdictions choose different 
paths  to  reach  the  same  destination  (mainly  because  they  are  using  the 
incorrect guide-book and asking the wrong questions).  I will conclude once 
again with Sally and an application of each of the tests to her situation.   
 
From  this  discussion,  as  with  Part  I,  certain  themes  will  emerge.    Of 
significance here is the role of policy in „leaping evidentiary gaps‟13: this will 
be  considered  in  some  detail  in  Chapter  9.  And  once  again  questions  of 
autonomy and choice will be raised and these issues will form the substance 
                                                 
12 An exception here is the decision of Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134.  In this decision, the Court created a link 
between the breach of duty and the physical harm but this was only possible through a „modest departure „ (Lord 
Steyn, [24]) and „some extension of‟ (Lord Walker, [101]) existing principle. 
13 J. Stapleton, „Lords A‟Leaping Evidentiary Gaps‟ (2002) 10 Torts Law Journal 276. 131 
of the discussion in Part III and will facilitate the proposed shift away from 
„informed consent‟ towards „informed choice.‟  132 




[6.10]  Analysis  of  the  decisions  in  the  United  Kingdom  reveals  an 
ongoing struggle to reconcile the rationale underlying the imposition of a 
duty of care and traditional causative principles.  Once breach has been 
established (through the application of the Bolam professional standards 
test) the Courts then move on to identifying a link between that breach 
and the harm suffered.  In the pre-treatment advice (or consent) cases the 
legally cognisable harm has been identified as the manifestation of a risk 
inherent in the medical treatment and the Courts must identify a clear 
link between this harm and the breach of duty to advise the patient.  It is 
at  this  point  in  the  enquiry  that  the  Courts  in  the  United  Kingdom 
struggle.  In attempting to bridge the gap between the breach of a duty to 
provide  information  and  the  underlying  personal  loss  of  a  right  to 
information,  the  Courts  begin  to  raise  questions  of  who  ought  to  be 
responsible as opposed to who is responsible.  The result is a judicial 
appeal to justice  and  a setting aside of the more  traditional causative 
principles. 
 
As we progress through the analysis of the flawed judicial process in the 
United  Kingdom  (and  in  following  Chapters,  the  United  States  and 
Australia) it is important to return to the core question: Would this be 
necessary  if  the  doctrine  were  informed  choice  instead  of  informed 
consent?  The  ongoing  search  for  the  missing  causative  link  is  only 
necessary  because  the  focus  continues  to  be  on  the  issue  of  consent 
which, as we have already discussed, is relevant to trespass but not to 
negligence.  This argument will be pursued further below, but for now it 
is  important  to  review  the  current  approach  and  clearly  demonstrate 
where (and how) it is flawed. 133 
 
Appeals to justice 
 
[6.20] The duty stage of the negligence enquiry is concerned with the 
identification of the need to moderate behaviour through considerations 
of its impact on others and, of course, what is the appropriate measure of 
that moderation.1  It would seem logical at this point to include questions 
of what ought to be expected in the circumstances.  The Courts in the 
United Kingdom have, as we saw in Chapter 3, chosen not to take that 
path,  preferring  instead  to  rely  on  measures  of  professionalism  as 
established by a „responsible body of peers.‟2There is little reference to 
the individual patient and what ought (in the sense of what is morally 
appropriate)  to  be  done.    This  changes  at  the  causation  stage  of  the 
enquiry which has been described as „an attribution of responsibility‟3 
requiring the Court to scrutinise closely the underlying rationale of the 
relevant duty, in an attempt to determine not only who is responsible for 
the loss sustained, but also who ought to be responsible.  As Jones4 points 
out, the Courts have taken care to avoid „emptying the duty of content,‟5 
preferring instead to make a „value judgment on responsibility‟6 with the 
view that there is no „uniform causal requirement for liability in tort … it 
depends upon the basis and purpose of the liability.‟7  This then conflates 
the duty and causation stages of the enquiry and imports value-based 
evaluations into questions of „did this lead to that.‟  I suggest that the 
reason  for  this  muddying  of  the  causation  enquiry  is,  quite  simply, 
because it is the incorrect „that‟ (outcome or loss) that is at the heart of the 
enquiry.  
                                                 
1 As explained in Part I, the dispute was between patient needs and professional practice as a means of 
measuring standard of care. 
2 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (Bolam) [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587. 
3 M.A. Jones, „“But For” Causation in Actions for Non-Disclosure of Risk,‟ (2002) 18 Tolley’s Journal of 
Professional Negligence 192, 192. 
4 Ibid, pp192-195. 
5 McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1, [47]. This and the following 3 decisions are explored in 
detail  by  Jones,  above  n.3  and  are  included  here  to  provide  insight  into  the  approach  of  Courts  to 
questions of causation. 
6 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraq Airways Co [2002] 3 All ER 209, [74] (Lord Nicholls). 
7 Ibid, [127] and [128] (Lord Hoffman).  134 
 
To import notions of what ought to happen (as opposed to what actually 
did happen) at this pivotal stage of the enquiry has led to a lack of clarity 
and certainty.  The line between duty and causation has become blurred.  
The  duty  to  warn,  which  was  formerly  determined  purely  on  an 
objective  standard  imposed  by  a  professional  body,  becomes  a  value 
laden notion pertaining to the nature of „justice.‟ 
 
The legal test for standard of care was well established in Bolam8 and, as 
outlined  in  Chapter  3,  the  Courts  have  declined  to  retreat  from  the 
position  adopted  in  that  decision.    The  professional  standard  test 
represents  clearly  enunciated  law  and  provides  a  transparent  and 
consistent legal framework.  Once duty and breach have been established 
however,  the  decisions  have  proven  to  be  less  clear.    Particularly 
troublesome have been the cases where there is no clear evidence that the 
failure to warn a patient of a risk made any difference to their actions.  
The problem facing the Courts in these situations is that, whilst it is clear 
that  a  right  has  been  violated  and  a  loss  sustained,  the  insistence  of 
linking  the  intangible  loss  of  a  right  with  the  tangible,  but  perhaps 
unrelated,  physical  harm  means  that  under  traditional  causative 
principles,  no-one  will  be  held  accountable.  In  situations  where  this 
problem  arises,  we  see  the  Courts  rationalising  their  decisions  by 
referring to specific characteristics of the plaintiff and the nature of the 
duty to inform.9 
 
As we shall see when we consider the decision in Chester v Afshar, it was 
unacceptable to the House of Lords that a deserving plaintiff be denied 
recompense on the grounds of established legal principles.  In search of 
                                                 
8 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (Bolam) [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
9 See for example, Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 which relied upon the rationale behind the duty to 
inform to conclude that the patient „ought‟ to recover (Lord Hope) and the characterisation of the plaintiff 
as „honest and innocent‟ (Lord Walker, [101]). 135 
justice then, the Law Lords „fearlessly embraced … policy.‟10 This retreat 
into „policy‟ has been explained on the grounds of lending meaning to 
the  apparent  rationale  of  duty  to  inform11  but  in  reality  it  served  to 
expose  some  flawed  reasoning.  The  crux  of  the  problem  lies  in  the 
belated entrance of the autonomous patient – a character largely absent 
from the duty discussion but suddenly central to the determination of 
causation.12  In  complete  contradiction  to  the  underlying  essence  of 
negligence law13 the actual damage suffered (or not) becomes irrelevant, 
the Court focusing instead on the nature of the „violated‟ right.14  Such a 
focus  would  have  been  entirely  appropriate  when  determining  the 
nature of the duty: However, causation should be about loss or damage 
and liability.15 
 
It is important to explain why this is of concern, especially as the crux of 
my argument is that the „dignitary‟ harm of denial of choice ought to be 
recognised.  The problem with the approach adopted in Chester16 is not 
that  the  outcome  is  incorrect;  it  is  that  the  path  taken  to  get  to  that 
outcome is wrong.  It is artificial and does not accord with established 
legal  principle  (but  claims  to).  The  current  model  of  loss  is  one  of 
physical harm with the Court searching for a link between the failure to 
provide appropriate pre-treatment advice and the later manifestation of 
an inherent risk.  The discussion begins with the personal right to choose 
                                                 
10 D. Brahams, „Public Policy – House of Lords Increases Scope for Claimants to Recover Damages for 
Negligent Failure to Warn of  Treatment Risks,‟ (2004) 72 Medico-Legal Journal 113,114. The Law 
Lords describe their approach as one of policy, therefore this term will be used here. Analysis of the 
decisions will reveal however that it is a „policy‟ based upon individual perceptions of what the most 
appropriate outcome would be.  The role of „policy‟ will be more closely analysed in Chapter19. 
11 S. Maskrey and W. Edis, „Chester v Afshar and Gregg v Scott: Mixed Messages for Lawyers,‟ (2005) 3 
Journal of Personal Injury Law 205, 209.  
12 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134. All of the Law Lords emphasised the significance of the autonomous 
patient, Lord Bingham (in dissent) [5], Lord Hoffman (in dissent) [28], Lord Steyn [14] and [24], Lord 
Hope [56] and Lord Walker [92]. 
13 As Lord Bingham stated in Chester v Afshar  [2005] 1 AC 134, [9] „ it is trite law that damage is the gist 
of the action in negligence.‟  
14 The concept of a violated right is central to the reasoning in Chester v Afshar  [2005] 1 AC 134, and will 
be considered in detail below. 
15 Although questions of „morality‟ and culpability have been viewed as an integral component of the 
broader  causation  question,  they  should  not  be  determinative,  P.  Cane,  Responsibility  in  Law  and 
Morality, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002), Chapter 4.   
16 To be outlined in more detail below. 136 
between all reasonable options and then shifts to the professional duty of 
the doctor and the outcome of the surgery.  The true nature of the harm 
is not recognised by the current approach and as a result, the  Courts 
struggle and application of the law becomes inconsistent.  Until the true 
nature  of  the  harm  is  identified  and  embraced  by  the  law,  such 
inconsistencies will continue and the interest at the heart of the doctrine 
will be denied.  This point will be demonstrated through a close analysis 
of the case law.  
 
The case law 
 
[6.30] The current position in the United Kingdom is best illustrated by a 
consideration of the evolution of causation through a series of cases.  The 
discussion  will  begin  with  three  decisions17  which  all  adopt  the 
traditional approach to causation.  In each of these decisions, the Court 
considered all of the relevant factors and determined whether, on the 
balance  of  probabilities,  the  patient  would  have  proceeded  with  the 
treatment if warned of the relevant risks.   
 
The approach changed with the difficult case of Chester18 in which the 
focus shifted to the right of a patient to refuse treatment19 resulting in 
compensation for the infringement of a right to autonomy20 as opposed 
to exposure to risk.  The perceived aim of the duty (which, historically, 
has not been embraced by the judiciary in the United Kingdom at the 
duty stage of the enquiry), was given a primary role in Chester with this, 
rather than well-established negligence principles, driving the outcome.  
                                                 
17 Smith v Salford Health Authority 5 Med L.R. 321, Smith v Barking, Havering & Brentwood HA [1994] 5 
Med L.R. 285, Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] ECC 167.  Although it is worth 
noting that Pearce did not turn on causation and the comments, made as obiter tend towards a more 
paternalistic approach. 
18 Chester v Afshar  [2005] 1 AC 134. Difficult because there was no clear conclusion as to what the patient 
would have done if she had been warned of the risk, indeed the Court openly accepted the submission that 
Mr Afshar‟s failure to inform did not materially alter the chance of the risk manifesting.  
19 Maskrey and Edis, above n. 11, 209. 
20 Ibid, 215. 137 
The question is, why did the House of Lords move away from the sound 
and reasoned process demonstrated in the earlier cases and embrace a 
„policy‟ based upon individual views of what is just and right?  Whilst I 
would argue that the shift in focus is appropriate, it is problematic in this 
context because the causative link is manufactured.  A broader and more 
consistent acceptance of the nature of the loss as a dignitary harm (denial 
of choice) would enable the creation of a clear legal framework and an 
appropriate  and  consistent  analysis  of  cases  involving  pre-treatment 
advice.  As the model currently exists, Courts such as the Chester Court, 
instinctively recognise the true nature of the harm suffered but struggle 
to  openly  address  that  harm  within  the  existing  framework.    The 
problem lies in the focus on the mainly unrelated harm and the absence 
of a clear or logical link.  The result then, as we will see in Chester, is the 
judicial  creation  of  a  link  (instead  of  the  more  appropriate  judicial 
identification of a link) and an undermining of the integrity of the law.  
 
Smith v Salford Health Authority21 
 
[6.40]  The  plaintiff  in  this  instance  was  a  previously  active  man  who 
suffered complications following spinal fusion surgery.  There was some 
dispute regarding the content of his discussion with the surgeon but it 
was accepted that whilst the plaintiff was told of the risks of not having 
the surgery, those risks inherent in proceeding with the treatment were 
completely overlooked.  The conversation took place in an examination 
room following tests when the plaintiff was in a vulnerable state and the 
judge  found  that  the  treating  surgeon  did  not  offer  the  plaintiff  any 
practical alternative or pursue the possibility of conservative treatment.22 
 
                                                 
21 [1994] 5 Med L.R. 321. 
22 Ibid, 329-330 (Potter J). 138 
Across  all  of  the  three  jurisdictions  under  discussion,  when  causation 
becomes an issue, the judges tend towards commentary on the nature of 
the evidence given by both the plaintiff and the defendant and are clearly 
swayed by personal characteristics and consistency of evidence.  In this 
instance, for example, Potter J made scathing comments about Mr Cowie 
(the treating surgeon) noting that the shifts in emphasis of his evidence 
led  to  the  conclusion  in  favour  of  the  plaintiff‟s  version  of  events.23  
Despite his clear rejection of the defendant as credible and acceptance of 
the  plaintiff  as  honest,  His  Honour  went  on  to  reject  the  plaintiff‟s 
assertion that he would not have proceeded with the treatment if all of 
the risks had been made clear to him.24 
 
In  reaching  his  conclusion,  Potter  J  followed  traditional  causation 
principles.  He considered the honesty of the plaintiff but recognised that 
his mind had only ever been directed to the issue of consent and risks in 
light of the „terrible results of his operation‟, when „hindsight is almost 
bound  to  rule.‟25  Of  significance  was  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  had 
experienced a prolonged period of discomfort and was eager to end it.  
The historical enquiry drove the outcome of this decision and the judge 
did  not  refer  to  normative  questions  of  what  he  felt  ought  to  be  the 
outcome,  preferring  instead  to  focus  on  what  he  determined  had 
happened and was most likely to happen if the requisite advice had been 
given.  The judge did not consider the underlying rationale of the duty, 
nor  did  he  turn  his  mind  to  any  harm  other  than  the  physical 
manifestation of a treatment risk.  This case represents a straightforward 
application of principle within existing constraints, and thus, a defeat of 
the plaintiff‟s claim. 
 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 329. 
24 Ibid, 330. 
25 Ibid. 139 
The  test  applied  here  was  a  subjective  one  tempered  by  objective 
considerations. The judges asked what this plaintiff would have done but 
then measured  this against what  was reasonable.  This  approach was 
described by Kennedy as a  „hybrid‟ or „modified objective‟ one in which 
either  evidence  of  what  a  reasonable  person  would  have  done  is 
tempered  by  considerations  specific  to  that  patient,  or  the  individual 
assertions of the patient as to how they would have acted are tempered 
by considerations of what the reasonable person would have done.26  The 
nature of the test and the specific problems which arise when confronted 
with the hypothetical nature of the causation issue in the context of pre-
treatment advice is more clearly, and specifically, addressed in the next 
decision. 
 
Smith v Barking, Havering & Brentwood Health Authority27 
 
[6.50]  The  decision  in  this  case  also  followed  traditional  causation 
principles and once again found in favour of the defendant.  The essence 
of the causation problem in „consent‟ cases was nicely summarised by 
Hutchinson J when he noted that he felt a great deal of sympathy for the 
plaintiff as she was expected to answer hypothetical questions designed 
to discover what she would have said „had she been asked questions that 
she  was  not  asked  at  a  time  when  she  did  not  know  what  she  now 
knows.‟28  In determining causation, the Courts are confronted with a 
series of uncertainties and must endeavour to determine what the most 
likely sequence of events would have been. 
 
The plaintiff had been ill as a child when she had a cyst drained; there 
followed a long recovery period after which her symptoms abated and 
                                                 
26 I. Kennedy, „Causation Test: Objective or Subjective?  Arndt v Smith (1998) 6 Medical Law Review 126, 
128. Kennedy goes on to describe this as an attempt to „steer between polar positions so as to avoid the 
pitfalls that attend each.‟ 
27 [1994] 5 Med L.R. 285. 
28 Ibid, 289. 140 
she lived a relatively normal life until, at the age of 18, her condition 
again began to deteriorate.  As her health declined, it became clear that 
the cyst had recurred and that if she did not receive treatment she would 
at  first  be  confined  to  a  wheelchair  and  within  6  months,  tetraplegia 
would develop.  The Court took care to note that despite skilled surgical 
intervention the procedure was unsuccessful and the plaintiff suffered 
immediate and permanent tetraplegia.29 
 
The action turned on the failure of Mr Fairburn (the surgeon) to warn her 
of  the  risks  which  all  agreed  were  inherent  in  the  operation  and  his 
failure to afford her the opportunity to reach an informed decision as to 
whether or not to proceed  with the treatment.30  We  see  here  that the 
argument mounted by the plaintiff mirrors the model advocated by this 
thesis.  It is my position that the denial of opportunity to decide is the 
true loss sustained.  Plaintiffs such as this also argue that it is central to 
their loss, but the current focus on the potential physical harm means 
that the Courts are unable to pursue this persuasive line of argument. It 
is  also  interesting  that  the  arguments  for  the  plaintiff  utilised  the 
language of informed decision-making but this was not pivotal to the 
reasoning of the judge and in fact, was not mirrored at all in his choice of 
language.  We  therefore  have  a  clear  divergence  between  the  case  as 
argued by the plaintiff and the case as considered by the judge. 
 
In this case, as in Smith v Salford,31 the judge saw fit to provide some 
commentary  on  the  behaviour  of  the  surgeon,  noting  that  he  was 
paternalistic  in  his  approach  and  that  he  ought  to  have  informed  the 
plaintiff  of  the  risks.    The  reality  of  the  situation  (which  was  not 
conveyed  to  the  plaintiff)  was  that  even  if  the  surgery  were  a  clear 
success  it  would  only  ever  have  provided  a  brief  respite  from  the 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 286-87. 
30 Ibid, 287. 
31 Smith v Salford Health Authority [1994] 5 Med L.R. 321, discussed above. 141 
condition and at best, a postponement of tetraplegia.  The outcome was 
inevitable;  it  was  the  timing  that  was  the  issue.    The  plaintiff  was 
completely unaware of the realities of her condition and as a result of the 
over-protective  approach  of  her  physician,  undertook  the  surgical 
procedure believing that there was a good chance of complete cure. 
 
Despite his concern about the approach of the physician, Hutchinson J 
emphasised that it was not the main issue before the Court.  The only 
significant  issue  in  his  view  was  whether  the  plaintiff,  had  she  been 
given the full advice, would have decided against the operation.32  Whilst 
the  appropriate  test  was  a  subjective  one,  His  Honour  noted  that  the 
Court must take care to approach the question with some objectivity.  He 
explained  that  in  his  view,  if  all  factors  pointed  to  the  fact  that  a 
reasonable  plaintiff  would  have  agreed  to  the  operation  in  the 
circumstances, then any assertion made after the fact and after having 
suffered  significant  injury,  that  she  would  not  have  undertaken  the 
surgery would need to be supported by extraneous factors.33 
 
The process adopted here was a reasoned one.  The judge explored the 
broader questions of what would be reasonable in the circumstances; he 
considered  the  particular  plaintiff  and  recognised  that  she  found  it 
extremely difficult to determine what she would have done if she had 
been aware of the risks.  A significant consideration was the fact that a 
probable delay of tetraplegia was a possibility that may well have made 
the risk worth the taking.  This was a decision which turned on the facts 
before the Court and beyond a mild scolding of the physician, there was 
no evidence of imposition of external values or attempts to determine 
what was „just‟ or redress any violation of rights.  It was, as His Honour 
explained, a situation of possibilities and probabilities.34 
                                                 
32 Ibid, 288. 
33 Ibid, 289. 
34 Ibid, 292. 142 
 
It  is  illustrative  to  note  the  description  given  by  Hutchinson  J  of  the 
internal  conversation  undertaken  by  a  patient  when  confronted  with 
difficult choices such as these.  In this instance he simplified the dialogue 
and suggested that if she had been in possession of the full information, 
reflection 
 
would have lead a reasonable patient to say to herself: “Well, it seems 
I‟m going to be paralysed anyway in a very short time. This operation 
gives me a reasonable chance of avoiding that condition perhaps for a 
few  years.  True,  there  is  a  real  risk  that  the  operation  will  not  be 
successful  and  I‟ll  then  be  paralysed  even  sooner  but  the  possible 
benefits clearly considerably outweigh the possible detriment and the 
chance is one well worth taking.35 
 
We  see  here  the  judge,  in  a  somewhat  superficial  manner, 
acknowledging the very process that has been denied to the patient.  If 
she had indeed been able to conduct this internal conversation then she 
would have been aware of all of the options open to her:  the choice 
would have been a truly informed one.  To borrow from the High Court, 
she  would  have  been  able  to  make  a  „meaningful  choice.‟36  It  is  the 
denial of information which divests the choice of meaning, and it is this 
divesting of meaning that is the true loss sustained by the plaintiff and 
the  causative  link  is  clear  and  unproblematic.    With  the  judicial  gaze 
squarely fixed on the manifestation of a different, unrelated harm, the 
causative enquiry becomes quite complex and, as demonstrated by the 
next  two  decisions,  infiltrated  by  inconsistencies  and  individual 
perceptions of what „ought‟ to happen.  
 
   
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 143 
Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust37 
 
[6.60]  The  two  preceding  cases  demonstrate  the  clarity  of  a 
straightforward application of well-established principles of negligence.  
They also demonstrate the problematic nature of the current focus on the 
notion of consent to treatment (as opposed to the process of gathering 
information  and  making  an  informed  choice):  it  makes  it  extremely 
difficult  for  a  plaintiff  to  succeed.  The  next  two  decisions  adopt 
contrasting  approaches  and  decline  to  follow  established  negligence 
principles.    The  result  is  two  anomalous  decisions  that  highlight  the 
flawed nature of the consent enquiry.   
 
Turning  first  to  Pearce,  we  see  a  Court  that  was  prepared  to  simply 
overlook the concept of the autonomous patient and defer entirely to the 
healthcare profession.  As outlined above,38 Mrs Pearce requested, and 
was denied, a Caesarian section late in her pregnancy.  The Court found 
that the risk of stillbirth was not „significant‟ and that the treating doctor 
was acting within the bounds of his duty when he failed to inform her of 
the increased chance of stillbirth if she returned home as advised.  The 
enquiry  did  not  extend  much  beyond  this  conclusion.    In  some 
interesting  obiter  comments,  however,  Lord  Woolf  revealed  a  strong 
belief in the traditional approach to determining cause and attributing 
liability.    He  was  dismissive  of  the  issue  of  causation  in  this  context 
because  it  was  difficult  to  envisage  what  would  have  been  the 
consequence if Mrs Pearce had been told of the risk.39  He went on to 
imply that it was not really worth considering as it was doubtful that she 
would have understood what she had been told and it was unlikely that 
she  would  have  done  anything  but  follow  the  advice  of  her  doctor.40 
Such a conclusion is unpersuasive when one considers the facts before 
                                                 
37 [1999] ECC 167.  
38 Refer discussion in Chapter 3, The Courts: Putting a gloss on the professional standard test (at [3.80]). 
39 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] ECC 167, [26]. 
40 Ibid.  144 
the Court: this was her fourth pregnancy, she was distraught and had 
specifically requested a caesarian section.  It is hard to imagine a risk that 
would be easier to understand in such circumstances. 
 
The approach to causation in this decision, albeit only in obiter and very 
brief, clearly supported the traditional views.  It was consistent with the 
apparent  deference  accorded  to  the  professional  knowledge  and 
expertise of the healthcare profession41 and avoided using the language 
of  autonomy  or  notions  of  what  was  „just‟  and  „right.‟    Mrs  Pearce‟s 
internal  conversation  was  irrelevant  as  was  her  right  to  make  an 
informed  decision  or  choice.    The  approach  in  Chester  was  somewhat 
different. 
 
Manipulating causation: Chester v Afshar42 
 
[6.70] This decision, handed down by the House of Lords, warrants close 
analysis as it demonstrates the struggle that arises when judges turn their 
mind  to  the  true  nature  of  the  loss  and  acknowledge  that  the  breach 
cannot, in any traditional way, be linked to the legally defined loss.  The 
result is a judgment that steps outside of the well-established bounds of 
negligence  law  and  employs  the  language  of  consent,  autonomy  and 
justice.  This  is  a  step  that  would  not  be  necessary  if  the  law  were 
focussed on the true loss as opposed to an artificial construction of loss.  
The Law Lords made it clear in their judgments that the decision was not 
designed to compensate Mrs Chester for the injury she suffered as the 
result of the skilfully performed surgery.  Rather, it was to compensate 
her for the infringement of her right to autonomy.43 
 
                                                 
41 As demonstrated in the Bolam test of duty. 
42 [2005] 1 AC 134. 
43 Maskrey and Edis, above n.11, 215. 145 
Before I outline the concerns I have with this decision, it needs to be 
acknowledged  that  the  judicial  recognition  of  the  infringement  of 
autonomy appears at first blush to be precisely the approach advocated 
in this thesis; therefore it may initially appear inconsistent to criticise it.  
The problem I have with Chester is not, however, with the spirit of the 
decision. It is with the fact that it results in incoherent law.  The Court is 
operating within the existing framework that requires the linking of the 
physical harm with the breach.  In the absence of this essential element, 
the Court simply made a leap across the „evidentiary gap‟44 and instead 
of seeking recompense for a loss or injury sustained as a direct result of 
the breach of duty by the defendant it  „vindicate[d] the violation of a 
right to choose.‟45 Once again, I recognise that perhaps this thesis ought 
to  be  applauding  the  adoption  of  such  language  as,  after  all,  I  am 
advocating the protection of that very right. However, the reasoning of 
the Court is deeply flawed. 
 
Honoré  has  noted46  that  an exception  to the application  of traditional 
causation is the case where the harm is not within the scope of the rule 
violated, because the rule is not intended to provide compensation for 
that  type  of  harm.  Here  the  current  framework  is  intended  to 
compensate for physical harm, not for the loss of autonomy. In Chester, 
the Court turned this reasoning on its head and found that because the 
harm suffered came within the scope of the rule violated, then there was 
causation.  The causative link to the existing legal definition of harm was 
glossed over.  We will see that the Court concluded that there was no 
historical  link  between  the  failure  to  inform  and  the  risk  of  physical 
harm.    This  represents  a  significant  departure  from  established 
negligence principles that would not be necessary if the doctrine changed 
to informed choice  and put all notions of consent to one side.  If the 
                                                 
44J. Stapleton, „Lords A‟Leaping Evidentiary Gaps‟ (2002) 10 Torts Law Journal 276. 
45Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [33] (Lord Hoffman). 
46A.  Honoré,  „Medical  Non-Disclosure,  Causation  and  risk:  Chappel  v  Hart‟  (1999)  7  Torts  Law 
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Court had been permitted to begin from a different definition of loss, 
which emanates from the right that was „violated‟, then it would have 
been able to embrace clearly the notions of what was „just‟ and operate 
within the negligence framework.  My concern is not with the outcome of 
the  decision  but  with  the  path  taken  by  the  Court  to get there.    It  is 
therefore necessary to closely consider that path. 
 
The facts and issues 
 
[6.80] Mrs Chester had a back condition for which she had undergone a 
number of years of conservative treatment.  It became clear that there 
was need for a more aggressive approach to her treatment and she was 
referred to Mr Afshar.  During her consultation with him, she expressed 
her concern regarding back surgery and he reassured her that he „had 
not crippled anybody yet‟47 and did not inform her of the small (1%-2%), 
unavoidable  risk  that  she  may  develop  cauda  equina  syndrome.48  She 
underwent the procedure within a few days of this consultation.  The 
evidence  was  that  the  operation  was  skilfully  performed  but  she 
developed the condition and was still suffering at the time of trial.  The 
trial judge found that Mr Afshar‟s failure to warn had caused the loss but 
the House of Lords rejected this finding, determining instead that there 
was no historical link between his failure and her condition and that the 
only certainty was that she would have delayed the procedure and that 
such  a  delay  would  not  have  an  impact  on  the  likelihood  of  the  risk 
materialising.49  However,  the  majority  focussed  on  the  nature  of  the 
duty to warn and held that „justice required a narrow modification of 
traditional causation principles to vindicate the claimants‟ right of choice 
                                                 
47 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [44]. 
48 Explained by Lord Steyn as „serious neurological damage‟ [11]. 
49 This can be contrasted to the finding in Chappel v Hart  (1998) 195 CLR 232, in which the delay did alter 
the risk as she would have sought a more skilled surgeon.  This case will be discussed in Chapter 7 (at 
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and to provide a remedy for the breach.‟50  Note here the emphasis on a 
remedy for the breach as opposed to the remedy for a loss as required by 




[6.90] It is important to acknowledge from the outset that at some level, 
all questions of duty are driven by policy,51 but as Khoury52 points out, 
there are always two sides to policy considerations. In the „consent‟ cases, 
these two sides represent the interests of the individual patient on the 
one  hand,  and  the  broader  societal  interest  in  a  proficient  medical 
profession on the other.  The question really is, what policy ought to be 
applied  and  when?53  An  additional  complicating  factor  is  the 
overarching layer of public interest in a transparent and consistent legal 
system  which  relies  on  well-established  principles.    This  too  can  be 
described as a „policy concern.‟  The use of the term policy was favoured 
by all of the Lords in this decision but it must be remembered that it was 
not always the same „policy.‟54  A consideration of individual judgments 
will reveal the malleability, and therefore problematic, nature of policy in 
this context.  
 
Two  of  the  Lords  (in  minority)55  insisted  on  adhering  to  the  rules  of 
negligence.    Lord  Bingham,  appealed  to  principle  and  policy56  and 
asserted that to depart from the traditional approach to causation would 
ensure  that  the  decision  was  contrary  to  the  „gist  of  negligence  law‟ 
                                                 
50 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134. (this summary is taken from the headnote of the reported decision. 
Individual judgments are considered in detail below). 
51 M. Hogg, „Duties of Care, Causation and the implications of Chester v Afshar,‟ (2005) 9 Edinburgh Law 
Review 156, 160. 
52 L. Khoury, „Chester v Afshar: Stepping further away from causation?‟ [2005] Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies 246. 
53 Ibid, 258. 
54 The broader issues of policy and appropriate use of the term will be discussed further in Chapter 10. See 
also above n.15. 
55  I  have  chosen  to  discuss  the  two  minority  judgments  first  as  they  adhere  to  traditional  causative 
principles. 
56 His reference to policy was in respect to a consideration of the underlying principles of negligence law. 148 
which he identified as „damage.‟57  Along with his colleagues, he noted 
that  the  central  question  was  whether  the  conventional  approach  to 
causation ought to be varied because of the nature of the duty.58  He 
emphasised that „the existence of the duty was not in doubt and neither 
was the rationale.‟59  Of significance to him was the fact that there was no 
clear understanding of what Mrs Chester would have done.  Whilst she 
may have delayed the procedure, she would probably have proceeded at 
some other time and, significantly, the risk would have „been the same 
whenever at whoever‟s hands she had the operation.‟60  In his view, to 
allow recovery purely on the basis of a failure to warn, without more, 
would  be  a  „substantial  and  unjustified  departure  from  sound  and 
established principle.‟61 
 
In  Lord  Bingham‟s  view,  the  driving  policy  consideration  was  the 
underlying purpose of negligence law as a whole. He began from the 
most basic position that the actual damage suffered by the plaintiff is the 
„gist of the action in the tort of negligence‟:62 
 
A claimant is entitled to be compensated for the damage which 
the negligence of another has caused to him or her … But the 
corollaries  are  also  true:  a  claimant  is  not  entitled  to  be 
compensated, and a defendant is not bound to compensate the 
claimant, for damage not caused by the negligence complained 
of.63 
 
                                                 
57 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [9] (Lord Bingham). 
58 Ibid, [1], (Lord Bingham) 
59 Ibid, [5]. In his view, the rationale is „to enable adults of sound mind to make decisions intimately 
affecting their own lives and bodies.‟ 
60 Ibid, [7]. 
61 Ibid, [9].  Contrast this to Lord Steyn‟s „m odest‟ departure discussed below. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 149 
His conclusion was based not on what either the plaintiff or defendant 
ought to have done64 but on what the law ought to do: 
 
I do not for my part think that the law should seek to reinforce 
that right by providing for the payment of potentially very large 
damages  by  a  defendant  whose  violation  of  that  right  is  not 
shown  to  have  worsened  the  physical  condition  of  the 
claimant.65 
 
Similarly,  Lord  Hoffman  (also  in  dissent)  began  from  a  position  of 
principle, albeit a narrower one than Lord Bingham.  In his view, the 
appropriate starting point is the purpose of the duty to warn which is to 
provide the patient with „the opportunity to avoid or reduce the risk.‟66  
He emphasised that the question to be asked was whether one would 
have taken the opportunity to avoid or reduce the risk, not whether the 
scenario would have altered in some „irrelevant detail.‟67  He completely 
rejected  any  argument  that  a  delay  in  the  treatment  would  affect  the 
likelihood of risk. He thought this to be as, 
 
logical as saying that if one had been told, on entering a casino, 
that the odds on the number 7 coming up at roulette were only 1 
in 37, one would have gone away and come back next week or 
gone to a different casino.68 
 
In such a situation, the only difference was in the timing and, as it was 
generally accepted that a change in timing would not alter the likelihood 
of the risk then the timing constituted an „irrelevant detail.‟   
 
                                                 
64 As will be seen in the discussion to follow, the majority focused on this question. 
65 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [9] (Lord Bingham). 
66 Ibid, [28].  
67 Ibid, [31]. 
68 Ibid. 150 
At the heart of the conclusions of both of these Lords lay adherence to 
established  causative  principles  and  a  confirmation  of  the  approaches 
adopted by the lower Courts in the decisions outlined above.  Adherence 
to orthodox principles was the appropriate „policy‟ of the two minority 
Lords. In contrast to this, the „policy‟ of the majority drilled below basic 
negligence principles and into the underlying ethos of this very specific 
duty69  and,  in  doing  so,  sidestepped  some  important  mechanisms  of 
negligence law and perhaps, distorted the purpose of the law in order to 
make it fit. 
 
The majority has been described as a „triumph of policy,‟70 as if it were 
one thing. But the interesting aspect of the case is that slightly different 
„policy‟ considerations drove each of the Law Lords as they strove to do 
„justice.‟ Lord Steyn framed his decision so as to loosely bring it within 
the confines of accepted negligence principles.  His rationale was that if 
Mrs Chester had been warned of the risk, the operation would not have 
taken place when it did.   
 
What is clear is that if she had agreed to surgery at a subsequent 
date, the risk attendant upon it would have been the same, i.e. 
1%-2%. It is therefore improbable that she would have sustained 
neurological damage.71 
 
His reasoning ran along these lines: because the risk was so slight and it 
manifested  at  this  time  and  in  these  circumstances,  the  chances  of  it 
happening  at  another  time  and  under  different  circumstances  became 
even slighter; therefore if she had chosen to delay the treatment then the 
risk became so slight as to be negligible.  In short, he was applying Lord 
Hoffman‟s „casino‟ rationale.  Whilst it is superficially logical, it does not 
                                                 
69 That of the doctor to warn their patients of risks. 
70 Khoury, above n.52, 248. 
71 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [11] (Lord Steyn).   151 
stand up to scrutiny.  It displays flawed logic that is grounded perhaps 
more in superstition than statistics.72 
 
A significant shift from the duty enquiry first emerged in Lord Steyn‟s 
judgment and is indicative of the general trend of this decision, when he 
retreated into the language of informed consent.  Echoing the language 
of Cardozo J in Schloendorff he asserted that: 
 
The  starting  point  is  that  every  individual  of  adult  years  and 
sound mind has a right to decide what may or may not be done 
with his or her body. Individuals have a right to make important 
medical decisions affecting their lives for themselves: they have 
the right to make decisions which doctors regard as ill advised. 
Surgery performed without the informed consent of the patient 
is  unlawful.  The  Court  is  the  final  arbiter  of  what  constitutes 
informed consent. Usually, informed consent will presuppose a 
general  warning  by  the  surgeon  of  a  significant  risk  of  the 
surgery.73 
 
Despite a later conclusion that the failure to inform the patient resulted 
in  the  injury,  he  maintained  a  focus  on  the  nature  of  the  right  and 
emphasised that beyond the historical question lies a normative one. 
 
… a patient's right to an appropriate warning from a surgeon 
when faced with surgery ought normatively to be regarded as an 
important  right  which  must  be  given  effective  protection 
whenever possible.74 
 
In an endeavour to remain close to established principles, Lord  Steyn 
was the only one to apply the but for test and conclude that  
                                                 
72 Refer Lord Hoffman‟s comments, above n.68. 
73 Schloendorff v The Society of the New York Hospital 105 NE 92 at 93 (1914), Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 
AC 134, [14]. 
74 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [17] (Lord Steyn). 152 
 
… but for the surgeon's negligent failure to warn the claimant of 
the small risk of serious injury the actual injury would not have 
occurred  when  it  did  and  the  chance  of  it  occurring  on  a 
subsequent occasion was very small. It could therefore be said 
that the breach of the surgeon resulted in the very injury about 
which the claimant was entitled to be warned.75 
 
Coincident with this conclusion, however, was recognition that the injury 
to  be  vindicated  here  was  that  done  to  her  right  of  autonomy  and 
dignity,76  which  warranted  a  „narrow  and  modest  departure‟  from 
traditional principles.77 In this judgment we observe a complex balancing 
act: an effort to maintain orthodox principles at the same time as giving 
meaning to the underlying ethos (or „policy‟) of a duty. 
 
It is in judgments such as these that we are able to see the problem at the 
heart  of  the  existing  doctrine.  The  true  nature  of  the  loss  was 
acknowledged and accorded respect by His Honour but he was unable to 
legitimately link that harm to the breach of duty.  Instead, he had to 
artificially create a link with the unrelated harm, a step which required a 
„modest departure‟  from established principle.  It  was in reality more 
than modest; it required the putting to one side of foundational causative 
principles.    The  complete  lack  of  a  link  was  overlooked.    If  the  law 
recognised the true nature of the loss, then it would not be necessary for 
the  judiciary  to  turn  its  face  from  established  principle  and  „leap 
evidentiary  gaps‟78  in  this  manner.    The  result  would  be  a  more 
transparent and coherent application of negligence principles. 
 
                                                 
75 Ibid, [19], this is merely the conclusion of his earlier rationale. 
76 Ibid, [24]. 
77 Ibid. 
78 J. Stapleton, „Lords A‟Leaping Evidentiary Gaps‟ (2002) 10 Torts Law Journal 27. 153 
Turning now to Lord Hope, we see a direct appeal to the function of the 
law. 
 
The function of the law is to protect the patient's right to choose. 
If  it  is  to  fulfil  that  function  it  must  ensure  that  the  duty  to 
inform  is  respected  by  the  doctor.  It  will  fail  to  do  this  if  an 
appropriate remedy cannot be given if the duty is breached and 
the very risk that the patient should have been told about occurs 
and she suffers injury.79 
 
This approach is similar to that advocated in this thesis.  His Honour 
sought to protect the right to choose in appealing to the remedy as a 
protection  of  the  right  to  choose,  but  did  not  define  it  as  the  legally 
cognisable harm.  Instead, he associated the process of choice directly 
with the duty to inform and the decision to consent to the treatment.  His 
underlying  concern  was  with  the  protection  of  rights,  but  the  harm 
continued to be the manifestation of the physical risk.  
 
In the process of delivering his judgment, Lord Hope acknowledged that 
the failure to warn did not increase the risk of physical harm, which was 
likely to occur at random.80  Instead he appealed directly to the function 
of the law, the scope of the duty and the need to give effect to the law of 
informed  consent  as  a  means  of  protecting  patient  autonomy.81  This 
position was echoed by Lord Walker who emphasised the role of the law 
and the need to ensure that an „honest plaintiff‟ not be left without a 
remedy.82  Significantly, Lord Walker argued that the Court must not 
empty an important duty of its content by failing to impose liability.83  
                                                 
79 Ibid, [56]. 
80 Ibid, [61]. 
81 Ibid, [56]. 
82 Ibid, [101]. Lord Walker is not considered in detail here as he essentially agreed with Lords Steyn and 
Hope, choosing to add „only a few brief comments of [his] own‟ [90]. His brief comments focussed on 
the individual right to autonomy and the nature of the duty to warn, and served to endorse the comments 
made by Lord Hope.  
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Thus the role of causation became inextricably linked with the content of 
the duty and questions of whether or not the actual advice given (or not 
given) truly made a difference, appear to have become secondary. 
 
Whilst it may appear to be a step in the right direction for the Lords to be 
referring to the nature of the loss and the need to protect the right to 
choose, neither of these provides the yardstick for measuring the loss.84  
The loss is measured by the manifestation of a physical harm, one that is 
likely to have occurred whether or not the plaintiff was informed.  There 
is a disjunct between the harm suffered and the remedy provided.85 
 
The approach in Chester is problematic as it represents a departure from 
accepted negligence principles, with the Court moving from the arms-
length consideration of professional standards which was evident at the 
duty  stage.    The  focus  at  the  causation  stage  of  the  enquiry,  as 
represented by Chester, is on questions of what „ought’ to happen.  The 
two approaches do not appear reconcilable.  The language of autonomy 
and informed consent played no role in the development of the duty and 
standard question in the seminal cases of Bolam and Sidaway. Yet here, in 
Chester, it was used in order to give effect to the apparent rationale of 
that duty.86 The autonomous patient has made a belated appearance and 
there  is  an  attempt  to  link  the  concept  of  the  personal  right  to 
information with the manifestation of the physical harm.  The illogical 
nature of such a link is well demonstrated here in Chester as we see the 
Law  Lords  departing  from  established  principles  in  an  endeavour  to 
construct links which, quite simply, do not exist.  If, however, the loss 
                                                 
84 During discussions regarding choice and the nature of the loss suffered by the plaintiff I will use the 
words loss, harm and damage interchangeably.  I will however conclude with a clear statement of a model 
of loss so as to clearly remove this discussion from any consideration of the assessment of „damages‟. 
85 Full assessment of the harm suffered by Mrs Chester was not discussed by the House of Lords.  As 
explained by Lord Hope: „The extent of her disability and its consequences have yet to be determined, as 
that part of the trial was adjourned by the trial Judge pending resolution of the dispute on liability.‟ [47] 
86 Refer Lord Bingham referring to the underlying need to make one‟s own decisions [5], Lord  Steyn 
referred to Schloendorff principles and informed consent to give effect to autonomy, [14] and [18].  Lord 
Hope also introduced the concept of informed consent into his reasoning, [57]. 155 
were defined in terms of the denial of this right, there would be no need 
to search for non-existent links and the Court would be able to act within 
the  negligence  framework  and  the  result  would  be  a  coherent  and 




[6.100] Time has passed since the Chester decision was handed down in 
October 2004 and it is illustrative to review its impact.  The decision has 
been considered beyond the confines of the „informed consent‟ context 
and, whilst it has been clearly stated that „none of the long established 
authorities  on  causation  were  overruled  by  the  House  of  Lords  in 
Chester,‟87 its impact on the nature of the causative enquiry cannot be 
denied. 
 
A consistent theme in subsequent decisions has been the significance of 
policy considerations.  The decision is now interpreted as authority for 
the  proposition  that  policy,  and  the  concept  of  justice  can  justify  a 
departure from well-established principles of causation.  The plaintiff in 
M’s Guardian88 ‟urged‟ the Court to „find causation in the absence of „but 
for‟ and on the basis of policy and corrective justice following Chester v 
Afshar.‟89 Lord Bannatyne resisted this argument, referring to Chester as 
„odd.‟90  In  B  v  Ministry  of  Defence91  Foskett  J  described  Chester  as 
„authority  for  the  principle  that  when  justice  and  policy  demand  it  a 
modification of causation principles is not beyond the wit of the modern 
Court.‟92 
 
                                                 
87 White v Paul Davidson & Taylor [2004] EWCA 1511, [42] (Aiden LJ). 
88 M’s Guardian v Lanarkshire Health Board [2010] CSOH 104. 
89 Ibid, [162] (Lord Bannatyne). 
90 Ibid, [268]. 
91 B v Ministry of Defence [2009] EWHC 1225 (QB). 
92 Ibid, [218] (Foskett J). 156 
Similarly, Baroness Hale suggested that Chester demonstrates how „well 
settled principles may be developed or modified to meet new situations 
if the Court cannot do justice without doing so.‟93 And in DN v Greenwich 
LBC94  Brooke  LJ  accepted  that  „justice‟  may  well  demand  a  „different 
approach‟  to  otherwise  well-established  principles.95  Chester  has  also 
provided support for Courts blurring the breach and causation lines of 
enquiry and choosing, when attributing responsibility for harm, to focus 
on  the  purpose  of  a  duty  as  opposed  to  traditional  causative  links 
between breach and harm.96  Overall, Chester gives authority to „stretch 
conventional notions of causation to the limit‟97, „liberalising the but for 
test of causation‟98 and a „departure from established principle.‟99 
 
Thus Chester, in struggling to link a dignitary harm with a physical loss, 
has  come  to  represent  a  shift  away  from  established  negligence 
principles.  It is important to recognise that a departure from established 
principle  may,  indeed,  be appropriate  at times.  As the theme  of this 
thesis represents a shift in focus from one form of loss to another, I am 
clearly not advocating for a law that never evolves or changes.  Neither 
am  I  denying  the  relevance  of  well  articulated  and  defined  policy 
considerations  along  with  conceptions  of  justice  (both  of  which  are 
explored  in  Chester).  The  concern  here  is  that  this  struggle  is  not 
necessary  and  neither  is  the  situation  in  „informed  consent‟  decisions 
„special,‟100 „exceptional‟101 or „odd.‟102  What we have in the „informed 
consent‟ decisions is an example of Courts struggling to identify links 
                                                 
93 Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176, [192] (Baroness Hale). 
94 [2004] EWCA Civ 1659. 
95 Ibid, [71]. 
96  Calvert  v  William  Hill  Credit  Ltd  [2008]  EWCA  Civ,  Lloyd  and  Etherton  LJ  held  that  Chester  is 
authority for the proposition that the Court can decline to apply a test for causation which would have the 
effect  of  stripping  the  duty  of  all  practical  force  and  content  [34],  whilst  in  Mosley  v  News  Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 Eddy J pointed out that it is accepted in recent jurisprudence that a 
legitimate consideration is that of vindication to mark the infringement of a right. 
97 M v Mid Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust [2005] EWHC 3469 (QB), [60] (Langdon J). 
98 Prison Service v Beart (No 2) [2005] EWCA 467, [39] (Rix LJ). 
99 Fotedar v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2005] EWHC 1327, [64] Gray J. 
100 White v Davidson & Taylor [2004] EWCA 1511, [41] (Aiden LJ). 
101 Beary v Pall Mall investments [2005] EWCA 415 [38], (Dyson LJ). 
102 M’s Guardian v Lanarkshire Health Board [2010] CSOH 104, [268] (Bannatyne LJ). 157 
that simply do not, and cannot, exist.  If the true loss were acknowledged 
then  causation  would  be  straightforward  and  even  truly  „modest‟103 
departures from established principles would not be necessary. 
 
Re-visiting the core issues 
 
[1.110] Before leaving the United Kingdom and moving on to our other 
jurisdictions I will address each of the questions asked at the beginning 
of this Part of our discussion.  The same approach will be adopted in the 
context  of  each  of  the  other  jurisdictions  and  then,  once  again,  the 
apparently  different  tests  will  be  applied  to  Sally.    This  will  clearly 
demonstrate the ongoing struggle facing Courts seeking to link the loss 
of a right to choose with an unrelated physical harm. 
 
What is the test for causation (is it subjective or objective)? 
 
[6.120]  Before  Chester  stepped  outside  of  established  approaches  to 
causation, the Courts applying traditional principles developed a hybrid 
approach.  The  basis  of  this  approach  was  judicial  recognition  of  the 
challenge  to a plaintiff when required to honestly  evaluate what  they 
would have done in hypothetical circumstances.  The  hybrid test was 
clearly set out by Hutchinson J in Smith v Barking, Havering & Brentwood 
Health  Authority104  when  His  Honour  recognised  that  establishing 
causation  begins  with  a  subjective  test,  based  upon  that  particular 
plaintiff.  He  went  on  to  explain  that  the  hypothetical  nature  of  the 
enquiry meant that it must be tempered by objective considerations such 
as what the reasonable plaintiff would have done.105  As we have seen, 
however,  since  that  time  the  issue  has  become  broader  than  a  mere 
                                                 
103 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [24] (Steyn LJ). 
104 [1994] 5 Med L.R. 285. 
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question of subjective or objective test and other issues106 have become 
relevant. 
 
What factors influenced the development of the test in each jurisdiction? 
 
[6.130]  The  pre-Chester  decisions,  in  developing  the  hybrid  test  of 
causation, were influenced by the hypothetical question that they were 
forced to answer.  The move beyond the bounds of traditional questions 
of causation was largely influenced by the Chester Courts‟ recognition of 
the limitation of established principles as a means to protect the right at 
the heart of the „informed consent‟ decisions.  Under Chester we see the 
importation of considerations such as the nature of the duty, dictates of 
policy and questions of justice.  Whilst the more traditional Courts had 
clearly rejected this approach it was clearly unacceptable to the House of 
Lords that the plaintiff, who had clearly suffered harm, would not be 
able to recover.  Instead of clearly addressing the true nature of the loss 
sustained  defined  by  Lord  Hoffman  as  „the  violation  of  a  right  to 
choose,‟107 the Court opted to „fearlessly embrace policy‟108 and sought to 
avoid „emptying an important duty of its content.‟109 The result has been 
a  shifting  of  the  bounds  of  causation  and  an  approach  that  has  been 
given  broader  application  than  the  narrow,  fact-driven  considerations 
raised by the House of Lords. 
 
What (if anything) is the problem with the chosen approach? 
 
[6.140]  The  discussion  in  Chester,  and  to  an  extent,  later  cases 
demonstrates a dissatisfaction with the notion of linking the loss of the 
ability to exercise a personal right with the manifestation of a physical 
harm.    The  earlier  decisions  were  equally  uneasy  about  traditional 
                                                 
106 These include concepts of justice, the rationale behind duty of care and autonomy. 
107 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [33] (Lord Hoffman). 
108 Brahams, above n.10, 114 
109 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [101] (Lord Hope). 159 
principles noting that causation is a vexed question because it is based on 
a purely hypothetical enquiry.  Therefore, even if subsequent Courts seek 
to distinguish the facts before them from those in Chester (perhaps by 
describing Chester as „odd‟110 or finding that it „does not establish a new 
general  rule  in  causation‟111),  the  search  for  the  causative  link  is  not 
straightforward.  
 
In both the hybrid approach (represented by Smith v Barking, Havering & 
Brentwood  Health  Authority112)  and  the  policy  based  approach 
(represented  by  Chester  v  Afshar113)  we  see  an  ongoing  struggle  to 
reconcile what the judiciary instinctively recognises as the true nature of 
the loss sustained with the existing negligence framework and reliance 
on  the  manifestation  of  a  physical  harm.    The  adoption  of  policy  is 
perhaps  aimed  at  legitimising  the  malleable  application  of  causation 
principles  but  it  is  undermined  by  the  inconsistent  and  individual 
interpretations  of  what  policy  is  the  appropriate  one  in  these 
circumstances.  We will see in later discussions that this thesis does not 
challenge the relevance of policy.  Rather it is the individual nature of the 
„policy‟  considerations  adopted  by  different  members  of  the  judiciary 
that causes concern.114 
 
The problem at the heart of both of the approaches found in the United 
Kingdom  is  that  there  is  an  importation  of  value-based  evaluations 
which  result  in  incoherent  law.    This  would  not  be  necessary  if  the 
Courts  were  able  to  openly  define  the  harm  as  the  loss  of  a  right  to 
choose  and  seek  to  link  that  harm  with  the  failure  to  adequately 
inform.115  Similar problems arise in both Australia and the United States 
                                                 
110 M’s Guardian v Lanarkshire Health Board [201] CSOH 104, [268] (Bannatyne LJ). 
111 White v Davidson & Taylor [2004] EWCA 1511, [40] ) (Aiden LJ). 
112 [1994] 5 Med L.R. 285. 
113 [2005] 1 AC 134. 
114 Refer to Chapter 9 for the discussion of the policy diversion. 
115 Central to this is, of course, the material nature of the omitted information. 160 
and, as we shall see in the following Chapters, an equally unsatisfactory 
resolution has been found.   161 




[7.10]  In  Australia  the  question  of  causation  has  presented  most  plaintiff 
patients with an insurmountable obstacle.  Much of the judicial debate about 
causation  has  turned  on  questions  of  the  nature  of  the  test  (subjective  or 
objective)  and  the  onus  of  proof.    There  has  been  a  complete  absence  of 
discussion  about  the  nature  of  the  loss  sustained  and  the  limitation  of 
personal choice-making authority, which was relevant when discussing duty, 
is put to one side.  The decisions turn on whether or not the patient would 
have agreed to undergo the treatment, with the focus of judicial attention 
being  entirely  on  the  manifestation  of  a  physical  harm  as  opposed  to  the 
removal of authority from the patient. At this stage of the enquiry we see that 
the  primary  concern  is  consent  (a  creature  of  trespass).    The  provision  of 
advice,  the  measure  of  standard  and  therefore  of  negligence,  becomes 
secondary. 1 
 
Before  examining  the  decisions  in  detail,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that 
whilst  the  test  for  causation  is  primarily  subjective,  it  is  not  wholly  so. 
Australian Courts, similarly to those in the United Kingdom, have recognised 
the  problematic  nature  of  relying  on  assertions  based  upon  purely 
hypothetical  situations  („hindsight  bias‟)2  but,  instead  of  turning  to  an 
objective test (which as we will see is the path taken in the United States), 
have  opted  to  exercise  caution.  The  High  Court  has  emphasised  that 
„tribunals  of  fact  can  be  trusted  to  reject  absurd,  self-interested 
assertions‟3and are therefore unlikely to be misled by self-serving evidence.  
The Courts, in seeking to walk a middle ground, have created a hybrid test in 
                                                 
1 A preliminary note must be made here that there has been legislative intervention in all Australian jurisdictions. 
This will be explored in more detail below. 
2 „Review of the law of Negligence Final Report‟, Sep 2002 („The Ipp Report‟) 
 http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law_Neg_Final.pdf, at 18 February 2011), [7.40]. 
3 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 273 (Kirby J).  162 
which  subjective  assertions  of  the  plaintiff-patient  are  tempered  by 
considerations  of  what  an  objective  patient  would  have  done  under  the 
circumstances.4  And, in four jurisdictions, the subjective test is specifically 
retained but the plaintiff-patient is not permitted to assert what they would, 
or would not have done: 
 
(3) If it is relevant to deciding factual causation to decide what the person 
who suffered harm would have done if the person who was in breach of the 
duty had not been so in breach--  
(a) the matter is to be decided subjectively in the light of all relevant 
circumstances, subject to paragraph (b); and  
(b) any statement made by the person after suffering the harm about what he 
or she would have done is inadmissible except to the extent (if any) that the 
statement is against his or her interest.5 
 
What  we  see  in  Australia  are  firm  reservations  about  the  subjective  test, 
combined  with  a  disinclination  to  adopt  an  objective  one.    This  does  not, 
however, result in a clear or balanced test and plaintiff-patients continue to 
be denied recompense for the loss of personal authority.   
 
Appeals to commonsense 
 
[7.20] Causation has had a chequered history in the common law world and, 
as noted by the Supreme Court of Canada, „much judicial and academic ink 
has been spilled over the proper test for causation.‟6 Historically, Courts have 
struggled with the identification of an appropriate test for causation which 
                                                 
4 See for example, Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, Micallef & Anor v Minister for Health of the State 
of WA  [2006] WASCA 98, [64] (McLure JA) and Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518, [72] 
(Harrison J). These and other decisions will be discussed in more detail below. 
5 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s5D(3), Civil Liability Act 2003 (QLD) s11(3), Civil Liability Act 2002 (TAS) 
s13(3) and Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s5C(3), the wording in the Western Australian Act is slightly different 
but the application would be the same. 
6 Resurface Corp v Hanke [2007] 1 SCR 333, [20]. 163 
has  been  outlined  and  dealt  with  elsewhere.7    For  present  purposes  it  is 
sufficient  to note  that the judiciary in Australia  has  stepped away from a 
factual or historical approach to causation and rejected the „but for‟ test as 
determinative.8  The driving consideration has been described as „common 
sense‟  in  an  endeavour  to  separate  the  legal  question  of  causation  from 
„philosophical  and  scientific  notions.‟9  Mason  CJ  explained  the  distinction 
between philosophy or science and law in the following terms: 
 
In  philosophy  and  science,  the  concept  of  causation  has  been 
developed in the context of explaining phenomena by reference to 
the relationship between conditions and occurrences.  In law on the 
other hand, problems of causation arise in the context of ascertaining 
or apportioning legal responsibility for a given occurrence.10 
 
In the same case, Dean J emphasised that causation is the „attribution of fault 
or  responsibility‟11  and  McHugh  J  referred  to  the  question  of  whether  a 
defendant „should be held legally responsible.‟12 The rationale behind this 
conceptual shift was described by McHugh J as the underlying purpose of 
the causation enquiry (at law), that is, „to allocate legal responsibility.‟13 Thus 
it is the position of the High Court that when one is attempting to determine 
causation on a philosophical or scientific level, it is a matter of addressing 
cause and effect: did event A clearly result in event B.  At law, however, the 
notion  of  causation  is  embedded  in  the  more  intangible  question  of 
                                                 
7 See C. Sappideen and P.Vines (ed), Fleming’s The Law of Torts, (10
th ed, Thomson-Reuters, Sydney, 2011), 
Chapter 9, B. Richards, K.Ludlow and A. Gibson, Tort Law in Principle, (5
th ed, Thomson-Reuters, Sydney, 
2009), Chapter 11, R.P. Balkin and J.L.R Davis, Law of Torts (4
th ed, LexisNexis Butterworth, Sydney, 2009), 
Chapter 9 and H.Luntz, D.Hambly, K.Burns. J.Dietrich and N.Foster, Torts Cases and Commentary (6
th ed, 
LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2009), Chapter 4. 
8 See March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506, 508 (Mason CJ), 522 and 523 (Deane J) and 524 (Toohey J). 
9 Ibid, 509 (Mason CJ), 522 (Deane J) and 529 and 530 (McHugh J). 
10 Ibid, 509 (Mason CJ). 
11 Ibid, 522 (Deane J). 
12 Ibid, 529 (McHugh J). 
13 Ibid. 164 
responsibility  and  therefore  becomes  a  normative  enquiry  in  which 
„considerations of policy and value judgments may necessarily enter.‟14 
 
Interestingly  the  „common  sense‟  approach  which  was,  according  to  the 
Judges, developed to accommodate notions of justice and responsibility and 
separate legal from scientific cause, has been interpreted in different ways.  
Honor￩, for example, has suggested that „the notion of cause is the same in 
law, medicine, science and everyday life. This point is one that common law 
judges have often stressed, when they say that causation in law is a matter of 
common sense.‟15  Cane has warned that „saying that causation is a matter of 
„common sense‟, „intuition‟ or „fact‟ does not absolve a judge from the hard 
task of analysing the concepts and issues underlying these opaque terms.‟16 
Milstein has noted that „common sense is an uncertain guide which does not 
lead everyone to the same conclusion,‟17 whilst Clarke has described common 
sense  as  „worrying  indeed.‟18  Analysis  of  some  key  decisions  will 
demonstrate  that  Cane‟s  warning  was  a  timely  one  and  that,  in  practical 
terms, the „common sense‟ discussion has lent little clarity.  Instead it has 
enabled the intrusion of individual views of what is the appropriate outcome 
in the specific circumstances before the Court. 
 
In response to the ongoing judicial and scholarly debate regarding the test for 
causation, there has been legislative reform in Australia.  This reform was 
aimed at more clearly setting out the causative test,19 but in practical terms 
                                                 
14 Ibid, 524 (Toohey J).  The foundational concept of responsibility is also discussed by Mason CJ at 509, Deane J 
at 522 and McHugh J at 530 and 531 where he refers to value judgments and moral responsibility. It is worth 
noting that Gaudron J agreed with Mason CJ and Deane J. 
15 A. Honoré, „Principles and Values Underlying the Concept of Causation in Law,‟ in I. Freckelton and Danuta 
Mendelson (eds), Causation in Law and Medicine (Ashgate/Dartmouth, Aldershot, 2002) 3, 3-4. The role of 
common sense and policy will be considered closely in Chapter 10. 
16 Peter Cane, „A Warning About Causation‟ (1999) 115 Law Quarterly Report 21, 27. 
17 Bob Milstein, „Causation in Medical Negligence  – Recent Developments‟ (1997) 6  Australian Health Law 
Bulletin 21, 22.  
18 Jeremy Clarke, „Causation in Chappel v Hart: Common Sense or Coincidence?‟ (1999) 6 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 335, 347. 
19 This reform was on the recommendation of the „Ipp Review of Negligence.‟ Australia, „Review of the law of 
Negligence Final Report‟, Sep 2002 („The Ipp Report‟) 
http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law_Neg_Final.pdf, at 18 February 2011, [7.28]-[7.36]. 
The relevant legislative provisions are: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) Part 4.4, Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW), s5D, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Ch 2, Pt. 1 Div.2, Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) Part 6, Div 4, Civil 165 
has simply enshrined the judicial mix of a factual and normative enquiry.20  
The High Court recently emphasised that causation is now governed by the 
relevant Act21 and suggested that this may differ from the „common sense 
approach of March v Stramare,‟22 which the Court described as a rejection of 
the  relevance  of  value  judgments  in  the  determination  of  causation  as  an 
issue of fact.23  This did not serve to clarify the test however, as the Court 
declined to examine exactly how (or indeed if) the outcome would differ if 
March, as opposed to the legislation, were applied.24  The legislative test was 
explained  by  the  High  Court  as  dividing  the  enquiry  into  two  elements: 
„factual causation and scope of liability,‟25 an approach which is consistent 
with earlier judicial considerations of causation in the context of „informed 
consent.‟   
 
Decisions, which have considered the legislative provisions in the context of 
pre-treatment advice, are limited but there is clear judicial support for the 
view that the law has not shifted significantly with the introduction of the 
legislation.  The New South Wales Supreme Court applied the Civil Liability 
Act  2002  (NSW)  in  Wallace  v  Ramsay  Health  Care  Ltd26  and  after 
acknowledging the authority of the Act and the two phases as explained in 
Adeels  Palace27  went  on  to  follow  the  approach  of  the  High  Court  in 
Rosenberg28 and demonstrated that these earlier authorities are consistent with 
the newer legislative provisions.  A further point of „clarification‟ introduced 
                                                                                                                                           
Liability Act 2002 (Tas) Div 3, Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), Part X, Div 3,Civil Liability Act 2003 (WA) Part 1A, 
Div 3. 
20 For further discussion see S.Bartie, „Ambition Versus Judicial Reality: Causation and Remoteness Under Civil 
Liability Legislation‟ (2007) 33 University of Western Australia Law Review 415. 
21Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, [41] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and 
Crennan JJ). 
22 Ibid, [44]. 
23 Ibid, [43]. 
24 Ibid, [44]. 
25 Ibid, [41]-[43]. See for example the South Australian provision:   
        s34(1)A determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises the following elements:  
(a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm ("factual causation"); 
and  
(b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person's liability to extend to the harm so caused 
("scope of liability”). 
Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s32. All other states have equivalent provisions.  
26 [2010] NSWSC 518. 
27 Ibid, [72] (Harrison J).  
28 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434. 166 
in  the  legislation  is  the  addition,  introduced  above,  that  that  causation  is 
determined  subjectively  but  that  „any  statement  made  by  the  person  after 
suffering the harm about what he or she would have done is inadmissible 
except to the extent (if any) that the statement is against his or her interest.‟29  
This appears to be a subjective test with limited emphasis on the plaintiff-
patient evidence, thus removing a vital element from the plaintiff‟s case.  In 
practical terms, however, it does not appear to be the case.  In delivering his 
judgment in Wallace30 Harrison J cited the Act, referred to the relevant section 
(s5D(3)(a)) and noted that the test was subjective but chose not to comment 
on the evidential limitation.31  He then went on to specifically explore the 
credibility of the plaintiff‟s evidence and openly rejected it.   
 
I would suggest therefore that the impact of the legislation on the judicial 
approach to causation  in the „informed consent‟  decisions  is limited.  The 
New  South  Wales  Court  of  Appeal  expressed  a  similar  view  in  Neal  v 
Ambulance  Service  of  New  South  Wales32,  with  Basten  JA  concluding  that 
„properly understood, the prohibition on evidence  from the plaintiff about 
what he or she would have done is of quite limited scope.‟33  Similarly, in KT 
v PLG & Anor34 the Court excluded evidence of what the plaintiff would have 
done  in  those  specific  circumstances  but  recognised  the  relevance  of  the 
surrounding  circumstances.35  These  circumstances  and  „relevant 
considerations‟ were listed in Neal as including: 
 
a. conduct of the plaintiff at the relevant time; 
b.  evidence  of  the  plaintiff  as  to  how  he  or  she  might  have  felt  about 
particular matters; 
                                                 
29 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s5D, Civil Liability Act 2003 (QLD) s11, Civil Liability Act 2002 (TAS) s13 
and Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s51. 
30 Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518. 
31 Ibid, [72] (Harrison J). 
32 [2008] NSWCA 346. 
33 Ibid, [41] (Basten JA). 
34 [2006] NSWSC 919. 
35 Ibid, [43] (Simpson J). 167 
c. evidence of others in a position to assess the conduct of the plaintiff and 
his or her apparent feelings or motivations; and 
d. other matters which might have influenced the plaintiff.36 
 
and reflect those endorsed by the High Court in Rosenberg v Percival37 (to be 
discussed  below).  In  exploring  the  Australian  approach  to  causation  I 
therefore  begin  with  a  recognition  of  the  legislative  reform  but  take  my 
guidance from the scholarly and judicial commentary that suggests that the 
legislation acts to endorse rather than change the preferred approach of the 
High Court. This approach is consistent with that of Gleeson and Evans who 
suggested that „the statutory inadmissibility of the plaintiff‟s evidence now 
renders  the  situation  similar  to  the  common  law  position  elucidated  in 
Rosenberg  v  Percival‟38  and  more  recently,  Cockburn  and  Madden  have 
asserted that „arguably the judicial process will not differ greatly as between 
those jurisdictions with the Civil Liability legislation evidence exclusion and 
those  without.‟39  I  will  therefore  refer  primarily  to  the  common  law  and 
judicial  statements  of  causative  principles,  and  not  the  legislation  where 
relevant.  
 
The case law 
 
Nature of the test 
 
[7.30] Turning now to the „informed consent‟ decisions, a close consideration 
of relevant case law reveals that whilst the negligence enquiry is clearly a 
staged one,40 the question of causation inevitably rests upon the nature and 
                                                 
36 Neal v Ambulance Service of NSW [2008] NSWCA 346, [40] (Basten JA). 
37 (2001) 205 CLR 434. 
38  J.Gleeson  SC  and  G.  Evans,  „The  Question  that  Plaintiff‟s  Counsel  Cannot  Ask‟  Bar  News  Summer 
2004/2005, 36, 38. 
39 T. Cockburn and B.Madden, „Proof of Causation in Informed Consent Cases: Establishing what the plaintiff 
would have done‟ (2010) Journal of Law and Medicine 320, 332.  The scholarly consideration of the reform is 
limited but consistent with my interpretation of the case law. 
40 Identification of duty, determination of breach and then causation. 168 
purpose of the duty of care.  In Chappel v Hart41 for example, when addressing 
the  issue  of  causation  Kirby  J reminded  us  that  the  „requirement  to  warn 
about risks is an important one conducive to respect for the integrity of the 
patient and better health care … the law intends its obligations to be carefully 
observed. Breaches must be treated seriously.‟42  The necessary implication 
was that if there is a breach of this significant duty, the Court will seek to 
attach liability for the breach, even in the face of uncertain causation.  We will 
see, however, that this is not often the case with Courts finding themselves 
limited  by  the  legal  requirement  that  this  respect  for  patient  integrity  be 
linked to the manifestation of a physical harm. 
 
In addition to the nature of the duty, the Court must deal with the rationale 
behind its imposition.  The plaintiff before the  Court will have suffered a 
physical injury but the interest to be protected by the duty to inform is more 
than  mere  physical  wellbeing.    It  is  the  individual  right  to  information.43 
These  core  concerns  when  combined  with  the  attribution  of  responsibility 
underpinning  the  causation  enquiry  have  meant  that  the  High  Court, 
similarly to the House of Lords in Chester v Afshar,44 has been influenced by 
the need to redress a perceived wrong (the failure to warn).  Once again we 
see  the  Courts  struggling  to  reach  the  desired  destination  (liability  and 
recompense for a wrong), but unable to do so because of conceptual difficulty 
of  identifying  a  link  between  a  dignitary  harm  and  a  physical  loss.  The 
stringent requirement of causation makes it impossible to take a direct and 
simple route.   
 
This enquiry is further complicated by the debate regarding the appropriate 
test.  Ought the causative question be answered subjectively (what would 
                                                 
41 (1998) 195 CLR 232. 
42 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, [93] (Kirby J). This is a theme he developed further in Rosenberg v 
Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, [154], when discussing the need for the test for causation to be consistent with 
the principles of tort law and the requirements of Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, (at [157]).  
43 Note Jeremy Clarke, „Causation in Chappel v Hart: Common Sense or Coincidence?‟ (1999) 6 Journal of Law 
and Medicine 335, 337, and analysis of Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 and other decisions below.   
44 [2005] 1 AC 134, refer Chapter 6 (at [6.70]). 169 
that particular patient have done if in possession of an appropriate level of 
information),  or  objectively  (what  would  the  reasonable  patient  in  that 
position have done if in possession of an appropriate level of information)?  
Whilst there has been a great deal of judicial energy expended on this debate, 
as we will see in the following discussion, there is little difference between 
the practical application of the two tests.45  It is my position that the reason 
that  there  is  little  practical  difference  lies  in  the  inappropriateness  of 
attempting to link a physical loss to a dignitary harm. 
 
A subjective test informed by objective considerations 
 
[7.40] Australian Courts have consistently emphasised the importance of the 
patient as a decision-maker.  From the beginning of the negligence enquiry, 
the individual before the Court has been central to the investigation.  If we 
return to the Rogers v Whitaker materiality test,46 the significant question was 
whether that particular patient would have deemed the information material 
to their decision-making process and, fleetingly, the concept of choice was 
introduced.  Maintaining this patient focus has meant that Australian Courts 
have purported to adopt a subjective approach to causation in the context of 
pre-treatment advice.47  The High Court has not specifically debated the issue 
but both Chappel v Hart48 and Rosenberg v Percival49 affirmed earlier Supreme 
Court decisions. Despite clear affirmation of a subjective approach, however, 
the High Court has adopted a tempered or hybrid version of the subjective 
test by measuring the evidence of the plaintiff against evidence of what a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff‟s position would have done.50 
                                                 
45 This will once again be demonstrated at the end of this Part of the discussion when we apply the different tests 
to Sally‟s situation.  
46 (1992) 175 CLR 479, refer above Chapter 4. 
47 As indicated above this has been endorsed by legislation in four jurisdictions:  adopted by the Civil Liability 
regime: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s5D(3), Civil Liability Act 2003 (QLD) s11(3), Civil Liability Act 2002 
(TAS) s13(3) and Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s5C(3). 
48 (1998) 195 CLR 232, 272 (Kirby J), affirming  Gover v South Australia (1985) 39 SASR 543 and Ellis v 
Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553. 
49 (2001) 205 CLR 434, 462 (Gummow J) (affirming Gover v South Australia (1985) 39 SASR 543 and Ellis v 
Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553) and 485-486 (Kirby J, affirming Ellis). 
50 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 provides an excellent example of the relevance of objective factors 
and will be considered in detail below.  170 
 
The  rationale  behind  the  adoption  of  a  subjective  test  of  causation  is 
consistent with that behind the imposition of the duty to warn.  In Ellis v 
Wallsend District Hospital,51 Kirby P pre-empted some of his later discussions 
in  the  High  Court  when  he  noted  that  the  subjective  test  for  causation  is 
appropriately  deferential  to  „respect  for  the  integrity  of  the  patient  as  an 
individual … hav[ing] command over his or her body.‟52  He recognised that 
there are problems with the subjective approach as it „involves an exercise of 
retrospective reasoning‟ and „however honest the patient may try to be, self-
interest  and  the  knowledge  of  the  misfortunes  that  have  followed  the 
treatment  will  necessarily  colour  the  patient‟s  response.‟53  He  further 
developed this theme in Chappel v Hart54 when he once again mentioned the 
„malleability of recollection even of an upright witness‟ but noted that the 
„dangers should not be over-stated. Tribunals of fact can be trusted to reject 
absurd, self-interested assertions.‟55 Note, however, that the emphasis is on 
the right to determine what is or is not done and thus is implicitly about 
consent, as opposed to the individual right to information.  The investigation 
is now centred on the issue of bodily integrity and the decision to proceed (or 
not) with the treatment.  This is a subtle but significant shift from the right to 
material information which drives the standard enquiry and is purportedly at 
the base of the whole process.  It is this shift that dilutes the enquiry and 
undermines the personal process of choice. 
 
The subjective test is not a straightforward one.  In those jurisdictions where 
plaintiff evidence is permitted, the Court is not bound to accept it.56 There 
                                                 
51 (1989) 17 NSWLR 553. 
52 Ibid, 560 (Kirby P). 
53 Ibid. 
54 (1998) 195 CLR 232. 
55 Ibid, 272-273 (Kirby J). Observations repeated in Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 467 and 486.  For 
an example of such a process, refer Bustos v Hair Transplant Unrep, NSWCA, 15 April 1997. 
56  Indeed,  plaintiff  evidence  in  medical  negligence  in  general  is  generally  treated  with  a  healthy  amount  of 
scepticism, see for example, Bustos v Hair Transplant Unrep, NSWCA 15 April 1997, as well as Bergman v 
Haertsh [2000] NSWSC 528, [51] where Abadee J specifically suggested that patients‟ „expectations will often 
exceed entitlement‟ and Micallef & Anor v Minister for Health of the State of WA [2006] WASCA 98, [64] in 
which we see McLure JA discussing the process of „test[ing] the patients‟ credibility.‟ 171 
will always be individual assessments of what is the „truth.‟  It is left to the 
primary judge to determine whether or not the plaintiff‟s evidence is credible 
and  it  is  at  this  point  of  the  enquiry  that  the  subjective  evidence  is  set 
alongside  objective  criteria  of  what  a  reasonable  patient  in  that  position 
would have done.57  This does not always end favourably for the plaintiff as 
was  demonstrated  in  the  New  South  Wales  Court  of  Appeal  decision  of 
Bustos  v  Hair  Transplant.58  The  appellant,  who  was  concerned  about  his 
receding hairline, had been impressed by a transplant operation performed 
on his uncle.  He actively sought the same treatment59 and later experienced 
some unfortunate side effects including drooping of his face and incomplete 
coverage of his head.  It was noted by the Court of Appeal that the primary 
judge found the evidence of the appellant to be „coloured and unreliable‟60 
and that he had been „keen to the point of desperation‟ to have the treatment 
with a „picture in his mind‟s eye of his rejuvenated uncle.‟61  The decision 
turned entirely on the impression of the plaintiff before the Court and his 
evidence was rejected outright.   
 
Similarly  in  Bergman  v  Haertsch62  when  the  Court  was  confronted  with  a 
complex case  considering patient dissatisfaction  with gender reassignment 
surgery,63 individual impressions of credibility were central to the outcome.  
In  the  process  of  delivering  his  judgment,  Abadee  J  repeatedly  and 
emphatically  rejected  the  evidence  of  the  plaintiff,  describing  her  as  an 
„unreliable and unsatisfactory witness.‟64 And in Wallace v Ramsay Health Care 
Ltd65 when considering the situation of a plaintiff who was disappointed with 
                                                 
57 Micallef & Anor v Minister for Health of the State of WA [2006] WASCA 98, [64] McLure JA explained that 
„the test for causation is subjective although objective factors are used to test the patients‟‟ credibility.‟  And as 
we saw in the discussions above, the Courts in four jurisdictions (NSW, Qld, Tas and Vic) now have legislative 
authority to decline patient evidence, refer above text accompanying n.5. 
58 Unrep, NSWCA, 15 April 1997. 
59 A „Juri flap‟ which later fell into disfavour but was appropriate and acceptable in 1982. Ibid, [2]. 
60 Bustos v Hair Transplant Unrep, NSWCA, 15 April 1997, Gleeson CJ [7]. 
61 Ibid, [22]. 
62 [2000] NSWSC 528. 
63 I describe this case as complex because it dealt with claims in contract, negligence and assault. This discussion 
will, of course, focus on the negligence discussion. 
64 Bergman v Haertsch [2000] NSWSC 528, [89]. See also [91] where His Honour rejected her credibility and 
[54] when he referred to the „clear evidence that she was seeking perfection.‟ 
65 [2010] NSWSC 518. 172 
the outcome of back surgery, Harrison J delivered part of his judgment under 
the  heading  „Credit‟  and  specifically  addressed  the  character  of  both  the 
plaintiff and the defendant, along with the character of their evidence.  In the 
process His Honour noted that „the assessment of the plaintiff as a patient 
and as a witness is critical at this [the causative] stage of the enquiry‟66 and 
repeatedly referred to the fact that the patient was „desperate‟67 and was able 
to conclude that „it is to my mind inconceivable, or at least highly unlikely 
that  the  plaintiff  would  have  hesitated  for  a  moment  to  submit  to  [the] 
procedure.‟68 
 
Whilst the decisions in each of these cases appear to be entirely reasonable in 
the circumstances,69 this is not always the case.  The reliance on impressions 
of the plaintiff and his or her evidence can come down to individual character 
traits and personal responses of the judge to the personality of the plaintiff.  
This has not gone unremarked upon by the Courts, and as we will see in the 
discussion that follows, the High Court in Rosenberg v Percival70 has expressed 
some concern about this aspect of the „informed consent‟ decisions. 
 
The  remainder  of  this  Chapter  will  involve  an  in  depth  analysis  of  the 
treatment  of  causation  in  „informed  consent‟  decisions.  I  have  chosen  to 
explore the judicial debates in some detail as they clearly demonstrate the 
difficulties that arise when the law attempts to establish a link between two 
different  interests  (the  dignitary  and  the  physical)  –  a  link  that  is,  quite 
simply, missing. 
 
                                                 
66 Ibid, [72] (Harrison J). 
67 Ibid, [6], [92] and [94]. 
68 Ibid, [94]. 
69 In Bustos and Bergman the plaintiff was searching for a perfection that could not possibly come from the 
procedure and in Wallace the plaintiff was intent from the outset on surgical intervention and ultimately, despite 
a complete lack of improvement, was not in any worse a position than he was prior to the treatment. 
70 (2001) 205 CLR 434. 173 
The subjective approach in the High Court: Rosenberg v Percival71 
 
[7.50]  Rosenberg  represents  an  authoritative  statement  that  the  appropriate 
test for causation is subjective.72  The decision also serves to demonstrate the 
manner in which the subjective test is tempered by evaluation of the plaintiff 
before the Court.  Each of the judges noted that the primary judge did not 
warm  to  the  respondent,  describing  his  view  of  her  evidence  as 
„unconvincing,‟73 „unbelievable,‟74 „of no evidentiary value whatsoever,‟75 and 
„of no assistance in the circumstances,‟76 and it was held that she would have 
proceeded  with  the  surgery  despite  her  strong  assertions  to  the  contrary.  
Thus we have a decision about causation which purports to be subjective but 
depends upon a complete rejection of the subjective evidence of the plaintiff.  
At first glance this appears to represent a distinctive shift to an objective test, 
but close analysis of the decision will reveal a mix of subjective qualities of 
the plaintiff (including her pre-treatment knowledge and experience77) and 
objective factors (the central question being, what would a reasonable patient 
in  this  position  have  decided?).    What  we  do  not  see,  however,  is  an 
acknowledgement  of  the  significance  of  the  provision  of  advice  and  the 
empowerment of the patient when given that information.  The focus is, once 
again,  on  the  final  stage  of  the  decision-making  process,  the  provision  of 
consent and the manifestation of a physical harm.  These questions are more 
suited to a trespass enquiry. 
                                                 
71 Two High Court decisions will be considered in some detail, Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 and 
Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, whilst Chappel clearly pre-dates Rosenberg I have chosen to discuss the 
later case first as it addresses the broad causation question.  Chappel on the other hand is unusual as it deals with 
the complex question of the loss of a chance and raises some other issues which warrant specific attention, 
against the backdrop of the test as clarified in Rosenberg. 
72  Rosenberg  v  Percival  (2001)  205  CLR  434, [24]  (McHugh  J),  [87]  (Gummow  J),  [157]  (Kirby  J),  [216] 
(Callinan J). The Rosenberg test is also of continued relevance in those jurisdictions which, as noted above, 
specifically address the subjective nature of the causative test and prohibit plaintiff evidence of what they would 
have done.  It has been argued, and I agree, that the legislative approach is a specific statement of the Rosenberg 
approach. This position will be clarified in the following discussion.  
73 Ibid, [15]  (Gleeson CJ). 
74 Ibid, [28] (McHugh J).  
75 Ibid, [52] (Gummow J). 
76 Ibid, [126] (Kirby J), also note [127] and [161].  Callinan J also commented on the scepticism of the Trial J, at 
[198]. Thus the plaintiff here started from a similar position to that of plaintiff‟s in the jurisdictions which 
prohibit plaintiff evidence.  Indeed, it could be argued that her position was prejudiced by her evidence and 
apparent lack of credibility. 
77 Evidence permitted under the legislative regime. 174 
 
The facts and issues78 
 
[7.60] The respondent, Dr Percival, was treated by Dr Rosenberg (an oral and 
maxillofacial  surgeon)  for  a  deteriorating  malocclusion.    There  were  a 
number  of  treatment  options  but  she  stressed  that  she  „wanted  the  best 
result.‟79 The selected treatment was orthognathic surgery, which involved 
surgical realignment of the jaw.  It was accepted by all that there was no 
warning regarding risks of temperomandibular joint (TMJ) injury, and this 
was the precise category of injury which manifested after the surgery.  Dr 
Percival  suffered  from  persistent  pain  following  the  initial  treatment  and 
underwent  some  further  surgery  followed  by  physiotherapy,  with 
disappointing  results.    At  the  time  of  trial,  she  continued  to  suffer  from 
chronic pain and was unable to speak at full volume, she also experienced 
difficulty eating, suffered from muscle spasms and overall, had a reduced 
quality of life.  
 
The original action was brought in the District Court of Western Australia 
and there were a number of issues before the Court, including the materiality 
of  the  information  and  causation.80  It  was  in  the  District  Court  that  Dr 
Percival  came  before  Gunning  J  and  failed  to  impress  him  as  a  credible 
witness.  It was his comments regarding her credibility that perhaps formed 
the basis of a successful appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia.81  The  leading judgment  was presented by  Wallwork J 
who was clearly concerned about the trial judge‟s conclusions regarding the 
credibility of Dr Percival and found that he had failed to take certain, what he 
viewed as key, issues into account: 
                                                 
78 The facts as described here are a summary of the events as set out by Callinan J in his judgment [168]-[205]. All 
other Judges in the High Court referred to Callinan J‟s summation of facts. 
79 Ibid, [169] (Callinan J). 
80 For the purposes of this discussion it will be noted that it was accepted that she ought to have been warned of 
the risk of TMJ injury, the focus will be on the operation of the subjective test of causation. 
81 This conclusion is supported by Kirby and Callinan JJ in Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, [137] 
(Kirby J) and [199] (Callinan J).  175 
 
The learned primary judge rejected the proposition that the appellant 
would have not had the surgery had she been warned of the possible 
risks. However, in my view the submission of the appellant's counsel 
that in coming to an adverse view of the appellant's credibility the 
learned primary judge did not take into account the important matter 
of  the  severe  effects  which  the  complications  have  had  upon  the 
appellant, both physically and mentally, is correct … Counsel made 
the valid point that had the appellant been properly warned in the 
circumstances,  she  may  not  have  been  carrying  the  obvious 
depression, the chronic anxiety and the collapse of her career which 
had occurred. The appellant may not have been as prone to make 
alleged extravagant statements. As counsel submitted, the reasons for 
judgment  should  have  identified  and  articulated  the  actual 
disabilities  which  the  appellant  had  and  attempted  to  dissect  how 
they were contributing to her performance and behaviour.82 
 
It was because of this apparent oversight that the Court of Appeal ordered a 
retrial on the question of causation.  It is also worth asking the question, what 
difference would it have made if the patient either had been told of the risk or 
the true nature of the harm done to her (that is a denial of access to material 
information) acknowledged? Perhaps less emotional and psychological harm 
would have been suffered and, more significantly, perhaps less time would 
have been spent in the Courts.  In short, if the Courts had been in a position 
to  acknowledge  a  lack  of  informed  choice  instead  of  struggling  with  the 
notion of „informed consent,‟ the judicial process and personal cost would 
have been significantly reduced.  
 
This  was  not,  however,  the  case,  and  working  within  the  confines  of  the 
„informed consent‟ doctrine, the argument was taken to the High Court.  It 
was argued on behalf of Dr Rosenberg that the decision of the primary judge, 
                                                 
82 Percival v Rosenberg [1999] WASCA 31, [100]-[101] (Wallwork J). 176 
„based on credibility, must stand unless it is shown that the judge failed to 
use his advantage or acted on evidence which was inconsistent with facts 
incontrovertibly established or was glaringly improbable.‟83  It was further 
suggested that although the test is a subjective one, objective facts „must be 
called in aid‟ to reach a determination of what the patient would or would 
not have done.84  Interestingly, the argument in support of Dr Percival also 
appealed  to  objective  elements,  describing  the  test  as  „only  nominally 
subjective‟ with a need to look to „objective surroundings.‟85 Clearly, counsel 
for Dr Percival viewed the objective factors as being in her favour, the High 




[7.70] The decision in this instance rested primarily on the reluctance of the 
High Court, as an appellate Court, to overturn the decision of the primary 
judge, based upon individual assessment of plaintiff credibility.87  Each of the 
presiding judges presented a detailed consideration of the application of the 
subjective  test,  the  role  of  appellate  Courts  and  the  relevance  of  objective 
elements.    Significantly,  none  of  the  judges  was  prepared  to  rest  his 
conclusion  on  the  purely  subjective  test  and  Gunning  J‟s  opinion  of  the 
respondent, preferring instead to measure the subjective evidence against the 
objective facts.  Thus we see the emergence of a hybrid test and it can be 
argued that, in adopting the external yardstick of objectivity, the High Court 
has moved away from the less certain „policy‟ of the House of Lords towards 
a more transparent framework.  A close analysis of the individual judgments 
will help to determine whether or not this is so. 
 
                                                 
83 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 434-435. 
84 Ibid, 435. 
85 Ibid, 436. 
86 The individual judgments all considered the different issues before the Court, the analysis here will however, 
focus only on the discussion relevant to causation. 
87 Although it must be noted that both Kirby and Callinan JJ expressed deep concern regarding the attitude of the 
primary judge to Dr Percival, this will be outlined in more detail below. 177 
In the briefest of the judgments, Gleeson CJ chose the nature of the risk as his 
starting point.  In a simple and persuasive discourse, he pointed out that in 
the ordinary conduct of life, we are surrounded by „adverse contingencies‟88 
and it is only the more serious ones that give us pause and cause us to alter 
our decisions.  If a risk appears to be remote, then it is unlikely to cause an 
individual to change course.89  Of significance to His Honour was the remote 
nature of the risk90 which was then viewed through the „prism of hindsight,‟91 
with an elevated significance.  It was the combination of these factors which 
enabled Gleeson CJ to look past any reservations he may have felt regarding 
the  strong  negative  reaction  of  the  Primary  judge  (to  the  plaintiff)  as  his 
„findings on the issue of causation did not depend solely upon the adverse 
opinion he formed.‟92 A sense of caution with respect to a simple application 
of the subjective test is apparent in this judgment.  There is little reference to 
the  assertions  of  Dr  Percival  that  she  would  not  have  proceeded  with 
treatment  had  she  been  warned.  Rather,  the  foundation  of  Gleeson  CJ‟s 
conclusion with respect to causation was the nature of the risk combined with 
objective elements such as Dr Percival‟s professional background, apparent 
lack of interest in risk and her need for corrective surgery.93 
 
McHugh J endeavoured to highlight the significance of the subjective test yet 
found  it  necessary  to  set  out  the  relevant  objective  factors  in  a  detailed 
consideration of the balance between objective and subjective elements.  His 
judgment began from the position that the test is a subjective one in Australia 
with the Court asking the question of what this patient would have done.94  In 
his view, however, this is not the most important question:  
 
                                                 
88 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, per Gleeson CJ [14]. 
89 Gleeson CJ pointed out that the act of driving to a doctor‟s surgery contains risk of injury in a car accident, but 
that will not stop the patient taking that risk which he described as „inconsequential‟ [14]. 
90 Ibid, [15]. 
91 Ibid, [16]. 
92 Ibid, [17]. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Ibid, [24] (McHugh J). 178 
What  a  reasonable  person  would  or  would  not  have  done  in  the 
patient‟s  circumstances  will  almost  always  be  the  most  important 
factor  in  determining  whether  the  Court  will  accept  or  reject  the 
patient‟s  evidence  as  to  the  course  that  the  patient  would  have 
taken.95 
 
Objective elements are therefore a method of assessing the evidence of the 
plaintiff.  This position becomes confusing when considered in the context of 
the  concluding  comments  of  his  judgment  when  he  reiterated  the  law‟s 
commitment to a subjective test and noted that, 
 
If the patient is believed, he or she succeeds even though the objective 
facts point the other way.  If the evidence of the patient is rejected, he 
or she carries the heavy evidentiary burden of persuading the Court 
to  make  a  favourable  finding  on  the  causation  issue  solely  by 
reference to the objective facts and probabilities.96 
 
The  problem  with  this  reasoning  is  that,  as  noted  earlier  in  his  judgment 
„human nature being what it is, most persons who suffer harm as the result of 
a medical procedure and sue for damages genuinely believe that they would 
not have undertaken the procedure, if they had been warned of the risk of 
that harm.‟97  On this reasoning, every plaintiff comes to the Court and tells 
the truth as they see it.  It is not the veracity of the plaintiff that is assessed 
against the objective factors; it is instead the reasonableness of their belief that 
is assessed by consideration of external factors, the implication being that this 
process takes place even if the patient is believed.98 The plaintiff evidence is 
therefore  of  little  import  and,  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  dictated  by  the 
                                                 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid, [44]. 
97 Ibid, [26]. 
98 Or to put it another way, the patient ought always be believed as they are presenting their version of reality and, 
are telling the truth as they know it.  The question is whether that particular reality is reasonable. 179 
legislative provisions, the „matter is to be determined subjectively in the light 
of all relevant circumstances.‟99 
 
McHugh J himself went through such a measuring process when he noted 
that it was not simply the „demeanour and personal attributes‟ of Dr Percival 
that resulted in a rejection of her evidence.  It was the important interplay of 
objective factors.100 He then listed these factors in some detail as including, 
inter alia, assessment of the patient's character and personality, the common 
nature of the procedure, the slight risk of harm and this procedure being the 
most likely to produce the best results.‟101 The subjective test begins to look 
increasingly objective. 
 
Gummow J adopted a similar approach to Gleeson CJ in that he noted the 
significance of the nature of the risk, highlighting the relevance not only of 
the  degree  of  risk,  but  also  the  severity.102  His  approach  to  the  test  was 
relatively straightforward as he emphasised the importance of the primary 
judge‟s  conclusions  regarding  the  credibility  of  Dr  Percival,103  which  he 
found were clearly supported by objective factors.104  Once he reached this 
point in his reasoning, it was his position that there simply was no appealable 
error.  Whilst this judgment was the most straightforward application of the 
subjective test involving a simple acceptance of the opinion of Gunning J, it 
must be recognised that the objective factors were still of relevance. 
 
In his judgment, Kirby J strove to strike a balance between the need to adhere 
to a subjective  test  (which in his view is  consistent with both the  general 
principles of tort law and the rationale behind the imposition of a duty to 
                                                 
99 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s5D(3)(a), Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s11(3)(a), Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas) s13(3)(a). The wording of Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s5C(3) is different and refers to determining what 
„the injured person would have done if the tortfeasor had not been at fault‟.   
100 Ibid, [31]. 
101 Ibid, [31]. These factors have been listed in detail here as they play a role in the reasoning of each of the 
judges. 
102 Ibid, [56] (Gummow J). 
103 Ibid, [50], [52] and [87]. 
104 Ibid, [87]. The factors listed were similar to those outlined by McHugh J. 180 
warn)105 and any negative impact that the primary judge‟s strong adverse 
reaction to Dr Percival may have had.  In endeavouring to attain equilibrium 
of interests, Kirby J was prepared to acknowledge the practical problems of 
implementation but felt that these problems did not provide sufficient reason 
to turn away from a subjective approach.106 
 
The process adopted by Kirby J is an interesting one as he began with a clear 
statement of his reluctance to overturn the initial assessment of credibility 
made  by  the  primary  judge107  but  then  expressed  concern  regarding  this 
assessment.    He  commented  that  it  was  early  in  the  judgment  that  the 
„primary judge indicated his disbelief of [her] evidence‟108 and highlighted 
the emphasis that the judge placed on the fact that Dr Percival was  „most 
anxious to tell her story in a way in which she thought would benefit her case 
and to play  down anything  that  she thought  might  be to the contrary.‟109  
Kirby  J  also  noted  that  the  primary  judge  referred  to  her  evidence  as 
„unreliable‟  and  found  that  her  assertions  regarding  what  she  would  (or 
would not) have done were such as „would be expected in the circumstances 
and  of  course,  again  in  the  circumstances,  [is]  of  no  evidentiary  value 
whatsoever.‟110 
 
Kirby J was not receptive to the reasoning of Gunning J and was determined 
to look beyond his mere dislike of the respondent.  He noted that the finding 
on  causation  was  „based  on  …  assessment  of  the  credibility  of  the 
respondent‟111 and that the strong personal reaction of the primary judge may 
have  influenced  the  actions  of  the  Appeal  Court  in  Western  Australia, 
causing  them  to  „overreact‟112  and  neglect  the  appropriate  approach  to 
causation.    These  clear  observations  of  the  trial  process  and  subsequent 
                                                 
105 Ibid, [154] (Kirby J). 
106 Ibid, [155]-[157]. 
107 Ibid, [125]. 
108 Ibid, [126]. 
109 Ibid, [127]. 
110 Ibid, [129] (setting out the reasons of the primary judge). 
111 Ibid, [136]. 
112 Ibid, [136] and [137]. 181 
appeal created an excellent foundation for a reasoned consideration of the 
facts and the application of the relevant test.  He emphasised the role of the 
subjective test, noting the problems with its implementation.113  Despite these 
concerns,  however,  Kirby  J  categorically  stated  that  the  Court  should  not 
adopt  a  variant  of  the  objective  test  as  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  the 
requirements of Rogers,114 preferring instead to rely on subjective factors.  It is 
interesting to note that despite the strong assertion of a subjective test, His 
Honour,  in  seeking  to  put  to  rest  his  concerns  regarding  some  of  the 
comments  of  Gunning  J,  referred to  (and highlighted)  the  external  factors 
which supported the initial determination on causation.  Indeed, Kirby J took 
the  conclusions  one  step  further  and  suggested  that  when  one  took  into 
account the objective factors that also supported Gunning J‟s assessment of 
the  evidence,  it  became  clear  that  in  practical  terms,  and  „as  a  matter  of 
inherent probabilities and logic,‟ both objective and subjective tests  would 
have resulted in the same outcome.115 
 
Of  all  of  the  judges,  Callinan  J  expressed  the  most  concern  regarding  the 
approach adopted by Gunning J.  He began by noting his strong negative 
reaction which led to scepticism and outright rejection of the respondent‟s 
evidence.116  He  agreed  with  Kirby  J‟s  assessment  of  the  Appeal  Court‟s 
decision as being overly influenced by this negative response, referring to the 
„unduly  critical‟  nature  of the initial judgment.117  Underlying Callinan J‟s 
evident discomfort with the conduct of the trial and subsequent treatment of 
the case by the Supreme Court was the fact that, unlike Kirby and McHugh JJ, 
he was not prepared to embrace the subjective test as the most appropriate.  
   
                                                 
113 Ibid, [155]. 
114 Ibid, [157]. 
115 Ibid, [165]. 
116 Ibid, [198], (Callinan J). 
117 Ibid, [199] and [222]. 182 
He expressed reservations regarding the relevance of plaintiff evidence and 
noted that,  
 
there is, in my opinion, a real doubt, whether a negative answer to a 
question,  „Would  you  have  had  the  operation?‟,  artificially  posed, 
years after the event, and answered, almost certainly, after the patient 
has suffered unexpected complications, and after repeated innocent 
rehearsal  in  making  a  statement  and  in  conference  with  legal 
advisors, can ordinarily carry much conviction, or should provide the 
basis for an undiscounted award of damages, or indeed, damages at 
all.  A disinterested bystander might well say of such an answer, „Of 
course, naturally she (or he) would say that. 118 
 
It is perhaps this view, in taking the concerns highlighted by some of the 
other judges a step further, which resulted in his strong conclusion that the 
primary judge was „unduly critical of the respondent‟119 and was sufficient to 
give  him  „serious  pause  in  this  case.‟120  Despite  His  Honour‟s  close 
consideration of the problems with the manner in which the case had been 
dealt with and evident discomfort with the treatment of the respondent, he 
was able to quickly and effectively deal with them.  In a brief statement he 
noted  that  despite  such  strong  concerns,  the  „judge‟s  conclusion  as  to  the 
incredibility  of  Dr  Percival‟s  answer  that  she  would  „never‟  have  had  the 
operations must be accepted.‟121 How could such deep concerns be dealt with 
so efficiently? By simple reference to the objective factors. 
 
In  summary,  therefore,  Gleeson  CJ  treated  the  subjective  elements  with 
caution, choosing to emphasise the objective ones.  This caution was extended 
by  Callinan  J  who  expressed  deep  reservations  regarding  the  subjective 
elements, preferring instead to find a straightforward solution in the objective 
                                                 
118 Ibid, [214]. 
119 Ibid, [222]. 
120 Ibid, [223]. 
121 Ibid, [223]. 183 
elements.  A different approach was adopted by McHugh J who emphasised 
the nature of the test but insisted that the objective factors be considered in 
detail as, in his view, it is these factors that allow the  Court to determine 
whether or not the plaintiff is telling the truth. Indeed he took this further by 
suggesting that the outcome of both objective and subjective tests would be 
the same.122A similar conclusion was reached by Kirby J who was prepared to 
recognise the practical difficulties of the subjective test, but asserted that it is 
the only appropriate test as it is consistent with the essence of negligence law.  
It is interesting to note,  however, that in reaching  his final conclusion,  he 
referred  to  the  objective  elements.    Finally,  Gummow  J‟s  judgment 
represented the strongest adherence to the subjective test but he still turned 
to objective factors to validate his conclusion.  One cannot therefore conclude 
that the test for causation in Australia is a straightforward subjective one.  
Whilst the High Court prefers to label it as subjective there is clear reliance on 
objective factors.  The test is one which begins with subjective elements and 
moves on to test them against objective criteria, and is best described as a 
hybrid test. 
 
What is the end result? It is a situation in which it is most likely that both 
objective and subjective tests would have resulted in the same outcome.123  
Why  then  the  ongoing  debate?  Perhaps  it  is  simply  indicative  of  the 
problematic nature of the process which requires a conceptual shift from the 
dignitary  interest  in  the  receipt  of  information  (which  is  the  focus  of  the 
breach  enquiry)  to  the  trespassory  question  of  whether  or  not  a  plaintiff 
would have consented to treatment.  Here we see the judges struggling with 
the „marriage of two doctrines‟124 and finding that perhaps it is an unhappy 
marriage.  The nature of the struggle and the mismatch of ideas was made 
                                                 
122 Ibid, [34] (McHugh J). 
123 Ibid, [165] (Kirby J). 
124 D.Beyleveld and R.Brownsword, Consent and the Law (Hart Publishing, Portland Oregon, 2007), 174. 
Discussed in Chapter 1, 
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very clear in the earlier decision of Chappel v Hart125 and subsequent decisions 
which seek to make sense of it.  
 
   
                                                 
125 (1998) 195 CLR 232. 185 
Manipulating causation: Chappel v Hart126 
 
[7.80] Chappel v Hart has generated much scholarly debate and been described 
as  both  an  appropriate  manipulation  of  causative  principles127  and  „a  lost 
opportunity.‟128 Whatever view is adopted, the significance of this decision 
cannot be denied.129  As we have seen, causation represents one of the most 
significant obstacles to a successful claim in negligent advice and it has been 
suggested that the existence of five separate judgments in Chappel stands as 
testament to the complexities of this area.130  The issues before the Court were 
not easy, and, like Chester in the United Kingdom, challenged the Court „to 
give legal sanction to an underlying moral responsibility,131 and required an 
elastic application of causative principles.  When the case went before the 
High Court, there was a sense of anticipation and belief that it provided an 
opportunity to lend clarity to the discussion and provide clear guidance to 
lower Courts.132  Unfortunately, however, these expectations were not met 
and whilst Chappel answered some questions, it left many more open.   
 
   
                                                 
126 (1998) 195 CLR 232. This decision deals with, inter alia, the question of a loss of a chance. In 2010 the High 
Court revisited the issue of a loss of a chance in Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537. This decision will not, 
however, be discussed in this thesis as it is very clearly confined to the provision of medical treatment and the 
issue of pre-treatment advice is not raised.  
127 A. Honoré, „Medical Non-Disclosure, Causation and risk: Chappel v Hart‟ (1999) 7 Torts Law Journal 1,19-
20. Honoré argues that this is a case where the „Courts are entitled to see that justice is done despite the 
absence of a causal connection. 
128  J.  Clarke,  „Causation  in  Chappel  v  Hart:  Common  Sense  or  Coincidence?‟(1999)  6  Journal  of  Law  and 
Medicine 335, 347. Clarke suggests that the decision could have „resolved the problems with the law of 
causation‟ and describes the decision as „disappointing‟ (347). He also refers us to J. Lavery „Chappel v Hart: 
The High Court‟s Lost Chance‟ (1998) 7 (3) Australian Health Law Bulletin 25. 
129 Indeed, the reasoning in Chappel v Hart provided the foundation for much of the discussion in Chester v 
Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134: [9] (Lord Bingham), [21]-[23] (Lord Steyn), [93]-[95] and [99] (Lord Walker) and 
Lord Hope provides a complex consideration [64]-[88]. 
130 Clarke, above n.128, 335.  Also note M.Stauch, „Taking the Consequences for Failure to Warn of Medical 
Risks,‟ (2000) 63 The Modern Law Review 261, and A. Honoré, above n.127 which refer to the complexities 
of causation in this context. 
131  A.Honoré, above n.127, 21. 
132  Refer  D.Mendelson,  „The  Breach  of  the  Medical  Duty  to  Warn  and  Causation:  Chappel  v  Hart  and  the 
Necessity to Reconsider Some Aspects of Rogers v Whitaker’ (1998) 5 Journal of Law and Medicine 312, 318 
where the author hopes that the High Court will take the opportunity to balance the protection of individual 
patients and those of the community in having a viable medical profession. This is taken one step further in, J. 
Devereux, „It‟ s Just a Jump to the Left – and then a Step to the Right: Developments post Rogers v Whitaker 
in the Law Relating to Failure by a Medical Practitioner to Advise of Risks‟ (1998) 17 University of Tasmania 
Law Review 63, when the author argues that the High Court should reject the Court of Appeal decision on the 
basis that it is „bad law‟ and does not provide for consistency in the law of negligence, 78-79. 186 
The facts and issues 
 
[7.90]  Mrs  Hart  sought  treatment  for  a  pharyngeal  pouch:  an  extremely 
uncomfortable condition which meant that food could become caught in her 
throat.  The  operation  to  remove  the  pouch  was  performed  (without 
negligence)  by  Dr  Chappel.    Unfortunately,  during  the  operation  her 
oesophagus  was  perforated,  an  infection  (mediastinitis)  set  in  and  she 
suffered long-term damage  to her  voice.   The basis of her claim was that 
whilst Dr Chappel had warned her of the slight risk of perforation, he had 
ignored her concerns regarding long-term damage to her voice,133 and failed 
to warn her of the chance of infection and long-term injury.   
 
If Dr Chappel had warned Mrs Hart of this risk, it was accepted that she 
would have delayed treatment and sought a more qualified and experienced 
surgeon.  There was no doubt that she would have eventually undergone the 
same procedure as her condition was „relentlessly progressive‟134 and surgical 
intervention was the only form of relief available.135  It was also common 
ground that, 
 
… the aetiology of the damage to Mrs Hart's laryngeal nerve was not 
in doubt. It required the coincidence of three events: (1) the operative 
tear to the oesophagus; (2) an escape of bacteria from the oesophagus; 
and (3) consequential impingement of the resulting infection upon the 
nearby right vocal cord causing paralysis and damage. Each of these 
preconditions was accepted to be very rare.136 
 
                                                 
133   Mrs Hart‟s evidence was that she had expressed specific concerns and had stated that she did not „want to 
wind up like Neville Wran.‟  Neville Wran was a past Premier of New South Wales who had suffered widely 
publicised injury to his voice, her reference therefore indicated a concern regarding the possible impact on 
her voice. 
134   This key fact was accepted by the Court, see Chappel v Hart  (1998) 195 CLR 232, [2] (Gaudron J), [38] 
(McHugh J), [91] (Kirby J) and [110] (Hayne J). 
135   Indeed, she had a subsequent operation to remove a grape which had become lodged in her throat, Chappel v 
Hart  (1998) 195 CLR 232, [104] (Hayne J).  
136  Ibid, [91] (Kirby J).  187 
There was clear consensus regarding both the duty to warn and the key facts 
of  the  case.    The  decision  turned  on  the  issue  of  causation  and  the  split 
between  the  majority  and  minority  judgments  rested  on  the  significant 
question of whether or not the failure to warn made a difference to the chance 




[7.100]  Earlier  in  Part  II  the  significance  of  policy  was  recognised  and 
demonstrated through the discussion of Chester.139  In contrast to the House 
of Lords, the High Court in Chappel tended to avoid the language of policy,140 
preferring instead to adopt the „common sense‟ test developed in  March v 
Stramare.141  Similarly  to  Chester,  however,  both  the  majority  and  minority 
judges relied upon the same test to arrive at different conclusions, thereby 
exposing possible limitations of the test.  The use of the common sense test in 
this  context  has  attracted  some  criticism,  with  it  being  described  as 
„recognition that resolving issues of causation in legal contexts may require 
value  judgments,‟142  „not  very  satisfactory,‟143  „uncertain,‟144  „a  leap  of 
logic‟145 and „worrying indeed.‟146 The only certainty with the „common sense‟ 
test  is  that,  like  policy,  it  depends  upon  who  is  applying  it  and  in  what 
                                                 
137 There is another strand of contention surrounding this decision which centres around the possibility of  a 
successful loss of a chance action.  This is beyond the ambit of the current discussion, but it was clearly 
rejected by the Court, see Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, [50]ff (McHugh J) [135]ff (Hayne J), [70] 
and [76] (Gummow J) [100] (Kirby J) and refer Gaudron J in general. For further consideration of the issue 
of loss a chance refer Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537. 
138  In this section, the focus will be on the specific approach of each of the judges.  There is a further issue 
regarding reversal of the evidential onus which emerged from this decision, and this will be considered 
below. 
139  Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, see discussion in Chapter 6, Manipulating causation: Chester v Afshar (at 
[6.70]). 
140  Although McHugh J did make reference to policy considerations in the context of „common sense.‟ Chappel v 
Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, [24]. 
141  March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506. It was in this decision that the High Court clearly rejected the „but 
for‟ test as the determinative test of causation.   
142   P. Cane, „A Warning About Causation‟ (1999) 115 Law Quarterly Review 21, 26. 
143   S.M. Waddams „Causation, Physicians and Disclosure of Risks‟, „Causation, Physicians and Disclosure of 
Risks‟ [1999] 7 Tort Law Review 5, 5-6. 
144   B. Milstein, „Causation in Medical Negligence – Recent Developments‟ (1997) 6 Australian Health Law 
Bulletin 21, 22. 
145   D.  Mendelson,  „Liability  for  Negligent  Failure  to  Disclose  Medical  Risk,‟ (2001)  Journal  of  Law  and 
Medicine 358, 365. 
146 Clarke, above n.128, 347. 188 
context.  „Common sense‟ led McHugh and Hayne JJ to the conclusion that 
the failure to warn did not have a causal link with the injury suffered whilst 
Gummow, Gaudron and Kirby JJ found that common sense took them in the 
opposite  direction.    From  Dr  Chappel‟s  perspective,  one  cannot  help  but 
conclude that the outcome is neither common nor sensible. 
 
It is in the minority judgments that the strictest adherence to a clear causal 
chain can be found thus it is those judgments that I will consider first.  I have 
chosen  this  approach  because  the  dissenters  provide  the  most  coherent 
approach to the law, the majority on the other hand, seek to do „justice‟ with 
tools  that  are  not  up  to  the  task.    To  begin  with  McHugh  J,  His  Honour 
opened  with  a  consideration  of  basic  causal  principles.    It  was  his 
unequivocal  position  that  the  breach  of  duty  and  injury  suffered  must  be 
„relevantly connected‟ with „common sense ideas‟ determining what makes a 
connection  „relevant‟  in  a  legal  sense.147  It  is  important  to  recognise  that 
McHugh J readily accepted that Dr Chappel‟s failure to warn Mrs Hart of the 
risk  of  long-term  damage  to  her  voice  was  „one  of  the  events  that  in 
combination  with  others  led  to  …  the  damage‟  and  that  „statistically  the 
chance  of  it  occurring  during  an  operation  on  another  occasion  was  very 
small.‟148  Such  a  link  was  not,  however,  sufficient  to  create  the  requisite 
„relevant  connection,‟  consistent  with  the  rejection  of  the  „but  for‟  test  in 
March v Stramare, something more was required.149 
 
McHugh J placed emphasis on the essence of causation as the „allocation of 
responsibility for harm or damage‟150 with the key to responsibility being a 
material  contribution  to  the  suffering  of  the  harm.151  In  focusing  on  the 
notion  of  responsibility  and  rejection  of  the  „but  for‟  enquiry  as  a 
                                                 
147  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, [23] (McHugh J). 
148  Ibid, [25]. 
149 It is important to note at this point, that his rationale in this stage of the discussion was in accord with that of 
the majority. 
150  Ibid, [26]. 
151  Ibid, [27]. 189 
determinative one, McHugh J noted that something more than a coincidence 
of time and place is required and, 
 
the fact that the risk eventuated at a particular time or place by reason 
of the conduct of the defendant does not itself materially contribute to 
the plaintiff‟s injury unless the fact of that particular time or place 
increased the risk of the injury occurring.152 
 
Once he had set out the basic premise of causation, McHugh J turned his 
attention to the evidence before the Court.  He carefully explored the nature 
of  Mrs  Hart‟s  condition153  and  the  suggestion  that  a  more  experienced 
surgeon would have reduced the risk of perforation and infection.  In his 
view, to conclude that the failure to warn Mrs Hart caused the injury would 
„seem an affront to common sense.‟154  An application of common sense to the 
facts lead McHugh J to the conclusion that the „cause of the perforation and 
the consequent mediastinitis was the examination of the oesophagus with a 
rigid  endoscope, an examination  which carried with it an inherent  risk of 
perforation.‟155 The lack of advice was little more than a coincidence and did 
not materially contribute to the injury.  The fatal flaw then was the absence of 
a link between the failure to inform and the manifestation of the physical 
harm.  If the harm itself had been re-defined to be a loss of choice, then the 
link would have been clear and unproblematic. 
 
A slightly different approach was adopted by Hayne J who began from the 
facts of the case and moved into application of the principles of negligence to 
these facts. In applying common sense to the facts before him, Hayne J, like 
McHugh  J,  concluded  that  the  failure  to  warn  did  not  cause  the  injury 
                                                 
152  Ibid.  
153  „Relentlessly progressive‟, [38]. 
154 Ibid, [43]. He reached this conclusion by applying the rationale to an alternate fact scenario in which Dr 
Chappel did warn Mrs Hart and she sought out another surgeon who subsequently perforated the oesophagus 
and mediastinitis developed.  To so conclude would be a faithful adherence to the „but for‟ test and an 
extension of the rationale leading to liability of Dr Chappel for Mrs Hart‟s present injury. 
155  Ibid. 190 
suffered by Mrs Hart.156  His Honour directed attention to certain „features of 
the case‟ which, in his view, needed to be born „steadily in mind.‟157  These 
key factors included recognition that the breach of duty rested in the failure 
to  warn  and  that  the  procedure  was  conducted  without  negligence.    He 
accepted  that  the  condition  was  „relentlessly  progressive‟  and  required 
surgery, therefore the situation was one of delay as opposed to cancellation.  
He noted that „whilst perforation of the oesophagus was not uncommon‟ the 
mediastinitis  was  „very  rare.‟    Finally,  Mrs  Hart  had  been  „accepted  as  a 
witness of truth‟ and therefore the decision was based on the fact that she 
would  have  sought  further  advice  and  requested  that  the  surgery  be 
performed by „the most experienced person with a record and reputation in 
the field.‟158 
 
Hayne  J  considered  the    „but  for‟  test,  and  recognised  its  utility  as  a 
preliminary enquiry and a „negative test … if it is not satisfied, it is unlikely 
that  there  is  the  necessary  causal  connection,‟159  but  rejected  it  as  the 
exclusive test. His Honour emphasised the need for a conclusion based upon 
careful reasoning and cautioned against a conclusion „without any lengthy 
articulation of reasons,‟160 and then concluded: 
 
In my view the only connection between the failure to warn and the 
harm the respondent has suffered is that but for the failure to warn 
she would not have been in harm‟s way … The appellant‟s conduct 
did  not  affect  whether  there  would  be  pathogens  present  in  the 
respondent‟s oesophagus, when the procedure was carried out; his 
conduct  did  not  affect  whether  the  pathogens  that  were  present 
would, in all the circumstances, produce the infection which they did; 
                                                 
156 Once again being limited by a physical definition of the injury. 
157  Ibid, [110] (Hayne J). 
158  Ibid. 
159  Ibid, [117] (Hayne J). This preliminary stage of the enquiry was later endorsed in Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 
205 CLR 434 and as we have seen, has since been enshrined in statute.  
160  Ibid, [111] (Hayne J). 191 
his conduct did not affect whether that infection would damage the 
laryngeal nerve as it did.161 
 
His Honour then moved on to a clear statement of principle which indicated 
that his (and indeed McHugh J‟s before him) approach accorded with core 
principles of negligence. He accepted that the purpose of a duty can inform 
the causation enquiry,162 but cautioned that it cannot  „obscure the fact that 
the  search  is  for  a  relationship  between  the  negligent  act  …  and  the 
damage.‟163  The importance of autonomy was recognised by Hayne J, as was 
the relevance of the connection between the risk which was both the subject 
of the duty to warn and the injury which manifested.  But in drawing the 
enquiry back to basic causal principles, he emphasised that a mere connection 
is not sufficient there must be a clear and direct link.164  Once again we see 
that  if  the  harm  had  been  re-defined  to  include  the  denial  of  personal 
authority, then the link would have been clear. 
 
Both of the minority judges relied upon their interpretation of the facts and 
their decision turned on the failure, in their view, to demonstrate that the 
surgeon‟s  skill  had  an  „effect  on  the  unusual  chain  of  events.‟165  Both 
McHugh J and Hayne J appealed to basic causal principles, rejected the but 
for test as determinative and employed the language of „common sense.‟  As 
will  be  seen,  this  approach  is  not  materially  different  from  that  of  the 
majority; the difference lies in the individual interpretation of what „common 
sense‟ means.  It is my position that the adoption of „common sense‟ in this 
decision is similar to that of „policy‟ in Chester v Afshar, a linguistic nicety that 
covers individual notions of what is the „right‟ answer in the circumstances.166 
 
                                                 
161 Ibid, [121] (Hayne J). 
162 Referring to the key judgment of Lord Hoffman in Environment Agency v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd 
[1999]  2  AC  22  which  referred  to  the  impact  of  the  purpose  of  the  duty.  This  approach  was  to  prove 
influential in Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 and in some of the majority judgments in the present decision.  
163 Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, [122]  (Hayne J).  
164  Ibid, [123]-[124], (Hayne J). 
165  Ibid, [133] (Hayne J). 
166 This will be explored further in Chapter 9: The Policy Diversion (at [9.20]ff). 192 
In a judgment appealing to notions of justice, Gummow J placed emphasis on 
the nature and significance of the injury.  He acknowledged that the central 
issue was one of causation and noted that since March v Stramare167 the „but 
for‟ test is no longer definitive.168  It was in his search for what constitutes 
that „something more‟ that we see a clear divergence from the minority. 
 
Gummow J began from the purpose of the duty which he described as the 
„right of the patient to know of material risks‟169 and then moved on to a 
consideration of the nature of the risk of injury and its potential impact on 
Mrs  Hart.    Of  significance  to  him  was  the  enquiry  made  by  Mrs  Hart 
combined  with  the  specific  impact  of  a  loss  of  voice  on  her  lifestyle.    He 
highlighted the fact that not only ought she to have been warned of this risk 
but she had specifically asked about it.  Furthermore, she was a person „for 
whom  the  potential  damage  to  her  voice  was  more  significant  than  the 
„statistical‟  risk.‟170  In  his  view,  it  was  the  combination  of  these  factors, 
„combined with the satisfaction of the „but for‟ test [that] were sufficient to 
establish causation in this case.‟171 
 
It is appropriate here to re-visit the Rogers v Whitaker materiality test: 
 
a  risk  is  material  if,  in  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  a 
reasonable  person  in  the  patient‟s  position,  if  warned  of  the  risk, 
would  be  likely  to  attach  significance  to  it  or  if  the  medical 
practitioner  is  or  should  reasonably  be  aware  that  the  particular 
patient, if warned of the risks would be likely to attach significance to 
it.172 
 
                                                 
167   (1991) 171 CLR 506. 
168  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, [59] ff (Gummow J). 
169  Ibid, [65]. 
170  Ibid, [66]-[67]. 
171  Ibid, [67]. 
172  (1992) 175 CLR 479, at 490. 193 
The causative reasoning of Gummow J echoes this duty rationale.  It was his 
position that Mrs Hart viewed any risk to her voice as material and this was 
evidenced (as with Mrs Whitaker before her), by her specific concerns. This 
evidence is relevant to a determination of duty to warn.  To extend it to a 
conclusion of causation, I would suggest, is merging the duty and causation 
enquiries and overlooking the fundamental chain of causation.   
 
Kirby  J  presented  a  reasoned  judgment  which  acknowledged  the 
complexities of the causative enquiry173 at the same time as emphasising the 
important  role  of  the  High  Court  in  the  provision  of  guidance  „as  to  the 
approach to be taken when problems of this kind arise in the future.‟174  An 
interesting aspect of this particular judgment is the fact that Kirby J openly 
and  candidly  embraced  the  importance  of  value  judgments  and  policy 
considerations,175 thus acknowledging the underlying rationale of his (and 
other members of the Court) decision. 
 
Kirby  J  approached  the  key  issue  of  causation  from  a  slightly  different 
perspective that the other judges, pointing not to the purpose of the duty but 
to the purpose of causation.176  He began with an acknowledgment of how 
difficult it is to establish causation177 and moved on to critique this.  He noted  
that such a complex process can (and does) 
 
…  cause  dissatisfaction  to  litigants  ,  anguish  for  their  advisers, 
uncertainty for judges, agitation amongst commentators and friction 
between healthcare professionals and their legal counterparts.178 
 
                                                 
173  Ibid, [96] (Kirby J). 
174  Ibid, [88]. 
175   Ibid, [93] (3). 
176   Ibid, [93](1). 
177   Ibid, [87]. 
178   Ibid. 194 
Whilst he was prepared to acknowledge the difficulties with the process, he 
could not move away from it and his decision was clearly guided by basic 
causal principles (as he viewed them). 
 
In  moving  on  to  a  consideration  of  the  purpose  of  the  causative  enquiry, 
Kirby J emphasised that it is „not to engage in philosophical debate,‟ rather it 
is  „about  attributing  responsibility.‟179  This  position  supports  conclusions 
driven by what „ought‟ to be done, and what outcome would be the „just‟ 
one180 but does not necessarily clarify or lend certainty to the decision. The 
process  was  muddied  even  further  by  Kirby  J‟s  acceptance  that  because 
causation is „a question of fact‟ to be „resolved as a matter of commonsense … 
there is usually a large element of intuition in deciding such questions.‟181 The 
solution then becomes driven by personal perspectives and interpretations 
and in this instance, in direct contrast to the minority, Kirby J‟s intuition led 
him to the conclusion that „the higher the skill of the surgeon, the less is the 
risk of any  perforation of the oesophagus into the mediastinum.‟182  Thus 
because the possibility of harm was increased, causation was established.  It 
is  unclear  how  this  application  of  „intuition‟  to  balance  possibilities  and 
probabilities  provides  the  essential  „guidance  to  the  approach  to  be  taken 
when problems of this kind arise in the future.‟183  Open acknowledgment of 
the dignitary harm to Mrs Hart, however, would have provided the requisite 
clear guidance. 
 
Gaudron J reached a similar, fact-driven conclusion to Kirby J.  In a decision 
which turned on her interpretation of the evidence, Gaudron J was unable to 
accept the proposition that the timing of the surgery made no difference to 
the outcome.  Whilst she readily accepted that a later surgery „would have 
                                                 
179   Ibid, [93] (1).  
180  Refer Gummow J above and the majority of the Law Lords in Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134. 
181  Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, [93](2) (Kirby J). 
182  Ibid, [97]. 
183 Ibid, [88]. 195 
been subject to the risk that eventuated‟ it would not, in her view, have been 
„to the same degree.‟184 
 
Of  all  of  the  judges,  Gaudron  J  gave  the most  considered  response  to  Dr 
Chappel‟s argument that the injury „was not physical but amounted to the 
loss of a chance.‟185  Whilst she was prepared to consider the position, she 
unequivocally rejected it, and it was this rejection that formed the basis of her 
conclusions.  It was her position that if Dr Chappel‟s argument was accepted, 
then the risk would have been the lost opportunity and if this was the case, 
then „the duty would have been a duty to inform her that there were more 
experienced surgeons practicing in the field.‟186 
 
The nature of the risk combined with the rarity of the condition to satisfy the 
causation test.  The rationale employed by Gaudron J was similar to that of 
Gummow J as she reasoned that because the risk was „both rare and random‟ 
it was „preclude[d] from being described as other than speculative.‟187 The 
conclusion from this was, quite simply, that it would not have happened at 
another time.  The traditional causative enquiry is absent from the reasoning 
of Gaudron J.  She did note that „questions of causation are not answered in a 
legal vacuum.‟188  Rather, according to Her Honour, tests of causation are to 
be considered in the broader context, or „framework in which they arise.‟189  
And it is this framework that remained the focus of Gaudron J‟s reasoning, 
with the physical nature of the risk driving her conclusion. 
 
Chappel v Hart190 is therefore a complex decision. Despite Kirby J‟s assertion 
that  „this  Court  must  endeavour  to  give  guidance  in  this  case  as  to  the 
                                                 
184  Ibid, [2] (Gaudron J). 
185   Ibid, [5]. 
186  Ibid, [10]. 
187   Ibid, [20]. 
188   Ibid, [7]. 
189   Ibid. 
190   (1998) 195 CLR 232. 196 
approach to be taken when problems of this kind arise in the future,‟191 it 
failed  to  clarify  the  causation  issue.    Each  of  the  High  Court  judges 
acknowledged  that  the  enquiry  was  to  be  driven  by  „common  sense,‟  but 
„common sense‟ in the High Court, like „policy‟ in the House of Lords does 
not  provide  a  consistent  legal  framework  and  serves  to  allow  individual 
perceptions to drive conclusions that claim to be driven by fact. 
 
Muddying the waters: A presumption of causation? 
 
[7.110]  Despite  the  clear  endeavours  of  the  individual  judges  in  both 
Rosenberg and Chappel to identify the process of determining causation in the 
context of medical advice, it continues to be an „area of the law that is highly 
discretionary and unpredictable.‟192  In the context of pre-treatment advice, 
most  of  the  debate  has  focussed  on  the  nature  of  the  test  (subjective  or 
objective).    But  Chappel  v  Hart  served  to  introduce  a  further  layer  of 
complexity when the judges hinted at a possible shift in evidentiary onus 
(from the plaintiff to the defendant) and thus a presumption  of  causation 
once breach of duty has been identified.  This shift has provided impetus for 
lower Courts to neatly sidestep evidentiary gaps relating to causation and has 
been described as „surprising‟193 and as representing „a fundamental change 
in the traditional law about causation and proof of causation.‟194  Perhaps in a 
response to this, evidentiary onus has been specifically considered in recent 
legislative amendments,195 but this does not signal the end of the debate.   
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The  recent  decision  of  Jovanovski  v  Billbergia196  which  applied  the  relevant 
legislation197 once again raised the question of a presumption of causation.  
Davies  J  clearly  stated  that  „certainly  the onus  remains  on  the  plaintiff  to 
prove causation‟,198 but in applying this test distinguished the facts before the 
Court199  from  those  in  both  Chappel  v  Hart200  and  Elbourne  v  Gibbs201  and 
stated that „the question is the extent to which inferences are available of a 
causal connection once it is shown there is a breach of duty to warn of a 
risk.‟202  Thus  the  existence  of  an  inference  of  causation  remains  open  and 
whilst the High Court has acknowledged the confused state of affairs and 
raised the question of the possibility of such an inference,203 no answer was 
given.  Thus in the absence of authoritative clarification the debate regarding 
a  shifting  of  evidential  onus  must  be  considered  here  when  we  are 
attempting to unravel the complicated threads of the causation debate. 
 
The shifting onus in Chappel v Hart204 
 
[7.120] That Dr Chappel ought to have acknowledged Mrs Hart‟s concerns 
and warned her of the risk to her voice was clear.  Whether or not this made a 
difference to the outcome was, as demonstrated in the preceding discussion, 
not so clear.  It has been suggested that with the „commonsense‟ approach 
sitting so firmly in the realm of intuition, the Judges have been left in the 
uncomfortable  position  of  intuitively  believing  that  Mrs  Hart  ought  to 
recover and then having to create a path of reasoning backwards to reach the 
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perceived appropriate outcome.205  This „backwards path‟ was facilitated by 
the apparent reversal of the evidential onus. 
 
Four of the members of the Court206 supported the shift of evidentiary onus 
from  plaintiff  to  defendant,  once  duty  and  breach  have  been  established. 
Hayne J however, was emphatic in his rejection of such a shift, asserting that 
a mere link between the „subject matter of the negligent conduct‟ and the 
„subject matter of the damage,‟ was not enough.207  A consideration of the 
process of shifting evidential onus demonstrates that in the view of the other 
judges, this link is not only significant but could prove to be decisive.  
 
Gaudron J appeared to unquestioningly embrace the concept of an inference 
of causation once breach is established when she noted that,  
 
The duty was called into existence because of the foreseeability of that 
very  risk.  The  duty  was  not  performed  and  the  risk  eventuated. 
Subject  to  a  further  question  in  the  case  of  a  duty  to  provide 
information, that is often the beginning and the end of the inquiry 
whether breach of duty materially caused or contributed to the harm 
suffered.208 
 
She  went  on  to  discuss  the  „inference‟  of  causation  that  arises  from  the 
establishment of duty and breach209 but also emphasised the significance of 
the plaintiff‟s evidence as to what he or she would or would not have done if 
the information had been provided.210 Thus in Her Honour‟s view there was 
a mix of inference and plaintiff evidence rather than a shift of evidential onus 
to the defendant. 
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McHugh J avoided the terminology of presumption or inference and referred 
instead to a prima facie case, 
 
However,  once  the  plaintiff  proves  that  the  defendant  breached  a 
duty to warn of a risk and that the risk eventuated and caused harm 
to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of causal 
connection. An evidentiary onus then rests on the defendant to point 
to other evidence suggesting that no causal connection exists.211 
 
From this position he moved on to a consideration of the type of evidence 
required of the defendant.  However, he too immediately shifted focus to that 
of the evidence provided by the plaintiff when, in the following paragraph he 
concluded, 
 
the defendant in my opinion can escape liability only if the proper 
conclusion  is  that  the  plaintiff  did  not  prove  that  the  defendant's 
failure  to  warn  resulted  in  her  consenting  to  a  procedure  that 
involved a higher risk of injury than would have been the case if the 
procedure had been carried out by another.212 
 
Gummow J also referred to the significance of a finding of duty and breach 
noting that „… in the absence of evidence that the breach had no effect or that 
the injury would have occurred even if Dr Chappel had warned her of the 
risk of injury … the breach of duty will be taken to have caused the injury.‟213  
His suggestion then was that the „task of Dr Chappel was to demonstrate 
some good reason for denying to Mrs Hart recovery.‟214  However, he too 
reached his conclusions through consideration of Mrs Hart‟s evidence and, as 
outlined above, the materiality of the risk. 
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The starting point of Kirby J‟s consideration of the „presumption‟ of causation 
was to acknowledge the natural sympathy for an injured plaintiff: 
 
Where a breach of duty and loss are proved, it is natural enough for a 
Court  to  feel  reluctant  to  send  the  person  harmed  (in  this  case  a 
patient) away empty handed.215 
 
He went on to explain and support the possibility of a shifting evidential 
onus  and  in  similar  terms  to  McHugh  J,  asserted  that,  „once  a  plaintiff 
demonstrates that a breach of duty has occurred which is closely followed by 
damage, a prima facie causal connection will have been established.‟216 Kirby J 
was the only one who carried the discussion to its conclusion and asserted 
that „an evidentiary onus lay upon Dr Chappel to displace the inference of 
causation which thereupon arose. He failed to do so.‟217  This conclusion was 
not, however, entirely removed from a consideration of Mrs Hart‟s evidence 
with  respect  to  causation,  as  he  noted  „Dr  Chappel  did  not  displace  the 
inferences to which her evidence gave rise.‟218 
 
It  is  clear  therefore  that  there  is  some  sympathy  in  the  High  Court  for  a 
presumption of causation once duty and breach have been established.  This 
is, however, neither a simple nor decisive presumption.  The evidence of the 
plaintiff continues to inform the determination of liability and the judicial 
preference  appears  to  be  a  consideration  of  both  plaintiff  and  defendant 
evidence and a determination of which outweighs the other.  This has  not 
been the approach of some of the lower Courts however with causation at 
times  attaining  the  position  of  a  rebuttable  presumption,  turning  on  the 
evidence of the defendant.  This is a position which has been described as 
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providing  the  plaintiff  with  a  path  „remarkably  free  of  obstacles‟219  and 
„raising  the  bar  for  the  defendant.‟220  In  practical  terms,  the  question  of 
liability for failing to inform simply becomes murkier. 
 
Moving beyond Chappel: Elbourne v Gibbs221 
 
[7.130]  To  suggest  that  Chappel  represents  an  unequivocal  acceptance  of  a 
shift  in  evidential  onus  (and  therefore  a  presumption  of  causation)  is  to 
overlook  the  significance  of  both  plaintiff  and  defendant  evidence  in  the 
decision.  It has been suggested that in Chappel the shift in onus „was applied 
by the majority merely to confirm the positive result of the „but for test‟ that 
had already been obtained‟222 and that perhaps it was neither significant nor 
decisive.  This has not been the position adopted by lower Courts, however, 
and there  has been a general trend towards acceptance  of the evidentiary 
shift  as  decisive,223  along  with  the  emergence  of  a  clear  presumption  of 
causation once duty and breach are established. 
 
One of the most valuable decisions in this context was handed down by the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal, Elbourne v Gibbs.224 This decision informs 
our  debate  here  as  it  explores  the  evolution  of  the  prima  facie  case  to  a 
concrete presumption.225  The facts of the case are fairly straightforward. Mr 
Gibbs was treated by  Dr Elbourne for a double  hernia. The outcome was 
disappointing with internal haemorrhaging, a swollen scrotum, chronic pain 
and  a  heart  attack.    Mr  Gibbs  had  a  long  history  of  ill  health  and  gave 
evidence at the trial that he would not have proceeded with the surgery if he 
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had  been  made  aware  of  the  attendant  risks.  There  was  no  finding  of 
causation at trial with the primary judge focusing on breach. 
 
In the Court of Appeal, a strong dissent was given by Ipp JA who expressed 
concern at the lack of a specific conclusion with respect to causation. It was 
his firm position that a finding of causation cannot be implied on the basis of 
a breach of duty226 and that the onus is on the plaintiff to prove causation.227  
To ensure that his position was clear, he went on to state clearly that „what 
was  said  in  Chappel  v  Hart  and  subsequent  cases  as  to  the  shifting  of  an 
evidential onus … does not assist this Court in determining causation.‟228  His 
conclusion  was  to  order  a  re-trial  to  fully  and  clearly  address  evidence 
pertaining to causation as it was not considered in the primary judgment.  He 
was not prepared to bridge the gap with what he viewed as a poorly formed 
presumption. 
 
Basten JA229 on the other hand, embraced the reversal of onus and concluded 
that causation had been demonstrated in the absence of sufficient proof to the 
contrary.  His interpretation of Chappel was that the majority, 
 
Appear to have adopted an approach which accepted that a temporal 
connection between the breach of duty and the harm suffered, being 
materialisation  of  the  risk  involved  in  the  failure  to  warn,  in  the 
absence  of  a  persuasive  contrary  explanation,  could  suffice  to 
establish a relevant causal connection.230 
 
This appears to take the position of the High Court a little further, clearly 
extending the prima facie case to a presumption which turns entirely on the 
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evidence of the defendant.  It is important to remember that at no point in 
Chappel was the relevance of the plaintiff‟s evidence with respect to what he 
or she would or would not have done, either denied or overlooked. 
 
Endeavouring to clarify his position, Basten JA reviewed the decisions post 
Chappel  and  listed  some  broad  propositions.  Of  relevance  here  was  his 
conclusion that the „degree of connection [between the breach and damage] 
must satisfy policy underlying the legal attribution of responsibility.231  At 
this  point  in  the  judgment  his  position  seemed  clear,  the  inference  of 
causation  was  accepted  and  adopted.  But  then,  there  was  an  internal 
contradiction in his judgment when he noted, 
 
Where it is demonstrated that a defendant has breached a duty owed 
to a plaintiff, and harm has followed, it would be understandable that 
the law might impose an onus on the defendant to show that his or 
her breach of duty had not caused the harm. 
 
However, that course has not been taken and it is clear beyond doubt that the 
burden of establishing causation lies on the plaintiff.232 
 
Clear beyond doubt? How then can his next comment be, 
 
On the other hand, in some circumstances the law has accepted that 
an inference of causation will arise from the existence of a temporal 
connection, together with other slender support.233 
 
The only clarity at this point is that there is no clarity in the test.  Basten JA 
went  on  to  conclude  that  the  „evidence  established  a  number  of  objective 
factors  which  support  the  view  that,  if  informed  of  the  risks  the  plaintiff 
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would not have had the operation, over and above the weight which may be 
given to his unchallenged evidence that he would not.‟234  Such a conclusion 
is  consistent  with  the  decision  in  Rosenberg  in  which  objective  factors 
overrode  the  subjective  evidence  of  the  plaintiff,  and  yet  there  is  little 
consideration of this subjective evidence.  Indeed, there is no mention of the 
subjective test at all.  The apparent presumption enabled His Honour to turn 
away from the plaintiff and overlook the fact that the primary judge did not 
even  address  causation  and  conclude  that  causation  is  established.    This 
conclusion rests upon the fact that the defendant did not „displace‟ the prima 
facie case „which follows from the application of Chappel v Hart.‟235  This truly 
is a curious result as it extends the rationale of Chappel and elevates causation 
to  a  presumption,  a  position  inconsistent  with  general  principles  of 
negligence law.  It further retreats from the clear authority of the subjective 
nature of the causative test and, I would suggest, allows questions of what 
„ought‟ to be done to override well developed principles of negligence law. 
 
If the Courts were permitted to acknowledge the true loss, the one that they 
are „intuitively‟ protecting, this overriding of causative principles would not 
be necessary.  The question would be, did the failure to provide sufficient 
information harm the patient‟s right to make an informed choice? The answer 
would  involve  a  straightforward  application  of  the  two-limbed  test  from 
Rosenberg (and relevant Civil Liability Act).  The „but for‟ link is clear and, if 
the  law  sanctioned  recognition  of  this  harm,  then  the  normative  enquiry 
would also be straightforward.  This is not, however, where the law stands at 
present  and  before  concluding  this  analysis  of  (and  challenge  to)  the 
approach to causation in Australian Courts, it is worth considering whether 
the presumption has achieved the aim of protecting the plaintiff‟s interests. 
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Does the presumption exist and, if it does, is it pro-plaintiff?236 
 
[7.140]  A  critique  of  the  apparent  evidential  shift  and  presumption  of 
causation necessarily raises the question of whether we now have an openly 
pro-plaintiff  approach  to  negligent  advice.    The  judicial  environment  has 
been described as „comparatively permissive,‟237 providing the plaintiff with 
a course „to travel and reach the causal destination‟ that is „free of obstacles 
that  have,  until  recently,  been  perceived  as  impeding  that  journey.‟238 
Conversely, the defendant‟s task is seen as more challenging with the Court 
having „raised the bar.‟239 It is true that at first glance, a test that purports to 
allow  the  plaintiff  to  sidestep  the  most  challenging  evidential  task 
(establishing  causation)  could  be  described  as  pro-plaintiff.  A  closer 
consideration of the decisions, however, demonstrates that causation is by no 
means a „given‟ once the plaintiff has established duty and breach.  Plaintiffs 
continue to walk away unsatisfied.   
 
The open scepticism with which Courts view plaintiff assertions240 regarding 
what  they  would  have  done  if  provided  with  appropriate  warnings  was 
clearly outlined in the discussion about Bustos v Hair Transplant,241 Wallace v 
Ramsay,242 Bergman v Haertsch243 and Rosenberg v Percival.244 As none of these 
decisions embraced (or even addressed) the apparent evidential shift (which 
is interesting as Rosenberg was clearly after Chappelv Hart and had three of the 
same presiding Judges) it is difficult to claim that there has been an evidential 
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shift and presumption of causation.  Indeed, in Bergman v Haertsch245 Abadee 
J emphatically stated that „mere proof of breach will not of itself be sufficient 
to  establish  an  entitlement  to  damages  for  every  harm  that  thereafter 
occurs.‟246 However, an equally sceptical Court adopted the evidential shift in 
the South Australian decision of Zaltron v Raptis247 and the plaintiff still failed 
to surmount the causation hurdle.   
 
The  events  in  Zaltron  began  with  a  sore  toe  and  ended  with  surgical 
treatment  of  blockages  and  amputation  of  three  of  the  plaintiff‟s  toes.  In 
presenting the judgment of the Court, Martin J referred to the „considerable 
support‟  of  the  High  Court  for  the  „concept  of  a  shifting  of  evidentiary 
onus,‟248 and ultimately accepted that this support „established the principle 
of a shifting evidentiary onus.‟249 Before concluding whether, in this instance, 
the application of the principle was pro-plaintiff, a few key factors need to be 
highlighted.    Firstly,  the  risk  which  materialised  was  „well  known  and 
significant,‟250 and Dr Raptis was clear that he did not warn the patient, and 
that he felt it was not necessary.  His Honour referred to the fact that „Dr 
Raptis plainly stated in evidence that he would not have warned the plaintiff 
about possible complications,‟251 and that the „plaintiff had not been given 
any information upon which she could make a meaningful decision … she 
was somewhat overawed by Dr Raptis.‟252  Furthermore, Dr Raptis‟ manner 
was described as „abrupt and domineering‟253 and Martin J acknowledged 
that not only did Dr Raptis fail to „comply with his duty to advise [but] he 
made no attempt to comply with that duty.‟254  Finally, it was noted that the 
plaintiff was not asked whether she would have proceeded if she had been 
told  of  the  risk  and  this  enabled  a  conclusion  at  trial  that  there  was  no 
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evidence that she would not have had the operation if warned.255  Clearly 
there  was  a  lack  of  evidence.    The  plaintiff  was  not  asked  and  the  issue 
appeared not to have been addressed.  The plaintiff in this instance, failed. 
 
The question then is, how can she have failed if there is a prima facie case once 
duty  and  breach  are  established  and  the  Court  clearly  identified  that  Dr 
Raptis was domineering in his approach and open about his decision not to 
comply  with his duty? Quite  simply,  His  Honour looked at the facts and 
concluded that the plaintiff would have proceeded, in part because of the 
domineering  personality  of  Dr  Raptis.    The  plaintiff  „chose  not  to  give 
evidence‟ as to what she would have done256 and the defendant was able to 
demonstrate that the diagnosis and treatment was the „recommended form of 
treatment.‟257  To suggest therefore that a shift in evidential onus removes all 
obstacles  from  the  path  of  the  plaintiff,  is  an  oversimplification.258 
Alternatively one cannot conclude that it is pro-defendant as demonstrated in 
Shead v Hooley259 and Elbourne v Gibbs260 when the defendant was unable to 
provide  sufficient  evidence  to  dislodge  the  prima  facie  case.  It  is  simply 
another possible approach, aimed at protecting the plaintiff‟s right to make a 
meaningful choice but missing the mark.  At best, the shift recognises and 
attempts  to  protect  this  right,  as  seen  in  Chappel  v  Hart261  and  at worst it 
results in a recognition of the harm262 followed by a compounding of it by 
admonishing  the  overbearing  doctor  but  finding  that  his  domineering 
character would have overawed the plaintiff to such an extent that she would 
have  proceeded  with  the  treatment,  even  if  she  did  not  want  to.    Thus 
acceptance of the very harm that lies at the heart of the „informed consent‟ 
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doctrine serves to defeat the claim.  It is difficult to find coherent law in this 
conclusion. 
 
Re-visiting the core issues 
 
[7.150] Before moving on to considering the position of the United States, we 
will  pause  and  summarise  the  position  here  in  Australia  through  a 
consideration  of  the  three  questions  asked  in  the  introduction  which  the 
address the core issues discussed here. 
 
What is the test for causation (is it subjective or objective)? 
 
[7.160] Australian Courts have recognised the risk of relying wholly upon a 
subjective test of causation and have noted that hindsight  „will necessarily 
colour  the  patient‟s  response‟263  but  have  chosen  to  describe  the  test  as  a 
subjective one.  This position is now given legislative force in four of the State 
jurisdictions  and,  as  we  have  seen  in  preceding  discussions,  is  routinely 
endorsed  by  the  Courts.    The  practical  application  of  the  „subjective‟  test 
however, is slightly more complex.  In recognising the problematic nature of 
a purely hypothetical enquiry relying on potentially self-serving testimony, 
the Courts have endeavoured to walk a middle line and the result has been 
the emergence of a hybrid test.  The common law test reached maturity in 
Rosenberg v Percival264 and the „hybrid‟ nature of the test is reflected in the 
potentially contradictory statements of McHugh J when he began from the 
position that „under the Australian common law … the test is a subjective 
test,‟265  then  went  on  to  explain  that  „what  a  reasonable  person  would or 
would not have done in the patients‟ circumstances will almost always be the 
most important factor‟266 in reaching a conclusion.  Of course we must also 
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remember  that  this  approach  is  now  legislatively  endorsed  in  four 
jurisdictions  which  specifically  limit  the  scope  of  plaintiff  evidence,267 
although the practical import of this change is, arguably, limited, 268 with the 
tests in both common law and legislative provisions having similar judicial 
processes.269  In  Australia,  therefore,  we  have  a  test  that  is  described  as  a 
subjective  one  but  is  better  described  as  a  subjective  test  measured  by 
objective considerations or, a hybrid test. 
 
What factors influenced the development of the test? 
 
[7.170]  In  Australia  the  starting  point  of  the  judicial  enquiry  into  the 
provision  of  pre-treatment  advice  is  the  patient  before  the  Court.    This  is 
clearly reflected in the patient-centred materiality test which emerged from 
Rogers  v  Whitaker.270  The  adoption  of  the  subjective  test  was  described  by 
Kirby J in the following terms: it is  
 
more consistent with the traditional principles of tort law … more respectful 
of the entitlements of patients whose privilege of choice this area of the law 
is  intended  to  reinforce.  Furthermore,  it  avoids  undermining  the  social 
objectives  to  which  the  obligation  to  provide  effective  warnings  is 
directed.271   
 
The aim of the test is thus to keep the patient at the centre of the enquiry. This 
interest is, however, balanced against the reality of the hypothetical nature of 
the questions asked and the potential for self-serving assertions of what the 
patient would or would not have done.  In short, it is tempered by the reality 
                                                 
267 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s5D(3), Civil Liability Act 2003 (QLD) s11(3), Civil Liability Act 2002 (TAS) 
s13(3) and Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s5C(3). 
268 Refer discussion above and the recent decisions of Wallace v Ramsay Healthcare Ltd [2010] NSWSC 518 (see 
text accompanying n.30. In this decision the legislative provision was acknowledged but plaintiff evidence 
closely scrutinised), Neal v Ambulance Service of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 346 and KT v PLG & Anor 
[2006] NSWSC 919. Also of relevance the discussions of Gleeson and Evans above n.38 and Cockburn and 
Maddern above n.39 
269 Cockburn and Maddern above n.39, 332. 
270 (1992) 175 CLR 479, outlined and discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
271 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, [154] (Kirby J). 210 
of  the  human  condition,  and  thus  the  subjective  test  is  always  measured 
against objective criteria.   
 
What (if anything) is the problem with the chosen approach? 
 
[7.180]  A  significant  problem  with  the  current  approach  is  that  it  is 
impossible to say with any clarity what the precise nature of the causative 
test is in Australia.  Broadly speaking, it is a subjective test measured against 
objective factors and there may, or may not, be a presumption of causation 
once  duty  and  breach  have  been  established.  The  High  Court  has  clearly 
indicated a preference for such a presumption but it has been noted that the 
nature  of  this  apparent  presumption  is  „unclear.‟272  This  uncertainty  was 
reflected  in  the  consideration  of  the  special  leave  application  in  Zaltron. 
Kirby J noted that the case was lost on the facts and saw no value in talking 
about „these verbal formulae,‟273 whilst Gaudron J was more specific in her 
statement  that  „this  is  not  a  suitable  vehicle  to  resolve  the  differences  of 
opinion expressed in Chappel v Hart.‟ 274  The Ipp Committee275 rejected any 
reversal  of  evidentiary  onus  and  the  High  Court  essentially  ignored  it  in 
Rosenberg. Causation remains a vexed question, with Australian Courts left 
constructing (and de-constructing) tests in an endeavour to meet the needs of 
plaintiffs who have suffered a loss, with little clarity added by the legislative 
intervention.  Perhaps  the  House  of  Lords  was  on  to  something  when  it 
ignored  the  rigours  of  the  negligence  framework  and  simply  allowed 
recovery for Mrs Chester because she ought to recover.  Or perhaps an even 
simpler approach would be to recognise the true nature of the loss suffered 
and apply a straightforward test of causation asking whether or not the lack 
of information caused the plaintiff-patient to be denied the right to make an 
informed choice. 
                                                 
272  Hamer, above n220, 557. 
273  Zaltron v Raptis A29/2001 (19 April 2002), 4. 
274  Ibid, 9. 
275  „Review  of  the  law  of  Negligence  Final  Report‟,  Sep  2002  („The  Ipp  Report‟) 
http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law_Neg_Final.pdf, at 18 February 2011, [7.28]-[7.36]. 211 




[8.10]  As  we  saw  in  Part  I,  the  Courts  in  the  United  States  have  been 
identified  as  the  most  plaintiff-centric  of  the  three  jurisdictions  under 
investigation.  In our earlier discussions I challenged this interpretation of the 
Courts of the United States as the defenders of the individual decision-maker, 
a challenge I will continue in this Chapter.  As we turn to the causation stage 
of the enquiry, we will see the relegation of patient-autonomy to a position of 
less  importance,  indeed  in  some  jurisdictions  in  the  United  States,  to 
irrelevance.  At the duty and breach stages of the enquiry, the Courts in the 
United  States  (as  represented  by  Canterbury  v  Spence1)  focussed  on  the 
individual needs of the plaintiff and emphasised the driving principle of the 
individual right to information; the causative enquiry represents a shift away 
from  the  perspective  of  the  individual,  autonomous  patient  and  the 
emergence  of  an  (apparently)  objective  test.  This  shift  has  meant  that 
causation has been acknowledged as representing the most „difficult doctrinal 
hurdle‟2 for the plaintiff.   
 
The  test  in  the  United  States  varies  across  jurisdictions.  Similar  to  both 
Australia  and  the  United  Kingdom,  it  is  neither  a  purely  objective  nor 
subjective test.  Whilst the majority of Courts3 purport to embrace a purely 
objective test, a close analysis of the relevant judicial reasoning reveals that 
on  a  practical  level  it  is  an  objective  test  tempered  by  subjective 
considerations.4    Once  again  we  see  the  emergence  of  a  hybrid  test.  The 
„objective‟  approach  of  the  United  States  turns  out  to  be  similar  to  the 
                                                 
1  Canterbury v Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (US Court of Appeals 1972). 
2  E. Rauzi, „Informed Consent in Washington: Expanded scope of material facts that the physician must disclose 
to his patient,‟ (1979-1980) 55 Washington Law Review 655, 663. 
3  It must be noted at this point that the objective test is enshrined in statute in many of the jurisdictions, see for 
example N.Y. Pub. H.L. Section 2805-d(3), Fla. Stat. § 766.103 (2007), and WA ST 7.70.050. 
4 As opposed to the Australian test, which is a subjective test tempered by objective considerations.  212 
„subjective‟  one  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  Australia.    Importantly,  the 
Courts in the United States continue in the same vein as their counterparts in 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Australia  and  ask  whether  or  not  the  plaintiff 
would have proceeded with the treatment.  Individual rights to a meaningful 
pre-treatment dialogue cease to be important.  The enquiry is no longer about 
information; it is entirely about consent. Where does this leave the plaintiff-
patients? Once again, they are on the outer struggling to demonstrate a link 
between two different forms of harm. 
 
The consideration of the test for causation in the United States will take a 
slightly  different  approach  from  that  of  the  other  two  jurisdictions.    The 
accepted test clearly utilises objective language.  Analysis will focus on some 
underlying issues which demonstrate that despite this apparent consistency 
and  clarity,  the  interpretation  of  what  constitutes  an  objective  test  varies.  
This discussion will reveal the basic flaws in the more objective approach, not 
the least of which is that a truly objective test is potentially illogical.  
 
The failure of the subjective test 
 
[8.20] When it occurs, the rejection of the subjective approach is emphatic.  It 
is,  however,  based  upon  a  simplistic  view  of  a  test  based  purely  upon 
plaintiff  assertions  of  what  they  would  have  done.    There  are  repeated 
references to the test exposing physicians to risk and enabling the plaintiff‟s 
evidence  to  dominate.5  The  most  common  judicial  interpretation  of  the 
subjective test is that the decision would „ultimately turn on the credibility of 
the hindsight of a person seeking recovery after he had experienced a most 
undesirable result.‟6  It is this narrow view of the test which has ultimately 
                                                 
5 Canterbury v Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (1972) , 791 (Robinson J), Mcpherson v Ellis 287 S.E. 2d 892 (1982) 896 
(Mitchell J), Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal.3d 229 (1972), 245 (Benke, Acting PJ), Fletcher v Medical University of 
South Carolina 390 S.C. 458 (2010) 469 (Konduros J).  
6 Sard v Hardy 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), 1025 (Levine J). 213 
resulted in its rejection.  The test has thus been rejected on the basis of a very 
narrow, and I suggest flawed, interpretation. 
 
Oklahoma provides a demonstration of the more extreme interpretation of 
the  subjective  test.    In  1979,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Oklahoma  (Scott  v 
Bradford7) tackled the objective/subjective divide and determined that only 
the  subjective  test  was  consistent  with  the  foundational  principle  of  the 
autonomous patient.  The plaintiff in this instance had sought treatment for 
fibroid  tumours  on  the  uterus  and  signed  routine  consent  forms. 
Unfortunately all did not proceed as planned: following the procedure, the 
patient had a vesico-vaginal fistula which permitted urine to leak from her 
bladder.  The  incontinence  was  only  fixed  after  a  further  three  surgical 
interventions.  The  basis  of  the  claim  was  that  the  treating  physician  had 
failed to advise her of the risks involved in the procedure or of any available 
alternatives to surgery.8   
 
In  delivering  his  judgment,  Doolin  J  began  from  first  principles  and 
emphasised  that  „Anglo-American  law  starts  with  the  premise  of 
thoroughgoing  self-determination.‟9  Consistent  with  this  principle  was  his 
view that „if a physician breaches [his duty to inform], the patient‟s consent is 
defective  and  the  physician  is  responsible  for  the  consequences.‟10  This 
statement provides an early hint of his conclusions which link the physician‟s 
„wrongdoing‟ with liability.  As will be seen in later discussions, the objective 
approach focuses on what would have been the decision of the „reasonable 
person‟ in these circumstances, and relies upon the establishment of a direct 
and  clear  link  between  the  decision-making  processes  of  the  „reasonable‟ 
plaintiff-patient and liability.  This was not, however, the approach adopted 
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in this decision; here the Court opted to 
                                                 
7 Scott v Bradford 606 P.2d 554 (1980). 
8 Facts are drawn from the judgment of Doolin J, 556. 
9 Scott v Bradford 606 P.2d 554 (1980), 556 (Doolin J). 
10 Ibid, 557. 214 
overlook  the  decision-making  processes,  choosing  instead  to  leap  directly 
from „faulty‟ advice to an imposition of liability.11 
 
The Court acknowledged that the question of appropriate standard  was a 
„difficult‟  one12  and  specifically  referred  to  the  decision  in  Canterbury  v 
Spence13 and noted that whilst this seminal decision emphasised the principle 
of self-determination, it „only permits liability if non-disclosure would have 
affected the decision of a fictitious „reasonable patient‟ even though the actual 
patient  testifies  that  they  personally  would  not  have  proceeded  with  the 
treatment if fully informed.‟14 Doolin J went on to reject the „reasonable man‟ 
approach adopted in Canterbury on the basis that it „represents a backtracking 
on its own theory of self-determination„15 and jeopardises (the) basic right to 
know.‟16 His Honour did recognise that the subjective test could be viewed as 
running  the  risk  of    „plac[ing]  a  physician  at  the  mercy  of  a  patient‟s 
hindsight.‟17 Rather than taking the approach adopted in the Courts of both 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Australia,  that  of  tempering  the  subjective 
assertions with objective considerations, he opted simply to point out that if 
the doctor „did not breach his duty then a causation problem will not arise.‟18  
Thus,  if  a  doctor  chooses  to  withhold  information  then  he  or  she  cannot 
complain about the impact of subjective experiences and assertions.   
 
This decision serves to demonstrate the impact of value-based judgments on 
the application of legal principle.  Here we have a judge who acknowledged 
the essential requirement of establishing a causative link but whose decision 
                                                 
11 This is perhaps an extreme example of the „presumption‟ of causation raised by some Australian Courts and 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
12  Ibid, 558. 
13  Canterbury v Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (1972).  
14 Scott v Bradford 606 P.2d 554 (1980),558 (Doolin J). 
15 Ibid, 559. His Honour referred to the criticism to this effect present in some commentary on Canterbury and 
referred  specifically  to  D.Seidelson,  „Medical  Malpractice:  Informed  Consent  Cases  in  “Full-Disclosure” 
Jurisdictions‟ (1976) 14 Duq.L.Rev 309 and J.Katz, „Informed Consent – A Fairy Tale?‟ (1977) 39 University of 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 137, a theme that Katz pursued nearly 20 years later in J. Katz „Informed 
Consent – Must it Remain a Fairytale?‟ (1994) 10 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 69.  
16 Scott v Bradford 606 P.2d 554 (1980), 559 (Doolin J). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 215 
turned on the existence of mere breach of duty being sufficient to establish 
liability.  In  adopting  this  approach,  the  Court  focussed  entirely  on  the 
protection granted to the patient.  In those jurisdictions applying the objective 
test, the Courts emphasise the „risk‟ to the physician of hindsight evidence 
and the bitter patient and thus seek to protect the physician.  Here, however, 
the Court was more interested in the basic premise of individual autonomy 
and, apparently, effective decision-making processes.  In an approach similar 
to  that  adopted  by  the  High  Court  of  Australia,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Oklahoma noted that the key to a successful application of a subjective test is 
to carefully appraise the credibility of the patient‟s evidence. 
 
If the reasoning of the Court had stopped at that point and suggested how 
this credibility could be tested (in much the same manner as High Court of 
Australia  has  done19)  then  the  subjective  test  may  well  have  won  some 
sympathy in the United States.  The Court, however, then took the reasoning 
one step further. The  Court clearly acknowledged the susceptibility of the 
physician to hindsight bias but merely gave a judicial shrug and suggested 
that this may well be so but responsibility for this susceptibility is to be laid at 
the feet of the treating physician.  After all, „a careful practitioner can always 
protect himself by ensuring that he has adequately informed each patient he 
treats … If he does not breach this duty, a causation problem will not arise.‟20  
Thus  the  subjective  test  of  causation  becomes  no  test  of  causation:  if  the 
physician fails to advise, then he or she is liable.  In struggling to link the 
right to information with a subsequent physical harm the Court here simply 
ignored an essential step of the negligence enquiry and failed to adopt an 
approach consistent with accepted legal principle.  With such a narrow and 
flawed approach to the subjective test for causation, it is not surprising that 
this decision has failed to attract support in other jurisdictions in the United 
                                                 
19 See for example Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232, 273 (Kirby J) where His Honour asserted that „tribunals 
of fact can be trusted to reject absurd, self-interested assertions.‟  And, as discussed in Chapter 7, the test for 
causation  in  Australia  has  emerged  as  a  hybrid  one  in  which  subjective  statements  are  measured  against 
objective criteria, Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434. 
20  Scott v Bradford 606 P.2d 554 (1980), 559 (Doolin J). 216 
States.  The  majority  position  among  United  States  Courts  is  that  the 
subjective test places an unreasonable burden on the medical profession.  
 
An objective test 
 
[8.30] Whilst Oklahoma and the subjective test do not represent the majority 
approach, it is worth noting that some judges have been reluctant to reject the 
subjective  test  but  have  been  bound  by  precedent  or  legislation  to  do  so.  
Some Courts have openly acknowledged the potential conflict between the 
autonomy of the patient and the objective test, whilst others have recognised 
the problematic nature of the objective test but equally, have pointed to the 
problems of the subjective test and chosen to adopt the objective approach as 
representing  the  least  flawed  of  the  two  tests.    An  example  of  the  latter 
situation is found in the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Scaria v 
St  Paul.21  Beilfuss  J  (in  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  majority), 
acknowledged that it is „conceivable that a jury could find that a reasonable 
man,  when  appraised  of  the  risks  involved,  would  have  consented  to  a 
procedure when in fact the plaintiff would not have consented.‟22 Yet he went 
on to suggest that the objective test is „more workable and more fair‟23 on the 
basis of inherent flaws of the subjective test which is „not without its margin 
for error.‟24  
 
This pragmatic approach is not a universal one.  Some Courts have made it 
clear that they would prefer to apply a subjective test so as to protect the 
needs of the patient-plaintiff but are constrained by legislation to approach 
causation objectively.  This conflict has given rise to judicial discomfort in 
some jurisdictions.  An example of a dissatisfied Court can be found in the 
                                                 
21 Scaria v St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co of Wisconsin 227 N.W.2d 647 (1999). 
22 Ibid, 655 (Beilfuss J). 
23 Ibid. 
24  Ibid.    Scaria  has  more  recently  been  affirmed  in  Bubb  v  Brusky  768  N.W.  2d  903  (2009)  and  Jandre  v 
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North Carolina Court of Appeals decision of Dixon v Peters.25  This decision, 
similar  to  that  of  Bustos,26  involved  the  cosmetic  „juri  flap‟  procedure.    In 
delivering the judgment of the Court, Becton J noted that the choice of test for 
causation is a question giving rise to „considerable debate.‟27 Still he was able 
to evaluate the Court‟s view of the objective standard as „particularly harsh.‟28 
His general dissatisfaction, however, appeared to be aimed more broadly at 
the problematic nature of the causation enquiry.  This is a recurrent theme 
across  all  three  of  our  jurisdictions  and,  as  argued  in  the  previous  two 
Chapters, reflects the conceptual problem of linking two disparate interests 
(the dignitary with the physical). It is relevant to note that whilst Becton J 
showed  a  clear  preference  for  the  subjective  approach  and  described  the 
plaintiff‟s  argument  as  „compelling,‟29  he  stopped  short  of  enthusiastically 
embracing it as an effective approach.  Rather he referred to it as „the lesser of 
evils.‟30  The Court was, however, constrained by the statutory test of whether 
the „reasonable person under all the surrounding circumstances would have 
undergone the treatment or procedure had he been advised by the health care 
provider in accordance  with the provisions,‟31  and thus had to reluctantly 
depart from the preferred, subjective, standard.   
It was therefore the view of the North Carolina Court of Appeals that neither 
the objective nor the subjective tests were adequate.  Once again this reflects 
the problematic nature of the causation enquiry in this context.  We see the 
Courts  struggling  to  reconcile  the  two  distinct  stages  of  the  enquiry:  the 
provision  of  information  and  the  consent  to  treatment.    This  problem  is 
perhaps compounded by the Court‟s recognition in Dixon v Peters that whilst 
the judicial enquiry into informed consent must begin from the position of 
the  protection  of  patient  interests,  the  relevant  legislative  provisions  are 
                                                 
25 Dixon v Peters 306 S.E.2d 477 (1983). This decision focussed primarily on matters of constitutionality of the 
relevant legislation but made specific comments regarding the nature of both the objective and subjective tests 
for causation. 
26 Bustos v Hair Transplant Unrep, NSWCA, 15 April 1997, discussed in Chapter 7 (see [7.40], [7.140]). 
27 Dixon v Peters 306 S.E.2d 477 (1983), 480 (Becton J). 
28 Ibid, 481 (Becton J). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid, 483. 
31 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.13(a)(3). 218 
driven  by  „policy‟  considerations  outside  of  the  scope  of  patient  interests.  
These considerations include, according to Becton J, the recognition that the 
„sole  purpose  of  the  legislation  was  to  avoid  valid  claims.‟32  This  is  a 
somewhat  curious  position  when  one  considers  that  the  doctrine  under 
consideration  is  widely  accepted  as  being  built  upon  the  foundational 
principle „that every individual of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
decide what may or may not be done with his or her body.‟33 
 
Despite  these  misgivings  regarding  the  objective  test,  it  has  been 
emphatically adopted in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States.34 
An early statement of the test is found in Cobbs v Grant.35 The plaintiff was 
admitted to hospital in August 1964 for the treatment of a duodenal ulcer and 
whilst she was warned in general terms about the risks of undergoing an 
anaesthetic, there was no discussion of the risks inherent in this particular 
procedure.    The  outcome  was  not  as  planned  and  resulted  in  a  series  of 
operations with 50% of her stomach being removed.36  It is interesting to note 
that the discussion began from the position of a needs-based doctrine with 
Mosk J emphasising that the „scope of communications to the patient … must 
be  measured  by  the  patient‟s  need.‟37  It  then  shifted  away  from  the 
                                                 
32 Dixon v Peters 306 S.E. 2d 477 (1983), 482 referring to a report of the North Carolina Professional Liability 
Study Commission (1979). 
33 Schloendorff v The Society of the New York Hospital 211 N.Y 125 (1914), 129-130. 
34 See for example: Dixon v Peters 306 S.E. 2d 477 (N.C. App. 1983), 478, Davis v Nassau Ophthalmic Services, 
P.C. et al 232 A.D. 2d 358 (NY A.D. 1996), 358, Canterbury v Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (1972)(decided May 
1972) (US Court of Appeals, DC Columbia), 791, Tribal v Queens Surgi-Center 8 A.D.3d 555 (2004),557, 
Foote v Rajadhyax 268 A.D.2d (2000) 745, 746, Barcai v Betwee 50 P.3d 946 (Hawai‟i SC 2002), 959, Snipes v 
U.S.  711 F.Supp 827 (District Court, WD North Carolina, Asheville Division, 1989), 829, Kohoutek v Hafner 
383 N.W.2d 295 (SC of Minnesota, 1986), 299, Fischer v Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund 256 Wis.2d 
848 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2002), 857, Schreiber v Physicians Ins. Co of Wisconsin 588 N.W. 2d 26 
(SC of Wisconsin, 1999), 33, Scaria v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co 227 N.W.sd 647 (SC of Wisconsin, 1975), 
655, Shinn v St James Mercy Hospital 675 F.Supp. 94 United States District Court, W.D. New York, 1987) 99, 
Backlund vUniversity of Washington 975 P.2d 950 (SC of Washington 1999),955, Woolley v Henderson 418 
A.2d 1123  (1132)(Mre 1980), 1132, Zeleznik v Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital 47 A.D.2d 199 SC, Appellate 
Division,  2
nd  Department,  NY,  1975),207,  Hondroulis  v  Schumacher  MD  553  So.2d  398  (SC  Louisiana 
1988),404, Sard v Hardy 379 A.2d 1014 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1977), 1025, Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal.3d 
229 (SC California, 1972), 245, Wilson v Merritt 142 Cal.App.4
th 1125 (2006), 1138 and Fletcher v Medical 
University of South Carolina 390 S.C. 458 (2010) 461. 
35 Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal.3d. 229 (SC California, 1972). This decision continues to be cited as a decision of 
authority. See for example Bubb v Brusky 768 N.W. 2d 903 (2009) , Hernandez ex rel. Telles-Hernandez v US 
665 F.Supp.2d 1064 (2009),Murillo v Millner , Not reported in C. Rptr. 3d (2010) and Applewhite v Department 
of Veterans Affairs 364 Fed.App 97 (2010). 
36 Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal.3d. 229 (1972) facts taken from the judgment of Mosk J, 234. 
37 Ibid, 245. 219 
individual patient towards the objective „reasonable‟ patient. This shift was 
driven by an interest in doing „justice.‟  The Court readily acknowledged that 
the patient may subjectively believe, „with 20/20 vision of hindsight‟ that he 
would have declined the treatment, yet could not rely upon this evidence 
because of their „doubt that justice will be served by placing the physician in 
jeopardy of the patient‟s bitterness and disillusionment.‟38  It is this protection 
of the treating physician that drives much of the reasoning, in this and other 
decisions,  including  Canterbury  v  Spence,  which  is  almost  universally 
described as representing the patient-centric doctrine of informed consent.39 
 
The next question then is what role does the evidence of the patient actually 
play?  Is  it  of  any  relevance  to  the  objective  process  or  is  the  specific 
individual relegated entirely to the sidelines?  Whilst the individual rights 
and interests of the patient are readily acknowledged at the duty stage of the 
enquiry,  some  jurisdictions  have  excluded  them  from  consideration  when 
turning  their  minds  to  the  causation  question.  In  New  York  and  North 
Carolina for example, it has been specifically noted that it is not a problem if 
the patient does not testify.40 This position was taken even further in Snipes v 
U.S.  when  the  Court  stated  that  what  the  „plaintiff  would  have  done  is 
neither here nor there.‟41  This exclusionary view of the plaintiff is, however, 
limited with the majority of jurisdictions adopting the  Canterbury  position 
that plaintiff evidence is „relevant but not determinative.‟42  Thus the plaintiff 
patient continues to be of relevance but in an apparently more limited sense 
than in the subjective test.  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin endeavoured to 
clarify this when they concluded that „the objective, reasonable man approach 
is  more  workable  and  more  fair  in  that  it  allows  the  jury  to  consider  the 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Canterbury v Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (1972), rejected the subjective test on the basis that it „places the physician 
in jeopardy of the patient‟s hindsight and bitterness.‟ 790-791. 
40 Davis v Nassau Ophthalmic Services, P.C. et al 232 A.D. 2d 358 (1996), 360 and Dixon v Peters 306 S.E. 2d 
477 (1983),484. 
41 Snipes v US 711 F.Supp 827 (1989), 830. 
42 Canterbury v Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (1972), 207. See also Sard v Hardy 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), 1025, Zeleznik v 
Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital 47 A.D.2d 199 Supreme Court (1975), 207 and  Shinn v St James Mercy 
Hospital 675 F.Supp. 94 (1987). This test includes such variations as „relevant but not controlling‟ Sard v Hardy 
379 A.2d 1014 (1977), 1026. 220 
plaintiff‟s  testimony  as  to  how  he  would  have  responded  without  being 
forced to engage solely in a test of the credibility of the plaintiff‟s hindsight 
after an undesirable result.‟43 This process in fact draws the „objective‟ test 
closer to the „subjective‟ (or in reality, hybrid) test as discussed in Rosenberg44 
with the patient evidence being weighed against the objective factors of what 
a reasonable person in their position would have done.   
 
An objective test informed by subjective elements. 
 
[8.40] Despite assertions that the preferred test is a purely objective one which 
contains  no  subjective  elements,  it  is  quite  clear  that  every  Court  which 
applies  the  objective  test  to  determine  causation  imports  the  subjective 
characteristics and interests of the plaintiff before them.  It is illustrative to 
begin with one of the strongest rejections of plaintiff evidence, reflected in the 
position that what a particular patient would have done was „neither here nor 
there‟45  which,  on  the  surface,  treats  individual  patient  differences  as 
irrelevant.  In this instance the Court was considering a gastric stapling that 
had not gone well and despite the Court‟s insistence that the test is objective 
and  rejection  of  the  particular  patient‟s  probable  course  of  action  as 
irrelevant,  close  consideration  of  the  „objective‟  process  demonstrates  the 
significance of subjective considerations.  The Court noted that the plaintiff 
viewed this procedure as his „last resort‟ and referred to the evidence that he 
was  aggressive  in  his  insistence  that  he  have  this  surgery.46  It  was  also 
deemed to be relevant that he had an „urgent indication for this operation‟ 
and that „if ever there was a person who could be called the perfect candidate 
                                                 
43 Scaria v St Paul Fire & Marine ins. Co 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975), 655 
44 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, see discussion in Chapter 7 (see [7.50]ff). 
45 Snipes v U.S. 711 F.Supp 827 (1989), 830. 
46 Ibid, 829, It is interesting to note here that these comments are similar to those of the Court in Harris v 
Bellemore [2010] NSWSC 176 where Bellemore J emphasised the plaintiff‟s desire for treatment [148] and 
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for gastric stapling, [the plaintiff] was that person.‟47  Thus the objective test 
clearly becomes imbued with subjective considerations. 
 
The  subjective  component  of  the  objective  test  is  in  fact  reflected  in  the 
description  of  the  objective  test  which  talks  of  the  „surrounding 
circumstances‟48 and, goes so far as to extend the reasonable person test to 
that of the reasonable person „standing in his or her shoes.‟49 This placing of 
the „reasonable person‟ in the context of the individual plaintiff empowers the 
Court to consider such subjective elements as the nature of the condition, the 
age and perhaps even any particular susceptibilities of the plaintiff.  
 
The  introduction  of  idiosyncratic  considerations  once  again  aligns  the 
specifically  objective  test  with  the  considerations  set  out  in  Australia  in 
Rosenberg.50  When a patient suffered a stroke following an arteriogram for 
example, the  Court of Appeal of Louisiana  felt it relevant  to consider the 
condition of the patient at the time of the decision, the necessity for treatment, 
the seriousness of the undisclosed consequences occurring and the measures 
available for the correction of the consequences should they occur.51  These 
factors  clearly  echo  those  set  out  in  Rosenberg52  and  were  extended  even 
further in Backlund v University of Washington53 when the Court specifically 
referred to the characteristics of the situation of the plaintiff patient including 
their medical condition, age and risk factors.  These factors then guided the 
Court  to  „make  findings  of  fact  regarding  the  risks  of  the 
treatment and any material risks regarding treatment alternatives.‟ Based on 
these findings the Court then concluded what a „reasonably prudent patient‟ 
                                                 
47 Ibid. Again it is relevant to refer to an Australian decision, consider Wallace v Ramsay Health Care Ltd [2010] 
NSWSC 518 where Harrison J carefully considered the need of the plaintiff for the procedure and pointed out 
that his „desperate preoperative plight‟ meant that this procedure was most appropriate for him [94]. 
48 See for example: Dixon v Peters 306 S.E.2d 477 (1983),479 and Snipes v U.S. 711 F.Supp 827 (1989), 829.  
49 Snipes v U.S. 711 F.Supp 827 (1989), 829. 
50  Rosenberg  v  Percival  (2001)  205  CLR  434,  see  Chapter  7,  The  subjective  approach  in  the  High  Court: 
Rosenberg v Percival (at [7.50]). 
51 Yahn v Folse 639 So. 2d 261(1993), 268. 
52  Rosenberg  v  Percival  (2001)  205  CLR  434,  see  Chapter  7,  The  subjective  approach  in  the  High  Court: 
Rosenberg v Percival (at [7.50]). 
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would have chosen.54  Thus the gulf between the „subjective‟ test in Australia 
and the „objective‟ test in the United States is narrower than the choice of 
language tends to indicate. 
 
The  role  of  subjective  elements  within  the  objective  framework  is  further 
illustrated  in  a  decision  from  Alabama:  Fain  v  Smith  &  Ors.55  An  injured 
patient and his wife brought an action for a failure to inform of the risk of 
perforation  during  the  performance  of  a  pulmonary  arteriogram.    The 
majority  judgment  emphatically  applied  the  objective  test  and  identified 
causation as the „primary point of difference between the parties on appeal.‟56  
It  was  noted  that  the  plaintiffs  sought  an  application  of  the  subjective 
standard which was described as being „judged solely by the testimony of the 
plaintiff that he would not have consented [and] exclusively on the basis of 
the credibility of the testimony of the patient.‟57  It is no wonder therefore that 
this narrow form of the subjective test was readily rejected by the Court as it 
relies  entirely  on  one  component  of  relevant  evidence,  and  as  explained 
above, does not reflect the practical reality of the subjective test as applied in 
either the United Kingdom or Australia.   
 
In turning to the objective test, the majority in Fain v Smith & Ors rejected the 
plaintiff‟s  contention  that  „the  objective  standard  does  away  with 
consideration  by  the  jury  of  the  patient‟s  testimony  concerning  his 
thoughts.‟58  In the view of the Court the plaintiff‟s evidence is „pertinent‟ and 
„occupies  the  same  place  in  the  jury‟s  deliberative  processes  that  the 
testimony of a defendant charged with assault with intent to kill occupies 
when that defendant testifies that he did not intend to kill the other party.‟59  
In other words, in much the same manner as the High Court in Rosenberg v 
                                                 
54 Ibid, 959. 
55 479 So.2d 1150 (1985). 
56 Ibid, 1152. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid, 1154. 
59 Ibid. 223 
Percival,60 the jury will „take the testimony into consideration along with other 
facts in determining  whether the testimony is to be believed.‟61  Thus the 
patient‟s assertion that he would  not have agreed to the surgery is tested 
against a more objective view of the facts and this would include the severity 
of  the  illness,  likelihood  of  the  risk  manifesting  and  other  relevant 
background features. 
 
Re-visiting the core issues 
 
[8.50] With the United States being commonly referred to as the most patient-
friendly  of  the  three  jurisdictions  under  consideration,  it  at  first  appears 
puzzling that there is clear judicial and legislative support for a shift away 
from individual patient interests when addressing the question of causation.  
However,  this  shift  does  not  represent  a  significant  departure  from  the 
approach  adopted  in  the  other  two  jurisdictions:  again  it  involves  a 
combination of both subjective and objective factors. Before drawing the last 
three Chapters together and considering the practical import of the evolution 
of different tests in each jurisdiction, we will pause and re-visit the questions 
asked in the introduction.  
 
What is the test for causation (is it subjective or objective)? 
 
[8.60] The approach to causation in the United States appears to be the most 
straightforward of the three jurisdictions.  Whilst there is some support for a 
subjective  approach,  the  majority  position  is  clearly,  and  emphatically, 
objective.  The language employed is that of the „reasonable patient‟, or, as 
explained by the Canterbury Court: 
 
                                                 
60 (2001) 205 CLR 434. 
61 Fain v Smith & Ors 479 So.2d 1150 (1985), 1154. 224 
… to resolve the causality issue on an objective basis: in terms of what a 
prudent  person  in  the  patient's  position  would  have  decided  if  suitably 
informed of all perils bearing significance.62 
 
The acceptance of the objective position however is not consistent across all 
jurisdictions  in  the  United  States.  The  nature  of  the  concerns  about  the 
adoption of an objective test were explained by the Court in Scott v Bradford.63 
The Court here, in the process of rejecting the objective test, lamented the 
disappearance of the autonomous patient in other jurisdictions.  Of note was 
the position that the Canterbury „view severely limits the protection granted 
an injured patient.‟ The Court even went so far as to find that „a patient‟s 
right of self-determination is irrevocably lost.‟64  Of significance is the appeal 
to  the  fundamental  right  „to  know  and  decide‟  as  the  „reason  for  the  full 
disclosure rule‟ which then led the Court to „decline to jeopardise this right 
by the imposition of the “reasonable man” standard.‟65  
 
Despite  concerns  such  as  these,  the  position  in  the  United  States  remains 
predominantly objective.  As we saw in the preceding discussion however, 
the  objective  approach  is  tempered  by  subjective  considerations.  The 
language  is  clearly  that  of  the  „reasonable‟  person  as  opposed  to  the 
individual patient, but considerations of the  individual characteristics can, 
and  do  (as  we  have  seen)  become  relevant.    Thus  it  is  most  accurate  to 
describe  the  majority  position  of  the  United  States  as  representing  a 
linguistically objective test which imports subjective elements.  In practical 
terms it is, similarly to Australia and the United Kingdom, a hybrid test. 
 
   
                                                 
62 Canterbury v Spence 464 F. 2d 772 (1972), 792. 
63 606 P.2d 554 (1979). 
64 Ibid, 559. 
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What factors influenced the development of the test? 
 
[8.60] The  majority position in the United States reflects a rejection  of the 
subjective test because it is seen to be dealing with hypothetical answers to 
hypothetical questions and thus incapable of reflecting reality. This position 
was clearly stated in Canterbury v Spence66 when the Court noted that „[w]hen 
causality  is  explored  at  a  post  injury  trial  with  a  professedly  uninformed 
patient  …  the  question  becomes  purely  hypothetical    [and]  …  places  the 
physician in jeopardy of the patient‟s hindsight and bitterness.‟67  Taking this 
reasoning one step further, Zeleznik v Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital68 contains 
the following assertion: „Whether in fact he would have refused the proposed 
therapy in the face of known risks is an altogether hypothetical question … 
No-one,  least  of  all  the  patient,  can  answer  that  question  with  reasonable 
certainty and the physician is placed at the mercy of the patient‟s hindsight.‟69  
Similarly, and more recently, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina found 
that „proof of causation under a subjective [test] would ultimately turn on the 
credibility  of  hindsight  of  a  person  seeking  to  recover  after  he  had 
experienced  a  most  undesirable  result.  Such  a  test  puts  the  physician  in 
“jeopardy of the patient‟s hindsight and bitterness.”‟70  
 
It would appear that not only the judiciary, but also the legislatures, have 
been influenced by concern for the doctor.  This was explored in  Dixon v 
Peters71 where the presiding Judge asserted that the passing of the relevant 
legislation was influenced by a report commissioned by the North Carolina 
Professional Insurance Study Commission.  This report, according to Becton J, 
„clearly reveal[ed] that the sole purpose of the legislation was to avoid valid 
claims.‟72  Thus, in an extraordinary shift from the patient-centred duty and 
                                                 
66 464 Fed R 2d 772 (1972). 
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breach  stages  of the  enquiry  we  see  that  the  driving  principle  behind  the 
development of the objective test is clearly concern for the doctor and a desire 
to protect them from the patient.  This raises the question: if we are protecting 
the patient from the paternalistic doctor at the duty and breach stages of the 
enquiry, and then protecting the doctor from the disillusioned patient at the 
causative stage of the enquiry, how can the interests of either be effectively 
addressed? 
 
What (if anything) is the problem with the chosen approach? 
 
[8.80] One of the main concerns with a purely objective approach is that it 
diverts attention away from the central character of the „informed consent‟ 
enquiry:  the patient.  This position was explored in an interesting, and strong 
dissent in Fain v v Smith and Ors73 when Jones J rejected the position of the 
majority,  preferring  instead  to  adopt  the  subjective  test.  In  his  view,  the 
„majority  opinion,  at  the  very  least,  substantially  compromises  the 
fundamental right of self-determination … and diverts the focus of the jury‟s 
determination  of  causation  away  from  the  patient.‟74  This  view  of  the 
objective test is reinforced in scholarly discussions of the doctrine of informed 
consent.  It has been argued that the suggestions that „the test for causation 
undermines  the  liability  standard  is  hardly  debatable‟75  and  that  it  is 
„inconsistent with the rationale of patient sovereignty.‟76 More significantly, 
however, not only does a purely objective test represent an undermining of 
patient rights, it is potentially illogical. 
 
The objective test is based upon the so-called „reasonable person‟ who does 
not actually exist and may not reflect the reality of the individual before the 
Court.    The  answer  to  the  question,  „would  a  reasonable  person  have 
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74 Ibid, p1156. 
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undertaken  this  treatment‟  is  problematic  as  it  undermines  the  particular 
medical treatment under consideration: it means that the treatment offered is 
an  inappropriate  one  as  no  right  thinking/reasonable  person  would  have 
undertaken it.  If a true and careful evaluation of the question is to occur, 
then  the  reasonable  person  must  adopt  some  of  the  characteristics  of  the 
plaintiff. 
 
The limitation of the reasonable person test in this context was recognised in 
Snipes v U.S.77 when the Court noted that, 
 
Since Snipes was an ideal candidate for this operation, to say that he 
could have intelligently or reasonably refused it if better informed is 
to say that every other person who was a candidate for it at about the 
same time should have refused it as well. 
 
In  turn,  this  would  imply  that  the  medical  profession  was 
perpetrating  a  massive fraud,  or  at  least  massive  bad judgment  in 
recommending  this  operation  to  thousands  of  patients.  It  suggests 
that  the  patients  could  have  prescribed  better  treatment  for 
themselves than their doctors were prescribing for them.78 
 
In  short,  the  „reasonable  person‟  must  be  given  some  of  the 
characteristics of the actual plaintiff if the test is not to undermine the 
medical profession by suggesting that the patient, as opposed to the 
doctor, is best suited to assessing their medical treatment.  
Thus a purely objective test is potentially as flawed as a subjective test and 
represents a significant shift away from the needs of the patient.  And whilst 
the position in the United States appears to represent the clearest and least 
problematic statement of a test for causation, it fails to address the specific 
problem  of  linking  a  physical  loss  with  the  dignitary  harm  that  occurred 
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when the patient was given inadequate information.  Once again it must be 
emphasised that the latter harm is crucial to the duty-and-breach enquiry but 
becomes irrelevant when seeking the causative link.  What we are seeing here 
is the continued struggle for balance between patient and physician rights, a 
struggle which is evident in both of the other jurisdictions. The problematic 
nature  of  the  enquiry  is  noted  in  some  of  the  commentary.    For  example 
Waltz  and  Scheuneman  discuss  the  „slippery  and  complex‟  nature  of  the 
concepts  surrounding the doctrine of „informed consent‟ and note that „there 
can be little wonder that doctors have been concerned that Courts have been 
less than precise.‟79 The role of causation in protecting the interests of the 
physician  is  addressed  by  Rauzi  who  suggests  that  an  expansion  of  the 
doctrine could upset the „decisional balance between patient and physician.‟80 
Significantly, the Courts and legislature are taking care „not to relegate the 
healthcare profession to strict liability.‟81  A balance of rights and interests is 
important but with judicial energies focussed on striking a balance, the true 
nature of the loss is overlooked and the patient ceases to be empowered to 
make an informed choice.  
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Chapter 9: Bringing it all Together 
 
Causation and policy 
 
[9.10] In the preceding three Chapters we have been exploring the nature of 
the test for causation and considering the apparent doctrinal divide between 
the  objective  and  subjective  approaches.    I  describe  this  as  an  „apparent‟ 
doctrinal divide because close analysis of the application of the three tests 
reveals  that  the  differences  are  linguistic  as  opposed  to  practical.  Each 
jurisdiction  purports  to  apply  a  test  that  sets  it  apart  from  the  other  two 
jurisdictions, yet the outcome is, more often than not, the same: the plaintiff 
fails in their action. Whilst the language used in each jurisdiction may differ, 
the  practical  application  is  much  the  same.    In  the  rare  situation  that  a 
plaintiff succeeds (such as Chester v Afshar1 and Scott v Bradford2) the Court 
usually  has  to  step  outside  of  the  specific  requirements  of  the  traditional 
negligence framework. As outlined in Chapter 6 (see [6.70]-[6.90]), in Chester 
this  meant  that  whilst  the  Court  acknowledged  that  there  was  no  legal 
causation, they deemed that the plaintiff had a meritorious claim, therefore 
they ruled in her favour.  And in Scott v Bradford liability was founded on 
mere breach with a non-existent test for causation. 
  
If we return to the issue with which this thesis is concerned, the importation 
of the trespassory concept of consent into considerations of an exchange of 
information and thus the negligence framework, we see that it is here, at the 
causation stage of the enquiry, that the doctrine of „informed consent‟ truly 
falls  apart.    The  adoption  of  the  language  of  consent  has  resulted  in  the 
creation of an „evidentiary gap‟.3  The Courts struggle to link the right to 
information  (which  I  describe  as  a  dignitary  right  concerned  with  one‟s 
                                                 
1 [2005] 1 AC 134. 
2 606 P.2d 554 (1980), discussed in Chaper 8. 
3 Once again I am adopting the language introduced by Jane Stapelton, „Lords A‟Leaping Evidentiary Gaps‟ 
(2002) 10 Torts Law Journal 276. 230 
personal dignity and unrelated to the external or physical well-being) to the 
trespassory  notion  of  consent.    The  sought-after  link  is  illogical  and  thus 
represents a gap in reasoning that cannot be bridged in a principled manner.  
One tool that the Courts have used to „leap the evidentiary gap‟ has been an 
appeal to policy.4 We need to understand these, at times incoherent, appeals 
to policy to truly understand the problematic nature of the search for the 
missing causative link. 
 
The policy diversion 
 
“I, for one, protest, as my Lord has done, against arguing too strongly upon public 
policy; - it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know 
where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all 
but when other points fail.” (Burroughs J)
5 
 
[9.20] The role of policy in judicial decision-making is widely debated. Policy 
is  often  perceived  as  the  „opt  out‟  clause,  the  tool  brought  in  to  reach  a 
conclusion in difficult situations. Appeals to public policy usually occur (as 
noted by Burroughs J nearly 200 years ago) when the answer, or indeed even 
the argument, is unclear. This approach is more likely in complex situations 
such  as  consent  to  treatment  when  it  is  difficult  to  apply  established 
principles  to  identify  a  link  between  the  legally  recognised  harm  and  the 
negligence act. 
  
The role of policy in the „informed consent‟ decisions has been highlighted in 
the preceding Chapters and warrants closer consideration.  This discussion is 
included here to clarify why the judiciary has turned to policy, as opposed to 
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legal principle,  in the informed consent  decisions.   I  will  suggest  that  the 
reason for resort to policy lies not in the lack of principle but in misplaced 
focus.  The  judicial  enquiry  begins  with  duty  and  breach  and  a  careful 
consideration of the individual right to information but then, at the causation 
stage of the enquiry, shifts to the manifestation of a physical harm.  This shift 
in focus requires the potentially illogical linking of two unrelated harms: a 
dignitary and a physical one.  It is here that we see the judiciary presented 
with a challenge that cannot be met without resort to loose „policy‟ claims.   
 
Policy in the consent decisions 
 
[9.30] The term „policy‟ or „public policy‟ defies clear and specific definition.  
Indeed it has been described as „one of the most under-analysed terms in the 
modern legal lexicon.‟6 It is a fluid concept which is, at times, employed by 
the judiciary to meet a perceived need.  This is particularly relevant in the 
context of the „informed consent‟ decisions.   
 
It is in the United Kingdom that appeals to policy are most commonly made.  
It was noted in Chapter 6 that there has been a consistent pattern of placing 
emphasis on the social utility of treatment and in 2005, in Chester v Afshar 
(Chester)7  the  House  of  Lords  clearly,  and  emphatically,  addressed  policy 
considerations  such  as  social  utility  and  questions  of  whether  a  plaintiff 
„ought‟ to recover at the expense of established causative principles.8 In the 
foundational  decision  of  Bolam  v  Friern  Hospital  Management  Committee 
(Bolam)9  policy  was  described  as  a  relevant  consideration10  and  again  in 
Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley 
Hospital & Ors (Sidaway)11 the need to focus on broader interests than those 
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represented by one patient were emphasised, along with the need to avoid 
the practice of defensive medicine which would potentially cripple medical 
advancement.12 The rationale underlying this conclusion was that to impose 
an  onerous  duty  to  warn  would  create  an  overly  cautious  medical 
professional, unwilling to advance or try out new treatment. Bolitho v City 
Hackney Health Authority (Bolitho)13 completed this triumvirate of cases and 
acted  to  reinforce  the  doctor-centric  policy  base  of  earlier  decisions,  thus 
preparing the ground for the emphatically policy driven decision of Chester. 
 
The difficult decision of Chester saw the House of Lords openly embracing 
policy as a driving consideration in decisions such as these. The problem with 
this approach is, as identified in Chapter 6, that whilst the Lords all referred 
to and relied upon policy, it was not always the same „policy‟. In the view of 
Lord  Bingham,  the  appropriate  policy  consideration  was  the  underlying 
purpose of negligence law as a whole,14 whilst the majority looked to the 
underlying  ethos  of  the  duty  to  warn  of  the  risks  inherent  in  medical 
treatment.15 And, in still a different approach again, Lord Steyn struggled to 
fit the enquiry into the existing negligence framework and application of the 
„but  for  test.‟  This  resulted  in  an  unconvincing  conclusion  based  on  the 
reduced  likelihood  of  a  small  risk  materialising  if  the  operation  was 
delayed.16 
 
In Australia, policy considerations have not been as openly accepted as in the 
United  Kingdom,  but  nevertheless  they  sit  behind  much  of  the  judicial 
reasoning  in  the  consent  decisions.  Whilst  the  High  Court  has  readily 
acknowledged  that  „value  judgments‟  and  „considerations  of  policy‟  enter 
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into „intangible question of responsibility‟ in the negligence enquiry,17 it has 
carefully  avoided  openly  embracing  policy  based  decisions.  There  is  a 
consistent endeavour to place the negligence discussion within a setting of 
principle but the Court often returns to the significance of broader „normative 
considerations,‟  such  as  „values  or  policy‟18  acknowledging  that  the  issues 
under consideration in this context do not always sit comfortably within the 
existing framework.  
 
An illustrative example is found in the decision of Chappel v Hart.19 As noted 
in  Chapter  7,  this  decision  saw  the  High  Court  avoiding  the  language  of 
policy,  opting  instead  for  the  „common  sense‟  test  developed  in  March  v 
Stramare,20  and  so  aiming  for  a  principled  approach  to  the  law.  Close 
examination  of  Chappel  v  Hart  in  Chapter  7,  however,  revealed  that  the 
„common  sense‟  test  necessarily  involved  the  introduction  of  value 
judgments.  When the concept of common sense is scrutinised, it is clear that 
the term requires individual, and often idiosyncratic, interpretations of what 
constitutes both common and sense. And in March v Stramare, Kirby J openly 
embraced  the  importance  of  „policy‟  considerations  (which  necessarily 
involve  individual  value  judgments)  and  highlighted  the  necessarily 
normative qualities entrenched in the general legal propositions raised in the 
causation  enquiry.21  Thus  whilst  policy  as  a  term  is  not  employed,  the 
underlying process is driven by similar considerations as those found in the 
decisions  from  the  United  Kingdom  which  specifically  refer  to  policy 
considerations.22  These  policy  considerations  range  from  views  of  the 
purpose of negligence law as a whole through to individual interpretations of 
what is just and right in the circumstances.   
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Despite the paucity of open acknowledgement of policy in Australian judicial 
discussion,  the  reality  is  that  something  more  than  a  strict  application  of 
principle  has  driven  the  „informed  consent‟  decisions.  This  was 
acknowledged  in  Elbourne  v  Gibbs23  when,  following  an  analysis  of  post 
Chappel decisions, Basten JA emphasised that the connection between breach 
and damage (that is, causation) must „satisfy the policy underlying the legal 
attribution of responsibility.‟24 Similarly in Dr Ibrahim v Arkell25 Fitzgerald JA 
noted  that  the  „informed  consent‟  decisions  are  driven  by  the  „policy 
requirement entitling a competent person to make his or her own decision 
about his or her life.‟26  Thus we have the broad notion of a policy which 
serves  to  preserve  the  rigour  of  the  law  alongside  a  narrower,  individual 
needs-based policy aimed at preserving the personal integrity of the plaintiff-
patient.    This  opens  the  question  of  what  is  the  dominant  „policy‟ 
consideration, how is it formed and how can potentially conflicting „policies‟ 
be reconciled?  It is the inability to answer this question with any certainty 
that lies at the heart of my concern about the role of policy  (both explicit and 
implicit)  in  the  „informed  consent‟  decisions.  In  seeking  to  identify  the 
appropriate role of policy in this context I will first consider the role of policy 
in judicial decision-making in general and then return to the narrower focus 
of the „informed consent‟ decisions.  The aim here is to determine whether 
policy has a legitimate place in these decisions.  This will involve addressing 
the  questions  as  to  the  nature  of  the  policy  driving  these  decisions  and 
whether that policy can be reconciled with the protection of an individual‟s 
right to choose.  
 
The policy/principle divide: Is there a distinction and is it important? 
 
[9.40] A common distinction made by both commentators and the judiciary is 
between policy and principle. It is equally common to deny that there is a 
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distinction  between  the  two  and  to  emphatically  state  that  they  are 
indistinguishable and interdependent. It is important therefore to begin any 
critical  assessment  of  the  role  of  policy  in  the  consent  decisions  with  a 
consideration firstly, of whether there is a clear divide between policy and 
principle and secondly, is this divide (or lack thereof) important?  
 
There is a mix of views regarding the apparent principle/policy dichotomy 
with one consistent thread running throughout: the relationship between the 
two  is  problematic.  Some  scholars,  such  as  Ronald  Dworkin  clearly 
differentiate between policy and principle.  Dworkin defines policy as a „kind 
of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in 
some economic, political or social feature of the community‟ and principle as 
„a standard that is to be observed … because it is a requirement of justice or 
fairness  or  some  other  dimension  of  morality‟27  Conversely,  Stapleton 
describes it as „odd‟ that „some Australian lawyers still believe that there is a 
meaningful tension  between principle and policy,‟28 and suggests that „we 
should  ditch  both  “principle”  and  “policy”  terminology.‟29    Most 
commentators and members of the judiciary sit somewhere  between these 
two views, variously referring to the „supposed distinction,‟ between policy 
and principle,30 or viewing them as „inseparable‟ and „complementary strands 
of the one rope,‟31 and  „not always easy to distinguish.‟32 In contrast, Beever 
refers  to  „policy  and  its  contrary  principle.‟33A  further  complication  is  the 
potential for distinction between „public‟ policy and „legal‟ policy: whilst the 
                                                 
27 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1979), 22. 
28 J.Stapleton, „The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort Law: Protection of the Vulnerable,‟ (2003) 24 Australian 
Bar Review 135, 135. 
29 Ibid, 137. 
30 C.Witting, „Tort Law, Policy and The High Court of Australia‟ (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 
569, 571. 
31 Ibid, 9. 
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High Court rejects any attempts to differentiate between public policy and 
legal policy,34 Cane specifically sets up a distinction between the two.35  
 
The clearest point of agreement that comes out of this debate is that both 
policy and principle have a legitimate role to play in the judicial decision-
making process. The law, as pointed out by Frank over 60 years ago,36 „is not 
a machine and the judges are not machine-tenders‟37 and it is dealing with 
„human  relations  in  their  most  complicated  aspects.  The  whole  confused, 
shifting helter-skelter of life parades before it.‟ 38 In short, the very nature of 
the issues that come before the Courts call for a willingness to be flexible and 
to perhaps apply a clear mix of fixed legal principle and the more  loosely 
defined considerations collectively labelled policy. This is a process we have 
seen  applied  with  a  liberal  hand  in  the  causation  stage  of  the  „informed 
consent‟ decisions. 
 
It would be easy to become mired in the principle/policy debate, and it is 
difficult to emerge from such an activity with any clarity.  Perhaps it is best to 
accept that as concepts, they are both difficult to define but undeniably have 
a role to play in the „informed consent‟ cases. Indeed, it may well be that „the 
best route to enduring principle … [lies] through policy.‟39  Accepting this 
reality does not, however, accept the current use of the term policy to veil 
individual  judicial  opinions  of  what  is  just  and  right.  To  base  judicial 
conclusions upon individual statements of „broad values … [may well be] 
beguiling‟40  but  is    „misleading  simplicity‟41  and  unlikely  to  result  in  the 
development of coherent law. 
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Seeking coherence 
 
[9.50] The problem at the heart of the policy/principle debate is a lack of 
coherence and transparency. The judges employ the term policy, in the words 
of  McHugh  and  Gummow  JJ,  „glide  to  a  conclusion,‟42  based  upon 
individually-formed  assumptions  of  what  is  appropriate  in  the 
circumstances. This occurs when the chaos of human relations collides with 
apparently rigid legal principles. In my view, policy serves to mask the true 
nature of judicial reasoning and leads to poorly formed law.  Stapleton on the 
other  hand,  questions  the  existence  of  a  „meaningful  tension  between 
principle and policy‟43 and suggests that it is „so-called  “principles” often 
simply masks the substance of a judge‟s reasoning process.‟44 Clearly there is 
a conflict of views regarding the source of the problem but the overarching 
concern remains the same: either principle or policy is acting as a veil over 
the true nature of judicial reasoning, resulting in a lack of transparency and, 
potentially, an incoherent development of the law. 
 
Whilst it is easy to refer simply to the notion of „policy,‟ it is difficult to give it 
specific content. As pointed out by Bennion, „the content of public policy (and 
therefore legal policy) is what the Court thinks and says it is.‟45 In the absence 
of  clear  (and  consistent)  content,  how  can  reasoning  based  upon  policy 
provide clarity or certainty in the law? To appeal to policy is potentially to 
appeal  to  uncertain  and  individual  notions  of  what  is  a  fair  result  in  the 
specific  circumstances  before  the  Court,  such  an  appeal  represents  a 
departure from „the path of merely logical deduction … [and we] lose the 
illusion of certainty.‟46 It is from certainty and consistency that confidence in 
the law grows. 
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It is important to recognise that a call for certainty does not connote a call for 
a concrete or inflexible law. Indeed the law must, as argued above, remain 
inherently  flexible  as  it  is  not  (and  ought  not  be)  a  machine.47  Flexibility 
however, does not necessarily lead to incoherent or opaque (as opposed to 
transparent) law. Rather it means a system that is able to shift and change as 
needs  and  expectations  of  society  shift  and  change.  This  is  particularly 
important in the context of the consent decisions which take place against the 
ever shifting background of medical treatment. As argued in this thesis, the 
conceptual  shift  to  informed  choice  would  represent  a  move  towards 
coherence  and  would  facilitate  a  clarity  of  judicial  reasoning  that  is  not 
present in the appeals to policy. 
 
The law must evolve and change, and this evolution and change must also be 
acknowledged. To appeal to „policy‟ as though it were a concrete and fixed 
notion (or, as Stapleton argues, to appeal to principle in the same terms) is to 
deny the nature of the law and to conceal the true nature of the reasoning 
process  underlying  the  decision.  The  problem  here  is  more  than  a  mere 
linguistic difference between principle and policy,  it lies in the absence of 
clear  reasoning.    As  explained  by  Kirby  J  in  Cattanach  v  Melchior48  „if  the 
application of ordinary legal principels is to be denied on the basis of public 
policy, it is essential that such policy be spelt out so as to be susceptible of 
analysis and criticism.‟49  Flexibility of the law is not something to hide; it is 
important that we acknowledge that the process of judicial decision-making 
is more than a mechanical application of rules.50 Frank takes this argument 
further  and  argues  that  we  ought  openly  to  acknowledge  the  flexibility, 
embrace the „unavoidably human, fallible character of the law,‟ and if we do 
this, then perhaps the „retreat into policy,‟ may not be necessary.51 The result 
would be a far more coherent development of the law and a recognition of 
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the true issues which lay at the heart of the decision.  To acknowledge choice, 
as opposed to consent, as the central concern would further facilitate this. 
 
Turning specifically to the „informed consent‟ decisions, there is a clear gap 
between the identified negligent act (failure to warn of a specific risk) and the 
manifestation of the risk, which occurs independently of the poor advice. The 
legally relevant harm arises not from the poor advice, but from the (usually) 
well-performed procedure.  There is a disjunct between the wrong and the 
apparent  loss  or  injury  (or  damage)  and  it  is  in  this  gap  that  the  judges 
flounder and make loose reference to what „ought‟ to happen and to policy. 
 
When a doctor fails to inform the patient of the risks involved in a particular 
course  of  treatment  (or  indeed,  of  not  following  a  particular  course  of 
treatment),  they  have  failed  to  appropriately  advise  that  patient.  The 
subsequent decision to undergo the treatment rests on a flawed foundation: 
the patient is not aware of all of the possibilities and they have a belief that 
they will be healed. Neither is the patient able to begin the process of coming 
to terms with the reality of their condition. This is not true autonomy.52  
 
The patient proceeds with the recommended course of treatment which is 
conducted with all due care and diligence. Sadly, the risk manifests and this 
is  deemed  to  be  the  loss.  This  loss  clearly  did  not  flow  directly  from  the 
wrong that was committed; the provision of advice did not impact on the 
likelihood of the risk materialising. The gap between the negligent advice and 
the harm suffered can lead to flawed reasoning.  Without resort to  „policy,‟ 
the outcome is often a conclusion that, the risk was so small, the illness so big 
and the trust in the doctor so strong that the patient would have undertaken 
the treatment even if the advice were given. The very nature of the enquiry, 
turning as it does on consent and the manifestation of a physical harm, means 
that „justice‟ cannot be done.  This in turn results in conclusions such as those 
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reached  by  Lord  Steyn  in  Chester  v  Afshar53  when  he  recognised  that  the 
decision could not be „accommodated in conventional causation principles‟ 
but that „policy and corrective justice pull powerfully in favour of vindicating 
the patient‟s right to know.‟54 He then concluded that whilst Ms Chester‟s 
case failed to meet the requisite legal test, she ought to recover so she would 
recover. This cannot be described as a coherent development of the law and 
can  only  result  in  a  lack  of  confidence  in  a  legal  system  that  asserts  that 
something „ought to be so‟ and therefore it is.  
 
Appeals to policy can aid in the attainment of a conclusion that an individual 
judge views as appropriate. This becomes even more problematic when the 
decision  is later given precedential value  and applied in entirely different 
circumstances. An example can be found in the pivotal decisions of Bolam and 
Sidaway  55  which  both  refer  to  the  „policy‟  of  the  social  utility  of  medical 
treatment. Both of these decisions are dependent on a policy formed at a time 
when  medical  developments  were  neither  as  carefully  scrutinised  nor 
monitored56  as  they  are  today.  As  pointed out  in  Chapter  3,57  subsequent 
judicial  interpretations  of  these  decisions  have  resiled  from  questions  of 
policy  and  have  failed  to  openly  acknowledge  the  significance  of  policy 
considerations. The reasoning of these later decisions has been couched in 
strict legal terms referring to the prudent professional, and this has now been 
given legislative voice here in Australia.58 Thus the policy of legal deference 
to the social utility of medical treatment and the difficulty in determining the 
appropriate  standard  of  care  against  the  backdrop  of  this  policy,  which 
became the foundation of both the Bolam and Sidaway conclusions, in turn 
become  the  foundation  of  later  decisions.  These  later  decisions  are,  as  a 
matter of practical reality, from different times and different eras, and failed 
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to acknowledge the relevant (or perhaps now irrelevant) policy concerns that 
lay beneath the original judicial reasoning.  
 
The  problem  is  therefore  a  multi-layered  one.  We  begin  with  a  flawed 
enquiry which relies on an illogical link between the negligent act of giving 
poor advice and the legally relevant (but logically irrelevant) harm suffered. 
The poorly framed nature of this enquiry causes the judges to struggle to fit 
their reasoning within accepted negligence principles, resulting in broadly 
framed appeals to policy. The notion of policy, as used by the judges, lacks 
clear or consistent content which means that the process of judicial decision-
making lacks transparency. As we have seen this is particularly problematic 
in the context of causation.  It is a problem that could be overcome if the 
judicial focus was on the dignitary harm of loss of choice as opposed to the 
unrelated  physical  harm  arising  as  a  result  of  competently  performed 
surgery. 
 
A subjective or objective test: Is there any practical difference? 
 
[9.60] The judicial approach to causation in the „informed consent‟ decisions 
is  not  solely  reliant  on  questions  of  policy.  Indeed,  there  is  an  ongoing 
endeavour  to  establish  a  coherent  and  principled  test  based  upon  either 
subjective  or  objective  considerations.    This  does  not,  however,  provide  a 
solution or clarify the process and causation consistently provides the most 
significant hurdle to the plaintiff, whether the test employed is subjective or 
objective.  An illustrative comparison is between the Australian decision of 
Bustos59  and  United  States  decision  of  Dixon.60  Both  cases  addressed  the 
question of informed consent in the context of a failed juri flap procedure. In 
Bustos, the plaintiff failed because of his subjective attachment to his vision of 
a new and improved self. In Dixon the plaintiff failed because the reasonable 
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person in his position (that  is, a person who  is seeking  cosmetic surgery) 
would be focused on the outcome and vision of a new and improved self and 
would  therefore  have  proceeded.  These  are  purportedly  different  tests, 
significantly  similar  approaches  and  exactly  the  same  outcome  –  a 
disappointed plaintiff. 
 
Causation is a difficult area of the law.  As Gaudron J explained in Chappel v 
Hart,61 „questions of causation are not answered in a legal vacuum. Rather, 
they  are  answered  in  the  legal  framework  in  which  they  arise.‟62  As  Her 
Honour went on to explain, „for present purposes that framework is the law 
of negligence‟63 and negligence demands a clear link between the breach of 
duty and the harm suffered.  Clearly then there is an expectation of a logical 
link  between  cause  and  effect,  and  the  test  as  stated  suggests  a 
straightforward  enquiry.    As  the  preceding  discussion  has  demonstrated, 
however, the enquiry is neither straightforward nor logical.  It is my position 
that the unnecessary complexity of the causation enquiry arises out of the 
impossibility of the task set before the Courts, and the need to link the denial 
of  a right to  information  with  the  manifestation  of  a  physical  harm.    The 
plaintiff is currently forced to focus their energies on (and seek recompense 
for)  a  physical  harm  when  their  concern  primarily  rises  out  of  the 
withholding of information and disempowerment of them as an individual 
chooser. 
 
The problematic nature of the current approach and focus on a link between a 
dignitary and a physical harm was discussed by Mendelson when she argued 
that: „[T]here is a long bow between being negligently deprived of the right to 
make  informed  decisions  (which  is  not  regarded  as  actionable  damage  in 
negligence)  and  compensation  for  physical  damage  which  arises  from  … 
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random  and  rare  complications.‟64  Mendelson  succinctly  summarised  the 
problem at the heart of the „informed consent‟ doctrine as it currently exists 
and  pointed  to  the  failing  of  the  continued  search  for  a  non-existent  link 
between two completely different kinds of harm.  It would be simpler to step 
back from the physical harm and give the right to make informed decisions 
the same level of respect it is accorded at the breach stage of the enquiry.  It is 
the denial of this right that would support the proposed doctrine of informed 
choice.  
 
It is clear that each jurisdiction recognises the individual right to consent (or 
not)  to  a  risk.    Equally  clear  is  the  perceived  role  of  the  autonomous 
individual.  In  every  jurisdiction  the  law  „start[s]  with  the  premise  of 
thoroughgoing  self-determination‟65  but  this  does  not  flow  through  to  the 
causative enquiry.  The question of causation is a truly vexed one which has, 
as we have seen, troubled the Courts. In reality, and on a practical level it is 
not truly that difficult; it has simply been made that way.  The negligent act 
itself  (the  failure  to  adequately  inform  a  patient)  is  of  such  an  entirely 
different nature from the actual injury (a physical loss), that a causative link 
proves elusive. There is advice, followed by a course of treatment which has a 
poor outcome. The treatment itself is not negligently performed, and in most 
instances, the recommendation that the treatment be undertaken was not, in 
itself, negligent. The true concern lies in the denial of choice, and it is at the 
point of this denial that the true injury occurs. Once this is recognised, then 




[9.70] Before leaving the causation discussion entirely, let us briefly return to 
Sally and see whether she could recover in any of the jurisdictions under 
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consideration, and of course consider whether or not there is any practical 
difference between the objective and subjective tests. Sally‟s story is set out in 
Chapter 5 and the relevant key points are: her age (20 years old) and the long 
history  she  had  with  her  doctor.    Her  degenerative  eye  disease,  if  left 
untreated,  was  certain  to  result  in  blindness  within  5  years  and  the  best 
suggested treatment had to offer was a slowing down of the degeneration 
and perhaps an additional 5 years of sight.  The treatment carried a small 
chance of immediate onset of blindness and Sally‟s doctor chose not to tell 
her of this risk as he felt that it would only serve to alarm her.  Duty and 
breach were clear and straightforward in all three jurisdictions.  Whether the 
Court chose to apply a patient or professional measure of the standard of care 
it was easy to determine what Sally ought to have been told.  This does not, 
however, translate into liability and we will see that the very nature of the 
relationship between Sally and her doctor, the trust and reliance upon which 
the therapeutic relationship is built, would undermine her claim. 
 
In  the  United  Kingdom  the  predominant  test,  as  enunciated  in  Smith  v 
Barking, Havering & Brentwood Health Authority66 is subjective in nature and 
based upon the particular patient.  The subjective test is, however, tempered 
by objective consideration of what the reasonable plaintiff, in that position, 
would have done.67  A similar approach has been adopted here in Australia 
and  the  test,  as  explained  by  McHugh  J  begins  as  a  subjective  test  but 
questions of „what a reasonable person would or would not have done in the 
patients‟ circumstances will almost always be the most important factor.‟68  
Thus both jurisdictions begin with the individual patient assertions of what 
they would or would not have done and temper this with considerations of 
what a reasonable person in their position would (or would not) have done.   
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If we begin with the subjective considerations, of course Sally would claim 
that she would not have had the operation.  She would however have had to 
admit the long and trusted nature of the relationship between her and the 
doctor  and  the  desperate  nature  of  her  condition  (in  the  absence  of  any 
treatment she would be blind within 5 years).  On a purely subjective basis, it 
would be difficult to accept any assertion by Sally that she would not have 
been prepared to take the risk that she may suffer immediate loss of sight.  
This position would of course be cemented by the application of objective 
factors  which  include,  inter  alia,  assessment  of  the  patient‟s  character  and 
personality, the slight risk of harm (1 in 14,000) and this procedure being the 
most likely to produce the best results.69  Sally would not be able to point to a 
link between the failure to provide her with sufficient information and the 
immediate onset of blindness.   
 
The position in the United States would not be any different.  In the majority 
of jurisdictions the Courts would begin with the objective test and ask what 
would a reasonable patient in Sally‟s position do? Clearly, a reasonable 20 
year old who  trusts her doctor implicitly  would balance  the  small risk of 
immediate  onset  of  blindness  and  the  chance  of  a  slowing  down  of  the 
degeneration of her sight against the certainty of complete loss of sight in 5 
years, and consent to the treatment.   
 
In all three jurisdictions it is clear that Sally would fail to recover.  But are the 
Courts asking the right question? This thesis asserts that no, the question as it 
stands  is  incorrect.    Of  course  Sally  would  have  proceeded  with  the 
treatment, there is no hint of trespass here.  However, this is not addressing 
the question of whether or not she was able to truly exercise her autonomous 
decision-making authority.  In the absence of a clear causative link the Courts 
could choose to adopt the Chester70 approach and conclude that she ought to 
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recover, and therefore she will.  Alternatively, the decision could be based on 
a statement of „values‟ enabling the Court to „glide to a conclusion‟71 thus 
acknowledging  the  „wrong‟  that  was  done  to  Sally.    Whilst  superficially 
achieving „justice‟ for the Sally such an approach would not accord with well-
established  negligence  principles  and  would  only  serve  to  undermine  the 
credibility of the law. The inability of the Courts to adequately address this 
was given some recognition in the decision of Smith v Barking, Havering & 
Brentwood  Health  Authority72  when  the  plaintiff,  in  a  similarly  reliant 
relationship,  was  not  informed  of  the  small  risk  of  immediate  onset  of 
tetraplegia.    Here  the  Court  awarded  her  damages  for  the  shock  and 
depression arising from the surprise at the immediate deterioration of her 
condition.    At  no  point  however  is  the  foundational  ideal  of  autonomy 
addressed and the right to make a meaningful choice and begin to address 
the reality of her condition is overlooked.  To award damages for the result of 
this  is  to  merely  apply  a  judicial  band-aid  and  fails  to  ask  the  correct 
question.    In  order  to  adequately  address  what  is  occurring  in  the  pre-
treatment  advice  decisions  the  Courts  must  be  permitted  to  cease  their 
ongoing struggle with consent and embrace the concept of choice. 
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PART III: THE WAY FORWARD - A NEW MODEL OF 
LOSS 
 
To  say  that  every  patient  must  provide  informed  consent  to  all  medical 
treatment is a deceptively simple statement.  Its basic premise is that we are 
autonomous individuals with certain fundamental rights and if these rights 
are denied, we have suffered a loss and ought to be able to seek recompense 
under the law.  Once again, this is a fairly straightforward statement, easy to 
accept but, when one looks behind the simplicity of the words, layer upon 
layer of questions arise:  if it is so straightforward, why (as demonstrated in 
Parts I and II) have the Courts struggled with the concept?  Does the doctrine 
of informed consent turn on professional standards or patient expectations? 
How can we  have a situation, as demonstrated in earlier Chapters, of the 
Courts stating that this is not about consent and then later Courts relying on 
these earlier decisions to support the „doctrine of informed consent?‟ If the 
discussion  is  all  about  autonomy,  what  is  autonomy?    And  finally,  is  the 
enquiry even about consent?  Inherent in all of these questions is the broader 
one  of  whether  we  should  be  shifting  our  focus  away  from  „informed 
consent„ towards a concept of „informed choice‟ thus achieving the goal of the 
High Court to infuse choice with meaning.1 
 
This  thesis  has  explored  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  „informed 
consent‟ and challenged the unwavering acceptance of the theme of consent.  
Parts I and II tracked the development of the current doctrine across three 
jurisdictions  and  asserted  that  whilst  there  are  some  semantic  differences 
between the tests, the basic process is the same with the outcome favouring 
                                                 
1  Rogers  v  Whitaker  (1992)  175  CLR  479,  489,  (Mason  CJ,  Brennan,  Dawson,  Toohey  and  McHugh  JJ) 
distinguish consent from meaningful choice, pointing to consent as being relevant to trespass and explaining that 
„meaningless consent‟ (that is consent based on insufficient information) can defeat a trespass claim.  It follows 
therefore that the doctrine of „informed consent‟ is not about trespass and consent but about ensuring that 
doctors provide the patient with sufficient information to enable a meaningful choice. 248 
the defendant.  It is from this discussion that the core themes of autonomy 
and choice are drawn.  At the heart of this thesis sits a recognition of the 
significance of autonomy and a challenge to the language of consent when 
addressing  the  provision  of  pre-treatment  advice.  Part  III  will  draw  the 
threads of the preceding discussion together and move towards a conclusion 
involving  the  adoption  of  a  more  precise  definition  of  autonomy  and 
recognition of the role of choice.  This represents a shift away from issues of 
„consent‟ and the problematic nature of importing trespassory notions into 
the negligence framework.  The creation of a model of loss based upon choice 
serves to empower the patient as a self-authoring participant in the treatment 
process and meets the foundational principle of autonomy.  
 249 
Chapter 10: Autonomy - Defining the Undefined 
 
Autonomy:  Do we know who the autonomous individual is? 
 
[10.10] The doctrine of „informed consent‟ rests on the notion of autonomy.  
This identification of autonomy as a fundamental principle was present in the 
earliest  decisions  regarding  advice  prior  to  treatment.    Despite  its 
characterisation as a trespass decision, the Schloendorff principle that „every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body‟1 has been described as „germinal.‟2 The 
language of Schloendorff was adopted by Lord Steyn in Chester v Afshar,3 and 
closer to home, Kirby J described the Schloendorff rationale as „fundamental to 
the formulation adopted by this Court in Rogers v Whitaker.‟4  A similar theme 
is  found  in  the  scholarly  literature  where  it  has  been  suggested  that  the 
„purpose of [the rules about informed consent] is to permit the patient the 
continued  exercise  of  self-determination  or  autonomy.‟5  More  broadly, 
protection of the autonomous individual has been described as „the dominant 
rhetorical value in … medical law and ethics,‟6 and autonomy, in the context 
of bioethics, has been described as „something of a religion.‟7   
 
Thus autonomy is clearly a „fundamental value‟ in discussions involving pre-
treatment  advice,8  yet  rarely  is  there  any  attempt  to  provide  a  purpose-
specific definition of the term.  It is one thing to make sweeping appeals to 
autonomy  or  self-determination  but  another  thing  entirely  to  define  and 
                                                 
1 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 105 NE (1914) 92, 93 (Cardozo J).   
2 Retkwa v Orentreich 154 Misc. 2d ed 164 (1992), 166-167 (Kristin Booth Glen J). 
3 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [14] (Lord Steyn).  
4 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, [142] (Kirby J, referring to Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 
479). 
5  S.A.M.  McLean,  A  patient’s  right  to  know:  Information  disclosure,  the  doctor  and  the  law  (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, Aldershot, 1989), 80.  
6 Roger B. Dworkin, „Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age‟ (1992-1993) 68 Indiana Law Journal 
727, 727. 
7 J.Coggon, „Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: Justifiable Inconsistency or 
Blinkered Moralism?‟ (2007) 15 Health Care Analysis 235, 236. 
8 McLean, above n. 5, 90. 250 
successfully protect it.  MacLean has noted that „in an ideal world, judges 
would  use  the  law  to  reinforce  the  value  of  patient  autonomy‟9  but  has 
lamented that this aspiration is not reflected in the legal reality.  She affirms 
that „the law of consent is unable to take meaningful account of the concept of 
autonomy.‟10 I suggest that this gap between aspiration and reality is due to 
the failure define autonomy.  The reality is that claims regarding the need to 
protect autonomy are „sometimes made with little thought as to the nature of 
the right [to autonomy] itself„11 and in the absence of a definition autonomy 
lacks content. As it stands, judicial ruminations on the level of information 
that  the  autonomous  individual  ought  to  receive  do  not  extend  to  a 
consideration of who, or what, is the autonomous individual.  The central 
character of the consent enquiry is therefore insubstantial and poorly defined. 
 
The law is a creature of definition and linguistic subtleties; indeed many legal 
decisions turn on the definition of specific words or phrases.  It is therefore 
curious that autonomy, which is central to the doctrine of „informed consent‟, 
is so ill-defined.  Of course it is important to remember that the role of the 
judge is to interpret and apply the law and, as such, it would perhaps be 
inappropriate for judicial consideration of medical advice to include an in-
depth exploration of abstract notions such as autonomy.  Indeed, such an 
exploration might well draw criticism that judges are „employed to judge the 
law and not questions of ethics.‟12  However, the ongoing reference to self-
determination  and  autonomy  in  the  absence  of  specific  judicial  definition 
hints at a common understanding of the meaning of the term which therefore 
does not require articulation.  This is not the case.  Autonomy has been the 
                                                 
9 Sheila A.M McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law  (Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2010), 95. 
10 Ibid, 94. 
11 R. Heywood, „Book Review: Autonomy, Consent and the Law‟ (2011) 19 Medical Law Review 150, 150.It is 
interesting to note here that Heywood refers to autonomy as a „right‟ of itself when it is perhaps more correct to 
identify that the different „rights‟ that recognition of autonomy protects, such as the right to information, make 
choices and bodily integrity. 
12 Coggon, above n.7, 236. 251 
subject of much scholarly discourse and who (or what) constitutes a truly 
autonomous individual remains open to debate.13 
 
It  is  clear  therefore  that  „informed  consent‟  rests  upon  a  poorly-defined 
concept.  The legal effect of the avoidance of the „full theoretical rigour‟ of 
autonomy  is that  „potentially the  Courts will find themselves defending a 
concept of unspecific scope or meaning.‟14  Coggon has also suggested that it 
is  „possible  for  judges  to  use  the  equivocal  nature  of  the  concept  [of 
autonomy] to achieve outcomes that they consider to be morally desirable … 
rather than simply to apply a single concept to comparable legal questions.‟15 
The  absence  of  a  clear  definition  is  problematic  and  if  the  pre-treatment 
conversation is to be given meaningful legal protection, then the character 
sitting at its heart (that is, the autonomous individual) must be clearly and 
appropriately defined.   
 
Clarification will come with the identification of a non-exhaustive definition 
of autonomy to be adopted by the judiciary in the context of the provision of 
pre-treatment  advice.    This  is  the  goal  of  this  Chapter.  Through  a  brief 
exploration  of  the  rich  scholarship  surrounding  autonomy  it  will  identify 
some common themes and will entail a consideration of the central debates 
surrounding  autonomy  and  identification  of  the  issues  at  the  heart  of the 
debates.  From this discussion, I will propose a definition of autonomy which 
will help the move towards a doctrine of informed choice.  The proposed 
definition  of  autonomy  will  provide  the  basis  for  Chapter  11  which  will 
consider the nature of consent and identify the true harm sustained when 
pre-treatment advice is flawed.  In drawing these two themes together, I will 
then suggest a reformulation of the legal test in order to adequately protect 
autonomy and meet the stated aims of the current, poorly framed, „informed 
                                                 
13 The scholarly debate is considered below: The scholarly debates (at [10.40]). 
14 Ibid, 238. 
15 Ibid, 236. 252 
consent‟ enquiry.  This proposal will require a conceptual shift away from 
„informed consent‟ towards one of „informed choice.‟ 
 
 A principle in search of a definition 
 
[10.20] Autonomy is a principle in search of a definition.  The very essence of 
autonomy  involves  a  concept  of  individuality  and,  as  such,  can  mean 
different things to different people in different circumstances.  Quite aptly it 
has been described as „a relatively contentless notion‟16 on the basis that „the 
exercise  of the capacity of autonomy  is what  makes  my  life  mine.‟17  It is 
therefore a daunting task to embark on the process of providing a definition 
that will capture the essence of autonomy and provide the clarity missing 
from  the  judicial  interrogations  of  pre-treatment  conversations.    In 
constructing a legal definition of such a complex term, it is appropriate to 
begin with a consideration of the dictionaries.  Consultation will begin with 
the common English dictionaries to provide insight into ordinary language 
usage, then the legal dictionaries will be considered to determine whether 
there  is  an  accepted  legal  definition  and,  finally,  the  dictionaries  of 




[10.30] The dictionary definition of autonomy is relatively straightforward. It 
is described as „the right of self-government, personal freedom and freedom 
of  the  will,‟18  and  „freedom  of  the  will,  freedom  of  external  control  or 
influence.  Personal  liberty.‟19  Similarly,  the  Macquarie  Dictionary  defines 
autonomy  as  „self-government,  independence,  self-sufficiency  and  self-
regulation‟20 and the Collins English Dictionary refers to „the right or state of 
                                                 
16 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988), 110. 
17 Ibid, 111. 
18 The Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991). 
19 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 1 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993). 
20 Macquarie Dictionary, (5th ed, Macquarie Dictionary  Publishers, Sydney, 2009). 253 
self-government, freedom to determine one‟s own actions, behaviour etc ...‟21 
Interestingly the last two dictionaries include a reference to the philosophical 
concept of autonomy, described as: „the doctrine that the individual human 
will contains its own principles and laws.‟22 From these definitions emerge 
the consistent themes of freedom, self-government and exercise of free will.  
The philosophical dictionaries expand on these themes and the vast body of 
scholarly work on autonomy endeavours to give them content and meaning. 
 
Autonomy is best characterised as an ethical or philosophical concept and is 
therefore not defined in the legal dictionaries.  But the relevance of autonomy 
to the law is identified in The New Oxford Companion to Law23 which describes 
the „most important task of autonomy‟ to be the ability to „argue for a certain 
ideal of the liberal state: that of neutrality.‟24 There is also a separate heading 
dedicated  to  the  role  of  autonomy  in  the  law  surrounding  consent  to 
treatment.  Here  the  primacy  of  the  principle  of  autonomy  and  the 
corresponding right to refuse treatment are highlighted and discussed in the 
context of the conflict with the sanctity of life.  The discussion further notes 
that  consent  to  treatment  will  negative  a  battery  action.    The  entry  also 
differentiates basic consent to medical treatment from the „ethical doctrine of 
informed consent‟ and then describes the „legal doctrine‟ of informed consent 
but does little to illuminate the role of autonomy,25 simply offering a basic 
outline  of  the  law  as  it  stands.    The  authors  also  note  that  „the  fact  that 
different theorists may use the same word should not … lead one to assume 
that they are all referring to the same thing … one has to fashion different 
concepts  in  light  of  the  nature  of  the  problems.‟26  In  short,  the  Legal 
Dictionaries offer the following „clarification‟: „Informed consent‟ is different 
from „consent‟ and can be described as an ethical doctrine.  But „informed 
consent‟ is then defined as a legal doctrine. Further, autonomy does not mean 
                                                 
21 Collins English Dictionary (2nd ed, Collins, Sydney, 1986). 
22 Ibid, and above n.20. 
23 P.Cane and J. Conaghan, ed The New Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). 
24 Ibid, 63. 
25 Ibid, 202. 
26 Ibid, 63. 254 
the same thing to every person but must be fashioned in light of the context 
under consideration.  
 
Turning then to the Dictionaries of Philosophy, the themes mentioned in the 
English dictionaries are given closer consideration.  The Penguin Dictionary of 
Philosophy27  refers  to  autonomy  as  self-rule  and  describes  the  role  of 
autonomy in ethics as „a person‟s capacity for self-determination; ability to 
see  oneself  as  the  author  of  a  moral  law  by  which  one  is  bound.‟28  The 
definition here includes reference to the view held by some philosophers that 
autonomy is a synonym for „logical or conceptual independence.‟29 
 
The  Oxford  Companion  to  Philosophy30  expands  on  the  Kantian  notion  of 
morality and introduces the „moral imperative‟ which is described as a „moral 
agent‟s own freely and rationally adopted moral policy.‟31  Significantly for 
this discussion, the definition then contains a clear statement regarding the 
broad variety of concepts of autonomy noting that „what autonomy amounts 
to  …  has  been  interpreted  in  radically  different  ways.‟32  The  ensuing 
summary of the different conceptions of autonomy includes reference to the 
notion  of  „enacting  through  common  rational  procedures,‟    „individual 
sovereignty over his or her choice of moral values and self-construction‟ and 
there is also reference to the importance of autonomy in the relations between 
the patient and the medical practitioner (but there is no attempt to specifically 
define  autonomy  in  this  context).33  The  essence  of  autonomy  in  this 
particular definition is then summarised as being „more than just the capacity 
                                                 
27 Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy (2
nd ed, Penguin, Melbourne, 2005). 
28 Ibid. The ideal of a „moral law‟ draws upon the work of Kant (to be discussed further below, see: The scholarly 
debates at [10.40]). 
29 Ibid. 
30 T. Honderich (ed), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995). 
31 Ibid, 69. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid, 69-70. 255 
to act on particular desires or choices … it is a more general capacity to be 
self-determining, to be in control of one‟s own life.‟34  
 
This brief perusal of the dictionaries may well leave one with the impression 
that autonomy defies definition, but this is not the case.  Certain concepts and 
themes are common to all of the discussions.  These include liberty and/or 
freedom, choice and the primacy of self-governance.  This of course opens the 
door to further, more complex debate regarding the nature of choice,35 the 
scope of individual freedom or liberty and of course, how we define „self.‟  
The remainder of this Chapter will provide some insight into the bioethical 
and philosophical debates regarding these issues and will draw out common 
themes  with  the  ultimate  goal  being  a  clarification  of  the  concept  of 
autonomy and how it can be precisely and simply defined in the context of 
the provision of pre-treatment advice. 
 
The scholarly debates 
 
[10.40] At the outset it is important to recognise that the breadth of scholarly 
discourse on autonomy is enormous and it is well beyond the scope of this 
thesis to provide a comprehensive overview of that discourse.  This is not a 
philosophical discussion; it is one based on legal issues.  The focus of the 
analysis is on the nature of a legal doctrine and the aim is to identify a way in 
which that doctrine can most successfully achieve the fundamental goal of 
protecting the autonomy of patients.  The aim of this part of the analysis is to 
emphasise  the  diversity  of  interpretations  of  the  term  „autonomy‟  and  to 
draw  out  common  threads  or  themes.    Once  these  common  threads  are 
identified it will be possible to identify a precise, easily-understood definition 
                                                 
34 Ibid, 70.  The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), introduces 
similar concepts but does not have a single entry for autonomy, referring instead to the free will problem, Kant 
and negative freedom. 
35 To be explored further in Chapter 11. 256 
of autonomy that can serve the purpose of „informed consent‟36 and empower 
the patient as the decision-maker.   
 
Before considering the definition of autonomy, it is worth asking why is it so 
important?  What  interests  lie  at  the  heart  of  the  autonomy  debate  and, 
indeed, why has the debate been so extensive?  It has been suggested that the 
„literature of biomedical ethics … [rests on] … assumptions that autonomy 
should  be  protected,‟37  and  the  same  can  be  said  of  the  legal  discussions 
which  point  to  autonomy  as  a  foundational  principle  warranting  legal 
protection.  There are also claims of the „triumph of autonomy‟38 which hint 
at  concerns  regarding  the  primacy  of  the  autonomous  individual.  
Underlying  all  of  these  discussions,  however,  is  an  acceptance  of  the 
significance of autonomy and the need to provide ethical and legal protection 
of the autonomous decision-maker.  Humans are regarded as a complex mix 
of social and individual beings.  Or, as Christman succinctly explains, „the 
autonomous  person  has  certain  fundamental  interests  which  principles  of 
justice are designed to protect.‟39  The key to successful protection is to find 
and enunciate those interests and principles in a meaningful way. 
 
This Chapter opened with a consideration of the linguistic and philosophical 
definitions  of  autonomy  and  three  themes  emerged  from  this  discussion: 
choice,  freedom  (or  liberty)  and  self-definition.    Choice  is  considered  in 
Chapter 11 where I will continue to challenge the appropriateness of the label 
„informed consent.‟  The other two themes, the concept of freedom or liberty 
and the ability to define one‟s self, will be the focus of the remainder of this 
Chapter which will provide a broad overview of the scholarly literature of 
autonomy.  This discussion will bring us closer to an acceptable definition of 
autonomy that can provide a sound basis for the judicial consideration of pre-
                                                 
36 Remodelled by this thesis to informed choice. 
37 Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy, (Yale University Press, London, 1986), 5. 
38 C.E. Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: patients, doctors and medical decisions (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1998), xi. 
39 J. Christman, „Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism and the Social Constitution of Selves‟ (2004) 117 
Philosophical Studies 143, 147. 257 
treatment advice.  These two Chapters will then be drawn together in the 
final  recommendation  of  this  thesis  which  is  the  conceptual  shift  from  a 
doctrine of „informed consent‟ to one of „informed choice‟ and will include a 
non-exhaustive definition of autonomy that will facilitate this shift. 
 
Freedom and/or liberty 
 
[10.50] Liberty is a fundamental component of autonomy. Throughout the 
literature it is either referred to alongside of, or at times, as synonymous with, 
autonomy.  Indeed, it could be said that the ultimate expression of autonomy 
is individual freedom. But what is the nature of this freedom (or liberty) and 
are there any limits imposed on personal liberty? Can autonomy exist in the 
absence of unfettered liberty? Different authors would answer this question 
in different ways. A useful summary is found in the work of Gerald Dworkin 
where he describes the different ideas of „persons as self determining‟ yet 
suggests that at an abstract level, the different models hold the same concept 
of autonomy.40  In his words: 
 
Josiah Royce speaks of a person as a life led according to a plan.  Marxists 
speak of man as the creature who makes himself; existentialists of a being 
whose  being  is  always  in  question;  Kantians  of  persons  making  law  for 
themselves.41 
 
Different scholars therefore view the essence and expression of individuality 
in different, and potentially contradictory ways, yet hold a common view that 
individuality  „functions  as  a  moral,  political  and  social  ideal,‟42  and  is 
something that ought to be left „independent and unmanipulated.‟43 Thus we 
see a view of an individual in the centre of their world, being permitted to 
define themselves with the fundamental freedom to do and be as they will.  
                                                 
40 Gerald Dworkin, above n.16, 10. 
41 Ibid, 9. 
42 Ibid, 10. 
43 Ibid, 11. 258 
In Dworkin‟s work, we see the emergence of liberty and the individual but 
we  are  not  seeing  a  definition  of  the  nature  of  liberty.  Its  importance  is 
undeniable,  but  its  nature  and  limits  remain  unexplored.  Guidance  and 
insight  can  be  found  in  the  work  of  the  earlier,  and  extremely  influential 
thinker, John Stuart Mill. 
 
Mill‟s famous essay, On Liberty is not limited to a consideration of autonomy; 
it also considers the interaction of the individual with society, suggesting that 
the essence of a healthy society is a collection of healthy individuals.  In Mill‟s 
treatise, the essence of autonomy (or individuality44) is closely linked with 
liberty.    Some  core  principles  can  therefore  be  borrowed  from  Mill  when 
endeavouring to identify the nature of autonomy (for legal purposes) and the 
relationship between autonomy and liberty. 
 
In Mill‟s view, individuality as an expression of autonomy is the essential 
ingredient of a healthy society. To enrich and empower the individual is to 
enrich  and  empower  society:  „In  proportion  to  the  development  of  his 
individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself and is therefore, 
capable of being more valuable to others.‟45 Thus, it is essential that different 
persons should be allowed to lead different lives.46 The liberty and freedom 
of individuals is the key to healthy individuals and thus a healthy society.  To 
Mill, the only possible rationale for interfering with the liberty of one person 
is to prevent them from harming another.47  In short, „over himself, over his 
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.‟48  This is a theme which 
echoes throughout the literature and overflows into the law. 
 
                                                 
44 J.S. Mill more commonly referred to individuality than autonomy but it was clear that he was considering 
similar themes and rights. 
45 J.S. Mill, On Liberty in J. Troyer, ed The Classical Utilitarians Bentham and Mill (Hackett Publishing Inc, 
Cambridge, 2003), 199. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, 158. 
48 Ibid. 259 
Turning now to Roger Dworkin,49 we see freedom described as „the cardinal, 
absolute  requirement  of  self-respect.‟50  It  is  Dworkin‟s  position  that  the 
„intrinsic and objective importance‟ of one‟s own life can only arise when the 
individual is free to lead „that life himself‟ as opposed to being „ushered along 
it by  others.‟51  Similarly,  the  celebrated  liberal  scholar Isaiah Berlin  places 
liberty alongside autonomy and emphasises the central importance of both 
concepts.52 He claims that freedom is given substance by the „degree to which 
no man or body of men interferes with my body‟53 yet describes it as „a term 
so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist.‟54 We 
are once again left with a concept that is undeniably central to the individual 
but open to interpretation and, according to Berlin, so „or porous‟ that it can 
be adapted for any purpose.  How then can it provide a consistent basis for a 
legal doctrine? 
 
Berlin does, however, explore the concept of liberty further and draws out 
similarities between the theories which mean that both autonomy and liberty 
can be given substance and form. He draws on „libertarians such as Locke 
and Mill‟ who believed that „there ought to be a minimum area of personal 
freedom  which  must  on  no  account  be  violated‟55  and  modern  Western 
liberals who  believe  that  „individual liberty is  an  ultimate  end for human 
beings.‟56 Liberty is also central to the work of Kant, but his version of liberty 
is different again. To Berlin, Kant‟s position is that liberty is expressed „not 
through the elimination of desires but with resistance to them and  control 
over  them,‟57  as  opposed  to  the  „libertarian‟  view  that  the  embracing  of 
desires and wishes is the embodiment of freedom.  Gerald Dworkin offers 
further  insight  into  the  Kantian  position  which  he  describes  as  viewing 
                                                 
49 Roger Dworkin, above n.6. 
50 Ibid, 239. 
51 Ibid. 
52 I. Berlin Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, London, 1969), 121. 
53 Ibid, 122. 
54 Ibid, 121. 
55 Ibid, 124. 
56 Ibid, 125. 
57 Ibid, 137. 260 
„moral autonomy  [as] a combination of freedom and responsibility: it is a 
submission to laws that one has made for oneself.‟58 Thus freedom, liberty 
and autonomy are open to a variety of interpretations but there is a constant 
thread  of  individuality  and  respect  for  individuality.    As  Berlin  suggests, 
„whatever  the  view  of  the  world  and  society  there  is  one  constant,  some 
portion of man‟s existence must remain independent … [that which] a man 
cannot give up without offending against the essence of his human nature.‟59  
The question then becomes, how do we identify what it is that „man‟ cannot 
give up and how can these diverse theories inform the law so as to ensure 
that core principle is accorded due respect?  We will return to this question 
after considering the struggle to define the nature of the individual. 
 
Defining one’s self 
 
[10.60] The preceding discussion reveals that while liberty and freedom are 
aligned with autonomy, the concept of autonomy is richer and broader than 
liberty,60 and that richness comes from the perceived nature of the individual.  
It may appear tautological to refer to the individuality of the individual but 
what defines each individual is, by its very nature, a personal process which 
can differ in as many ways as there are people.  We are, therefore, dealing 
with a potentially complex and variable notion and it is in this complexity 
that the problematic nature of a legally-defined autonomous being becomes 
more  evident.    It  is  important  to  reiterate  here  that  I  am  not  seeking  to 
identify a broad, all-encompassing definition of autonomy.  The aim of this 
Chapter  is  more  modest:  it  is  to  identify  a  practical,  legal  definition  of 
autonomy which accords with general views.  This definition will take the 
diverse  interpretations  of  autonomy  into  account  but  will  not  attempt  to 
reconcile them.  
 
                                                 
58 Gerald Dworkin, above n.16, 14. 
59 Berlin, above n.52, 126. 
60 Gerald Dworkin, above n.16, 106. 261 
As Berlin points out, the question of what constitutes an individual has been 
raised before, but is yet to be definitively answered: „ever since the issue was 
raised  towards  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  what  is  meant  by  an 
individual has been asked persistently and with increasing effect.‟61 But in 
hinging  arguments  upon  such  broad  concepts  as  autonomy  without 
analysing  or  addressing  exactly  what  we  are  talking  about,  there  is  a 
tendency to oversimplify the way in which we make decisions and perhaps 
succumb to the temptation to „exaggerate the uniformity of human nature 
and conduct.‟62 This temptation can, however, be avoided if we focus on the 
process  of  self-definition  as  opposed  to  defining  what  constitutes  an 
individual.  There are readily identifiable similarities in the broad spectrum 
of the former but few in the latter.  Each and every identified individual in 
the world differs in some material way, thus it is impossible to state that all 
individuals have the same specific characteristics.  It is possible, however, to 
identify similarities in the manner in which we determine and approach self-
definition.   
 
Two clear schools of thought have developed in the scholarly literature on 
the  definition  of  self:  the  individualistic  model  and  the  relational  model.  
While there are important differences between the two schools of thought, 
the following (necessarily brief) overview of the relevant literature reveals 
that  Christman  was  correct  when  he  asserted  that  „social  and  individual 
conceptions  of  self  are  compatible.‟63    A  similar  view  was  more  recently 
expressed  by  McLean  when  she  suggested  that  „the  purported  difference 
between individualistic and relational autonomy is by no means so great as at 
first appears,‟64 and „that the distinction between the two is exaggerated.‟65 
                                                 
61 Berlin, above n.52, 154. 
62 Schneider, above n.38, xvii. 
63Christman,  above  n.39,  146.  He  refers  at  this  point  to  Mackenzie  and  Stoljar,  “Introduction:  Autonomy 
Reconfigured” in C.Mackenzie and N.Stoljar (eds) Relational Autonomy: Feminist perspectives on Autonomy, 
Agency,  and  the  Social  Self  (Oxford  University  Press,  New  York,  2000),  8  also  J.  Crittenden,  Beyond 
Individualism: Reconstituting the Liberal Self, Chapter 5 in W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989).  
64 S.A.M McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law  (Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2010), 214. 
65 Ibid, 224. 262 
 
For those who support an individualistic view of autonomy, the process of 
self-definition is an internal process.  The most notable advocate of this view 
of autonomy is Immanuel Kant who adopted the position that the essence of 
autonomy is self-determined morality.66  It was his view that we are „rational 
beings who spontaneously impose lawfulness on the world in which we live 
and thereby create basic order.‟67 The essence of Kant‟s approach is to treat 
„autonomy  as  a  basic  condition  of  moral  agency‟  which  involves  „one 
imposing  moral  constraints  on  oneself  through  one‟s  own  reason.‟68  Kant 
sought to root morality in reason which was an internal as opposed to an 
external  force,  completely  „independent  of  external  influences  and 
constraints.‟69 Thus Kant‟s „categorical imperative‟ saw the individual as an 
isolated creature, created and constrained from within. 
 
This position is in direct contrast to that of the relational autonomists who 
argue for the inherently social nature of humans and say that we cannot view 
individuals in isolation; rather they must be viewed and defined within the 
social and familial frameworks which surround and support them.  This view 
of autonomy was initially associated with feminist scholars70 but is now more 
widely embraced and in my view presents a persuasive model of autonomy 
which acknowledges that individuals exist within a context of experience and 
relationships. 
 
                                                 
66 See I. Kant, The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Translated by H.J.Paton (Routledge 
Classics, London, 2005), 61 in which Kant describes the „aim of the present Groundwork is to seek out and 
establish the supreme principle of morality’ 
67 J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1998), 483 and 484. 
68 L.C. Becker (ed) L.C. Becker  (assoc ed), Encyclopedia of Ethics (Garland publishing Inc, NY, 1992), 71 and 
72. 
69 J. Macquarrie (ed) A Dictionary of Christian Ethics (SCM Press Ltd, London, 1971), 63. 
70 Christman, above n.39 for example refers us to refers us to J.Nedelsky, „Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, 
Thoughts and possibilities,‟ (1989) 1Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 7-36, M.Oshana „Personal autonomy 
and Society‟ (1998) 29(1) Journal of Social Philosophy 81-102 and an overview, the essays in C.Mackenzie and 
N.Stoljar (eds) Relational Autonomy: Feminist perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2000). See also McLean, above n.64, 214 who describes relational autonomy as 
„closely identified with communitarianism and feminism.‟ 263 
The broad view of relational autonomy is that individuals are to be viewed as 
inherently social and supported by „natural and social settings.‟71 Christman 
draws  our  attention  to  relational  autonomy  as  „emphasising  the  role  that 
background social dynamics and power structures play in the enjoyment and 
development of autonomy,‟72 and Berlin cautions us that our „individual self 
is not something which [we] can detach from [our] relationship with others, 
or from those attributes of [ourselves] which consist in their attitude towards 
[us].‟73 Similarly, Atkins reminds the reader that „my sense of who I am … 
cannot be isolated from my social setting or from specific others in relation to 
whom the question of who I am arises.‟74 Of significance to the relational 
model  of  autonomy  is  the  view  of  identity  as  something  „dynamic  and 
discursive, a collaboration … formed through relations with other people.‟75  
In short, the very social nature of humanity is fundamental to the process of 
defining individuals; we are subject to the influences of the world around us 
and of those who inhabit that world.   
 
While the individualist and relational theories of autonomy provide different 
insights into the essence of the individual, they do have one fundamental 
concept in common: the individual at the heart of the debate.  At the centre of 
all of these discussions sits the individual either defined entirely from within, 
or as a  result of their interaction  and  relationships with others, that  is an 
individual formed as they relate to others.  Either way, there is an individual 
who directs what does, or does not happen to them.  They are self-authoring 
and  self-directing.    It  is  to  this  common  thread  that  I  will  now  turn  and 
identify  the  most  appropriate  model  of  autonomy  in  the  context  of  pre-
treatment advice: narrative autonomy. 
 
                                                 
71 Haworth, above n.37, 14. 
72 Christman, above n.39, 143. 
73 Berlin, above n.52, 156. 
74  Kim  Atkins,  „Narrative  Identity  and  Embodied  Continuity‟ in  Kim  Atkins  &  Catriona  MacKenzie  (ed), 
Practical Identity and Narrative Agency (Routledge, New York, 2008), 87. 
75 Ibid, 89. 264 
A common thread: The individual as storyteller 
 
[10.70] It is clear therefore that autonomy is a complex ideal.  It represents 
individual  freedom  to  choose  and  define  oneself.    Autonomy  relies  upon 
theories of individuality and the nature  of humanity which, as  Christman 
explains,  is  „variable  and  fluid‟  meaning  that  „self-conceptions  (and  so 
“selves”) change over time and vary considerably across contexts.‟76  To inject 
meaning into the legal doctrine of „informed consent,‟ therefore, we need to 
identify  the  appropriate  elements  of  „self-conception‟  and  adopt  a 
contextually appropriate definition of autonomy.  This is, surprisingly, quite 
easy to do.   
 
Whatever  view  of  self-definition,  freedom,  liberty,  self-determination, 
individuality (to list just a few of the relevant labels) is adopted by scholars, 
there remains one constant, and that is the view of the individual as a self-
directing or self-authoring being.  The differences in theories spring from the 
view  of  the  relevant  influences  that  act  upon  that  individual  and 
identification of any possible limitations on individual authority.  In the idea 
of  the  individual  as  author  of  his  or  her  own  life,  however,  we  begin  to 
identify  a  model  of  autonomy  which  can  be  readily  understood  and  is 
relevant to the context of a patient embarking on medical treatment.  This 
view of autonomy is not a new one and scholars now discuss it under the 
broad heading of narrative autonomy. 
 
In  managing  our  identity  and  planning  our  future  we  ask  two  questions: 
„what should I do‟ and „who should I be?‟77  In the process of answering these 
questions, we set out our life‟s story and it is from the continuity of this story 
that we establish continuity of being.78  The planning of life‟s story is about 
                                                 
76 Christman, above n.39, 145. 
77 J.Bransen, „Personal Identity Management‟ in K.Atkins and C.MacKenzie (ed), Practical Identity and Narrative 
Agency (Routledge, New York, 2008), 113. 
78 Atkins, above n.74, 79. 265 
„integrat[ing] my past, present and anticipated attributes.‟79  Intimately linked 
to this process of self-definition and continuity of story is the physical body 
because, as Atkins notes, „our bodies are simultaneously something that we 
have and something that we are‟80 and are an „integral component of our 
narrative  identity.‟81  This  then  is  the  key  to  the  relevance  of  narrative 
autonomy  in  the  context  of  pre-treatment  advice.    We  obtain  information 
which  helps  us  to  identify  our  possible  future  selves  and  an  integral 
component of the possible futures is our physical health.  If we are unaware 
of the possibilities then we lose the right of authorship: the story is potentially 
taken out of the hands of the author. 
 
The concept of life as a story with individuals in charge of the narrative is 
further explained by Bransen who describes it in the following terms: lives  
„do not just happen or take place; they are lived and living a life means at 
least  once  in  a  while,  facing  practical  problems  and  solving  them  by 
determining the best alternatives of oneself.‟82  Thus a key part of living our 
lives  is  determining  future  paths  and  this  is  done  through  the  process  of 
identifying  possible  future  selves,  or,  as  Bransen  explains  it,  of  facing  the 
difficult  choice  and  wondering  who  we  should  or  would  be  if  we  take  a 
particular  path.83  It  is  all  about  a  process  of  „imaginative  projection‟  and 
„helping us envisage future possibilities and to make sense of the alternatives 
we face.‟84   
 
The  recommended  model  of  autonomy  for  the  purposes  of  legal 
consideration of pre-treatment advice is therefore narrative autonomy.  It is 
appropriate to define the patient as the author of their future, the one who is 
to consider the possible paths lying before them and then choose the most 
                                                 
79 Ibid, 91-92. 
80 Ibid, 82. 
81 Ibid, 86. 
82 J.Bransen, above n.77, 108.  
83 Ibid, 107. 
84 C.Mackenzie, „Identity and Self Transformation‟ in K.Atkins and C.MacKenzie (ed), Practical Identity and 
Narrative Agency (Routlegde, New York, 2008), 122-123. 266 
appropriate one.  This model is consistent with both individual and relational 
conceptions  of  autonomy  and  supports  the  fundamental  requirement  of 
liberty or freedom of choice.  Narrative autonomy provides a clear view of 
autonomy  which,  for  present  purposes,  avoids  the  complexities  of  the 
individual  vs.  relational  debate  and  embraces  the  essence  of  autonomy 
upheld by all theorists. 
 
Some final thoughts 
 
[10.80]  Autonomy  is  a term employed to justify the doctrine  of „informed 
consent‟ yet, as Coggon notes, it is „rare for a judge to provide an explicit, 
philosophical investigation of autonomy.‟85 The judiciary refers to autonomy 
in  a  manner  that  implies  a  common  and  implicitly  agreed  upon, 
understanding of the nature of autonomy and the personal authority that it 
connotes. But even the most cursory of reviews of the scholarly literature on 
autonomy will reveal that this is not the case.  Autonomy as an ideal is almost 
universally supported but it is not universally defined. 
 
It is important to recognise, however, that this lack of a universal definition 
may not, on the whole, be a bad thing.  A complex and fundamental aspect of 
humanity, such as autonomy, is perhaps best dealt with via a broad brush.  
As  Gerald  Dworkin  has  suggested,  it  may  be  more  appropriate  to 
„characterise‟ rather than to „define‟ complex philosophical concepts (such as 
autonomy)  if  they  are  to  retain  any  meaning.    Any  attempt  to  „specify 
necessary and sufficient conditions‟ may well drain it „of the very complexity 
that enable[s] it to perform its theoretical role.‟86 Dworkin also challenges the 
very existence of a „core meaning that underlies all these various uses of the 
term.‟87 But the preceding discussion has demonstrated that there are clear 
and  consistent  themes  and  ideals.  Three  core  considerations  are:  liberty, 
                                                 
85 Coggon, above n.7, 236. 
86 Gerald Dworkin, above n.16, 6 
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choice and self-definition.  Similarly, it is possible to identify, at the heart of 
the  debate,  a  self-authoring  individual.  And  it  is  this  self-authoring 
individual who can serve to characterise the term autonomy and enable us to 
create a more accessible and transparent legal consideration of the provision  
of pre-treatment advice.  As Schneider has suggested: 
 
… some simplifications of life‟s complexity is necessary if human problems 
are to be handled practically and promptly, if comprehensible rules are to be 
devised, if useful precedent is to be developed, if institutions are to function 
smoothly.88 
 
For now, we will put the discussion of autonomy and the characterisation of 
the self-authoring individual to one side and address the concept of choice.  It 
is  in  the  adoption  of  the  model  of  narrative  autonomy,  set  alongside  the 
rejection of consent (and adoption of choice) that we will find an appropriate 
simplification of the complexity of „informed consent‟. 
                                                 
88 Schneider, above n.38, xvii. 268 




[11.10] The  preceding Chapters have tracked the ongoing  judicial struggle 
with the central themes of the doctrine of ‘informed consent’.1  Central to this 
struggle is the unhappy marriage of ‘not just two elements but two doctrines: 
one  a  doctrine  of  informational  obligation  which,  contingently  bears  on 
consensual decision-making; the other a defence of consent to an intentional 
tort’2;  that  is,  a  ‘marriage’  of  negligence  and  trespass  within  the  same 
‘doctrine’. As we have seen, the central argument of this thesis is that the 
legal  test  of  ‘informed  consent’  and  its  accompanying  language  do  not 
achieve  the  foundational  aim  of  protection  of  patient  autonomy.    A  more 
effective  model  requires  a  rejection  of  loose  language  and  an  adoption  of 
carefully defined terms.  This can be achieved by a removal of the concept of 
consent  in  favour  of  choice.    Despite  consent  being  described  as  ‘poorly 
defined and curiously unstable’3 it does have a specific legal definition in the 
law of tort. Its legal purpose is to negative trespass and it is not related to the 
quality of pre-consent information.  Choice, however, does rely on quality of 
information  and  is  a  process  that  occurs  prior  to  consent.    It  is  therefore 
essential that a model of choice is formulated and placed within the legal 
framework  around  consideration  of  the  provision  of  advice  prior  to 
treatment.   
 
                                                 
1  These  themes  are  of  course  the  provision  of  advice,  protection  of  autonomy  and  bodily  integrity  and  the 
identification of appropriate professional standards. 
2 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Consent and the Law (Hart Publishing, Portland Oregon, 2007), 174. This concept 
was first raised in Chapter 1 and discussed in the specific context of Australia in Chapter 7.  
3 I.  Leader-Elliott and N. Naffine, „Wittenstein, Rape  Law and  the Language  Games of Consent‟ (2000) 26 
Monash University Law Review 48, 48. 269 
We have now arrived at the final stage of the critique of ‘informed consent’ 
and this Chapter will focus on the concept of consent.  It will become clear 
that the interests of both the patient and doctor will be best served when the 
language of consent is removed from the discussion. We will then turn to the 
idea of choice, establish a clear account of the process of choosing (which 
includes provision of appropriate advice) and briefly consider rational choice 
theory  to  demonstrate  why  choice  is  the  more  appropriate  model  in  this 
context.  Finally, Sally’s choice process will be considered and the precise 
nature of her loss, once it is framed in these terms, will be demonstrated.  





[11.20]  The  introduction  to  this  thesis,  and  the  elaboration  on  the  law  in 
Parts I  and  II  demonstrated  that  there  have  been  some  clear  judicial 
statements rejecting the language of consent as appropriate when examining 
the  provision  of  advice  prior  to  medical  treatment.4  However,  as  also 
highlighted in these earlier discussions, the interpretation of key decisions 
and  subsequent  scholarly  discourse  has  embraced  the  term  ‘consent’  and 
resulted  in  the  wide  acceptance  of  the  label  ‘informed  consent.’5  It  is 
important  to  note  at  this  point  that,  as  with  autonomy  (discussed  in 
Chapter 10),  consent  is  adopted  and  adapted  in  judicial  and  scholarly 
discussion but never defined.  It is, yet again, an example of an assumed 
understanding  of  a  concept.    A  close  consideration  of  the  philosophical, 
                                                 
4 See for example the clear statement in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ), here the Court specifically stated that the issue was one of the provision of 
advice prior to treatment and not one of consent.  This authoritative judgment contained the assertion that 
consent is relevant in the context of actions framed in trespass and not negligence. 
5 This was recognised by Kirby J in Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 476-477 where His Honour 
acknowledged the rejection of notions of consent in the earlier decision of Rogers v Whitaker but explained that 
the concerns dealt with in both Rogers and Rosenberg were the same as those commonly dealt with in the legal 
and medical literature under the label of  „informed consent‟.  270 
judicial and plain language meaning of consent reveals that, as suggested by 
the High Court in Rogers v Whitaker,6 consent has a narrow meaning that is 
only truly relevant in the context of trespass to the person.7   
 
Consent is a social activity.  It is a communication by one person to another of 
the result of the internal processes of choice.  It is important to remember that 
consent  simpliciter  is  the  end  of  a  process  and  cannot  be  reduced  to  the 
minutae  of  information  provided  to  the  consenter,  or  the  quality  of  that 
internal,  and  often  deeply  personal,  process  of  choice.    Consent  is  quite 
simply an agreement.  The law does not address the quality of the consent. It 
is an absolute term and is either positive or negative.  Significantly, consent, 
unlike autonomy or choice, lacks a deeper philosophical meaning and is a 
straightforward word, with a simple and straightforward meaning, that has 
become  overly  complicated  through  the  evolution  of  the  doctrine  of 
‘informed consent.’ 
 
To  effectively  challenge  the  relevance  of  the  notion  of  consent  it  is 
appropriate  to  clearly  define  it.    This  is  best  achieved  through  a  brief 
consideration of the plain English, legal, and philosophical dictionaries. If we 
turn  first  to  the  plain  English  dictionary,  the  definition  of  consent  is 
straightforward.  It is defined as an expression of willingness, a granting of 
permission,  an  agreement.8  Consent  is  not  a  deeply  philosophical  or 
conceptually difficult term.  Indeed it is absent from any of the philosophical 
dictionaries  consulted  when  I  was  attempting  to  come  to  terms  with  the 
                                                 
6 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
7 It is worth noting here that consent, like autonomy, has a rich body of literature which is concerned with seeking 
a coherent definition in the context of criminal offences against the person.  This is, however, well outside of the 
scope of this thesis but an illuminating discussion of consent in the context of criminal offences can be found in: 
I.  Leader-Elliott  and  N.Naffine,  „Wittenstein,  Rape  Law  and  the  Language  Games  of  Consent‟ (2000)  26 
Monash University Law Review 48.  
8 The Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991). 271 
language  surrounding  pre-treatment  advice.9  Similarly,  those  few  Legal 
Dictionaries which define consent, simply mirror the plain English definition.  
It is described as ‘affirmative acceptance. Actual agreement by a plaintiff to 
the action complained of,’10 and ‘an agreement to expose oneself to a risk or 
participate in an activity. Consent generally operates as a complete defence at 
common law for trespass to the person.’11 It is notable that in other, equally-
common legal dictionaries, the term consent is not defined,12 thus indicating 
the assumption that  consent is to be given its plain English definition: an 
affirmation  or  agreement.  There  is  no  reference  to  the  quality  of  the 
information or the process of making the decision to consent in any of the 
definitions,  yet  both  play  a  significant  role  in  the  doctrine  of  ‘informed 
consent.’ 
 
How then can such a simple term have travelled so far from its plain English, 
and  apparent  legal  meaning  to  encompass  broader  issues  including  the 
quality of advice given prior to treatment.  A clue can be found in the New 
Oxford  Companion to Law13  which supplies  a  contextual definition with the 
inclusion of a definition of ‘consent to treatment.’ This definition notes that 
the expectation of patient consent to treatment is a ‘legal expression of self-
determination’ and reflects the primacy of autonomy.  The discussion at this 
point focuses on the right to refuse life-preserving treatment which prevails 
over the ethical principle of sanctity of life.  It is significant that the provision 
of advice prior to treatment is not initially discussed.  Instead, the definition 
refers to the proposition that treatment in the absence of consent will give rise 
                                                 
9 These included the Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (Fontana, Collins, 1977), Penguin Dictionary of 
Philosophy, (2
nd ed, Penguin, London, 2005), and The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1995). 
10 Butterworths Concise Legal Dictionary, (3
rd ed, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2004). 
11 Oxford Australian Law Dictionary, General Ed Trischa Mann, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2010). 
12 See for example, CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law, Words and Phrases Legally Defined, (4
th ed, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Sydney 2000) and Words and Phrases Judicially Defined in Canadian Courts and Tribunals, 
(Toronto, Carswell, 1993). 
13 P. Cane and J. Conaghan ed, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). 272 
to the tort of battery.  Once the narrow definition of consent to treatment is 
explained,  the  definition  then  expands  to  include  consideration  of  the 
appropriate  level  of  information.  Interestingly  there  is  an  assertion  that 
‘Courts have declined to give full effect to the ethical doctrine of informed 
consent.’14  This is to be contrasted with a statement in the next paragraph 
that failure to inform the patient about the risks, side effects and alternatives 
will  not  give  rise  to  an  action  in  battery  but  in  negligence  through  the 
doctrine of informed consent.  This somewhat muddled definition reflects the 
problematic state of the existing use of language.  The New Oxford Companion 
to  Law  purports  to  simplify  and  explain  the  law  yet  cannot  avoid  the 
inconsistencies  of  a  law  which  is  not  about  consent  but  relies  upon  the 
language of consent.  It is this internal inconsistency of the existing doctrine 
of  ‘informed  consent’  that  lays  the  foundations  for  later  conceptual 
difficulties and, as explained above,15 the linking of a wrong with a logically 
irrelevant harm (that is, the dignitary wrong of withholding of information 
being  linked  to,  and  measured  by,  the  infliction  of  an  unrelated  physical 
harm).  
 
A  final  source  of  interpretation  of  a  legal  term  is,  of  course,  judicial 
discussion.  Superior Courts in both Australia and the United Kingdom have 
specifically rejected the role of ‘consent’ in the evaluation of the quality of 
pre-treatment information.  Lord Donaldson in Sidaway v Board of Governors of 
the Bethlehem Royal Hospital16 clearly stated that he was ‘wholly satisfied that 
as a matter of English law a consent is not vitiated by a failure on the part of 
the  doctor  to  give  the  patient  sufficient  information  before  the  consent  is 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 This issue was first raised in Part I when we explored the appropriate standard of care but was specifically 
highlighted in Part II when the efficacy of the current causative test was challenged. 
16 [1984] QB 493. 273 
given.’17  Similarly,  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker18  the  High  Court  stipulated  that 
‘consent is relevant to cases involving trespass not negligence < the question 
is not one of consent < Battery is negatived by the patient being advised in 
broad terms of the nature of the procedure to be performed.’19 On this view 
then, the quality of pre-treatment advice is not concerned with consent. 
 
At law, consent is defined in plain English terms.  It is the active agreement to 
a particular course of treatment and does not rely on a particular quality of 
information.  The use of the term ‘informed consent’ is inconsistent with clear 
judicial comments that the term should not be used.  This inconsistency leads 
those attempting  to clarify  the law20  to make incoherent statements to the 
effect that there is no doctrine of informed consent but then to presuppose its 
existence  and  declare  that  the  doctrine  of  informed  consent  rests  on  the 
provision of advice prior to treatment.  It is essential therefore that we turn 
away from the problematic language of consent and adopt a language which 
reflects the process that actually occurred before consent was given and will 
enable  an  appropriate  identification  and  measurement  of  loss.    The 




[11.30] Turning now to choice, a consideration of the nature of choice will 
clarify  why  choice,  not  consent,  more  accurately  reflects  the  interplay  of 
rights  and  duties  in  the  pre-treatment  conversation.    The  important  point 
with respect to choice is that it is repeatedly referred to as an internal process.  
A further relevant consideration in the context of this thesis is that not only is 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 511. 
18 (1992)175 CLR 479. 
19 Ibid, 490. 
20 For example, the authors of New Oxford Companion to Law, above n.13. 274 
choice both internal and a process (as opposed to an end point), but it is a 
deeply personal process that cannot be measured by physical outcomes. A 
consistent  theme  of  the  definitions  is  the  evolutionary  nature  of  an 
individual’s  choice  and  the  significance  of  options.    Choice  evolves  and 
matures as the individual becomes aware of all relevant options and weighs 
them against each other.  Thus the process of making a choice is an integral 
part of the pre-treatment conversation. 
 
As with  consent,  if a clear understanding  of the nature  of choice  is to be 
gained, we must first begin with a basic definition of the term.  Turning first 
to the plain English definitions: In The Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary, choice is 
defined as ‘The act or instance of choosing, a range from which to choose.  To 
choose is to select out of a greater number.’ 21 The New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary  refines  the  definition  and  refers  to  choice  as  ‘deciding  between 
possibilities.  A scope or field of possibilities.’22 The significance of different 
options  or  possibilities  is  also  emphasised  in  the  only  philosophical 
dictionary  consulted  that  included  choice,23  where  choosing  and  deciding 
were linked together and defined as ‘< mental events or processes that may 
issue in ordinary actions. Selecting from a range of options. A mental event.’  
The third and final source of definition is  of course legal dictionaries and 
judicial  discussion.    The  term  choice  is  not  included  in  general  legal 
definitions but Words and Phrases Legally Defined24 refers us to a High Court 
decision which defined choice as ‘meaning no more than to make a selection 
                                                 
21 The Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary ,Oxford (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991). 
22 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Volume 1. (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993). 
23 The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted J Honerich, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995). Choice 
was not included in: The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996), 
Fowlers Modern English Usage ,(3
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between different things to alternatives submitted, to take by preference out 
of all that are available.’25 
 
It is clear, therefore, that choice can be distinguished from consent. Choice is 
the process that occurs prior to the granting of consent and, significantly in 
this context, relies upon a clear and complete array of options.  Thus when 
considering the provision of information, the significance of choice is easily 
identified:  the  absence  of  information  reduces  the  range  of  options  and 
undermines the careful balancing process that is choice.   
 
A model of choice 
 
[11.40] The provision of advice and information is integral to the process of 
choice.  The concept of choice is not enclosed in a static definition and there is 
a  vast  body  of  scholarly  work  exploring  choice  theory  in  psychology, 
education  and  economics.26  It  is  well  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis  to 
explore this body of work in any depth but it is worth pausing and taking a 
brief look at the essentials of one of the more common theories of choice: 
rational  choice  theory.    The  key  to  all  versions  of  choice  is  the  ability  to 
consider the future (or, more specifically, to consider possible futures) and 
then  choose  the  best  or  most  appropriate  path  to  the  preferred  possible 
future.  In denying access to realistic insight into possible futures, there is an 
undermining of the choice process and this is where the loss is sustained.  It is 
not related at all to the granting of consent, the agreement to the touching of 
                                                 
25 Judd v McKeon (1926) 38 CLR 380, 383 (Knox CJ, Garan, Duffy and Starke JJ). 
26 See for example, M. Dan-Cohen, „Conceptions of Choice and Conceptions of Autonomy‟ in Harmful Thoughts. 
Essays on Law, Self and Morality,‟ (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002), R. Hastie and R. M.Dawes, 
Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: The psychology of judgment and decision making ( Sage Publications, 
London, 2001), D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement ( Oxford University Press, ,Oxford 1986), M.Allingham 
Choice  Theory:  a  Very  Short  Introduction  (Oxford  University  Press,Oxford,  2002)  and  J.  Riley  Liberal 
Utilitarianism:  Social  Choice  Theory  and  J.S.  Mills  Philosophy  (Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press, 
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one’s body.  Consent is the endpoint of the choice process and the loss has 
occurred before that point is reached. 
 
The  process  of  choice  and  the  essential  nature  of  information  regarding 
possible  futures  is  clearly  enunciated  in  rational  choice  theory.    Rational 
choice involves a choice set and depends upon preference. The process at the 
heart  of rational  choice  theory  is  selection  and  it  has  been  suggested  that 
‘choice is about control, about achieving what each individual wants. To be 
able to shape one’s life.’27 Thus in being able to control the future and make 
an informed selection, the ‘chooser’ must be aware of all of the elements of 
the choice set; they must, in the words of the High Court, be informed of all 
‘material’ information.28 
 
The process of making a choice is complex.  Rational choice theory identifies 
four criteria to be met if a choice is to be described as ‘rational’ (or of value): 
 
1.  It is based on the decision-maker’s current assets. Assets include not 
only  money  but  physiological  state,  psychological  capacities,  social 
relationships and feelings, 
2.  It is based on the possible consequences of the choice,  
3.  When these consequences are uncertain, their likelihood is evaluated 
according to the basic rules of probability theory, and 
4.  It  is  a  choice  that  is  adaptive  within  the  constraints  of  those 
probabilities and the values or satisfactions associated with each of 
the possible consequences of the choice.29 
 
                                                 
27 M. Dan-Cohen, „Conceptions of Choice and Conceptions of Autonomy‟ in Harmful Thoughts. Essays on Law, 
Self and Morality (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002), 126.  This author in fact then moves on from a 
model of choice and expounds a theory of „willing‟ a detailed and technical discussion that is well beyond the 
parameters of this thesis. 
28 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
29 R. Hastie and R. M.Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: The psychology of judgment and decision 
making (Sage Publications, London 2001), 18. 277 
If we examine each of these criteria in the context of advice prior to treatment 
it  becomes  apparent  that  they  can  be  linked  easily  with  the  process  of 
diagnosis, identification of options and discussion of those options.30 Clearly 
the patient’s ‘assets’ include their relationships with their family, their age 
and, most importantly, the nature of their condition.  The second criterion is 
the ‘missing link’ in the pre-treatment advice situations.  When the doctor 
fails to explore all possible options with the patient, the patient is unaware of 
all the consequences  of their choice.  If there  is no  discussion of ‘material’ 
risks, then there is an obvious gap in the choice process.  Similarly, if the 
information is not conveyed to the patient, then they are unable to meet the 
third criterion. There is no realistic evaluation of the likelihood of a particular 
outcome (in the patient’s optimistic view, this is perhaps a return to good 
health) in the absence of complete information.  If a particular likelihood is 
not even mentioned, then there is no ability to assess the probability of a 
preferred outcome.  Finally, the fourth criterion is also undermined in the 
absence  of  complete  information.  The  patient  cannot  adapt  their  choice 
within the constraints of probabilities and possibilities when information is 
either  withheld  or  overlooked.    They  are  unable  to  evaluate  values  or 
satisfactions  associated  with  consequences  of  which  they  are  unaware.  
Rational  choice  theory  turns  on  successful  and  comprehensive 
communication of options and incomplete communication undermines the 
rationality of choice. A significant component of rational choice theory is the 
ability  to  assess  thoroughly  future  possibilities  and  consequences.31  It  is 
essential that we are able to predict what will make us happy after we choose 
a particular path.32  This predictive process is broader than mere expectations 
of happiness and includes a balancing of options, an evaluation of all aspects 
                                                 
30 For the purposes of this discussion, the term „patient‟ will be used in place of „decision-maker‟. 
31 Hastie and Dawes, above n.29, 44. 
32 Ibid, 199 278 
of the expected consequences and a clear understanding of what we want 
and how best to achieve it.33 
 
The theory of rational choice then can be seen as ‘primarily concerned with 
preferences  between  states  of  affairs  conceived  as  alternative  possibilities 
realisable in action.’34 When a patient is not fully informed, the alternative 
possibilities are not all available for their assessment and it is quite easy to 
identify a loss.  The patient is not empowered to be a ‘rational’ chooser and it 
is the choice that precedes the consent that is flawed, not the consent itself. 
 
Drawing this discussion back to the central theme of the provision of advice 
prior to treatment, it becomes clear that choice, and the process of choosing, is 
at the heart of both judicial and scholarly discussions.  Some scholars prefer 
the  language  of  ‘choice’  to  that  of  consent:  Jones  has  argued  that  ‘it  is  a 
misnomer  to  talk  of  informed  consent  since  a  patient’s  right  to  the 
information will enable him to make a meaningful choice,’35 and Faden and 
Beauchamp referred us to the Canterbury decision and the ‘informed exercise 
of choice.’36  Similarly Berg et al described the ‘underlying rationale’ of the 
doctrine of ‘informed consent’ as the empowerment of patients to ‘exercise 
choice’37  and  Ronald  Dworkin,  in  describing  autonomy,  referred  to  the 
‘integrity of the choosing agent’ and the ideal of ‘self-creation.’38 Similarly, the 
judiciary  has  appealed  to  choice.  As  we  have  seen,  it  was  central  to  the 
discussions of the High Court in Rogers v Whitaker.39 This language has been 
                                                 
33 Ibid, 199-200 and 252. 
34 D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement  (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986), 22. 
35 M.A. Jones, Medical Negligence (Lawbook Co, Sydney. 2003), [6-105]. 
36 R.R. Faden and T.L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1986), 133. They were referring to Canterbury v Spence 464 Fed Report 2d, 772 (1972). 
37 J.W. Berg, P.S.Appelbaum, C.W. Lidz, L.S Parker, Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice 
2
nd ed, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), 48. 
38 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual Freedom  (Vintage 
Books, New York, 1993), 224. This linking of choice and „self-creation‟ is consistent with my discussion here 
about choice and self-authorship (narrative autonomy discussed in Chapter 11). 
39 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 279 
adopted  in  later  decisions.  In  Rosenberg  v  Percival,  for  example,  Kirby  J 
supported his argument with the assertion that it is ‘more respectful of the 
entitlement  of  patients,  whose  privilege  of  choice  this  area  of  the  law  is 
intended to reinforce,’40  and Basten  JA,  in the  New South Wales  Court of 
Appeal, suggested that the ‘...duty to warn might more aptly be described as 
a duty to inform or communicate information, so as to permit the patient to 
make an informed choice,’41 and in the same Court, Santow AJA referred to 
the notion of ‘informed choice.’42  
 
Thus  choice  is  already  an  accepted  part  of  the  language  surrounding  the 
provision  of  pre-treatment  advice.    But  it  is  not  carried  through  to  its 
conclusion,  and  the  practical  reality  is  that,  despite  the  adoption  of  the 
language of choice, Courts and scholarly debates tend to shift focus back to 
the notion of consent.  The enquiry needs to maintain the focus on choice as it 
is here that the true loss is to be found.  The consent to treatment comes after 
a flawed choice-making process as the patient has been denied the right to 
complete information and is no longer in charge of their personal narrative.  
It is the denial of choice, through inadequate information, that is the true loss 
and it is this that should be recognised.  Once the discussion becomes centred 
on informed choice, as opposed to informed consent, the nature of the loss 
becomes evident and the essential causative link more readily identified.  If 




[11.50] As we have seen, Sally has a degenerative condition that, if left alone, 
will result in blindness within 5 years.  She sought advice from her doctor 
                                                 
40 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, [154], (Kirby J). 
41 Ellbourne v Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127, [57] (Basten JA). 
42 Johnson v Biggs [2000] NSWCA 338, [53] (Santow AJA). 280 
and two key pieces of information were withheld from her: first that she has 
no possibility of recovery (the most favourable outcome is a slowing down of 
the degeneration of her sight), and second, that there is a small (1 in 14,000) 
chance that the procedure could result in immediate onset of blindness.  The 
omission  of  these  two  possibilities  from  Sally’s  choice  set  means  that  her 
process of evaluation is flawed.  She is unaware of the reality of her situation.  
Her choice process can be diagrammatically represented in a ‘decision-tree’, a 
diagram  which,  as  explained  by  Hastie  and  Dawes,  reminds  us  ‘that  the 
crucial first step in understanding any decision is to describe the situation in 
which the decision occurs.’43 Figure 1 represents Sally’s view of her choice. 
Figure 2 represents the reality of her process.  The lighter coloured box in 
Figure  1  represents  fictions  that  Sally  believes  in,  and  in  Figure  2,  crucial 
elements  of  her  choice  set  of  which  Sally  is  unaware.    The  lighter  boxes 
therefore represent the flaws in her choice process. 
 
                                                 
43 Hastie and Dawes, above n.29, 33. 281 
FIGURE 1: SALLY'S VIEW 
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We see here that Sally’s view of reality is very straightforward. Proceeding 
with the treatment has no possible negative outcome. She either recovers or 
remains  the  same.    The  reality  of  her  situation,  however,  is  significantly 
different.  She  can,  at  best,  slow  down  the  degeneration  and,  at  worst, 
accelerate it to the point that she is immediately blind.  Sally has no insight 
into this aspect of reality; she is not addressing ‘realisable’ possibilities;44 the 
future she envisages is a fiction for there is no possibility of a complete cure. 
Sally  has  clearly  suffered  a  loss.  She  is  unable  to  realistically  assess  her 
options and her possible future selves.  Despite this the current framework 
which focuses on the end point of the choice process - the consent (or not) to 
treatment - fails to recognise the very real loss that Sally has sustained.  Her 
consent is valid, as she has agreed to the surgery and given permission to the 
touching,  but  the  choice  behind  that  consent  is  flawed  and  rendered 
‘meaningless.’45 
 
We cannot consent to a particular path until we have made a choice between 
possible paths. Consent is a social and legal communication with both social 
and legal consequences.  Choice on the other hand is a private and internal 
activity.  It  represents  the  exercise  of  the  autonomous  right  to  choose  a 
particular path. The consent is then the communication of that choice and if 
the  choice  is  meaningless  then  there  is  not  true  consent.  Importantly, 
however, even if the consent is based on a flawed choice it will still constitute 
sufficient legal consent to negate an action in trespass to the person.  
 
The loss then is a process loss.  Autonomy and the authority to make choice 
based  upon  clear  and  realisable  options  are  both  denied.    The  existing 
approach to ‘informed consent’ is therefore flawed.  The judiciary seeks to 
                                                 
44 Gauthier, above n.34, 22. 
45 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 283 
protect  patient  autonomy  and  begins  with  the  basic  right  to  sufficient 
information to infuse choice with meaning.46  The adoption of the trespassory 
notion of consent then serves to misdirect the enquiry and we have seen the 
ongoing struggle to link two conceptually different ideals: the right to bodily 
integrity and the right to information and meaningful personal choice.   
 
We have three useful legal concepts at play here:  „Consent‟ (appropriately 
dealt  with  in  the  context  of  trespass  to  the  person,  but  misplaced  in  the 
negligence  enquiry),  autonomy  (currently  lacking  a  sufficiently  precise 
definition) and choice (introduced in the discussions but not afforded any 
legal significance). The way forward is to return consent to the confines of 
trespass and move to the process of choice.  If this is done, then the patient 
will be empowered to make their own choice and maintain control of their 
personal narrative.  Such a shift does not require a significant overhaul of the 
law.  Rather it represents the establishment of a realistic and attainable legal 
„doctrine‟  which  would  sit  comfortably  within  the  existing  framework  of 
negligence law and formally apply the existing judicial language of consent. 
 
Before  drawing  this  discussion  to  a  close  I  acknowledge  that  the 
quantification  of  damages  for  such  a  dignitary  harm  may  be  problematic.   
Nonetheless, I argue that this is not a problem that has defeated the law in the 
past.  One needs only consider the chequered history of ‘nervous shock’ (now 
mental harm) or the willingness of the courts to award damages for loss of 
expectation of life or pain and suffering to see that intangible losses can be, 
and  have  been,  quantified.    Significantly,  in  Tame  and  Annetts47  the  High 
Court asserted that psychiatric harm ‘is not damage of a different kind from 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Tame v State of New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317.  284 
physical injury’48 and were able to apply general damages principles to the 
specific issue before the court.  
 
Whilst  the  actual  quantification  of  damages  for  the  harm  suffered  when 
choice is denied is well outside of the scope of this thesis, it is appropriate to 
consider briefly what approach to such quantification could be adopted by 
the Courts.   This brief discussion will outline one general approach which 
could be utilised.   While the discussion will not be comprehensive, my aim is 
to  indicate  that  whilst  it  may  be  difficult  to  quantify  the  damages  for  a 
dignitary harm, it is neither impossible nor inconsistent with established law 
to do so.   
 
The starting point is that damages for all non-economic losses are notoriously 
difficult  to  calculate  with  any  mathematical  certainty.    This  does  not, 
however,  represent an insurmountable obstacle to the award of damages for 
such  loss.    In  the  existing  negligence  framework,  damages  are  routinely 
awarded for intangible losses such as pain and suffering, loss of amenities 
and loss of expectation of life,  all of which are analogous to the dignitary 
harm suffered when a patient is denied the right to make an informed choice.  
The problematic nature of these forms of loss has been acknowledged by the 
judiciary  and  the  legislature.    However,  in  the  High  Court  decision  of 
Todorovic  v  Waller,49  Gibbs  CJ  and  Wilson  J  reminded  us  that  whilst  it  is 
difficult to assess damages in the absence of physical or economic loss, as the 
quantum of the harm is ‘less obvious,’ it does not mean that it is ‘less real.’50   
It  is  my  argument  that  dignitary  harm  is  analogous  to  the  types  of  non-
economic loss which are already recognised by tort law.   Therefore, I argue 
dignitary harm is as real as any physical or economic one but more difficult 
                                                 
48 Ibid, 368, McHugh J. 
49 (1981) 150 CLR 402. 
50 Ibid, 412 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J). 285 
to quantify.  It has been recognised in existing tort law, that mere difficulty in 
quantification should not prevent the courts engaging with such loss and as 
stated  in  Todorovic  ‘the  difficulty  inherent  in  the  assessment  of  damages 
provides no reason for the courts to shirk the task of arriving at the estimate 
most likely to provide fair and reasonable compensation.   But it may provide 
reason for approaching it with some caution.’51  
 
The type of dignitary harm I am considering in this context is distinct from 
the physical injury which has traditionally been linked to ‘informed consent’ 
and which is inflicted prior to the provision of medical treatment.  It is an 
abstract harm, that is analogous to the mental anguish and insult that occurs 
as  a  result  of  discriminatory  behaviour.    The  essential  harm  is  always 
dignitary  as  it  involves  the  loss  of  the  right  to  choose  with  appropriate 
knowledge.   Whilst the harm can exist alongside a physical injury, it is a 
separate  form  of  harm  and  must  be  treated  as  such.      In  seeking  an 
appropriately cautious model of damages, therefore, a relevant comparator is 
to be found in anti-discrimination law, which deals with issues of human 
dignity.    Human  dignity  (and  therefore  dignitary  harm),  is  a  potentially 
imprecise  notion  and  yet  it  is  one  which  is  of  ‘value  and  worth  to  all 
individuals in society.’52  It is helpful therefore to consider how Australian 
courts  have  placed  a  value  on  the  harm  suffered  to  dignity  when 
discrimination has occurred. The preferred approach of the Federal Court of 
Australia has been to turn to tort law for guidance on the determination of 
damages.  It was suggested by Lockhart J in Hall v Sheiban53 that it ‘would be 
unwise to prescribe an inflexible measure of damage in cases of this kind’54 
                                                 
51 Ibid, 413 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J). 
52 C. Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011), 122. Here Foster was quoting 
from a decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice (1998) 6 BHRC 127, [30] (Ackermann J). This is relevant in this context as it is dealing with 
the two concepts under consideration which are anti-discrimination law and human dignity. 
53 Hall v Sheiban (1989) 20 FCR 217, a decision dealing with the harm suffered as a result of sexual harassment. 
54 Ibid, [239] (Lockhart J). 286 
but his Honour went on to say that ‘the measure of damages is the same as 
the general principles respecting measure of damages in tort, it is the closest 
analogy that I can find and one that would in most foreseeable cases be a 
sensible  and  sound  test.’55  This  can,  in  turn,  provide  guidance  to  courts 
assessing damages for the denial of choice.    
 
It is clear then that damages could be assessed for dignitary harms, utilising 
existing tort principles.  What would this mean in practice?   In much the 
same  manner  as  in  other  negligence  situations,    it  would  require 
consideration of the facts and circumstances before the court: by looking at 
the  plaintiff  and  determining  what  personal  loss  was  suffered  by  the 
identified wrong.  Some guidance is provided by a decision from the English 
Court  of  Appeal  where  Mummery  LJ  acknowledged  the  difficulty  of 
assessing  intangible  losses    but  was  nevertheless  able  to  suggest  a  way 
forward noting that ‘the courts and tribunals have to do the best they can on 
the available material to make sensible assessment.’56 
 
A similar point was made by May LJ in Alexander v Home Office57 ( a decision 
cited with approval by the Australian Federal Court in Hall v Sheiban58) when 
he concluded that with respect to the assessment of damages, ‘it is impossible 
to say [with certainty] what is restitution [in these cases], the answer must 
depend on the experience and good sense of the judge and his assessors.’59  
Thus,  consistent  with  all  other  areas  of  negligence  law,  the  assessment  of 
damages in the context of the dignitary harm identified here is not a science.   
Rather it will require a careful and considered balancing of factors and will be 
left to the discretion of the courts.  If there is concern at a later date that 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2002] EWCA Civ 1871, [51] (Mummery LJ). 
57 [1988] 2 All ER 118. 
58 (1989) 20 FCR 217. 
59 Alexander v Home Office [1988] 2 All ER 118, 122 (May LJ). 287 
damages are inflated (or perhaps marginalised) then, as with non-economic 
loss  suffered  as  a  result  of  negligent  infliction  of  physical  harm,  the 
legislature may deem it prudent to step in and impose legislative controls.60  
In  short,  damages  for  the  dignitary  harm  suffered  when  insufficient 
treatment  information  is  provided  and  choice  is  denied  will  reflect  a 





                                                 
60 Refer Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s99, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Division 3, Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and Claims) Act 2003 (NT) s24,Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s52, Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s27, 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s28G, Civil Liability Act 2003 (WA) ss9 and 10 which all provide guidance to and 
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Chapter 12: Informed Choice 
 
Rejecting informed consent  
 
[12.10] We all have the right to choose the path of our medical treatment.  In 
choosing what path to take, we must be provided with sufficient information 
to make an informed (or „rational‟,1 or „meaningful‟2) decision. This truism is 
easy to accept but, as we have seen, it does not translate comfortably into law.  
The  doctrine  of  „informed  consent‟  is  the  accepted  legal  mechanism  for 
protecting this right.  It is, however, a faulty mechanism that represents the 
unhappy  and  unsuccessful  marriage  of  two  doctrines.3  This  thesis  has 
explored the problematic nature of this „marriage‟ and now draws the logical 
conclusion that a separation of the doctrines is in order.   
 
Negligence „is a basis of liability [concerned with] conduct that falls below the 
standard  regarded  as  normal  or  desirable.‟4  The  implementation  of  the 
current doctrine of „informed consent‟ begins with an appropriate exploration 
of what is the „desirable‟ amount of information to be provided to the patient.  
The  provision  of  information  is  aimed  at  empowering  the  patient  as  a 
decision-maker  and  providing  them  with  sufficient  information  to  choose 
their preferred treatment path.  This initial stage of the enquiry thus seeks to 
protect  the  autonomous  patient  and,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  preceding 
Chapters, autonomy is often cited as the foundation of „informed consent‟.   
 
                                                 
1 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital  & the Maudsley Hospital  & Ors [1984] QB 
493, 512 (Lord Donaldson). 
2 In Rogers v Whitaker the High Court described a decision based upon insufficient information as „meaningless‟ 
thus it can be implied that a decision made after the provision of sufficient information can be described as 
„meaningful‟, see Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and 
McHugh JJ). 
3 D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Consent and the Law (Hart Publishing, Portland Oregon, 2007), 174. This 
concept was first raised in Chapter 1 and discussed in the specific context of Australia in Chapter 7.  
4 C. Sappideen, and P. Vines (ed), Fleming’s The Law of Torts 10
th ed (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2011) 121. 289 
The  doctrine  stumbles,  however,  with  the  importation  of  the  concept  of 
consent,  a  central  feature  of  the  intentional  tort  of  trespass  to  the  person.  
Indeed,  the  „germinal  case‟  of  Schloendorff,5  from  which  the  doctrine  of 
informed  consent  is  said  to  have  emerged,6  is  in  fact  a  case  dealing  with 
trespass to the person and not negligence.  As we saw in Part II, it is at the 
causation stage of the enquiry that the Courts struggle to link the individual 
right to information to a subsequent, unrelated physical harm.  Autonomy is 
interpreted here as being expressed through the consent to treatment.  But 
autonomy  is  broader than  this  and  cannot be  limited  to  considerations  of 
bodily integrity. Whilst autonomy and bodily integrity are twin concepts that 
sit side by side (and in reality the absence of one often undermines the other), 
they are not one and the same.  An exercise of autonomy cannot be purely 
measured by the invocation of the right to bodily integrity.  An individual 
can  maintain  their  bodily  integrity  by  consenting  to  a  procedure  and 
indicating  their  willingness  to  be  touched  but  in  the  absence  of  complete 
information they are not truly exercising autonomy. Their right to form their 




[12.20] The character of autonomy and the basic aims of the law’s approach to 
pre-treatment discussions must be clearly understood if any meaningful legal 
intervention is to occur.  If we begin, as many judicial discussions of informed 
consent begin, with Cardozo’s renowned statement,7 we see that there are 
some clearly defined characteristics.  The autonomous being must be of adult 
years and ‘sound mind’.  They are able to make decisions regarding their 
                                                 
5 Retkwa v Orentreich 154 Misc. 2d 164 (1992, SC of NY County, NY), referring to Schloendorff v The Society of 
the New York Hospital 211 N.Y 125 (1914). 
6 The language of Schloendorff was adopted by Lord Steyn in Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, [14] and, closer 
to home, Kirby J described the Schloendorff rationale as „fundamental to the formulation adopted by this Court 
in  Rogers  v  Whitaker’  Rosenberg  v  Percival  (2001)  205  CLR  434,  [142]  (Kirby  J,  referring  to  Rogers  v 
Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479). 
7 „Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient‟s consent, commits an assault, for which he 
is liable in damages,‟ Schloendorff v The Society of the New York Hospital 211 N.Y 125 (1914), 129-130. 290 
body and are sovereign in this respect. Importantly, autonomy is expressed 
by  decisions  which  relate  to  the  physical  person,  that  is,  by  decisions 
regarding what is or is not done to one’s own body.  Here we see the legal 
principle of physical integrity driving the enquiry.  Thus it can be concluded 
that autonomy is related to physicality in this context and for autonomy to be 
harmed, physical harm must be sustained.  This assertion, made on the basis 
of  a  decision  involving  trespass  to  the  person,  has  become  central  to  the 
doctrine of ‘informed consent.’ Thus a principle of trespass to the person has 
become central to the practical application of negligence principles to consent 
to treatment.  As the doctrine currently stands, for an identified breach to be 
seen to have caused a harm, there must be clear evidence of the suffering of a 
physical  harm.  Importantly,  that  harm  must  be  the  one  about  which  the 
doctor failed to inform the patient and, the patient/plaintiff must be able to 
demonstrate  that  they  would  not  have  proceeded  with  the  treatment  had 
they been informed of the possibility of this harm.   
 
Once  again,  simple  statements  obscure  the  underlying  complexities.    As 
outlined in Part II and demonstrated by decisions such as Rosenberg v Percival8 
this  mandatory  linking  of  the  failure  to  inform  with  the  physical 
manifestation of the risk often means that the plaintiff/patient will fail in their 
action.  In anchoring the expression of autonomy to the physical, the law 
overlooks  significant  aspects  of  the  autonomous  individual  and  their 
expression  of  being.    Autonomy  is  not  purely  corporeal.  As  we  saw  in 
Chapter  10,  it  is  about  the  person’s  sense  of  self  which  embodies  both 
physical and internal, psychological aspects of being.  It is these, less tangible 
aspect of being that are harmed when insufficient information is provided.   
 
                                                 
8 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, refer to discussion in Chapter 7, in particular the discussion under 
the heading The subjective approach in the High Court: Rosenberg v Percival (at [7.50]ff). 291 
To confine autonomy within physical integrity is to deny the essence of the 
individuality of each individual.  Autonomy extends beyond a mere interest 
in our body.  It is a broad concept that encapsulates each person in their 
entirety.  As individuals, we craft our own path through life and it is in that 
crafting that we express the essence of ourselves as human beings.  If we are 
denied insight into potential treatment paths, including obstacles to health 
that may exist on those paths, then our sense and expression of self as an 
autonomous being is diminished. If the law surrounding the pre-treatment 
conversation is truly to protect the autonomous individual then a definition 
that looks beyond mere physical interests of each individual must be adopted 
by  the  Courts.    Such  a  definition  was  provided  in  Chapter  10  when  I 
proposed that we define the autonomous patient as an individual storyteller, 
reviewing and choosing between possible future selves.   
 
Gaps in the Current Approach  
 
[12.30] This thesis has asserted that we need to move away from the doctrine 
of ‘informed consent’ towards a new doctrine of ‘informed choice.’  In the 
process  of  developing  this  argument  some  significant  gaps  in  the  current 
approach have been identified and addressed. We have seen that autonomy 
is a complex concept which is difficult to define.  Possibly in response to this 
complexity  the  judiciary  has  avoided  any  attempt  at  definition,  opting 
instead to rely on broad statements regarding the rights that are accorded the 
autonomous  individual.9  It  is  from  this  avoidance  that  one  of  the  most 
significant  gaps  in  the  current  approach  emerges.    The  legal  enquiry 
consistently  begins  with  the  individual  and  an  affirmation  that  the 
autonomous individual sits at the centre of the discussion.  This starting point 
generally takes the form of an affirmation that our bodies are inviolate and 
                                                 
9 These are premised on Cardozo J‟s statement in Schloendorff  (see above n.7) and were explored in detail 
Chapter 9, Causation and policy (at [9.10]) and The policy diversion (at [9.20]ff) and then again in Chapter 10. 292 
that we have control over what is (or is not) done to our bodies.10 Then almost 
immediately the focus shifts and there is a retreat from the interests of the 
patient/plaintiff and the substance of the discussion focusses on the actions of 
the relevant doctor.  The question moves from a consideration of the rights of 
the patient to the duties of the doctor which may not directly correlate with 
those  patient  rights,  and  we  see  a  question  of  one  individual’s  personal 
dignity  and  autonomy  being  solved  by  close  analysis  of  the  professional 
standards of another individual (which may not have a direct bearing on the 
rights of the first individual). In short, the entire enquiry is backwards and 
the question of patient autonomy is quietly put to one side.11  
 
This  problem  was  clearly  outlined  in  Parts  I  and  II  and  warrant  a  brief 
reiteration here.  In the United States of America the foundational principle is 
consistently described as the right of each individual to determine what is (or 
is not) done to their own body.  As stated by Justice Robinson in Canterbury v 
Spence, ‘it is the clear prerogative of the patient < to determine the direction 
in which their interests lie.’12  His Honour went on to adopt the language of 
Schloendorff  and  to  talk  of  the  ‘informed  exercise  of  choice.’13  Thus  the 
enquiry emphatically begins with the individual, with a focus on the patient’s 
right to determine the path of their medical treatment.  This focus, however, 
is  short-lived  and,  as  outlined  in  Part  I,  the  judicial  eyes  are  almost 
immediately lifted from the patient and turned to the treating doctor.  As 
noted in Chapter 2, Canterbury v Spence is held out as the highpoint in patient 
                                                 
10 See for example Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d. 772, 784 (Robinson J), „It is the clear prerogative of the patient 
… to determine the direction which their interests lie‟, Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134,[14] (Lord Steyn), 
„Individuals have a right to make important medical decisions for themselves‟ and  Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 
205 CLR 434, 486 (Mason C.J., Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ), referred to the right to information 
and explained that it „arises from the patient‟s right to decide for himself or herself whether or not to submit to 
the medical treatment proposed.‟ 
11  The  description of  the  „backwards‟ enquiry  refers back  to  the  Introduction to Part II  of  this thesis and  a 
reference to Roger B. Dworkin, „Getting What We Should from Doctors: Rethinking Patient Autonomy and the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship‟ (2003) Health Matrix 235, 283. 
12 Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, (1972), 784 (Robinson J).  
13 Ibid, 779. 293 
autonomy and the definitive decision regarded ‘informed consent’ yet, the 
key  question  to  be  addressed  when  determining  how  best  to  protect  the 
individual is, according to Robinson J, whether or not the physician made a 
‘reasonable effort to convey sufficient information.’14 
 
The enquiry purports to have the autonomous patient at its centre, but the 
real focus is on another individual.  The discussion concerns what the doctor 
does and says with little, to no reference to the actual patient and their needs 
and  desires.    It  would  seem  that  autonomy  here  becomes  an  issue  of 
professionalism and professional standards as opposed to individual patient 
needs  and  decision-making  authority.    This  problem  becomes  even  more 
complex when the discussion moves on to the question of causation.  Then 
and  the  harm  suffered  (physical  injury)  is  disconnected  from  the  interest 
being protected (autonomy).15 
 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  there  has  been  a  rejection  of  the  language  of 
informed consent.  Duty of care is focussed entirely on the doctor and their 
professional standards which are, as outlined in Part I, set by professional 
peers.  The particular patient remains curiously absent from the duty and 
breach  stage  of  the  enquiry  and,  despite  some  limited  support  for  the 
approach taken in the United States,16 the focus here starts and ends with the 
doctor’s  professional  standard.  The  question  asked  is  ‘what  information 
would  a  responsible  body  of  peers  have  deemed  appropriate?’17  The  test 
applied is confined to a consideration of clinical judgment regarding what 
                                                 
14 Ibid, 779, fn.15. 
15 This issue was initially explored in Part II (Chapter 8, with respect to Canterbury) and elaborated on in Chapter 
11 where we explored the true nature of the loss sustained when insufficient information is provided.  
16 Refer  Lord Scarman in  Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital  & the Madusley 
Hospital & Ors [1984] QB 493 and discussion in Chapter 3 regarding Lord Scarman‟s judgment in Sidaway 
under the heading Developing the Bolam test: Sidaway: Judgment: House of Lords (at [3.60]). 
17 This is a simplified statement of the „Bolam test‟ which was taken from Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee (Bolam) [1957] 1 WLR 582, refer to Chapter 3 for detailed consideration of this test. 294 
ought  to  be  told  to  a  patient18  and  the  approach  continues  to  be  based 
paternalistically upon the view that the doctor really does know best with the 
prudent patient being a ‘rare bird.’19  
 
This  approach  did  not  sit  comfortably  with  all  of  the  Law  Lords, 
demonstrated  by  Lord  Scarman’s  strong  dissent  in  Sidaway  where  he 
emphasised that the doctor’s duty to inform arose from the patient’s rights.20  
Lord  Scarman  has  not  been  a  lone  voice  of  dissent:  close  reading  of 
subsequent decisions reveals a discomfort with the accepted approach.  There 
is  a  clear  and  firm  position  regarding  duty  and  breach  depending  upon 
professional standards, but the absence of consideration of patient rights at 
the initial stage of the enquiry has led to a belated introduction of those rights 
during the causation discussion.  This approach culminated in the curious 
conclusion of Chester v Afshar.21 As outlined in Chapter 6 (see [6.90]), the Law 
Lords in Chester felt constrained by the parameters of the ‘informed consent’ 
enquiry and succumbed to the temptation, acknowledged in other decisions, 
to  reach  conclusions  about  responsibility  based  upon  individual  views  of 
what ought to happen in the circumstances.22 
 
It is clear, therefore, that in the United Kingdom there is a struggle between 
strict application of principle at the duty-and-breach stage of the enquiry and 
the  considerations  of  the  needs  of  the  vulnerable  individual  patient  who 
makes  a  belated,  yet  significant,  entrance  at  the  causation  stage  of  the 
enquiry.23  The breach question is clearly driven by considerations of medical 
                                                 
18 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1984] QB 
493, 517 (Dunn LJ). 
19 Ibid, 513 (Donaldson LJ). 
20 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & Ors [1985] AC 
971, 881-882 (Scarman, LJ). 
21 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, discussed in detail in Chapter 6 (at [6.70]). 
22 A temptation discussed and acknowledged by Lord Nicholls in Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraq Airways Co [2002] 
3 All ER 209. 
23 This struggle is considered in Chapter 6. 295 
professionalism as determined by other members of the same profession.  It is 
a  potentially  biased  exploration  that  has  been  justifiably  criticised  by  the 
High Court in Australia.24  Nor does it sit comfortably with all of the Law 
Lords, and perhaps that is why, as outlined in Part II, the discussion becomes 
infused  with  individual  judges’  notions  of  justice  when  the  question  of 
causation  is  addressed.    In  Chester  v  Afshar  for  example,  autonomy  is 
highlighted by all of the Lords once they turn their attention to causation25 
and it becomes relevant that the plaintiff/patient can be described as ‘honest 
and  innocent.’26  Indeed,  in  an  attempt  to  balance  the  scales,  the  enquiry 
becomes focussed upon the question of ‘violated rights’ as opposed to the all-
important professionalism and behaviour of the doctor.27   
 
Whilst the autonomous individual is present in, and important to, the process 
of determining causation, we see that once again there is no attempt to define 
what or who constitutes an autonomous individual.  There is some progress 
made  when  Lord  Steyn  recognises  a  relationship  between  autonomy  and 
personal dignity.28  This does not, however, provide any real clarity as it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to build a logical bridge between a professional 
standard,  unrelated  to  individual  rights  and  the  very  personal  concept  of 
autonomy  as  reflected  in  personal  dignity,  which  is,  by  its  very  nature, 
individuals.  The result is an unwarranted leap across the gap between legal 
principle and individual rights to the conclusion that Ms Chester has suffered 
a wrong and therefore ought to recover.29  What is the rationale behind this 
conclusion?  It is to satisfy the essential purpose of the law, to right a wrong.30  
Such  a  leap  would  be  unnecessary  if  a  clear  and  defined  model  of  both 
                                                 
24 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 484-490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).  
25 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, Lord Bingham (in dissent)[5], Lord Hoffman (in dissent) [28], Lord Steyn 
[14] and [24], lord Hope [56] and Lord Walker [92]. 
26 Ibid, Lord Walker [101]. 
27 This is clearly outlined in Chapter 6, see Manipulating causation: Chester v Afshar (at [6.70]). 
28 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, Lord Steyn [24]. 
29 Ibid. Once again refer to the detailed discussion in Chapter 6. 
30 Ibid, [25] 296 
autonomy (as proposed in Chapter 10) and loss (the loss of a right to make a 
choice  based  upon  a  complete  map  of  paths  to  possible  future  selves,  as 
outlined in Chapter 11) were to be adopted.  
 
This conclusion is further supported by the approach adopted in Australia.  
The High Court begins the enquiry at a different place from the Courts in the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  The incongruity of applying a peer 
driven professional standards test was recognised by the Supreme Court of 
South Australia in FvR31 when King J suggested that practices adopted within 
a  profession  may  be  driven  primarily  by  the  needs  and  interests  of  the 
professionals  rather  than  those  of  the  individual  clients  (or  in  this 
circumstance, the patient).  In recognising this, His Honour called for judicial 
as opposed to peer scrutiny of acceptable practice.32 A shift in focus from the 
medical professional to the patient in determining what is appropriate would 
involve a clear rejection of the previously accepted Bolam principle, and this is 
precisely what occurred in Rogers v Whitaker. 33 As outlined in Chapter 4 (see 
[4.10], [4.20]), the High Court specifically rejected the Bolam test, describing it 
as ‘illogical.’34 
 
The foundational decision of Rogers v Whitaker was discussed in Chapter 4 
and it is from this decision that the materiality test emerged.  The focus of the 
judicial  enquiry  shifted  from  the  doctor  to  the  patient  and  whilst  it  may 
appear that individual rights moved to the heart of the enquiry, the reality is 
that this is not the case.  The test,35 is about materiality and what would be 
significant to the patient. Whilst it is a rights and interest based approach, the 
Court rejected the language of autonomy and informed consent, describing it 
                                                 
31 (1989) SASR 189. 
32 Ibid, 193-194. 
33 (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
34 Ibid, 489 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).  
35 Outlined in Chapter 4. 297 
as  ‘amorphous’  and  ‘apt  to  mislead.’36  Despite  the  clear  rejection  of 
autonomy, similar themes to those raised in the other jurisdictions emerged.  
The discussion turned on the concept of meaningful choice (a concept I argue 
is central to autonomy) and the judgment of the Court indicated that meaning 
would  grow  from  understanding  and  the  provision  of  appropriate 
information.  This information, described as material, is anything that would 
make a difference to that patient.  Thus, at the conclusion of Rogers v Whitaker 
the position  in  Australia  was rejection of the  established tests of both  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  (which  involved  a  focus  on 
professional  standards  as  defined  by  the  medical  profession  and  an 
embracing  of  the  language  of  autonomy).    The  preferred  approach  was 
described as removed from concepts of autonomy and self-determination but 
involved a patient-centred enquiry about what information was needed.  This 
of course raises the question, highlighted in Chapter 4 and explored in more 
detail  in  Chapter  10,  of  whether  the  rejection  of  autonomy  and  informed 
consent  in  Rogers  v  Whitaker  amounted  to  a  linguistic,  as  opposed  to  a 
practical distinction from the tests in the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America.  
 
The implications of employing the language of autonomy and creating a test 
based upon the so-called autonomous individual were clearly identified by 
the High Court and Rogers v Whitaker heralded an apparent retreat from the 
position adopted in other jurisdictions.  Despite the care taken to establish a 
unique test, removed from considerations of individual autonomy however, 
Rogers  v  Whitaker  has  perversely  come  to be  interpreted  and  applied  as  a 
decision about individual rights and practical application of the theories of 
                                                 
36 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 490 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 298 
autonomy.37  As we saw in Chapter 4, this subsequent interpretation of the 
decision in Rogers v Whitaker is not limited to inferior Courts.  Members of the 
High Court have described the rule regarding materiality as a recognition of 
individual  autonomy  and  as  an  Australian  adoption  of  the  Schloendorff 
principles.38 
 
The  concept of autonomy  was therefore  purportedly  rejected  by  the High 
Court.    This  apparent  rejection  was,  however,  relatively  short-lived  and 
autonomy has subsequently been accepted as a valid consideration by the 
High  Court.    Indeed,  the  autonomous  individual  sits  at  the  heart  of  the 
causation  enquiry  with  Australia  being  the  only  jurisdiction  of  the  three 
under consideration, to adopt a subjective test for causation.39 The underlying 
rationale of the subjective test is an acknowledgment that only the individual 
before the Court can truly say what would have been significant to them and 
what would have made a difference in their decision-making process.  As 
outlined in Chapter 7 however, it does not follow that the Courts accept the 
plaintiff’s assertion that they would not have proceeded with the course of 
treatment, merely because they say so (and indeed, in 4 jurisdictions plaintiff 
evidence to this effect is legislatively excluded). In short, the Court recognises 
the risk of 20-20 hindsight and treats the evidence, which they specifically 
seek,  with  a  level  of  scepticism  which  is  almost  contemptuous.40  Where 
permitted,  individual  evidence  is  invited  and  encouraged  and  then,  more 
often than not, rejected as being coloured by experience and hindsight. 
 
                                                 
37 D.Chalmers and R.Schwarz, „Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 and Informed Consent in Australia: A 
Fair Dinkum Duty of Disclosure‟ [1993] 1 Medical Law Review 139, 145.  See also the discussion in Chapter 4: 
The scholarly view of Rogers v Whitaker (at [4.70]ff), and specifically footnotes 62, and 65-74. 
38 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, 480 (Kirby J). 
39 For a detailed analysis of this refer Chapter 7. 
40 This is discussed in some detail in Chapter 7.  See also Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, [16] where 
Gleeson CJ refers to the „prism of hindsight‟ which alters the focus of the plaintiff and [156] where Kirby J 
noted the „inherent unreliability of self-serving testimony.‟ 299 
In Australia therefore the autonomous individual is evident at the edges of 
the breach enquiry but is central to discussions about causation.  In practical 
terms, as we saw in Chapter 7, the impact of the plaintiff’s evidence is often 
negligible.  This is mainly because the physical condition of the plaintiff, and 
their vulnerable status at the time of the decision-making,  means that  the 
Court is unable to conclude that they would have rejected the treatment.  It is 
only in the rarest of cases that a patient, like Mrs Whitaker, is able to satisfy 
the Courts that the material information would in fact have changed their 
treatment decision.  Once again therefore we have the extraordinary situation 
of  the  rights  which  attend  concepts  of  autonomy  being  subrogated  to 
considerations of external factors.   
 
A significant issue highlighted in this summary of the identified deficiences 
in  ‘informed  consent’  is  the  issue  of  causation.    Part  II  of  this  thesis 
highlighted the significant problems with the attempts by the Courts across 
all  three  jurisdiction  to  link  the  failure  to  inform  with  the  subsequent 
manifestation of a physical harm.  At the causation stage of the enquiry there 
is  a  clear  line  drawn  between  information  which  the  Court  recognises  as 
material  and  that  which  would  have  made  a  difference  to  the  decision-
making process.  Information which is clearly identified as significant to the 
patient (on either the subjective or objective test) will not always alter the 
treatment path.  Therefore, individuals who walk a particular treatment path 
on  the  basis  of  incomplete  advice  find  that  there  is  no  recognition  of  the 
impact that the denial of information can have.  The Courts are prepared to 
conclude that the information ought to have been more complete and that the 
patient  embarked  on  a  journey  for  which  they  were  ill-prepared  but  the 
enquiry stops there. The law links the lack of information to a completely 
unrelated physical outcome and, unsurprisingly finds (in most instances) that 
there is a lack of causative link.  This is described as unsurprising because 300 
there  can  be  no  causative  link  between  two  events  that  are  logically 
unrelated.  There is clearly a need to retreat from the doctrine of ‘informed 
consent’ and move towards a more meaningful approach that will bridge the 
gaps identified here. 
 
The way forward: Informed choice 
 
[12.40] The doctrine of informed consent is built on flawed foundations.  The 
doctrine in its current form is aimed at protecting the autonomous decision-
maker but fails to define autonomy.  The interest protected by the doctrine, 
that  is  the  individual  interest  in  making  choices,  does  not  factor  into  the 
enquiry.  And crucially, it entails the complex mixing of two quite distinct 
considerations:  negligence  (standard  of  care)  and  consent  (trespass).    This 
thesis  has  carefully  sifted  through  the  plethora  of  judicial  and  scholarly 
discussions regarding „informed consent‟ and has concluded that the ongoing 
debates regarding appropriate tests for standard and causation mask the true 
flaw in the doctrine.  An important conclusion is that despite the apparently 
divergent  paths  travelled  by  the  judiciary  in  the  three  jurisdictions  under 
consideration,  the  reality  is  that  all  three  usually  arrive  at  the  same 
destination which is, more often than not, denial of the plaintiff‟s claim.  A 
consistent  starting  point  in  all  three  jurisdictions  is  the  assertion  of  the 
individual right to information and it is this right that is then put to one side 
later in the negligence enquiry.  If there is to be a meaningful protection of the 
right to information this interest must be a primary consideration and the 
trespassory notion of consent must be put to one side in favour of choice. 
 
This  argument  intentionally  puts  the  issue  of  damages  to  one  side.  As 
indicated in earlier discussions (both in the introduction and in Chapter 11), 
this discussion stops at the boundary of identifying a loss.  Issues regarding 
damages and the appropriate measure of damages are beyond the scope of 
this thesis and would be determined by the Courts. Specific consideration of 301 
autonomy is, however, essential.  To give true meaning to „informed choice‟ 
however we must begin from a clear, purposive definition of autonomy.  The 
model most consistent with the ideal of choice is that of narrative autonomy.  
Here  we  could  see  the  self-authoring  individual  empowered  through  the 
provision of appropriate knowledge to choose between possible future selves 
in a meaningful way.  Whilst the journey of this thesis has been a long and 
involved one it is ending at a point first introduced by the High Court (and 
then largely ignored) in the key decision of Rogers v Whitaker.  The proposed 
model  would  represent  a  shift  away  from  the  „meaningless  choice‟  that  a 
patient makes when material information is withheld.41  A legal model based 
upon  narrative  autonomy  and  choice  would  result  in  a  meaningful 
consideration of pre-treatment advice: informed choice. 
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